Arms Control & Disarmament

A QUARTERLY BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ABSTRACTS AND ANNOTATIONS



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A QUARTERLY BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ABSTRACTS AND ANNOTATIONS

Prepared by the
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PREFACE

Arms Control & Disarmament attempts to bring under bibliographic control a large and growing body of literature in an important subject area. It is prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section of the Library of Congress, through the support of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Each quarterly issue contains abstracts and annotations of current literature in the English, French, German, and Russian languages, as well as abstracts and annotations of current literature in all languages published in English translation. Author and subject indexes appear in the first three numbers of each volume, with the fourth number containing cumulative author and subject indexes.

To facilitate the use of this bibliography the title of each foreign language entry is preceded by its English translation in brackets. Titles in the Cyrillic alphabet are transliterated according to the Library of Congress system, but with ligatures omitted. For the convenience of readers in the Library of Congress, call numbers are given for all cataloged and classified materials. Uncataloged and unclassified materials are designated by symbols indicating the custodial divisions of the Library in which they can be found. A list of these symbols appears on the next page.

Matters of fact and opinion presented in *Arms Control & Disarmament* are solely the responsibility of the authors of the items abstracted, and their inclusion does not constitute endorsement by either the Library of Congress or the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Information about the periodicals cited can in most instances be obtained readily from standard reference works.

The bibliography is compiled from a survey of the literature received by the Library of Congress that is likely to be available in the larger research and public libraries in the United States. Sources surveyed include trade books, monographs, selected government publications, publications of national and international organizations and societies, and approximately 1,700 periodicals. With the exception of materials delayed in arriving at the Library, the literature cited has usually been published in the 3 months preceding the month in which a number is sent to press. Entries are chosen under the assumption that arms control and disarmament is a subject area encompassing related topics such as weapons development and basic factors in world politics. The coverage is not exhaustive, however. It excludes articles in newspapers and the reporting of day-to-day events in newsmagazines.

The abstracts are written by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section, except that abstracts or summaries published with the articles to which they relate may be used verbatim or in a modified form; they are designated "author's abstract," "author's summary," etc.

Library of Congress Location Symbols

(Uncataloged and Unclassified Materials)

Chi Kor	Chinese and Korean Section
LL	Law Library
Newsp	Newspaper Reading Room
P&GP RR	Periodical and Government Publication Reading Room
Sci RR	Science Reading Room
Slav Rm	Slavic Room

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I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

A. BASIC FACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS

1
Archibald, Kathleen, ed. STRATEGIC INTERACTION AND CONFLICT: ORIGINAL PAPERS AND DISCUSSION, by Morton Deutsch [and others] Berkeley [Calif.] Institute of International Studies, University of California [c1966] 227 p.
JX1291. A7

Papers from a conference "held under the auspices of the International Security Program of the Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley."

Partial contents.--Some social-science implications of a new approach to game theory, by John C. Harsanyi.--Bargaining, threat, and communication: some experimental studies, by Morton Deutsch.--A classroom study of the dilemmas in interpersonal negotiations, by Harold H. Kelley.--Uncertainty, brinksmanship, and the game of "chicken," by Thomas C. Schelling.--Strategic and non-strategic approaches to problems of security and peace, by Anatol Rapoport.

Focuses on the area of strategic interaction--"analyses of conflict that utilize a game-theoretical or bargaining perspective." Formal discussions were confined to analytical problems in the theory of conflict, avoiding whenever possible policy problems involving international security. The topics considered included the concept of rationality, the vocabulary of basic moves, the structural properties of the actor, types of conflict and settlement procedures, and communication and enforcement systems.

2
Barnett, S. A. IS THERE A HUMAN "AGGRESSIVE INSTINCT"? New scientist, v. 3, May 26, 1966: 536-539. Q1. N52, v. 3

War, riot, murder, and mayhem in the human community have no counterparts in the animal world. Hostility within species exists but is usually confined to formal and symbolic encounters between individuals, with serious wounding rare and death almost unknown. Status systems obviate violence within groups, but different packs, herds, etc. often clash over territorial instinct, which is exhibited by most of the larger land animals (particularly birds) and which tends to space out population densities. That animals behave so well does not, unfortunately, provide a lesson for man. Animals' "civilized" actions are based not on a system of morality, which is unique to man, but on standardized signals and responses. Animal aggression does vary, and experiments have been conducted to pinpoint the factors involved in provoking and maintaining aggressive behavior. Human behavior is apparently regulated by far different factors, and may go so far as to cause "the breakdown of social order." Despite the scope of his aggression, man does not necessarily possess a fixed aggressive instinct. Indeed "it is often gratifyingly difficult to instil martial 'virtues' in an ordinary person." Parental love or the lack thereof appears to contribute in large measure to the regulation of human aggressive behavior. The crowding of populations, as in the cities of today, may also stimulate human violence, perhaps as a hangover of some ancestral territorial behavior. In any case, although animal studies may be revealing in light of the instinctual components of human activities, we must in the end base our decisions on awareness not of other species but of ourselves. We are responsible for our actions.

3
Beer, Stafford. AN OPERATIONAL RESEARCH APPROACH TO THE NATURE OF CONFLICT. Political studies, v. 14, June 1956: 119-132.
JA1. P63, v. 14

Paper presented "at a Study Conference on the Contributions of Science to the Resolution of International Conflict, held at Cumberland Lodge, Windsor Great Park, 28 June-1 July, 1963."

A British management specialist's approach to the use of operational research, specifically the game model, in studying international politics and conflict.

4
Bergstraesser, Arnold. [POWER AS A MYTH AND AS A REALITY: AN INVESTIGATION] Die Macht als Mythos und als Wirklichkeit; eine Untersuchung. Freiburg, Rombach [1965]
HM201. B424, 1965

Bibliography: p. 187-190.

Contents.--Power--the word and the problem.--Culture and power in the history of mankind: Jacob Burckhardt.--Power and modern democracy: Alexis de Tocqueville.--Power and revolution: Karl Marx and Georges Sorel.--The power of the systems: Max Weber.--Leadership systems and the access to power: Vilfredo Pareto and Alfred Weber.--The power of states.--The power of people.

An inquiry into the meaning, forms, and manifestations of social power from the historical, sociological, economic, and political viewpoints. After analyzing relevant work of philosophers, historians, etc., Bergstraesser sets forth the concept of curbing the power of individuals and social groups, including states, to stage wars. He considers this to be by no means utopian, as it would have been before the advent of nuclear arms, but a realizable necessity for the modern age. Men can just as well employ social political power for consolidation as for disintegration and thus construct genuine world peace.

5
Bolkhovitinov, N. N. [THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RUSSO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1775-1815] Stanovlenie russko-amerikanskikh otnoshenii, 1775-1815.

Akademiia nauk SSSR institut istorii. Moskva, Nauka, 1966. 640 p. E183.8.R9B6

Asserting that relations between the Soviet Union and the United States attract universal attention today, presents a documented account of the opening and development of diplomatic, trade, and social-political relations between the young American republic and the feudal Russian empire. The author concludes that over the last two centuries, including the examined period of 1775-1815, one can find in Russo-American relations many instances of controversial questions, opposition, and even conflict, the resolution of which indubitably was made more difficult by the difference in their social-political systems. To ignore class contradictions, to write of the existence of "sincere" and "forgotten" friendships of czars and presidents, as some present day authors with monarchist sympathies occasionally do, is as incorrect as to propagandize the thesis of "agelong enmity." "If one speaks of the main lesson to be learned from Russo-American relations, then it consists not at all in the absence of disagreements and conflicts but in that the experience of history evidences the possibility of overcoming these, not with the aid of weapons but by peaceful means, by negotiations. That is the way it was in the past and one wishes to believe that it will be thus in the future."

6
Coplin, William D. INTER-NATION SIMULATION AND CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. American political science review, v. 60, Sept. 1966: 562-578.
JA1.A6, v. 60

Developed by Harold Guetzkow and others at Northwestern University, Inter-Nation Simulation [INS] as a research tool focuses on the patterns of international interaction and assumes that a science of international politics is best built on the framework of the international system. In INS decisionmakers have at their disposal most of the means available in the referent world, such as warfare, negotiation, and trade. The simulated international system combines formal and informal patterns of behavior, in the manner of any social system. As a theory-building exercise INS affords the medium through which existing verbal theories, such as those of Hans Morgenthau, can be made more explicit and coherent. As compared to verbal theorizing this explicitness identifies theoretical questions more clearly, helps to classify the positions of theorists, and sometimes raises questions not raised by them. Certain weaknesses in INS, for example neglect of nonmilitary pressures on decisionmakers, could permanently limit the utility of the model but need not, because they are not inherent in the technique. INS can never substitute for the real world, but at the very least it can force discipline on what has been a discouragingly inexplicit field of study.

7
Council of Europe. Council for Cultural Co-operation. BOOKS DEALING WITH EUROPE: BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR TEACHERS. Strasbourg, 1965. 67 p.
Z2000.C63

Briefly describes books and pamphlets dealing with European geography, history, philosophy, culture, integration, education, civics teaching, textbooks, and relations with the rest of the world.

8
THE EUROPEAN AND ATLANTIC COMMUNITIES: A GUIDE TO SOURCE MATERIALS AND TEACHING AIDS. Exeter (Devon) European Atlantic Movement, 1965. 48 p. D845.E8

Materials selected "to meet the needs of the relative newcomer to the field of European and Atlantic studies." Serials and monographs, maps and charts, and films and filmstrips are cited and described, and assistance available to scholars, such as fellowships, conferences, and tours, are listed.

9
Fetscher, Iring. [THE PROTECTION OF PEACE: A PROBLEM OF POLITICAL THEORY] Die Sicherung des Friedens. Ein Problem der politischen Theorie. Merkur, deutsche Zeitschrift für europäische Denken, v. 20, July 1966: 611-630.
AP30.M43, v. 20

Analyzes political theories of securing permanent world peace: the world state theory, the balance of power, free trade, the Democratic theory, the Socialist and the psychoanalytical. Fetscher feels that none of them offers a viable solution to the problem. The only hope, lies in fostering democracy and reducing contrasts and tensions within and between the nations -- all this "under the protection of the balance of deterrence."

10
Frank, Jerome D. HOW NATIONS SEE EACH OTHER. War/peace report, v. 6, June/July 1966: 3-8.
P&GP RR

The possibility of total annihilation in nuclear war has made it imperative that nations explore all fields of knowledge that might assist them in devising new ways to deal with one another. The striking similarity between the behavior of nations and individuals indicates that the study of human nature may be such a field. Both an individual's and a nation's beliefs and expectations largely determine how he thinks and behaves. When nations are in conflict, their images of one another are shaped by their expectations. For example each sees itself as peaceloving and the adversary as aggressive. This view, that the other nation's acts always have hostile or aggressive motives, can create a self-fulfilling prohecy. The classic example of this in international relations is the arms race, where each opponent, anticipating attack by the other, may do things that make his expectations come true. When nations are heavily armed and mutually fearful the slightest incident can spiral into conflict leading to war. This image of the enemy as evil acts to block acceptance of his conciliatory moves or friendly gestures. A shared ideology--democracy, communism, a religious belief--is a psychologically crucial part of a group, linking the individual members and giving meaning to their lives. Existence of a group with differing beliefs creates anxiety because it implies that one's own ideology may be wrong. The sense of threat is intensified if the rival ideology attempts to win converts. People fighting a war which has assumed an ideological character, as the Vietnam War has, can seldom be forced into surrender by punishment. "To suffer and die for a holy cause is highly virtuous, and one hopes through example to convert others by one's own sacrifice." Psychology offers some lessons in establishing communication with an antagonistic or suspicious counterpart. First a nation must examine

its own image of the enemy to be sure it is not misjudging his intentions. It must show a persistent willingness to listen and refuse to be discouraged by rebuffs. The nation must defend itself against physical attack but ignore verbal abuse. Demonstration that important national policymakers and segments of the public are actively trying to understand an adversary view of the world and searching for ways to improve relations might be a better way of relieving the fears of the public than attempts to reassure them directly.

11
Frank, Jerome D. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NONVIOLENCE. Gandhi marg 39, v. 10, July 1966: 176-183. DS481.G3G22, v. 10

"Mankind's readiness to resort to violence is its greatest curse." Invention of enormously destructive weapons must eventually force nations to rely for survival on new forms of power, particularly the nonviolent group methods of conflict which have recently emerged in India and the United States. Realization of both the limitations and achievements of nonviolent tactics and campaigns thus becomes important. One limitation of nonviolence is that so far it has been based on a religious philosophy preaching the ultimate supremacy of love and the redemptive power of suffering. Obviously this philosophy cannot be accepted by everyone. Secondly, can nonviolent campaigns be adhered to only where the group knows it cannot win by violent means, or employed also where violence too may succeed? A third limitation is that nonviolent methods to date have been used only where opponents are in continual face-to-face contact, not in disputes between nations where populations have no direct contact. A fourth limitation concerns the strength of a group's commitment to nonviolence under prolonged exposure to threats and humiliations. Finally, one cannot fail to see that all nonviolent campaigns up to now have been waged with the threat of violence lurking in the wings. On the other hand nonviolence has had many positive achievements. Most significant is demonstration that nonviolent tactics can succeed against an adversary who possesses superior means of violence and is prepared to use them. A second achievement is that nonviolent campaigns have altered the relationship between violence and masculine courage. Teaching children to glorify war and military heroes and exposing them to violence in mass communications threatens this achievement and must be stopped. At the international level man must strive for a sense of world community and common humanity, thereby combatting the dehumanization of one's opponent apparently prerequisite to undertaking his destruction. Finally, he must encourage those trying to solve social conflicts in nonviolent ways and look for ways to further develop these tactics.

12
Häntschel, Anton. [WORLD EVENTS AT THE DOOR OF THE ARCTIC SEA: SPITSBERGEN IN WORLD POLITICS] Weltgeschehen am Rande des Polarmeeres; Spitzbergen in der Weltpolitik. Würzburg, Marienburg-Verlag [1964] 204 p. G780.H3
Bibliography: p. 201-202.

Contents.--The Far North's bone of contention.--Archipelago falls into the field of vision of the European seapowers.--Diplomatic confusion about "the coal bin of the Arctic."--From the Christiania Conference to the Treaty of Sèvres.--Arctic land in the field of tensions between East and West.--Chronology.

A history of Spitsbergen from the 12th century to date from the viewpoint of the archipelago's role in the European balance of power.

13
Harlech, David Ormsby-Gore, baron. MUST THE WEST DECLINE? New York, Columbia University Press, 1966. 65 p. CB245.H29

A series of lectures assessing the strengths and failings of Western civilization and the causes of decline in civilizations generally. Lord Harlech concludes that the West will not fail through lack of resources, but may do so as a result of "foolish" policies. "The goal of a real Atlantic Community seems to me a noble one. If we can achieve it, Western civilization will present to the entire world a society that is both materially and spiritually more satisfying to men and women than anything the doctrines of Karl Marx and his disciples can fashion. But if we aim at no such goal and allow ourselves to be dragged back slowly but surely into the jungle of competitive nationalism, then I see a bleak future for our civilization."

14
HOW THE GREAT MINDS OF TODAY SEE THE WORLD OF TOMORROW. Réalités [English ed.] no. 191, Oct. 1966: 52-57. AP4.R2164, 1966

Answers to a questionnaire completed by 25 Nobel Prize winners and "by twenty-five leading figures including British historian Arnold Toynbee, Spanish author Salvador de Madariaga, and the Dalai Lama." Among the subjects covered are the possibility of partial or total disarmament, the inevitability of war, the limitations of scientific research, the importance of determinism, and the choice between slavery and total destruction.

15
Kelman, Herbert C., ed. INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR: A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston [1965] 626 p. JX1255.K47
"Published for the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues."
Includes bibliographies.

Studies "social-psychological variables involved in international interactions--real or symbolic, among members of various elites or of the populations at large." Rather than concerning themselves with psychological research relevant to war and peace the authors of the 16 chapters concentrate on international behavior.

16
Marmor, Judd. NATIONALISM, INTERNATIONALISM, AND EMOTIONAL MATURITY. International journal of social psychiatry, v. 12, summer 1966: 217-220. RC321.I58, v. 12
"Presented at the Joint Meeting of the American Psychiatric Association and the Mexican Society of Neurology and Psychiatry, Mexico City, May 11-14, 1964."

Nationalism as an attitude has been almost sanctified, to the point at which even questioning it brings forth

accusations of treason. Love of country is of course normal. The symbols and objects with which humans are brought up always retain a special significance. They are "favorably and indelibly inscribed in our unconscious. Such deep-seated symbolic images are particularly susceptible to the appeal of emotional slogans, and anything which threatens them can arouse violent defensive reactions." The act of growing up, however, enables people to form object-relationships that go beyond early experience. This is as true in patterns of social behavior as it is in "individual interpersonal relationships." Thus the emotionally immature person continues to identify with his family, his home town, his alma mater, his state. Likewise he remains "tied to a parochial kind of nationalism which tends to distrust all 'foreigners,' and to perceive all actions of one's own government in self-righteous terms." The superpatriot generally has had a disturbed childhood. The more emotionally mature the individual, the more he has resolved his Oedipal conflicts, and the less he needs to identify with others just like himself. At the highest stage of emotional development, ethnocentrism is ruled out. This is not to say that all internationalism stems from emotional maturity; it can be neurotically motivated also. Nor does it mean that mature internationalism precludes the love of country. One does not love his family less because he loves his country more, nor his country less because he loves the world. The development of such a worldview is increasingly important if man is to survive the atomic age.

17

Mnatsakanian, M. O. [THE NATION AND NATIONAL STATEHOOD] Natziia i natzional'naia gozudarstvennost'. Voprosy istorii, v. 41, Sept. 1966: 27-36.
D1.V6, v. 41

The article analyzes the role and significance of the factor of statehood in the life of different nations. Research in the problem of the rise and development of nations, the emergence and spread of national movements in conditions of capitalism, a close analysis of the process of the flourishing of nations and their mutual rapprochement in conditions of socialism, as well as of the process of formation of new, young nations within the bounds of their national statehood, enable the author to draw the conclusion that the community of the state system constitutes one of the most essential characteristics of a nation. The author's conclusion is based on the well-known theoretical propositions of Marx and Engels, who regarded a national state as an indication immanent in the nature of national community, as well as on Lenin's idea that in the period of capitalism a national state should be regarded as a natural and typical phenomenon in the life not only of European nations but of the whole civilized world. The author brings up for discussion the general definition of the concept of nation and, specifically, of a socialist nation. (Abstract supplied)

18

Moore, Barrington. WHY WE FEAR PEASANTS IN REVOLT. Nation, v. 203, Sept. 26, 1966: 271-274.
AP2.N2, v. 203

The United States stands today as the military bastion of counterrevolution, willing and able to rain fire upon people made impatient by hunger. The key to this situation is the great wave of peasant revolutions that has swept over the world in the last 50 years as part of the still greater sweep of post-capitalist industrialization and the American decision to resist this trend by might. Political landlordism comprises the main propelling force behind modern peasant revolutions. Yet this force has produced major upheavals only in Russia and China. Since good grounds exist for believing that the wave has already peaked, why does the United States persist in trying to "burn these revolutionary movements off the face of the earth?" Because such movements, along with Chinese power, pose a major threat to American capitalism, the Administration and its radical critics answer. A second possible explanation suggests that American policy is monstrously irrational, while a third holds that contingent and accidental factors largely explain American actions. No clear-cut choice among these interpretations appears possible. Even so it is probably correct to maintain that the conflict between capitalist and Socialist states, which may be looked upon as the modern manifestation of the age-old system of competing sovereign states, has been the basic deformer of both socialism and liberal democracy. At present Soviet-American rivalry is ceasing to be the primary axis of world politics. Chiefly as a result of U.S. policy the international stage is being set for conflict between those states that have achieved industrial civilization and those that seek it by revolutionary methods.

19

THE RANGE OF HUMAN CONFLICT: A SYMPOSIUM. In Menninger Clinic, Topeka, Kan. Bulletin, v. 30, Sept. 1966: 265-314. RC321.M4, v. 30

"Papers presented at a session of the 1965 annual meeting of the American Psychiatric Association."

Contents.--Introduction, by Lester Grinspoon and Roy W. Menninger.--Conflict and violence, by Robert Waelder.--The reaches of intrapsychic conflict, by Jacob A. Arlow.--Experiments in dyadic conflict and cooperation, by Anatol Rapoport.--Some determinants of international conflict, by Lewis A. Coser.--Decision-making in conflict, by J. David Singer and Paul Ray.--Summary, by Kenneth E. Boulding.

Seeks to relate intrapsychic and interpersonal conflict to "the far larger scale of international conflict which leads to war." Waelder's thesis is that issues involving self-preservation, narcissism, and moral principles are not negotiable and have a high potential of violence. Arlow traces the conflicts generated within an individual and attempts to relate this process to group conflict. Rapoport relates experiments simulating two-person conflict based on the "prisoners' dilemma" paradox and criticizes too great a reliance on strategic-military games. Coser disputes Waelder's explanations of war, suggesting instead that "a full appreciation of the sources of international conflict requires us to distinguish motivational and psychological elements from the objective issues over which conflicts are waged." Decisionmaking in the conflict setting is examined from a psychological point of view in Singer and Ray's contribution. Finally Kenneth E. Boulding summarizes in extemporaneous verse the proceedings of the session.

20

Rosecrance, R. N. BIPOLARITY, MULTIPOLARITY, AND THE FUTURE. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 10, Sept. 1966: 314-327.
JX1901.J6, v. 10

In the modern world bipolarity has been said to reduce international violence. The following reasons

are advanced for this phenomenon: Competition between the two major powers is intense and falls into all spheres of endeavor; thus it keeps the international system on an even keel. Recurrent crises teach the antagonists the responsible management of conflict. Finally, the preponderance of power residing in the two major nations greatly diminishes the significance of shifts in the power balance caused by other nations. Bipolarity may well reduce the possibilities for expansion; it does not, however, alleviate the motivations causing expansionism. Moreover to argue that a shift of allegiance by one bloc member has little effect on the international balance implies that the system is not actually bipolar, since in a truly bipolar system one power's gain is the other's loss. And "peace by crisis" is scarcely a desirable way to ensure the survival of humanity. Multipolarity also has its proponents, those who argue that it offers a "greater number of interaction opportunities"; that it diminishes the attention paid by one state to the others; and that it tends to dampen arms races. But multipolarity too has its disadvantages. Although the significance of international conflicts would be reduced in a multipolar world, they would certainly occur with greater frequency. If nuclear weapons were widely disseminated in such an environment the consequences would be disastrous. Worse still, the argument that states would pay less attention to one another simply does not hold water. Truly desirable for the world would be a combination of the best features of both bi- and multipolarity. Such a system, "bi-multipolarity," would include both a U.S.-Soviet détente and a curb on nuclear proliferation. The architects of this system would "seek to avoid the extremes of either parent form." National interests would be partly consonant and partly dissonant; altering the power balance would be significantly more difficult yet less important; policymaking would be more difficult than in a bipolar world yet less chaotic than in a multipolar environment; the probability and consequences of overt conflict would fall between the two extremes; and the incentives toward, and the results of, nuclear dissemination would likewise be intermediate. The present international scene to some degree resembles bi-multipolarity but is not identical to it. In a bipolar-multipolar world final equilibrium might eventually be achieved.

21

Rummel, Rudolph J. SOME DIMENSIONS IN THE FOREIGN BEHAVIOR OF NATIONS. Journal of peace research, no. 3, 1966: 201-224. graph, tables.
AS9.J6, 1966

A factor analysis and orthogonal rotation has been carried out on data for the mid-1950's for 94 variables and 82 nations. The results can be put in several propositions: 1. Many activities of nations are highly correlated with each other and can be structured meaningfully in terms of several independent (uncorrelated) dimensions. 2. Many diverse international activities of nations form independent patterns of relationships that can be identified as participation, conflict, aid, ideology, popularity, South American, and migration dimensions. 3. Basic indicators that index some of the independent clusters of relationships among the many diverse activities of nations are trade, threats, technical assistance and relief fellowships received, net percent UN votes for the US, ratio of visitors to population, air distance from the US, and ratio of immigrants to population. 4. The magnitude of participation by a nation in the international system is a result of its economic development and power capability. Its conflict behavior is a phenomenon dependent on its relation to other nations. (Author's summary)

22

Seabury, Paul. BALANCE OF POWER. San Francisco, Chandler Publishing Co. [1965] 219 p.
JX1318.S4

Partial contents.--The idea of balance in classical thought.--The balance of power as a system.--Perceiving and redressing an imbalance of power.--Justifying and rejecting the balance of power.--The balance of power after World War II.--The status quo and the balance.

Selections by authors ranging from Aristotle and David Hume to Woodrow Wilson and Andrei Zhdanov. They have been chosen "not to present a comprehensive collection of classical writings about the Balance of Power, but rather to present the reader with a spectrum of important views about the nature of that balance, and about how, at various times, it has been seen to work or not to work."

23

Sharp, Gene. GANDHI'S DEFENCE POLICY. Gandhi marg 39, v. 10, July 1966: 184-195.
DS481.G3G22, v. 10

Examines in some detail Gandhi's view that "violence was better than cowardice, submission and impotence in face of violence and political evil," emphasizing that he also viewed undue resort to violence as a sign of weakness. He felt nonviolence was "a weapon of the strong," and a better way of resolving conflicts for those who have the will. Concerning the problem of military defense, Gandhi claimed that "arms were a symbol of helplessness, not of strength," and that military spirit is incompatible with democracy, and significantly interrelated with totalitarianism. If India enters the armaments race, the last hope of the world for nonviolence will be gone.

24

Strzetelski, Stanisław. THE CRITICAL DECADE, 1965-1975. Polish review, v. 11, spring 1966: 65-81.
DK401.P825, v. 11

As of the present, the entire structure of international life that was developed in the postwar period is either crumbling or in ruins; this applies to both the Western democracies and the Communist camp. Still more serious shocks and tragedies are likely to overcome the world as soon as weapons of ultimate destruction have come into the hands of an unlimited number of states. This new destructive power, combined with equally new and irrational uncurbed forces of overpopulation, starvation, and racial, religious, and national fanaticism, poses a terrific threat to the world. All these forces are currently being held in check by what Churchill called the "balance of terror," which results from the atomic duopoly of the United States and the Soviet Union. If the world wants to replace this balance by one based on international law and order before China explodes its first hydrogen bomb, it must be done in the forthcoming decade. Since present international institutions seem incapable of coping with the situation, there is no alternative but to rely on the balance that rests on the nuclear armories of the two superpowers and hope that it "may gradually evolve into some sort of agreement and cooperation,

first in disarmament negotiations and later in joint action in the United Nations." Prerequisites to such cooperation can be found in the common interests of the superpowers. Both want to hold their duopoly intact, and neither desires any enlargement of the "atomic club"; both have the same enemy in Red China; and both believe in a potential "coexistentialist evolution." If they can agree on nuclear disarmament, a step toward general disarmament might be taken. Then the United Nations could be reactivated as an instrument to struggle against war and alleviate overpopulation, famine, and lack of education. A moral awakening and the use of foreign aid for achieving international goals could be instrumental in the process, with the United States helping not only the Third World but also Russia in technological development. Finally a stabilized Europe, including a peaceful Germany reunited within its present boundaries, could contribute its cultural values to life in a new era, in which nations, rich and poor, will be inextricably intertwined.

25
Taylor, A. J. P. PEACE COMES OF AGE. New York times magazine, Aug. 14, 1966: 14-15, 64, 66, 68, 72.
AP2. N6575, 1966

Twenty-one years after the First World War the Second had been running for over 2 months. Today, 21 years after the surrender of Japan in Tokyo Bay, the world is still without a world war, and there is none in immediate sight. One cannot attribute this difference merely to nuclear weapons and the fear of their use. While the destructiveness of nuclear weapons has hopefully made nuclear war impossible, it has at the same time made nonnuclear war more likely. The dissimilarity is likewise not attributable to superior leadership, as the world today is run by "very ordinary men." One major factor maintaining peace is the unparalelled economic prosperity which has followed the Second World War. This economic stability is probably the cause of another difference, the absence of any serious Fascist movements or governments. The principal reason why today's small wars have not escalated into great ones is "the old prosaic factor of the balance of power." Victory in the interwar period looked easy to potential aggressors because the great powers had withdrawn into isolation. The decisive transformation since 1945 has been wrought by the emergence of the United States as a world leader prepared to accept the responsibilities of its power. America is the only power that can maintain the peace of the world and the only power that can cause a great war. "The peace of the world depends on American strength and, still more, on American restraint."

26
Toncic-Sorinj, Lujo. [PROTECTION OF THE SMALL IN THE WORLD OF THE LARGE] Der Schutz der Kleinen in der Welt der Grossen. Aussenpolitik, v. 17, Oct. 1966: 592-598. D839. A885, v. 17

Historically the small states have secured their existence either through protection by a great power or through a multilateral balance of power. In the current century the League of Nations and the United Nations wanted to offer states, particularly the small ones, a new form of security. Dr. Lujo Toncic-Sorinj, the Foreign Affairs Minister of the Austrian Federal Republic, thinks that these two attempts have proved unavailing and holds out for a natural return to the institutions of classical policy. He therefore calls the neutrality of a small state that is ready to help itself its only real chance, and he leaves the small states of Asia to adopt that concept, because through its realization the power equilibrium among big states would be established. (Translation of supplied abstract).

27
U.S. Dept. of the Army. MIDDLE EAST: TRICONTINENTAL HUB; A STRATEGIC SURVEY. Washington [for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1965. 167 p. maps.
DS44. U56
"Department of the Army pamphlet no. 550-2."

An annotated bibliographical survey of publications received by the Army Library which deal with the Middle East from the military, political, economic, and sociological viewpoints. Within this framework the individual countries covered include: Aden and Protectorate of South Arabia, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Muscat, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Trucial Coast Sheikhdoms, Turkey, the United Arab Republic, and Yemen. Cyprus is included in an appendix because of the politico-military problems which involve Turkey with this island. The bibliography aims primarily at persons charged with planning and implementing policy; it was prepared at the request of the Director of Coordination and Analysis, Office, Chief of Staff, Department of the Army.

28
Vyas, Ramnarayan. PEACE, PHILOSOPHY AND PROGRESS. Jullundur City, Sterling publishers, 1966. 117 p. JX1952. V9

Contents. --One world. --Why the state came into being. --Is peace natural? --India & the peace ideal. --Peace and the West. --Epilogue.

Expounds on the idea of, and mankind's need for, peace. The author sees the pursuit of peace as intrinsic in human nature. However that pursuit must be awakened anew due to a partial loss by modern man of his "heritage of rationality" and to the advent of the nuclear age. Vyas outlines the cultural background of Indian pacifism; discusses the contributions made by Mohandas K. Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Vinoba Bhave, and Sir Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan to the cause of peace and universal brotherhood; and reviews Western peace ideals, especially those of Aristotle, Spinoza, Voltaire, Rousseau, Kant, Thoreau, Hegel, Marx, Thomas Hill Green, and Bertrand Russell. The author sees no basic difference between Western and Indian attitudes toward peace, only a difference in their approach to the problem. He rejects "Darwinian justification of war and violence" (in the animal world) on the grounds it has been scientifically disproved (e.g., by Petr Alekseevich Kropotkin and Lloyd Morgan) and asserts that "man is not meant to be a sheer animal." The author advocates creation of a World Federation of nations responsible for securing world peace, and also limitation of national sovereignty with regard to decisionmaking in matter of war and peace.

29
Ways, Max. EUROPE'S NEW NATIONALISM. Fortune, v. 74, Sept. 1966: 109-110, 230-248.
HF5001. F1, v. 74

To the American public, Charles de Gaulle often stands as the symbol of a selfish and shortsighted

nationalism that is obstructing enlightened efforts to achieve closer European integration. A closer look at the social and economic forces shaping European politics--east and west--reveals that a new nationalism is emerging on both sides of the iron curtain, a nationalism that is not incompatible with a high degree of international cooperation. For the West, this presents a challenging opportunity to construct a progressive order among strong, independent nations. The "new" nationalism, unlike the divisive and destructive brand of prewar nationalism, is not concerned with Lebensraum and captive markets. It looks not to aggressive horizontal expansion, but to vertical growth through the limitless space of technological progress. The Europe of 1966 is the Europe of the "salaried man," whose economic environment is one of interdependence and cooperation; as he is part of a team, the salaried man expects his nation to be part of a team of nations. Twentieth-century Americans should have no trouble understanding the "new" nationalism; they invented it. Yet understand it they must if the U.S. is to adjust its policies on the North Atlantic Treaty, Eastern Europe, and German unification to the changing political atmosphere. (Abstract supplied)

30
Windass, Stanley. TWO MEANINGS OF VIOLENCE. New Blackfriars, v. 47, Sept. 1966: 647-657.
BX801. N35, v. 47

Great power possession of nuclear weapons that can cause unacceptable destruction constitutes a deterrent against the use of these weapons, and also against aggression generally. Broadly speaking there are two possible ways of approaching this "nuclear balance": as the "culminating expression of the evil and aggressive nature of man . . . threatening the whole human race with annihilation--which would serve them right"; or as a system involving a kind of tacit cooperation in which hostile groups neutralize each others' capacity for violence and fashion a kind of uneasy peace out of the materials of war. Both interpretations express important aspects of the truth. The proposed nonproliferation agreement is an attempt to institutionalize to a small extent the nonviolent meaning of violence. Man must recognize that the new meaning will grow not by rejection and condemnation of the old, but by its development and modification. The outright condemnation of violence is itself a kind of violence, an unwillingness or inability to understand and forgive. Although some nations may be threatened by hostile and aggressive powers, to what extent have their own expectations contributed to the establishment of this situation? A more positive approach to the problem of war starts by taking seriously the positive values asserted in international conflict, which often, because of the defects of international organization, can be resolved only in this way. Equally important is comprehension of the underlying sociological causes of the conflict, which may or may not be closely related to the explicit motivation. Control of violence in the macrocosm of international politics has its counterpart in the microcosm of man and is related to the problems man faces in every aspect of life.

31
Zamkovoi, V. I. [CRITICISM OF THE BOURGEOIS THEORIES ON THE INEVITABILITY OF A NEW WORLD WAR] Kritika burzhuaznykh teorii neizbezhnosti novoi mirovoi voiny. Moskva, Izdatel'stvo Mysl', 1965. 208 p. U21.2.Z3

Contents. --War as a social-historical phenomenon. --The peculiarities of nuclear-missile war. --Denial of the possibility of peaceful coexistence, the means of justifying the inevitability of a new world war. --Is war inevitably "characteristic of human nature?" -- The insubstantiality of attempts to excuse the inevitability of aggressive wars as a weapon of nationalist policy. --Is peace possible "from a position of strength?"

Criticizes contemporary Western ideologists' views on the inevitability of a new world war as irrational and anachronistic and argues for the position that the possibility of eliminating world war from human society is not based upon an abstract wish but is a natural result of the inevitable change in relations between war and peace in favor of peace. The Soviet Armed Forces support the peoples' aspirations for peace and security, and the historic mission of communism is to do away with war and establish on earth permanent peace.

B. FOREIGN POLICIES

32
Abosch, Heinz. [THE BONN GOVERNMENT AT THE CROSSROADS] Le gouvernement de Bonn à la croisée des chemins. L'année politique et économique, v. 39, July 1966: 181-194.
D410.A6, v. 39

Since Erhard became Chancellor in 1963 the policy of West Germany has changed. Bonn's objectives always included the dismantling of the other German state and the extension of the German boundaries to the East. It hoped to achieve these objectives by relying on a narrow and offensive alliance with America. During the 1961 Berlin crisis a divergence between Bonn and the other NATO countries emerged because the latter wanted to preserve the status quo in Europe. This impelled Bonn to demand participation in atomic armament. In exchange Bonn willingly supported the multilateral force concept and the U.S. policy in Vietnam. This policy change placed Bonn in opposition to President de Gaulle's recognition of present German boundaries, refutation of atomic armament for Germany, and desire for rapprochement between East and West. Erhard also overlooked a serious divergence between his policy and that of the United States, namely the fact that Russia was still West Germany's main enemy, whereas China had become the principal enemy of the United States. This was well recognized by the German Gaullists, who never expected any major U.S. concession on the atomic front. Adenauer found it more advantageous to cooperate with France, whereas Strauss advocated the revival of the cold war against the U.S.S.R. with the help of all potential allies including China. The return to militarism was supported even by the Socialist Party of Germany. The struggle for atomic armament and power in foreign affairs found a natural reflection in an imperialist internal policy, combining economic and political power and limiting democratic liberties. Fortunately some centrifugal tendencies opposing the liquidation of democracy have recently manifested themselves in West Germany. The threat of extreme nationalism and the fascination with military power are still present, but a détente in Europe could give a better chance to peaceful elements. The liquidation of NATO and the establishment of a close alliance of West and East European states might gradually bring about development of a democratic and pacific Germany.

33
[THE AMERICAN POLICY OF AGGRESSION BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL OF PUBLIC OPINION] La politique d'agression americaine au tribunal de l'opinion mondiale. Les documents politiques, diplomatiques et financiers, v. 47, Sept. 1966: 1-24.
D1.D6, v. 47

Contains the following three parts: (1) General de Gaulle's address in Phnom-Penh on Sept. 1, 1966, criticizing the American role in the Vietnam War; (2) the Franco-Khmer Declaration of Sept. 2 on international recognition of the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia and the security of Southeast Asia; and (3) U.N. Secretary General U Thant's announcement of Sept. 1 that he would not accept the mandate for another term.

34
Barre, Jean. SIHANOUK'S NEUTRAL WAY. Far Eastern economic review, v. 53, July 21, 1966: 110-113.
HC411. F18, v. 53

Contends that, in the face of speculations that Cambodia's policies were shifting toward a Europe-oriented neutralism and accusations that Sihanouk has often been guilty of instability and of veering with the prevailing wind, the Prince has always been faithful to "certain principles." If he ever appeared inconsistent it was with a fixed purpose in view. The author feels that Bangkok and Saigon maintain their expansionist ambitions against Cambodia and are only waiting for a chance to put them into effect. This threat constitutes the most serious obstacle to a lasting détente between Cambodia and the "Free World."

35
Billotte, Pierre. [FRANCE AND WORLD POWER] La France et la puissance mondiale. La revue des deux mondes, Sept. 1, 1966: 3-14.
AP20. R3, 1966

A great power for centuries, France retained this status despite defeat in 1815, 1871, and 1940, and continued to help maintain the European balance of power in the "Concert of Europe." Only after the Second World War did France lose her great-power status, when the United States and the Soviet Union concentrated world power in their own hands. In view of this change it is worthwhile to analyze the elements that cause a state to be considered a great power. They are usually identified as follows: a vast territory with natural resources, well equipped, organized, and defended; an abundant population, animated with a common will, some capacities, and certain natural virtues, and not corrupted by vice; a wealth managed according to the demands of the epoch; and spiritual prestige. Furthermore the will-to-power lodges in the heart of every great polity--a will to hold power and attain "grandeur," the ideal position a state can occupy. France attained grandeur in the Middle Ages and maintained her position by will and patience (the modest form of will). If France ever loses her will-to-power and her idea of grandeur, she will be lost. Renan said about France that she can be everything except mediocre. France has recovered from the Second World War. She is ready to write another page of her economic history. Throughout the world her spiritual and intellectual influence is widespread. She is old and young, humane and scientific, conscious of her limitations, and in love with grandeur. Paul Valery once wrote that the modern world with all its power and stupendous technical accomplishments fails to produce a policy, a morale, an ideal, a code of civil and criminal law which would be in harmony with the mode of life it creates. Charles de Gaulle and the Gaullists feel that France is able to take over this task and be the avant-garde nation of universal evolution. Her only problem is to find a way of being herself.

36
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. TOMORROW'S AGENDA. Foreign affairs, v. 44, July 1966: 662-670.
D410. F6, v. 44

Today, many Americans--and certainly most Communists--tend to see international conflict primarily in terms of the cold-war struggle between Western democracy and communism. Yet this is no longer the basic issue facing mankind. The cold war still continues, but its character has changed and its importance diminished. The reason for this change lies in the growing evidence that communism has exhausted its revolutionary potential, and its further expansion is not likely even in the Third World. Besides, the Soviet Union has been outclassed by the United States in military power and economic progress and did not achieve its expected Communist goals. Consequently, the predominant Western attitude is that communism will gradually moderate itself, eventually approximating social democracy. Accordingly the Western posture vis-a-vis communism is no longer one of crusading militancy. Furthermore there is evidence that in the second half of the 20th century democratic institutions in the developed nations will face a real threat caused by miraculous technical progress and social changes, while the underdeveloped countries will be challenged by a fundamental crisis of the survival of organized society. Responding to these twin challenges will require a basic reordering of U.S. perspectives. First of all, "America cannot, as some would wish, ignore the cold war or abandon the obligations it has undertaken." However the cold war should be considered primarily as a means of refuting the dogmatic ideological concepts of the Communists. Simultaneously the West should create conditions that would attract Communist states to cooperation. The Yugoslav example proved that the Communist countries are not immune to intelligent Western initiative. Their cooperation would be needed for the development of a community that could face and deal with forthcoming crises in the Third World. Future social and individual changes require that the United States anticipate needs rather than respond to crises and develop institutions able and capable of dealing with rapid social change and mitigating its consequences. Success in adapting democratic institutions to new conditions while at the same time safeguarding individual freedom may determine the role the United States will be playing at the end of this century.

37
Carmoy, Guy de. [EUROPE AND GERMANY AFTER THE MOSCOW TRIP] L'Europe et l'Allemagne après le voyage de Moscou. Revue politique et parlementaire, v. 68, Sept. 1966: 7-19. H3. R4, v. 68

General de Gaulle surprised the world by his reformulated policy toward NATO and the Franco-Soviet declaration signed in Moscow on June 29, 1966. Understanding the significance of these acts requires analysis of De Gaulle's basic concepts of the future of Europe and Germany. His European concept contains

three parts: the confederation of European states, Europe for Europeans, and Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. This concept has remained remarkably constant through recent years. His German concept contains some constant elements, such as a unified Germany jointly regulated and guaranteed by the European states, German recognition of the Oder-Neisse boundary, and a Germany prevented from producing nuclear weapons by neutralization. De Gaulle changed his German concept in 1964, when Germany refused his formula, "Europe for Europeans," preferring to stay under U.S. protection. After an abortive attempt to regain Germany (Strasbourg on Nov. 22, 1964) De Gaulle abandoned his plan of a unified Europe based on Franco-German solidarity and thus protected from Soviet ambitions. He adopted a new plan of Franco-Russian solidarity, one protecting Europe from German ambitions. In consequence of this change a profound antinomy appeared between De Gaulle's present geopolitical strategy and the plan for a unified Germany in a democratic Europe, which France shared with the other West European States in the Atlantic Pact. The new situation has aroused fears of a complete withdrawal of France from the Atlantic alliance and alienation from the West. The General, wanting to avoid an "American" continent, is exposing Europe to the danger of becoming Russified.

38
Cathala, François. [THE REUNIFICATION OF THE GERMANIES AND THE GENERAL'S TRIP TO THE U.S.S.R.] La réunion des Allemagnes et le voyage du général en U.R.S.S. Écrits de Paris; revue des questions actuelles, Sept. 1966: 29-37.
AP20.E355, 1966

The wisdom and usefulness of General de Gaulle's visit to Russia is questionable. In fact the Soviets have caught the General in a trap. They agree with his slogan "Europe for Europeans" only because it implies the removal of U.S. military forces from Europe. They want reunification of Germany only under a Communist government, for the influence of a unified liberal Germany and Europe would undermine the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. The Soviets are trying to arouse European nationalism and thereby precipitate the American exodus from the Continent. If viewed from this perspective, General de Gaulle's negotiations with Russia appear dangerous. France can be efficiently active within the Atlantic alliance, if she cooperates with her Western partners. Alone she might succumb to Russian influence. The Gaullists conceal this possibility by making people believe that France is much stronger and more powerful than she actually is.

39
Cook, Don. FLOODTIDE IN EUROPE. New York, Putnam [1965] 384 p. D1058.C64

Recounts inter-European relations since World War II. Part 1 examines postwar Europe (particularly France, Germany, and Britain) and emphasizes that a fundamental harmony of purpose and political strategy prevailed until 1963. This unity ended with De Gaulle's press conference of January 14, 1963, announcing France's blockade of British entry to the Common Market, rejection of an integrated NATO nuclear force, and the beginning of an independent Gaullist foreign policy and strategy in the West, separate from the established NATO policies under U.S. leadership. De Gaulle's determined announcement of Europe's political independence and the repercussions which followed comprise Part 2, "ten days that shook the western world." The final part deals with four countries from 1963 to the present: De Gaulle's France and Europe, The New Germany and Europe, Britain and Europe, and the United States and Europe.

40
Coudenhove-Kalergi, Richard Nicolaus, graf von ["A LETTER TO FRIENDS"] "Lettre à des amis." Synthèses, no. 242/243, July/Aug. 1966: 14-19.
AP22.S9, 1966

Decisions made at the Yalta Conference became the real peace treaty of the Second World War. There the fate of Europe was decided without the participation of any representative of the European countries; there the Continent was divided into American and Russian spheres of influence. Only Churchill recommended, in vain, a Pan-European union. The European countries, having no choice, adapted to the decision. The first to revolt against it was Yugoslavia, which rejected Russian tutelage. Later Austria managed by adroit negotiations to liberate itself from Eastern and Western occupation. But the real revolution occurred only on March 7, 1966, with the French declaration of independence from NATO. The declaration was a further step in President de Gaulle's attempt to liberate Europe. The next step was De Gaulle's visit to Russia, an attempt to end the cold war and overstep the Iron Curtain by pacific revision of the Yalta agreements. He based this attempt on the probability that strained Soviet relations with China would force the Russians to seek a detente in Europe. De Gaulle judges that the Russians, adhering to Lenin's principle of national self-determination, and promoting this principle in the Third World, will not be able in the long run to refuse independence to the East European states. Then will be the time to revise the Yalta agreements. The revision could make possible the abolition of the Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall and bring about the unification of Germany and the independence of the East European countries. It could end Russian tutelage over Eastern Europe. On the other hand France, by remaining a faithful ally of the United States, might obtain U.S. support for the revision, because the United States is not the least interested in preserving an agreement which has been deprived of all justification by later events. The guardianship of the United States could eventually be replaced by loyal partnership, which is the desire of all young West Europeans. Today, however, the Yalta agreements constitute a real danger for Europe because a U.S. return to the Yalta policy, brought about by a potential Russian-American entente in Europe, could perpetuate Europe's tutelage. Revision of the Yalta agreements cannot obliterate this danger. But, as revision would involve issues of European reunification and Europe's growth into a fourth great power, revision might contribute to world peace through a favorable change in the world's balance of power.

41
Crankshaw, Edward. KHRUSHCHEV: A CAREER. New York, Viking Press [1966] 311 p.
DK275.K5C7

A biography of Nikita Khrushchev from childhood and early career through his rise to power and eventual decline.

42
Crozier, Brian. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE THIRD WORLD. Chester Springs, Pa., Dufour Éditions [1966] 156 p. D943.C74, 1966

Discusses the activities of "Moscow, Peking and other communist capitals" in the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The detailed evidence collected in this book confirms beyond any doubt, in the author's opinion, the persistence of the threat of Communist takeover of the Third World. In fact the new phenomenon of competitive Russian-Chinese subversion has actually intensified the problem. Crozier predicts that the struggle against Communist subversion in the Third World will most likely be a protracted one.

43
Dai, Shen-Yu. PEKING'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION." Current history, v. 51, Sept. 1966: 134-139, 180. D410.C82, v. 51

Above all else the leadership directing the "cultural revolution" in Communist China has "moved to show clearly that change, when it must come, must be in line with established policy and theory." Any move at the top level would be, and apparently has been, planned from within the existing leadership, the seven-man directorate of the Central Committee and its immediate periphery, the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party. Sufficient evidence exists to suggest that those who move to the top are being directly raised, influenced, and persuaded by Mao Tse-tung himself, e.g., Teng Hsiao-p'ing for the Party, Lin Piao for the Army, and perhaps Chou En-lai for the Government. If the United States is going to be affected by such upheavals, it had better prepare for more until Mao's China feels satisfied materially, culturally, diplomatically, and politically. "It will take some time before the revolution exhausts its momentun and runs its historic course to the end."

44
Dawson, Raymond, and Richard Rosecrance. THEORY AND REALITY IN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE. World politics, v. 19, Oct. 1966: 21-51. D839.W57, v. 19

Reviews the major problems, events, and vicissitudes in Anglo-American relations from the end of the Second World War to date, "all of which goes to prove that between friends the balance of power does not mean very much. Neither the unilateral nor the bilateral possession of nuclear weapons has fragmented the alliance; neither has divided the policies of the two governments. History, tradition, affinity have been crucial to the alliance, rather then peripheral. The relationship is special in one notable sense: the theory of alliances does not explain it, but policy must take account of it."

45
DICTATORS OF CHINA. Indian Marxist, v. 2, Aug. 1966: 21-28. HX3.N2515, v. 2

Profiles of Mao Tse-tung (Communist Party Chairman), Lin Piao (Minister of National Defense), Teng Hsiao-ping (General Secretary of the Communist Party), Lui Shao-chi (Chairman of the Republic), and Chou En-lai (Premier). The political futures of these five prominent Chinese Communist leaders are evaluated.

46
Duverger, Maurice. [THE OTHER EUROPE] L'autre Europe. Le nouvel observateur, no. 87, July 13, 1966: 4-5. AP20.02, 1966

Today the East European bloc is less monolithic than its Western counterpart. Its military integration is no more advanced than NATO's; its economic integration in the Council for Mutual Economic Aid [COMECON] cannot be compared to the integrated and growing Common Market; and its psychological integration, its acceptance of Russian domination, is much weaker than the acceptance of American leadership in the West. All these facts became evident in the proceedings of the Bucharest Conference of the Warsaw Pact Countries, which clearly demonstrated the members' desire for autonomy. Some facts stated and revealed during the Conference are of great interest and should be taken into consideration by Washington. The two most important are: the fear of Germany, which impels the Warsaw Pact countries to cling to the Soviet Union for protection although they would prefer more independent national policies; and the reluctance of the East European states to accept De Gaulle's plan for a united Europe under the tutelage of Russia and France. Fearing Russian tutelage these countries would prefer a Pan-European Conference in which the United States participates.

47
EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION SUBJECT OF FALL SYMPOSIUM BY FOREIGN AFFAIRS GROUP, by W-k. Central Europe journal, v. 14, Nov. 1966: 359-360. DB200.7.S74, v. 14

A report on the fourth international conference organized by the Foundation for Foreign Affairs, Chicago, "to discuss aspects of the East-West confrontation." The conference was held Sept. 6-9, 1966, in Wiesbaden, Germany. Among topics discussed were German reunification and the Sino-Soviet feud.

48
ESSENTIAL POINTS FOR PROPAGANDA AND EDUCATION IN CONNECTION WITH CHINA'S GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION. Global digest, v. 3, Aug. 1966: 35-54. P&GP RR

"Translated from Jiefangjun Bao, Peking . . . (Liberation Army Daily, June 6, 1966)."

Illuminates some facets of Communist China's cultural revolution in the form of a historical tract, Central Committee catechism, and a revolutionary's handbook. The article is designed for "the several hundred million workers, peasants and soldiers and the masses of revolutionary cadres and revolutionary intellectuals" who, "armed with Mao Tse-tung's thought," are exhorted and told why and how to clear out the "many monsters entrenched in the ideological and cultural positions" and rout and scatter to the winds the bourgeois experts, scholars, authorities and respected masters and their like, and their whole arrogance--all in the interest of destroying the bourgeoisie and establishing a genuine dictatorship of the proletariat. "The enemy fears Mao Tse-tung's thought . . . . But the more the enemy opposes it, the more ardently we love it. We must persist in studying Chairman Mao's work and . . . . be thoroughgoing revolutionaries. Alongside the people of the whole country, we shall completely destroy the black anti-Party, anti-socialist line, safeguard our dictatorship of the Party, Chairman Mao and Mao Tse-tung's

thought . . . so that we shall carry our cause of socialist revolution and socialist construction forward from one great new victory to another!"

49
Etinger, IAkov IA., and O. Melikyan. THE POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT. Moscow, Progress Publishers [1965?] 140 p. D835. E81

Contents. --Essence and features of Afro-Asian neutralism. --Neutralism and the struggle to consolidate national independence. --The non-aligned countries and the main issues of modern times. --South-East Asia, a bulwark of neutralism. --Non-alignment in the Arab East. --Neutralism spreads in Africa. --The Belgrade Conference of non-aligned countries. --The Second Conference of non-aligned countries. --Imperialism in retreat.

Examines the roots and features of the neutralist policy of the new national states of Asia and Africa, which is seen as "a powerful factor of peace and of the struggle against colonialism and imperialism."

50
Fairbank, John K. REFLECTIONS ON "THE CHINA PROBLEM." Diplomat, v. 17, Sept. 1966: 37-39. AP2. D575, v. 17

Chinese-American cultural differences complicate the two nations' power relations. Mao sees "American imperialism" as China's enemy, whereas Americans wonder whether China may not be the main opponent of their vision of individual rights and personal welfare. Americans may be a people of infinite potentiality, but in fact are devoted to the doctrine of individualism and the practice of commercialism, qualities which in China are "highly disesteemed." In the Confucian social order the individual fulfilled his role according to his status within a hierarchy of family-clan-neighborhood relations. No doctrine of natural rights existed. Still today China's moral code favors personal austerity and collective effort and teaches that self-limitation is nobler than self-realization. Even the term for "individualism" (ko-jen chu-i) means literally "each for himself" and imputes antisocial selfishness. On the other side the suppression of dissent in China will continue to seem a threat to American values, and the contrived voluntarism, spurious enthusiasm, and other manipulations of China's national collectivism will seem the opposite of freedom. This difference in values between Chinese and Americans makes it easy for each to regard the other as immoral. But when peasant lads of the People's Liberation Army storm U.S. guns like a human sea, Americans must realize they are neither stupid nor hopped-up fanatics. They merely believe in self-sacrifice of a sort that the code of individualism hardly comprehends. The future is not foreclosed and Americans may develop the insight and self-control to deal with the Chinese revolution: by "containment," i.e. resistance to aggression, balanced by "noncontainment," i.e. encouragement of feasible alternatives such as peaceful participation in international diplomacy, trade, travel, information, disarmament negotiations, and technical and cultural exchange. A balance of containment and contact toward China may take years to achieve, but one will avail little without the other.

51
Fricke, Karl W. SOVIET ZONE'S "FRIENDSHIP" WITH TITO'S YUGOSLAVIA. Central Europe journal, v. 14, Nov. 1966: 336-341. DB200. 7. S74, v. 14

Karl Wilhelm Fricke has examined the demonstration of friendship between comrades Walter Ulbricht and Josef Broz Tito, submitting the thesis that although rapprochement between the Soviet Zone of Germany and Yugoslavia appears to be reinforced this friendly attitude is but a political pose, not cordiality on a personal basis. The two men, he says, are of opposite natures and have "no genuine political points of contact in common." Tito's overtures, he is convinced, are purely tactical, yet this merely bears out the author's general opinion that political differences and disputes between the individual Communist parties, and by the same token, displays of friendship, should not be taken too seriously, for they depend ultimately on what impulses are sent out from main nerve centers in the Soviet Union. (Abstract supplied)

52
[FRUSTRATED GERMANY] L'Allemagne déçue, par J. G. Perspectives, no. 996, Oct. 22, 1966: 2-3. HC10. P4, 1966

West Germans feel that neither their European allies nor the Americans have any interest in the fate of their country and that their own Government both defends obsolete theses and lacks imagination. They feel isolated. Their hope for a vigorous Western community has vanished, because West European unity was achieved not in the political but only in the economic sphere; they watch with anxiety the crisis in NATO. After the French withdrawal from the organization, it seemed for a while that West Germany would win permission to produce or hold nuclear weapons. But this hope did not materialize; the concept of American-British-West German cooperation for the defense of Europe was rejected by Washington. The United States pursues a different policy in Europe: it seeks an entente with the Soviet Union, an agreement on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and security for Europe. Thus instead of being invited to participate in the nuclear club, West Germany was asked to augment its contribution to the expenditures of the Anglo-Saxon military forces in Germany. West Germans are tired of being just an object in international politics and want to take their destiny in their own hands. The people want reunification and are ready to discuss it with East Germany. Chancellor Erhard remains skeptical, but his Government is in a crisis, and the Socialists may take over soon. Within that party exists a trend toward closer contacts between the Socialist Parties of Western and Eastern Germany. And in the minds of certain German politicians the memory of the Rapallo Treaty, which established close ties between Germany and the Soviet Union, seems to be revived.

53
Garder, Michel. [AGONY OF THE REGIME IN SOVIET RUSSIA] L'agonie du régime en Russie soviétique. Paris, La Table ronde [1965] 206 p. DK274. G3

Partial contents. --Beginning of the end. --Real crimes of Comrade Khrushchev. --Faults follow the crimes. --Euphoric years. --The phase of stubborness. --The phase of impotence. --The collective administration face the broken pots. --The Chinese ultimatum. --Perspective of the future. --On the way to an inevitable revolution. --Provisional epilogue.

Asserts that the day of Khrushchev's demotion will be remembered by future generations as the beginning

of the agony of the Marxist-Leninist regime in Russia. Reviewing and analyzing Khrushchev's "faults" in internal and foreign policy, from de-Stalinization to the alienation of China, the author demonstrates a decline of Soviet power in the world and a transition of the communist leadership from Russia to China. He predicts that the decline will not stop and that the regime itself will not last longer than 1970. Then the world will have to face the problem of how to fill the power vacuum left by the U.S.S.R. in opposing China.

54
Gaulle, Charles de, Pres. France. [DE GAULLE SPEAKS, 1962-1966] De Gaulle parle, 1962-1966, edited by André Passeron. [Paris, Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1966] 450 p. (Les grands études contemporaines) DC412.G32

Partial contents. --De Gaulle speaks about East-West relations. --De Gaulle speaks of defense and alliance. --De Gaulle speaks of Europe. --De Gaulle speaks of Germany. --De Gaulle speaks of the Third World.

Collected excerpts from General de Gaulle's addresses and speeches, 1962-66, which continues another book, published under the same title, covering 1958-62. The present volume contains an extensive bibliography and indexes.

55
Glaser, Kurt. CHANCES FOR FREEDOM IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE? Central Europe journal, v. 14, Nov. 1966: 342-351. DB200.7.S74, v. 14

A summary of theses discussed at the Fourth International Conference on Central and East European Affairs, Sept. 6-9, 1966, Wiesbaden, Germany, sponsored by the Foundation for Foreign Affairs and the Studiengesellschaft für Fragen mittel- und osteuropäischer Partnerschaft [German Research Association for the Problems of Central and East European Partnership].

Professor Kurt Glaser, actively participating in the annual conference at Wiesbaden, which included American and German professors, researchers, political leaders and members of the German Bundestag, succinctly resumés its proceedings. The symposium centers around the basic issues which divide the East and West ideologically, and on changes taking place in the Eastern camp. Senator Thomas Dodd epitomizes the entire East-West confrontation as being based on the concept that freedom cannot be defended in Europe while simultaneously abandoned in Asia, with the corollary that the American people is basically committed, not only to European unity but to transatlantic unity. Professor Meissner points out that changes in Kremlin leadership have brought no change in basic imperialistic policy, no desire to reduce tension, no interest in bilateral talks on Germany with the United States. Professor Mosely's comment that while Communist leaders attempt to control political and social evolution they often fail, was taken as a hint that there are autonomous laws of political behavior above ideology, an idea that seems to warrant further investigation. Professor Possony feels that if the Soviet Union continues to expand its missile force at the current rate, with the USA adhering to replacements only, parity could be achieved between 1970 and 1972. Analyzing Asian affairs, Professor Walker suggests that the real revolution in that part of the world is happening outside the Communist area of control, with growing international cooperation through the Asia Development Bank, and the ASPAC, to which the USA does not belong. Relative to the continuing partition of Germany and Europe, it was noted that Germany does serve as a cultural link between the East and the West despite partition, and that the presence of the US in Europe is important to keep a vacuum from forming which only Soviet Russia could otherwise fill. Bishop Paolo Hnilica reports on the plight of the churches behind the Iron Curtain, citing the shortage of material goods such as books and prayer-books as being but a fraction of the overall need into which Communism has forced religious groups in its drive to eradicate religion completely. (Abstract supplied)

56
Gladwyn, Hubert Miles Gladwyn Jebb, baron. THE EUROPEAN IDEA. London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson [1966] 159 p. DI060.G49, 1966a

Traces Britain's relations with the mainland of Europe. Gladwyn outlines the European idea and its development through the centuries, what it meant in the past, and what it may mean in the future. Europe's situation after the Second World War, De Gaulle's concept of nation states, NATO, the German reunification question, the Common Market the reasons why Britain should join it, and how the entry will affect Great Britain are discussed and analyzed. The author recommends rejection of De Gaulle's concept, British membership in the Common Market, and establishment of a European community with some supranational powers.

57
Grabowski, Z.A. THE MOOD OF EUROPE, 1966. Quarterly review, no. 649, July 1966: 247-258. AP4.Q2, 1966

Dreams and plans for European unity have been shattered by the persistence of tradition and the reaction of nationalism. The Common Market has been saved, but only at the price of slowing down the rate of economic integration and postponing the idea of political union. The principal problem is De Gaulle, whose so-called independent policy for France has proved a comedy of errors. His idea that Europe is incomplete without its Eastern half may be valid, but weakening the Western alliance can only hinder unity. France's industrial progress has not lived up to expectations, nor does one hear much about the future of the force de frappe. Moreover, many Frenchmen feel that their withdrawal from European affairs will increase West German influence. Germany also is disenchanted with De Gaulle, with the United States, and with the chances for reunification. Although there still are few strikes, the German worker no longer is willing to sacrifice for the "economic miracle." In the full employment economy the threat of inflation always exists. Germans are becoming aware of the discrepancy between their economic position and their diplomatic and political inactivity; not a few of them see German foreign policy as too subservient to the United States. Many agree with Strauss that the only chance for reunification lies within a general European settlement. Finally, although there is no immediate threat to democracy, rightwing extremism and anti-Semitism have been steadily increasing. The other countries in Europe are also having nationalism problems, labor unrest, and political crises. Reactionary tendencies throughout Europe are slowing the movement toward Western unity.

58
Gt. Brit. A POSITIVE POLICY TOWARDS THE UNITED NATIONS: RECENT MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS OF UNITED KINGDOM POLICY. [Exeter? Eng., 1965] 29 p. JX1977.2.G7G75

Extracts and full texts of speeches delivered during 1964 and 1965 by British officials.

59
Haley, P. Edward. REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY AND CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY. SAIS review, v. 11, autumn 1966: 5-12. JX1295.J6A3, v. 11

If the Chinese Communists were nonrevolutionary political figures operating in, say, the Western European context, interpretations of their motives might be based on some concept such as national security. In fact Chinese Communist leaders have increasingly anchored their approach to foreign policy problems to ideas and experiences drawn from their revolutionary past. Of these the two most readily identifiable are the concepts of the united front and of armed struggle. "The heart of the united front strategy during the Chinese revolution was to resist Japan and the Kuomintang according to the trilogism: 'Unite with all progressive forces, win over or neutralize all middle forces, isolate and destroy all reactionary forces.'" This appears to be a sound description of current Chinese Communist policy. As to the concept of armed struggle, since 1958, and particularly since 1963, Communist China, in the eyes of its leaders, has been playing on a world scale the same role adopted by the Party during the revolution. Mao's death could bring sharp and immediate changes in both domestic and foreign policy. Barring this, in the event that the Chinese continue to analyze interstate relations according to their revolutionary experience they probably cannot avoid repeated failures and disappointments in Asian, African, and Latin American countries. Even so the permanence of a revolutionary mentality and approach to foreign affairs should not be underestimated, especially when factors such as profound discontent with existing conditions are operative in the world. One or two outbreaks of people's wars could prolong the life of Chinese universalism.

60
Humphrey, Hubert H. VIETNAM: THE CASE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION. Diplomat, v. 17, Aug. 1966: 17-18, 60-61. AP2.D575, v. 17

Two major groups exercise "their right of dissent" toward America's Vietnam policy: those who consider American aid to South Vietnam immoral, and those who regard it as merely misguided. Many of the former base their argument on the erroneous assumption that the National Liberation Front represents the great majority of the Vietnamese people, and that therefore the United States is waging an essentially colonial war. This group identifies the National Liberation Front with the Viet Minh, an earlier coalition of Communist and non-Communist nationalists who led the struggle against the French. However as the Front became increasingly identified with the Communists it lost its nationalist support; few people today in Vietnam claim it speaks for anyone but the Communists. Others who denounce the American effort as immoral base their case on the illegality of American intervention. But the United States is obligated to intervene as long as the Communist powers consider it essential to support wars of national liberation. The group of Americans who regard the U.S. effort as misguided challenge the wisdom or strength of the U.S. commitment to defend Asia, or question whether South Vietnam is the place to make a stand. However the aggressor chooses the place where he issues his challenge; to others is left the decision of whether to respond. If the United States does not defend Vietnam, it will sooner or later be confronted with the same situation elsewhere. The aims of the United States are strictly limited ones, designed to insure to the people of South Vietnam the right of self-determination. The United States has sought the opening of peace negotiations through the United Nations and in the principal Communist and non-Communist capitals of the world. It is not America's choice that the war continue. Nonetheless the United States must brace itself for a struggle that may continue for a long while and strive for the peace and security that will finally open the way for the Vietnamese peasant to choose his own way of life.

61
IN C.P.S.U. CENTRAL COMMITTEE. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 18, Sept. 21, 1966: 3. D839.C87
Translated from Pravda, Sept. 1, 1966, p. 1. Slav Rm

Describes the serious attention drawn by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU] to the communique published in the Chinese press on the 11th plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The communique launched "slanderous attacks on the C.P.S.U. and the Soviet Union" and in essence "rejected the proposal of the C.P.S.U. and other fraternal parties to act jointly in the fight against imperialism, including the aggression of American imperialism in Vietnam." The CPSU Central Committee maintains that "such actions and the statements officially made by the leading body of the Chinese Communist Party signify a serious new step detrimental to the cause of unity in the international Communist movement, the cause of the struggle for socialism and national liberation, for peace and the security of peoples."

62
Kägi, Werner. [WINSTON CHURCHILL'S APPEAL TO EUROPE: THE ENDURING RELEVANCE OF HIS SEPTEMBER 19, 1946 SPEECH IN ZURICH] Winston Churchills Appell an Europa: die fortdauernde Aktualität der Zürcher Rede vom 19. September 1946. Europa, v. 33, Sept. 1966: 5-7. P&GP RR

Expounds the still-pressing importance of Winston Churchill's ideas on European integration that were presented in his 1946 speech to the "academic youth of the world."

63
Kahn, Herman, and William Pfaff. OUR ALTERNATIVES IN EUROPE. Foreign affairs, v. 44, July 1966: 587-600. D410.F6, v. 44

The French withdrawal from NATO was a salutary shock to the United States and the other NATO powers. The crisis which it unlashed demonstrated that now is the time for reappraising the objectives of the European-American alliance and the position of the United States in European affairs. First of all the United States should adopt a moderate policy toward France. It must prevent France from proposing an all-European settlement with the Soviet Union on the basis of a

neutralized Germany; such an agreement would mean a great loss of U.S. prestige and influence in Europe and the deterioration of NATO. In addition Americans should consider the whole European problem from the viewpoint of their own interests. Before making this estimation, however, they should remember that the fundamental objectives of U.S. policy in Europe are (1) prevention of Europe's domination by any hostile power and (2) attainment of political stability by European unification under the protection of NATO. As NATO plays an essential role in U.S. policy, the Nation should ensure its continuation by allowing France to remain as a nonintegrated member with a newly defined "associate" status and benefits limited to activities defined by the NATO treaty. It should avoid new burdensome demands on any member of NATO except Great Britain and West Germany. Thus the defense of Europe would rest chiefly upon American, British, and West German capabilities, and not become a matter of U.S.-West German special relations. As far as the general long-range policy options are concerned, three lines of action are discernible: pursuit of a reformulated "Atlanticism" that leaves room for participation by a future French Government, preservation of a partnership with a genuinely autonomous "United Europe" able to defend itself, and an active search for a formal European settlement. This settlement could involve the withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet military forces from Europe; a probably provisional and conditional but acceptable settlement of the German question that would preserve the freedom and sovereignty of West Germany; and replacement of the major existing military guarantees and constraints in Europe with a political arrangement that could secure the interests of all parties. If Europe of the 1970's is to be stable, secure, and sound in its relations with the United States, the Nation will need to play an active part in the changing situation.

64
Kallai, Gyula. [ON THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. THE ALINEMENT OF FORCES IN THE WORLD AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN TWO WORLD SYSTEMS] O Kommunisticheskom dvizhenii i mezhdunarodnoi politike. Sootnoshenie sil v mire i sovremennye voprosy bor'by dvukh mirovykh sistem. Kommunist, v. 43, July 1966: 107-111.
HX8. K56, v. 43

Translated from the Hungarian newspaper Nepszabadsag, June 8, 1966. Newsp

The development of international relations in our epoch is characterized by two opposing tendencies: one the way of naked imperialist aggression and war, and the other that of peaceful coexistence. No matter how onerous the international situation, it is necessary above all to struggle for peaceful coexistence, which remains the basic foreign policy principle of Socialist governments and the determinant of their relations with the capitalist states. Peaceful coexistence is not without problems. For instance bourgeois propaganda has shifted tactics. If earlier it was against peaceful coexistence, now it blames the Socialist States for not wanting "real" peaceful coexistence; i.e., for refusing to renounce their support for national liberation movements and their solidarity with the struggle of the working class in capitalist states. American imperialists play a double game, on the one hand pretending to seek peaceful coexistence with the Eastern bloc, on the other carrying on a ruthless war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, executing endless aggressive acts against the peoples struggling for national liberation. But peace, being indivisible, cannot be used with some countries and discarded with others. Serious opposition has arisen within the imperialist camp: other bourgeois governments are sitting in judgment of Washington policies and significant capitalist circles are perceiving the benefits of trade with Socialist countries. World peace can be achieved if nations: (1) Discontinue aggression, accept obligations to respect the sovereignty of other nations and the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other peoples, and develop multilateral economic, trade, and cultural ties; (2) Withdraw military forces to within their borders and liquidate military bases on foreign territory; (3) Cease underground testing of atomic weapons, establish nonnuclear zones, destroy atomic arms, and reject the plan to furnish Germany atomic weapons; (4) Conclude a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw treaty group; (5) Abrogate military agreements and replace them with treaties for collective security, preparing for this by initiating discussions for European security including liquidation of World War II remnants in Europe and a peaceful settlement of the German question; (6) Pursue nothing less than general and complete disarmament under strict international control; and (7) Enhance the role and weight of the United Nations in such manner that the Organization would become a guardian of peace and security in the full spirit of its Charter.

65
Karol, K. S. MAO'S SECOND REVOLUTION. New statesman, v. 72, Sept. 9, 1966: 340-341.
AP4. N64, v. 72

"The present explosion of 'popular anger' in China recalls the turbulent first year of the Russian Revolution." The meaning of the current revolution lies not in a struggle for Mao's mantle of power nor in educational and cultural policy changes, for even previously the Chinese were not tolerant of "bourgeois intellectuals"; rather the current revolution is inspired by what comes first with Maoists, the conduct of the daily lives of the Party faithfuls. A good Communist lives in austerity, and every official or intellectual who takes advantage of his position to make his life easier unveils his "revisionist nature." It is not by chance, therefore, that the first to be purged were those of the Peking Party Committee, who inevitably enjoyed a higher standard of living, met foreigners, visited the luxurious International Club, etc. The crime of Chou Yang, Central Committee cultural leader, might be just this. Mao could have dismissed him without resorting to a "cultural revolution," but that would have had little educative value for the youth and the population as a whole. In the West one can hardly believe that movements inspired from above to attain limited objectives could be greeted with genuine enthusiasm. The whole "cultural revolution" therefore appears to be artificial. But one knowing the political climate of today's China can understand that once the impassioned young generation was set in motion it formed itself into militant Red Guards who now believe themselves to be the heirs of the Russian and Chinese revolutionaries of 1917 and 1949. The Chinese leaders are no doubt delighted with the zealous devotion to the Maoist cause, and the demonstrated proof that the revolutionary spirit is not dead, and the fact that China will not lack volunteers to repel Americans should they cross the 17th parallel in Vietnam or attack China. China's excesses should be cause neither for rejoicing nor condemnation. "It would be better to understand the very special and tragic conditions which have brought about this distortion of the Chinese revolution:

China, over and above Vietnam, remains the main target of American aggression, and by virtue of this fact alone, she is the vanguard of the resistance to the Pax Americana."

66
Labin, Suzanne. [RECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA: EMBASSIES FOR SUBVERSION] Reconnaissance Chine Communiste, ambassades pour subversions. Paris, Éditions de la Ligue de la liberté [1964?] 47 p. DS740.4.L28

Criticizes French recognition of Communist China, which Labin asserts will have adverse political effects. The majority of the Chinese population hate their Communist regime and will feel the recognition as a dagger in their backs; Chiang-kai-shek will resent it as treason and surrender of the fight against communism; West Germans will see it as a precedent for the feared recognition of East Germany; and the Chinese embassy in Paris, like all other Chinese embassies, will serve as an instrument of Communist subversion. The author wonders if the meager gain of a not-even-needed platform for negotiating the Southeast Asian problems will be an adequate compensation for all the harm inflicted by the recognition.

67
Larmour, Peter J. DE GAULLE AND THE NEW FRANCE. Yale review, v. 55, June 1966: 500-520. AP2.Y2, v. 55

An analysis of the phenomenon known as "Gaullism," the attempt to reconcile modernization and heroism. Larmour discusses in depth the historical development and themes of Charles de Gaulle's philosophy.

68
Levi, Werner. CHINA'S ASIAN POLICY. Current history, v. 51, Sept. 1966: 153-158. D410.C82, v. 51

Evaluates as cautious the "general approach China has taken in its attempt to establish hegemony in South and Southeast Asia." The states of South and Southeast Asia are situated in what China would like to establish as a "sphere of influence or buffer region." How long and how successfully the governments in this region can pursue a policy of resisting outside pressures and asserting their independence will depend largely upon how much encouragement they receive from the more powerful nations that identify their own interests with the independence and economic development of the states of South and Southeast Asia.

69
Löwenthal, Richard. [THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT AND THE WEST] Der russisch-chinesische Konflikt und der Westen. Österreichische Zeitschrift für Aussenpolitik, v. 5, no. 5/6, 1966: 346-359. DB47.O43, v. 5

Outlines the history of the Sino-Soviet conflict and its implications for Soviet policy toward the West. Löwenthal feels the West should exploit that conflict by encouraging the disintegration of the Soviet bloc in Europe. This, however, would require a more realistic West German policy toward the East European nations that are dependent on Moscow, and the recognition by Bonn of the Oder-Neisse line as a boundary between Poland and Germany.

70
Long, J. F. L. THE SOVIETS IN WORLD AFFAIRS. Royal Air Forces quarterly, v. 6, autumn 1966: 187-193. UG635.G7A1252, v. 6

The new leaders of the Soviet Union must decide how far a conventional foreign policy can support the revolutionary aims of a Communist state. In the harsh world of foreign affairs "moral matters" take second place to national security. Lines of force prevailing in the world at large and not the inclinations of individual politicians set the limits of national action. The Soviet Union's foreign policy is further limited by the problems of balancing the long-term revolutionary aim of destroying capitalism against the shorter-term considerations of defending the security of the Soviet state. To date Khrushchev's successors have had to admit some temporary defeats. Normalization of relations with Communist China is out of the question for some time. The price of understanding with the United States is beyond reach until the war in Vietnam is settled. On the question of Germany and European security the new leaders are even more rigid than Khrushchev. No new ground has been broken at the disarmament talks in Geneva, and no cuts have been made since December 1964 in Soviet military expenditures. On the positive side, in Eastern Europe Soviet diplomacy is pressing forward, attempting to combat revived nationalism through a new political relationship based both on the Warsaw Pact and direct links between each of the East European states and the Soviet Union. The Soviets are using Cyprus as a lever to woo Turkey and are exploring economic relations with Japan. Increased activity is evident both in Latin America and the Afro-Asian world. Although the revolutionary aims of Soviet foreign policy are still supported through aid to the national liberation struggle the new Soviet leadership appears "businesslike, less not more inhibited by revolutionary theory, active, flexible and, above all, prudent."

71
Lukaszewski, J. [THE COMMUNIST BLOC AND THE INTEGRATION OF EUROPE] Le bloc communiste et l'intégration européenne. Synthèses, July/Aug. 1966: 20-39. AP22.S9, 1966

The Soviet attitude toward unification of Europe is demonstrably based on the principle stated by Lenin in 1915 that such unification under capitalism must be either reactionary or impossible. Later Lenin changed his mind and condemned all, even Socialist, attempts at European unification. This policy continued in force until 1962, when it was supplemented by a Soviet plan for a geographical Europe extending from the Atlantic to the Urals. The development of the Common Market surprised the Russians, and Khrushchev adapted Lenin's theory to his new policy of peaceful coexistence, not only between states, but between organized units of both blocs such as the Common Market and the Council for Mutual Economic Aid. Although the Russians welcomed the Common Market crisis as showing the disintegration of capitalism, they hid their enthusiasm to avoid offending France, which was beginning to advocate close East-West cooperation. The truth is that the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe have no desire to be "admitted" to the kind of unified Europe represented by "Little Europe." They still adhere to the old formula of "pan-European cooperation" and support the French policy because they believe it will help to combat the economic integration of Europe. The people of East Europe, in contrast, are attracted by the idea of a unified Europe

because it represents a kind of insurance against the German danger, to which they are imminently sensitive. Also the comparison between economic conditions in the East and West may inspire East Europeans to seek closer relations. On the other hand a lack of progress in European integration would mean a loss of Western prestige in the East. It should not be forgotten that this prestige was gravely damaged before, at Munich and Yalta. Rapid progress of occidental integration, its extension to the political domain, and the creation of supranational organs can attract the East European peoples into the mold of a freer, more human and prosperous, democratic society.

72
Luzern, René. [PEKING AND THE GERMAN QUESTION] Peking und die Deutschlandfrage. Deutsche Fragen, v. 12, May 1966: 81-83.
P&GP RR

Reviews the fluctuations of Red China's policy toward West Germany. Luzern argues that, due to East Germany's increasingly cool relations with Red China, Peking turns more and more to Bonn for further development of its European trade. According to unofficial estimates, in 1955 the West German-Red Chinese trade totalled at least DM 1 billion in value. The author feels that Bonn could better utilize its relations with Peking to promote German reunification.

73
Maier, Lutz. [ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE EXCEPTIONAL AGGRESSIVENESS OF GERMAN IMPERIALISM] Über die Grundlagen der besonderen Aggressivität des deutschen Imperialismus. Wirtschaftswissenschaft, v. 14, Aug. 1966: 1233-1251. tables
HB5.W5, v. 14

Reflects to some extent the author's paper, which was read March 1966 to the Conference on "The State of Monopolistic Capitalism in West Germany and the Militarization of the National Economy and Social Life There." The conference was organized by the Institute of Social Sciences at the Socialist Unity Party's Central Committee and by the German Institute of Economy.

In the author's view, the exceptional aggressiveness of German imperialism - present and past - can only be understood in connection with its specific historical development. Over and above the factors determining the German imperialism of the past (the alliance between monopoly capital and the prussian militaristic Junkers as well as the position of a late-comer in the partition of the world) the author considers the following factors to be responsible for the exceptional aggressiveness of West German imperialism as it stands today: 1. The alliance of the West German with the U.S. imperialism; the implementation of the strategy of the cold war against socialism and all other democratic forces as worked out by U.S. imperialism; 2. the qualitative new stage in capital concentration in West Germany, basing not alone on the capital power of the trusts, but also on the potentialities of the state; 3. the new patterns of militarism; the harmonisation of economic, armaments, and military forms of organisation; 4. the uneven economic and political development in West Germany following the Second World War, but especially of late; 5. the dwindling of international influence by West German imperialism; 6. the position and the part played by West German imperialism in the struggle between the capitalist and the socialist system in Germany and the world. (Abstract supplied)

74
Malmström, Vincent H. NORDEN: CROSSROADS OF DESTINY. Princeton, N.J., Van Nostrand [1965] 128 p. maps DL87.M3
Bibliography: p. 123-124.

Explores the differences in political outlook of the five states of Northern Europe and the facts of geography and history behind them. The author examines the question of why states with so much in common have never achieved a community of political outlook or interest. The physical setting and cultural heritage of the region as a whole is discussed, after which each of the five countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland) is examined individually. The final chapter attempts to assess the changing strategic significance of "Norden" as a whole.

75
Massip, Roger. [THE FRENCH-AMERICAN CRISIS] La crise franco-américaine. Revue politique et parlementaire, v. 68, Oct. 1966: 98-99.
H3.R4, v. 68

During the summer of 1966 relations between the United States and France deteriorated. The Paris-Washington negotiations on the withdrawal of American NATO forces stationed in France made little progress; the conversion of dollars into gold bullion (which continues) irritated France's trans-Atlantic friends; and in his Phhom-Penh address President de Gaulle took an almost inimical position toward the United States. In contrast to France's position the United States displayed moderation and patience. President Johnson is a man who naturally seeks compromise. Several times he restrained his advisors from adopting a severe attitude and strong policy toward France. He would probably have accepted an invitation to meet General de Gaulle in the Antilles, but the Phhom-Peng speech has frustrated all hopes for a conference between the two chiefs of state. General de Gaulle's declarations have not promoted the cause of peace in Vietnam. By taking a categorical position against the United States, the General prevented himself from becoming a mediator. The Hanoi leaders, who expected criticism, received a happy surprise. This surprise may be mingled with disappointment, however, if they feel that the chance of an honorable settlement, which the General might have negotiated, has now faded away.

76
Mikhailov, M. ITALY, EUROPE AND SECURITY. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 18, Aug. 3, 1966: 14. D839.C87, v. 18
Condensed from Izvestiia, July 12, 1966, p. 5.
Slav Rm

Italian leaders' continued support of NATO and West German revanchist aspirations ignores Italy's diverse social and political forces--from Communists to Catholics--who want their country to follow an independent policy favoring cooperation between East and West European states. The popular desire is evidenced by the recent intergovernment economic, scientific, and technical agreements and by business deals between the Soviet trade organizations and Fiat, Olivetti, Montecatini, and others. Although Italy is no longer a weak "Marshallized" country, the continuing penetration of the Italian economy by American capital makes Italian politics inordinately dependent on Washington. The "threat from the East" that served Americans as a pretext for remaining in Western Europe in the guise of "defenders" was a myth, and

NATO is openly called an anachronism in the Italian press and by various representatives of Italian society. It is understandable that Washington and Bonn need NATO. But the Italian leaders' acceptance of American garrisons and stockpiles of atomic bombs and warheads and the transformation of Italy into a Mediterranean U.S. naval base under the NATO stamp puts their country in a dangerous position, one that can have only adverse effect on Italy's national interest. It is hoped that Italy will begin to play a worthy role in building a European system of relations within which the security of each nation would be the security of all as voiced by the leaders of the Socialist countries in the Bucharest Declaration.

77
Munthe-Kaas, Harald. CHINA'S COMMUNIST NEIGHBOURS. Far Eastern economic review, v. 53, July 7, 1966: 22-26. HC411. F18, v. 53

Traces the developments in China's relations with the Communist Parties of North Vietnam, North Korea, and Japan in the course of its cultural revolution and the recent changes in the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Serious disagreement exists between these Parties and Peking on important issues such as the conduct of the Vietnam War and the need for a united worldwide Communist front to oppose U.S. "imperialism." "It thus appears that the Chinese Communist Party will have to prepare itself to take on almost sole responsibility for defending what it believes to be pure and uncorrupted Marxism-Leninism in an increasingly revisionistic and hostile world. A successful 'salvation' of her own quarter of humanity from revisionism and capitalism will, of course, in itself be no mean accomplishment."

78
Niu, Sien-chong. SWEDEN AND SWITZERLAND: A COMPARATIVE STUDY. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 11, June/July 1966: 90-97. UA646. F5, v. 11

A comparative study of Sweden and Switzerland, "Europe's two best-known neutrals." The object of this study is to uncover the unusual features in the geographical environments and historical backgrounds of these two countries that influence their national attitudes on both domestic and foreign policies. Niu concludes that neutrality has such enormous prestige and is so firmly implanted in the minds of the people of both nations that a drastic change of course is unthinkable in the foreseeable future. Switzerland is beginning to recognize that from a military point of view at least, neutrality has more disadvantages than advantages. Many Swiss argue that neutrality applies only in peacetime, and will not restrict the Nation from military cooperation in time of war. Unfortunately, peacetime cooperation and preparation are essential foundations for a coalition engaged in war. As technology progresses, independent production of modern weapons systems will become prohibitively expensive for individual nations. Nonetheless until NATO regains its vitality and reconstructs its forces, it will offer little incentive for Sweden and Switzerland to abandon their traditional policies.

79
Ojha, Ishwer C. THE SINO-AMERICAN CONFRONTATION: COMMUNIST CHINESE PERSPECTIVES. Current history, v. 51, Sept. 1966: 147-152, 179. D410. C82, v. 51

The heart of current Sino-American relations is China's push to achieve world status commensurate with its strength. "This goal may not be incompatible with American foreign policy aims, for such an adjustment might bring China into the status quo power group . . . [and] permit China to take part in a new and more realistic political order, one in which China itself would have a real stake." Despite almost two decades of anti-Americanism Peking's foreign policy has been basically cautious, other than in Korea where it can be argued that China's national security was involved. Thus to adopt a "Munich complex" and equate Mao with Hitler is ill-advised. Nor is it wise to overlook Chinese resentment of the American presence in Asia, the availability of Taiwan as an American base, and the location of the 7th Fleet near China's territorial waters. A ring of military bases elsewhere in Asia also helps explain Peking's claustrophobic anxiety. "The past record of Chinese foreign policy suggests that China will probably not try to conquer foreign territory by force." Tibet can make few claims to actual independence from Peking. In the case of India, China has offered impressive legal documentation to support its conception of the border and Chinese moves there have probably been motivated primarily by a desire to humiliate India and to strip from her all claims to Asia's leadership.

80
Osten, Walter. [CONDUCT OF THE SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY OF GERMANY WITH REGARD TO THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT] Die Haltung der SED im chinesisch-sowjetischen Konflikt. Osteuropa, v. 16, Sept. 1966: 621-627. DR1. O8, v. 16

Evaluates the reaction of the East German Communist leadership to Mao Tse-tung's doctrine of an "Interzone" (viz the group of states--including France, West Germany, Great Britain and Red China--that will eventually counterbalance the combined strength of the United States and the Soviet bloc) and to his questioning the validity of Germany's present eastern boundaries. Osten contends that the Red Chinese position on these matters gives East German Communists no choice but to support Moscow all the way in its feud with Peking. Thus East Germany has lost a chance, open to other East European countries, of using the Sino-Soviet conflict to gain greater independence from Moscow. Interpreting the "Interzone" doctrine as Peking's flirtation with Bonn the East German Communists have stiffened their already obstinate opposition to German reunification. The author concludes, however, that even if Peking's policy toward Germany were different, East Germany's freedom of action would still be limited by its military and economic interdependence with the Soviet Union.

81
Page, Martin. THE DAY KHRUSHCHEV FELL. New York, Hawthorn Books [1965] 224 p. DK275. K5P22

An admittedly journalistic account of how and why Khrushchev fell from power in October 1964 and what happened as a result of his disappearance from the Soviet and international political arena.

82
Peyret, Henry. [RUSSIA AND EUROPE] La Russie et l'Europe. Économie; informations industrielles,

financières, agricoles & scientifiques du monde entier, v. 22, Oct. 14, 1966: 9-24.
HC10.E42, v. 22

On the occasion of De Gaulle's visit to Russia examines the historical background and the present status of the General's and the Soviets' concepts of "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals." While favoring present attempts for a political and economic rapprochement between Western and Eastern Europe, the author warns De Gaulle and France not to involve Russia in the building and organization of a unified Europe. Russia is not a purely European state, its interests widely exceed the European frame, and its ideology is basically different from the Western ideology. "Let us build up a united Western Europe," says the author. "If Russia chooses to join it will be welcomed, and it will receive a place adequate to its possibilities and needs."

83
Philip, André. COUNSEL FROM AN ALLY: REFLECTIONS ON CHANGES WITHIN THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY. Columbia, University of Missouri Press [1966] 79 p. (The John Findley Green Foundation lectures, 1965) DC412.P45

A series of lectures on the problems France faces in Europe. The first discusses the tremendous changes presently taking place, both technologically and in French economic, social, and political institutions. The second examines the effect of the unification of Europe on economic and trade relations between Europe and other industrialized countries. The final lecture considers problems of French and European foreign policy and proposes formation of a new Atlantic alliance on a constructive and more nearly equal basis.

84
Plummer, Mark A. TAIWAN: "THE OTHER CHINA." Current history, v. 51, Sept. 1966: 165-171, 178.
D410.C82, v. 51

The Taiwanese economy has a high rate of growth even with the suspension of United States aid. The gross national product of 1965 was up 7.42 percent over 1964 and per capita income had gained 4.32 percent. Some estimates see the per capita income of Taiwan as about three times that of Communist China. Even the old China hands are impressed by this phenomenal growth. The full dinner pail of the Taiwanese has made most of the native population tolerant of their minority mainland rulers. The Taiwanese, who were afforded even less self-government during their 50 years of Japanese rule, may be content to accept continued concessions from the mainlanders, while expecting that the effectiveness of the Nationalist rule will be gradually reduced as its older generation is removed from the scene by natural causes. Taiwanese, the mainlanders on Taiwan, and the U.S. Government are all agreed upon the necessity of defending the island against a Communist invasion. Since the "two Chinas" are separated by 100 miles of the Straits of Taiwan, and neither the Communists nor the Nationalist have a substantial Navy, an indefinite continuation of the status quo seems the most likely prediction. Revolt against the ruler of "either China," an international conflict involving China, or even some kind of accommodation between the two governments could alter the situation abruptly. But at this time these possibilities are remote.

85
Riche, Jean M. WHY FRANCE SEES NATO, U.S. AS THREATS TO ITS SOVEREIGNTY. Armed Forces management, v. 12, June 1966: 59, 61-62.
UB153.A65, v. 12

Action by General de Gaulle and his government to force a discussion on NATO within the Atlantic Alliance is only one aspect of the global efforts by France to regain its full sovereignty. This position of independence is, in turn, considered a prerequisite for more efficient contributions by France to the preservation and construction of peace and the elimination of major sources of conflicts. The most immediate goal of France is negotiation and final resolution of the German problem which the French have always considered a basic issue calling for discussion among all European countries. (Abstract supplied)

86
Riklin, Alois. [MILITARY-POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN MOSCOW AND PEKING] Militärpolitische Aspekte des Disputs zwischen Moskau und Peking. Wehr-wissenschaftliche Rundschau, v. 16, Sept. 1966: 481-494. U3.W485, v. 16
Bibliographical footnotes.

Inquires into the "external aspects" of the Sino-Soviet dispute: its bearing on military and political relations between the Communist countries; relations between the Communist and the capitalist States; peaceful coexistence between the blocs; and the problems of world revolution and of war and peace. Although in most respects Communist China appears to represent a greater threat to the West than does the Soviet Union, the Soviet challenge is more effective due to Moscow's highly versatile policies toward the free world.

87
Roberts, John G. THE SPOILS OF PEACE. Far Eastern economic review, v. 52, June 23, 1966: 596-598. HC411.F18, v. 52

Japan's relations with South Korea are entering a new stage consequent to the conclusion of last year's treaty after 14 years of bitter wrangling, but sources of strain still continue. Following "normalization" of relations, there are plans for a massive influx of Japanese capital into South Korea. Although the impoverished Korean economy needs development urgently, it may find it difficult to absorb the vast sums now promised by Japan. While Japan has emerged as one of the great industrial nations, with a vigorous domestic economy, one of the world's highest growth rates, and exports amounting to some $9 billion annually, South Korea in contrast is economically and politically a U.S. satellite. Living standards are barely above subsistence level, industry has been extremely slow to start despite enormous aid, and exports do not exceed $170 million annually although imports amount to some $500 million, three-fourths of which consist of U.S. aid commodities. There is little Japan can import in exchange for the manufactured goods and capital equipment needed by South Korea. Seoul's trade balance with Tokyo has been worsening steadily and Japan's favorable balance during the last decade is believed to be nearly $1 billion. South Korea's 600,000-man army, although largely supported by the United States, is a serious drain on scanty resources, taking about one-third of the national budget--only 23 percent goes into public investment. The ratification of the treaty was

secured by dubious means in both the Japanese and Korean Parliaments in the face of massive protests. Nonetheless Washington beamed over its success in forcing a burdensome and reluctant South Korea into the arms of a hesitant Japan. The "lure of South Korea for Japanese businessmen is a tantalizing $800 million promised by Japan as Seoul's price for the normalization agreements. Of this amount, $300 million are an outright grant, $200 million are government loans and $200 million commercial loans mostly for industrial plants." Companies having close capital and technical ties with U.S. firms have secured the lion's share of South Korean plant business.

88
Schoenbrun, David. THE OTHER WORLD OF CHARLES DE GAULLE. Diplomat, v. 18, Oct. 1966: 44, 76-78. AP2.D575, v. 18

Although the inexperienced observer may question the logic of Charles de Gaulle's forthcoming trip around the world, experienced "gaullologists" know it has been carefully planned. Each stop will be selected with a single foreign policy objective in mind: to assert the independent and influential position of France in world affairs. Disciples of the realpolitik school are inclined to dismiss the French President's activities as much showmanship with little substance or consequence. However the style and sweep of Gaullism--the defense of French individualism and passionate nationalism--are emotions felt in other nations. Leaders of NATO and the Common Market, still reeling from De Gaulle's attacks, can attest to the strength of Gaullism. The maddening and arrogant claims of French grandeur are based on some real achievements. For the first time in 25 years French soldiers are not fighting anywhere in the world. De Gaulle has also ended the continual political upheaval of French national government. On the other hand France is isolated and alienated from its neighbors and former allies. The economy, while currently prospering, is based on a highly unstable foundation with signs of inflation and recession on the horizon. Perhaps most serious is the general feeling of lassitude and boredom rather than the reawakening of French national ambition for which De Gaulle yearns. Probably the greatest source of his strength at home is the failure of the opposition to produce men of stature to oppose him. His success in disrupting NATO is due more to U.S. and Soviet preoccupation elsewhere in the world than to his own power. He looms as a giant in the "other world of Charles de Gaulle" because of crisis in the real world.

89
Schorr, Daniel. ERHARD: GERMANY'S UNWILLING POLITICIAN. New leader, v. 49, June 6, 1966: 9-14. HX1.N37, v. 49

A brief personal and political profile of West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard. The author concludes with summaries of Erhard's views on a number of important foreign policy issues. The Chancellor rejects the Gaullist idea of a Franco-German hegemony over Western Europe and asserts that American nuclear guarantees and the North Atlantic defense structure are indispensible to Europe's security. With De Gaulle his personal relations are cordial, but with Lyndon Johnson he has strong rapport. West Germany feels morally bound to support the United States in Vietnam, regardless of whether it approves of every development in the escalating war. Erhard has ruled out German military aid to that country, however, and opposes reduction of U.S. troops in Europe to support the war effort. Erhard continues to advocate an allied nuclear force and sees German participation as a way to provide a more convincing deterrent to Soviet aggression. The Chancellor has no illusions that the partition of Germany can be ended soon, but does ask that the allies raise the issue whenever the opportunity presents itself. He is fully convinced that concessions about borders, military position, and other matters will have to be made prior to unification, but that German unification is "a historical inevitability, like self-determination everywhere."

90
Seiki, Watanabe. THREE WORLD STRATEGIES AND JAPAN. Japan quarterly, v. 13, July/Sept. 1966: 310-318. DS801.J274, v. 13

What can Japan do to ensure peace and its security in the present world situation, given the delicate balance between U.S., Soviet, and Chinese Communist world strategies? One hopeful sign is the seeming entente between the United States and the Soviet Union which leaves China the sole major threat. Opinion is split in Japan on the best course of action toward China: whether to seek shelter under the American nuclear umbrella, or to seek normalization of relations with China through removal of American bases in Japan. There is little call for Japanese nuclear armament. The role of Japan around which the country can perhaps unite is promoter of disarmament and a world disarmament conference that includes Communist China. Japan might also contribute to a peaceful settlement in Vietnam, the present "tangling ground for the grand designs of the three nations." On this issue the Soviet Union is caught in the middle, basing its relations with the United States on practical common interests and its relations with China on ideology. Do the factors which have brought about the U.S.-Soviet détente seem likely to affect U.S. relations with China? It was more than the U.S. containment policy that made the Soviets change their foreign policy. The "Pax Russo-Americana" is based on their common interest in breaking the vicious circle of the arms race, preventing the outbreak of war, and stopping nuclear proliferation. Between the United States and Communist China the sources of enmity seem more numerous than common interests. America's containment policy has shown little flexibility. China's nuclear armament has proceeded rapidly, and its foreign policy statements have been intransigent. Hopefully some of the more flexible ideas expressed in the recent U.S. congressional hearing on China will gain acceptance, and the American people will reconsider their policies. Hopefully China will see its own advantage in an end to confrontation.

91
[SIX ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL POLICY TOWARD GERMANY: AN ATTEMPT AT STOCK-TAKING] Sechs Faktoren internationaler Deutschlandpolitik. Versuch einer Bestandsaufnahme. Neue Politik, v. 11, Sept. 10, 1966: 7. H5.N377, v. 11

Considers the extent of consensus among the United States, Great Britain, and France with respect to the German question. Discussion focuses on the problems of the German boundaries, West German nuclear-arms sharing, German reunification, European secu-

rity, and the East-West détente in Europe. The attitudes of West Germany's allies on most of these questions differ, openly or not, from the position adopted by Bonn.

92
[THE SPEECH OF MAY 7, 1966 BY THE FIRST SECRETARY OF THE RUMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY NICOLAE CEAUSESCU ON THE OCCASION OF THE 45TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PARTY (EXCERPTS)] Rede des Ersten Sekretärs der Rumänischen Kommunistischen Partei, Nicolae Ceausescu, anlässlich des 45. Jahrestages der Gründung der Partei am 7. Mai 1966 (Auszüge). Europa-Archiv, v. 21, June 25, 1966: D303-D314.
D839.E86, v. 21

Declares the existence of military blocs, and military bases and forces of one country in another, to be an anachronism seriously impeding the normalization of postwar conditions and peaceful international relations. Ceausescu proclaims that the Rumanian Workers' Party stands opposed to any domination--either within the international Communist movement or the Socialist bloc--of one Communist Party over another or of one state over another. He criticizes imperialism, especially American policy in Vietnam, for its aggressive purposes and underlines the duty of each Socialist state to work for world peace and improved relations between nations regardless of their political system. The Rumanian leader points out his state's good relations with a number of capitalist countries, among them France. "The peaceful settlement of the German question," says Ceausescu, "and prevention of the West German revanchists from access to nuclear weapons would in considerable measure contribute to the consolidation of peace in Europe."

93
Spiro, Herbert J. FOREIGN POLICY AND POLITICAL STYLE. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. American civilization: its influence on foreign policy. Special editor: James C. Charlesworth. Philadelphia, 1966. (Its Annals, v. 366) p. 139-148. H1.A4, v. 366

An explanation of the peculiarities of United States foreign policy must be based upon its systematic description and comparison. American domestic and international politics have tended toward the pragmatic and, until very recently, away from the ideological. Even legalism and violence have been pragmatically motivated. This peculiarity cannot be explained by socioeconomic factors like industrialization and urbanization. Social mobility and the American educational system can provide road signs toward a more adequate explanation, to which three primarily political factors can contribute: the break with time executed by the makers of the American Revolution; the adversary method of pleading of the retained Common Law; and the constitutional environment created by the Founding Fathers. Only in the last decade has American foreign policy moved toward an incongruous ideologism. (Abstract supplied)

94
Strausz-Hupé, Robert. RESTORATION EUROPE AND WORLD POLITICS. Yale review, v. 55, June 1966: 488-499. AP2.Y2, v. 55

Throughout history the geographic proximity of the people of Europe has failed to engender political cohesiveness. The European Defense Community, a postwar attempt to provide Europe with the appropriate political institutions to effect a substantial transfer of power from national governments to a truly European community, foundered on the rocks of Anglo-French disagreement. To this day the work of European integration proceeds "via the bypass of Jean Monnet's functional economic schemes." This indirect approach --submerging political and ideological differences for the profits of economic cooperation--has a dubious chance of success. The Suez crisis further emphasized the lack of unity, increased Britain's grim determination to hold on to its nuclear deterrent, and accelerated the immense French effort to create a nuclear force from scratch. Development of a United States-German "alliance-within-an-alliance" further alienated the British and French. Except for his personal style and hyper-French-nationalism, De Gaulle has not really changed European attitudes and policies. Long before De Gaulle a Socialist premier expanded the French nuclear program and the British Government recognized Communist China. Gaullism is not a passing phenomenon but an accurate mirror of European nationalist aspirations. De Gaulle's departure will not restore European accord or NATO solidarity. Although the present likelihood of unification is small, powerful forces are pushing the European countries toward one another. Economic and technical cooperation is essential if Europe is to compete effectively against the giant economies to the west and east. While a united Europe would create some risks for the United States, it could fill a strategic vacuum, provide the United States with a solvent trading partner, and assist the Nation in the staggering task of international economic development.

95
Taillefer, Jean. [THE DISRUPTION OF NATO] La rupture de l'O.T.A.N. Revue banque et bourse, v. 30, June/July 1966: 97-116.
HG15.R38, v. 30

Evaluates the motives for the French withdrawal from NATO and the effects it will have on French economy, foreign policy, and trade. France is now completely isolated. She has alienated the United States, her faithful ally for 200 years who twice helped her to avoid disaster during this century. The author fears that a policy of broken promises, discourtesy in international relations, and refusal to recognize, if not to pay, debts of gratitude will not contribute to his nation's grandeur.

96
Takita, Kazuo. DELIGHTED EMBARRASSMENT. Far Eastern economic review, v. 53, Aug. 18, 1966: 309-312. HC411.F18, v. 53

Despite the complications in Japan-U.S.S.R. relations, the Japanese have been very pleased with the various friendly approaches made to them by the Soviet Union in recent years. The invitation extended by recent visitor Andrei Gromyko to join Britain and France as countries with which the Soviet Union "consults" regularly particularly delighted them. Progress achieved in improving political relations was limited, hinging largely on the Soviet Union's negative response to Japan's continued pleas for the return of its war-lost territories in the North Pacific and for

safe operations for Japan's fishermen around the islands to the north of Hokkaido. But in the fields of trade and economic cooperation (particularly in Siberia) there are unlimited prospects of closer ties. All is not troublefree; these ties cause embarrassment in Japan's relations with China, now Japan's second best customer, the United States, her principal ally, and the rest of Asia.

97
Taylor, Charles. CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY. International journal, v. 21, summer 1966: 311-322.
D839.I5, v. 21

China's foreign policy derives as much from history and tradition as from the Communist ideology of the present rulers. For the most part it has been realistic and restrained, exhibiting a determination to gain for China the place a nation of its size and potential strength deserves. The matter of most immediate concern to Chinese leaders is American "encirclement" and the desire to have American military, economic, and political influence removed from Asia. This goal is more nationalistic than ideological, more defensive than aggressive. The hope to regain "lost territories," including Hong Kong, Macao, parts of Soviet Asia and Taiwan, is not expansionism but, to the Chinese, reclamation of territory rightfully theirs. They also want to establish political and economic hegemony over their neighbors in Southeast Asia, although publicly they indignantly deny any suggestions to this effect. The Chinese Communists have resorted to force only within clear limitations and only when they felt directly threatened. To a large extent this restraint has been forced upon them by the American military presence on their borders. The Chinese rightly hold that no nation could ever conquer them, but they have few misconceptions of the damage American bombers could wreak. Although they vociferously proclaim their support for revolutionary movements throughout the world, they also caution that revolutions can be won only by the people of the nation involved. Lately many Afro-Asian leaders have exhibited the same skepticism toward Chinese intentions as they have toward American and Soviet blandishments. Perhaps disillusioned by their foreign policy setbacks, the Chinese may now be turning inward. The eventual demise of Mao will no doubt accentuate this trend, as the new leaders devote most of their attention to consolidating their political positions. Because of overwhelming U.S. superiority and China's fear of massive U.S. retaliation, nuclear weapons are unlikely to make Peking more daring. Most likely Chinese weapons are a bargaining tool like the French "force de frappe." However, as China must use the threat of external aggression to unite its people, its policy is unlikely to become outwardly more moderate or more amenable to rapprochement with the United States or the Soviet Union.

98
[THREE USELESS CONFERENCES] Trois conférences pour rien, par J. G. Perspectives, no. 997, Oct. 29, 1966: 1-2. HC10.P4, 1966

Summarizes the achievements of the international conferences held in October 1966 in Manila, Moscow, and New Delhi and evaluates their effect on the world situation and promotion of peace. In the author's view the achievements were meager. President Johnson did not persuade his allies to make a larger contribution in military aid for the Vietnamese War; the Soviets did not succeed in pressing their satellite states to excommunicate China; and Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia did not win recognition as nonalined countries themselves or as representatives of this group of states. Apparently spectacular manifestations of policy changes are useless as long as the international situation remains frozen by the American-Soviet thermonuclear balance, and the small nations feel that they can struggle among themselves and even against their protectors and still be sure their protectors will defend them anyway.

99
Toshio, Ueda. THE OUTLOOK FOR RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA. Japan quarterly, v. 13, July/Sept. 1966: 292-300.
DS801.J274, v. 13

In examining the background of Sino-Japanese relations in the postwar period, particularly relations between Japan and Communist China, it becomes clear that Communist China's ultimate aim has been "liberation of Japan through Communism." Its tactics have aimed at estrangement between Japan and the United States, destruction of the two China notion through trade, and cultural and personal exchanges with Japan. The Japanese Government continues to maintain friendly ties based on its diplomatic relationship with the Government of the Republic of China and at the same time to promote private contact with the Chinese mainland. The Government has repeatedly stressed its desire to press ahead with the principle of not mixing politics and economics. However, doubting that Communist China would carry out its responsibilities as a member of the United Nations, Japan has opposed replacement of the Nationalist government by the Communists. Both the Nationalists and the United States are critical of Japan's trade policies toward the mainland, seeing them as economic aid to an enemy. Japan feels, however, that expansion of trade will encourage the Chinese to peaceful participation in the world community. There is no conflict between the Japan-Taiwan Treaty of 1952 and recognition of two Chinas. And until unification has been achieved by the Chinese themselves, a two China policy is the only course for Japan to follow.

100
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD ASIA. Hearings, 89th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. DS518.8.A46

Includes testimony by a number of well known non-Government authorities on the Far East and U.S. interests there. Most of the discussion is on Communist China.

101
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. CHINA, VIETNAM, AND THE UNITED STATES: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE HEARINGS OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE. Washington, Public Affairs Press [1966] 218 p.
E183.8.C5U5, 1966

A collection of "the most significant statements" on Vietnam and mainland China made by experts and scholars before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-

mittee in February and March 1966. The book also includes "Historical Overview" on China by Senator J. William Fulbright.

102
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. SUPPLEMENTAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, FISCAL YEAR, 1966: VIETNAM. Hearings, 89th Cong., 2d sess., on S. 2793. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. HC443.V5U472

Hearings to authorize an additional $415 million in foreign economic aid for FY 1966. Of the $315 million requested for supporting assistance, $275 million is for Vietnam, and much of the $100 million requested for the President's contingency fund will undoubtedly be used for that country. The witnesses (David E. Bell, James M. Gavin, George F. Kennan, Dean Rusk, and Maxwell D. Taylor) discuss all aspects of U.S. policy in Vietnam. The hearings were held in February 1966.

103
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO MAINLAND CHINA. Hearings, 89th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 657 p. E183.8.C5U5

Statements and testimony by recognized authorities and scholars in the field of China, primarily from universities and research institutes. The hearings were chaired by Senator J. William Fulbright and held in March 1966.

104
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. THE VIETNAM HEARINGS, WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT. New York, Random House [1966] 294 p. DS557.A6U447, 1966a

Complete statements and extensive excerpts from the testimony given by Dean Rusk, James M. Gavin, George F. Kennan, and Maxwell D. Taylor before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearings on Vietnam in February 1966. The volume also contains an introduction by J. William Fulbright, Committee chairman.

105
Wayper, C. L. CHINA & THE WORLD. Royal Air Forces quarterly, v. 6, autumn 1966: 169-171. UG635.G7A1252, v. 6

Study of China's past behavior shows that while that nation claims ideological objectives, she gives priority in her foreign policy to the concept of national interest. Where the support of Communists is to her advantage, as in such strategically important areas as Korea or Vietnam, or where it will embarrass her enemies and help stake a claim on the future, as in Africa, China has come to their aid, although only to the degree that her own interests permit. Where, however, ideological ends have been incompatible with the national interest, as in Burma and Pakistan, China has not pursued them. One can be more impressed with the caution that has attended China's behavior than with the immoderation that has characterized her language. For example never since the Korean War has China permitted herself to become involved in war with a major power. It is unlikely she will forget that caution when she acquires full nuclear strength. Although to expect outstanding virtue in China is folly, the absence of outstanding virtue is not proof of overwhelming vice.

106
Wilson, Dick. CHINA'S TANZANIAN TOE-HOLD. Far Eastern economic review, v. 53, Sept. 15, 1966: 477-479. HC411.F18, v. 53

Despite China's recent political reverses in Africa and reduced budget allocations for aid, its trade is building up with a conspicuously firm foothold in Tanzania. The reasons for China's success in Tanzania are many; the skill of Ambassador Ho Ying and the good sense of President Nyerere, who displays neither the sycophancy nor the hysterical abuse so typical of African leaders' relations with Peking, stand out.

107
Wilson, Dick. LIN PIAO--A TIGER IN MAO'S TANK? Spectator, no. 7209, Aug. 26, 1966: 251. AP4.S7, 1966

Briefly recounts what is known of the early life of Lin Piao, probable successor to Mao Tse-tung as leader of Communist China. Wilson describes Lin as "a brilliant quick-thinking army commander somewhat lacking in the political and diplomatic finesse of a Mao or a Chou En-lai," and sees little likelihood of China taking a harder line under his leadership.

108
Wilson, Richard B. NATIONAL POWER AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE. Colorado quarterly, v. 15, summer 1966: 5-16. AP2.C6634, v. 15

Where political theory has no viable conception of the public interest, political action is most likely to resolve into a competitive struggle to maximize power for its own sake. The two political systems that dominate the world have made a virtue out of necessity and sacrificed their original values. What Hamilton and Madison have done to Paine, Lenin and Stalin have done to Marx. Thus at bottom both the East and the West are identical. The power syndrome they have created goes a long way toward explaining the balance of terror that grips the world today. This balance of terror is likely to continue for some time, because the two power-oriented systems probably will not agree soon on a workable scheme for disarmament, arms control, or voluntary surrender of authority to the United Nations. As a result the United States will have time to do what must be done: rethink the basic premises of the American political system to discover why the humanitarian tradition has all but disappeared from it, and recognize that the problems besetting America cannot be solved until the intellectual foundations of its political actions are rebuilt.

109
Yu, George T. CHINA'S FAILURE IN AFRICA. Asian survey, v. 6, Aug. 1966: 461-468. DS1.A492, v. 6

In the past decade Africa has "assumed an important place in Chinese foreign policy." Eighteen African countries have extended recognition in response to China's initiatives. The abortive second Asian-African Conference of 1965, however, represented a major breakdown in Chinese-African relations. Since then,

in spite of three African nations severing diplomatic relations with her, China continues to solicit the help of Africa in the struggle of the "world countryside" against the "world cities." An analysis of Chinese policy objectives and tactics shows three themes to be predominant: anti-imperialism, antirevisionism, and Asian-African unity. The first is designed to expose America as the successor to European colonialism. The second, antirevisionism, is equated with anti-imperialism and manifests the Sino-Soviet dispute. China seeks to "discredit the Soviet Union as a revolutionary force by identifying her with 'United States imperialism'"; China thereby hopes to pressure the Soviets into a confrontation with the United States. In this way China plans to establish itself as the world's foremost revolutionary force. The third theme, Afro-Asian-Latin American solidarity against further exploitation by the West, is constantly reiterated to give China immediate leadership among developing states. "The acceptance and support of China by the nearly forty African states is regarded as a major prize. In addition Africa's adoption of China's revolutionary and developmental model would greatly enhance China's international status." China's response to three basic African goals--both political and economic independence and membership in the community of nations--is the assurance that China and Africa have common goals in the face of common enemies, the United States and the Soviet Union. China's ability to articulate African objectives in line with Chinese policy aims has led to failure as well as success. China has "attempted to induce the African states to accept fully her world view and major policy objectives. This the vast majority of the African states have been unwilling to do." This policy of China's reflects her view of the world, of the twin danger of imperialism and revisionism.

110

Zorza, Victor. THE HIDDEN BATTLE FOR POWER IN RED CHINA. Look, v. 30, Aug. 23, 1966: 25-28.
AP2. L79, v. 30

Although it has not been publicly voiced, a Chinese Communist opposition to that nation's "hardline" policies has arisen even in its highest leadership. The opposition first questioned Maoist policies in 1959 at a meeting of the Party's Central Committee. They were answered by the quiet dismissal of Defense Minister Peng Teh-huai, an official said to have attempted to turn the Army against the Party and to have opposed the final break with the U.S.S.R. The Party-Army struggle was highlighted again last year with the abolition of all military ranks, doubtless the Party reaction to the growth of a military group strong enough to question the principle of "putting politics in command." The Army commander began asserting last summer that China should prepare for the most difficult of war situations and envision the use of nuclear weapons. Indirectly he advocated that China in the near future safeguard its position by negotiation with the imperialist nations and increase its strength in the long term through a renewed alliance with the U.S.S.R. Soon after he was removed from the public eye. Evidence indicates that the U.S. determination to stay in Vietnam was a main spark setting off the Chinese leadership crisis, although the controversy covered the whole range of Chinese policy, seeking "to curb some of the excesses of the dictatorship and introduce a measure of democracy and rationality into the ways of government." Controversial issues presumably intensify before and after a change in leadership. The West, prevented from perceiving such situations by its fixed image of a monolithic Communist hierarchy, has missed opportunities to influence policy throughout the Communist world. In China the West's chance to influence policy has passed with the defeat of the rightists. But this chance was insignificant compared to what will ensue with the passing of Mao. Will the West design policies to offer a little of what the new opposition may want in order to influence Chinese policy? The West should begin now to persuade the more moderate Chinese leaders of the necessity and sagacity of keeping up the pressure on their more hardline colleagues.

II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

A. MODERN WAR

111
AlRoy, Gil C. INSURGENCY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE OF UNDERDEVELOPED SOCIETIES. Antioch review, v. 26, summer 1966: 149-157.
AP2.A562, v. 26

The Chinese are revolutionizing the Marxist concept of world revolution by replacing the urban proletariat with the peasantry, a class for whose insurrectionary quality Marx had only contempt. If post-World War II experiences are any indication the Chinese heretics appear to stand on firm ground. In view of their legendary inertness and reactionary instincts, why do the peasants of today's underdeveloped world seem to possess this revolutionary potential? A principal reason is the appalling performance of governments in rural areas in socioeconomic reforms and, frequently, in merely maintaining a semblance of order. Insurgents rise against a government which is neither there nor capable of getting there fast and which is notoriously inefficient when it is there. The other chief cause of rural insurgency potential is the backwardness of the peasantry. In the prevailing state of lawlessness the guerrilla, emerging where rural brigands have always been, may appear in a traditionally defined role at least as familiar as that of the nominal government itself. Although revolutionary warfare thrives on backwardness, the response to it does not rest solely on socioeconomic reform. Fulfillment of popular aspirations and social justice are aims for substantially developed societies. In the critical meantime, regimes in underdeveloped areas can best reduce their vulnerability to insurgency by pursuit of more effective control and organization of their peoples.

112
Beecher, William. PSYOPS: A BLOODLESS WEAPON. National guardsman, v. 20, July 1966: 2-8.
UA42.N24, v. 20

Psychological warfare on civilians and enemy troops in South Vietnam is illustrated by specific examples of American and South Vietnamese forces trying to win over the enemy by peaceful means. A slightly edited transcript of an interview with a North Vietnamese defector appears at the end of the article.

113
Berindranath, Dewan. THE WAR WITH PAKISTAN. Delhi, Asia Press [1966] 144 p. illus.
DS384.B47

Narrates events of the Indo-Pakistan war from August 5, 1965 through September 23, 1965. "The emphasis is placed more on actual details of action than on analysis either of justice and injustice, or failure and success in achieving long range objectives."

114
Burnhauser, Anton. [BASIC CONCEPTS OF STRATEGY: AN ATTEMPT TO ILLUSTRATE AND DEFINE THEM] Grundbegriffe der Strategie. Ein Versuch zu ihrer Erläuterung und Abgrenzung. Wehrkunde, v. 15, Oct. 1966: 510-516. U3.W396, v. 15

Expounds on the evolution and different meanings of strategy from the time of ancient Greece to the present, especially with regard to the relationship between strategy and policy. Burnhauser feels that because of modern weapons--including psychological, educational, economic and other means--modern strategy has been totally integrated with policy.

115
Covington, Benjamin W. LIMITED WAR AND THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER. Armor, v. 75, July/Aug. 1966: 8-11. UE1.C33, v. 75

"A limited war is a war which is confined in time, space, effort, or in all three, which has limited objectives (implied or stated), and which may be concluded with a settlement short of unconditional surrender." Its causes include any number of political, economic, sociological, or military phenomena. Although states have fought limited wars in the past, until the last 10-15 years the history of U.S. warfare has not included the concept as defined today. Testimony given before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security by senior military commanders of the Korean War shows they were totally unprepared by their military and civilian leaders for the limitations and goals of the war they had to fight. The limited war concept challenges the long-accepted philosophy that total defeat of the enemy is and should be the ultimate objective of war. Today the professional soldier must know not only the technology of his trade, but the political causes and effects that will ultimately dictate his actions on the battlefield. An increasing number of professional soldiers are studying international relations and related subjects. Only through a complete understanding of the concept of limited war will the commander be able to most efficiently carry out his mission.

116
Garland, R. S. THE CONDUCT OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY WARFARE. Australian Army journal, no. 200 Jan. 1966: 10-28. U1.A92, 1966

Cites historical examples illustrating what the author considers the basic points to remember in planning the "military aspects of counter-insurgency warfare." Five basic counterguerrilla precepts are offered: "development of techniques for the conduct of fluid warfare, based on a large number of wireless controlled fighting patrols"; "cultivation of an offensive and energetic attitude"; increase in "mobility and cross-country performance of . . . infantry"; emphasis on "the importance of tactical deception"; concentration on "perfecting all basic infantry skills."

117
Heilbrunn, Otto. THE ALGERIAN EMERGENCY, 1954-1962. In Royal United Service Institution, London, Journal, v. 111, Aug. 1966: 230-234.
U1.R8, v. 111

Historical review of the methods employed by both the French and the rebels during the Algerian insurgency. Rebel strategy and French military countermeasures are mentioned and their political effectiveness in gaining the allegiance of the population is

analyzed. Mr. Heilbrunn believes the Algerian war proves that "even if the insurgents face military defeat, they may still win the war provided they have won popular support."

118
INDIA-PAKISTAN WAR. Pakistan horizon, v. 18, fourth quarter, 1965: 323-456.
DS376.P32, v. 18

Contents.--Pakistan and the world--quarterly survey.--Some aspects of the war, by Mohammad Musa.--The real issue in the present India-Pakistan war, by K. Sarwar Hasan.--The India-Pakistan war--a summary account, by Zubeida Hasan.--Diplomacy of the India-Pakistan war, by Khalida Qureshi.--The Rann of Kutch dispute, by Farzana Khan.--Documents.--Chronology.

Articles dealing with the background of this war and subsequent developments, with some special mention of the Kashmir question which was at the root of the conflict. The issue also contains a detailed chronology of the crisis period from September to November 1965 and the texts of the United Nations documents related to the conflict.

119
Kim, G. [ON THE NEW STAGE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION REVOLUTIONS] O novom etape natzional'no-osvoboditel'nykh revoliutzii. Aziia i afrika segodnia v. 10, July 1966: 2-4. DS1.S7, v. 10

Describes the factors leading to the "new stage" of national liberation revolutions and points out their new traits and tendencies as summarized at the 23d Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

120
Tilman, Robert O. THE NON-LESSONS OF THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY. Asian survey, v. 6, Aug. 1966: 407-419. DS1.A492, v. 6

The growing American involvement in Vietnam creates a tendency to seek precedent in the Malaysian experience. This is hazardous since the Malaysian emergency of 1948-60 offers few policy guidelines applicable to the Vietnamese setting. While the Malaysian insurgency was Communist inspired, it was aided by two other factors: the existence of a large unassimilated Chinese population and the fact that the ruling European power had been defeated by an Asian power, giving inspiration to any nationalistic postwar movement. Also the Korean War created an economic boom; the demand for tin and rubber made it more profitable to produce than fight. It can be said that the Briggs plan for political-military action against the insurgents was abetted by these and other, ethnic, factors which do not exist in Vietnam. Further, Malaysia is bordered by only Thailand and surrounded by ocean, which makes the supply and direction of an insurgent movement hazardous and expensive. In addition the British prepared the country for independence, were able to deal with native rulers, and made every effort to retain control over these local potentates. Vietnam is not granted any of these favorable variables. Native local government was broken by the French. Vietnam borders on a nation fostering and supplying the insurgents, and two other neighboring states, Laos and Cambodia, are apathetic toward the movement of materiel over their territory. The homogeniety of national sentiment brought about by ethnic similarities in Malaysia is contrasted with the Vietnamese inter-ethnic tribal dislikes--a situation compounded by the fact that the 600,000 Vietnamese aborigines do not understand the concept of sovereignty. The hamlet resettlement program succeeded in Malaysia because sentiment among the people was strongly with the central government and they did not have historic ties to the land. This is not the case in Vietnam. It can be concluded that: "The Malaysian Emergency and the present Vietnamese war, if not entirely of different genera, are at least two distinctly different species of 'national liberation wars.'" The parallels are so few that each experience must be examined in the light of its own variables; to do otherwise would be naive and fraught with political danger.

B. MODERN WEAPONRY AND RELATED TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

121
[AIRCRAFT TODAY] NATO's fifteen nations, v. 11, Aug./Sept. 1966: 18-96.
UA646.F5, v. 11

Partial contents.--The future of manned aircraft in the armed forces, by J. P. McConnell.--The European aircraft industry must be integrated, by A. E. M. Duynstee.--European co-operation in Britain's aerospace industry, by W. T. Gill.--European fighters: 1966, by John W. R. Taylor.--European bombers, by John W. R. Taylor.--Cargo planes in the Vietnam war, by James H. Winchester.--Helicopters in South Vietnam, by James H. Winchester.--The fleet air arm of the Royal Navy, by Sir Richard Smeeton.--AIRSOUTH: fifteen years of NATO airpower, by Grover Heiman.--The F-104S salutes Leonardo da Vinci, by Barney Oldfield.--Electronics in aerospace, by John Marriott.

Surveys NATO aircraft. J. P. McConnell expresses confidence that manned aircraft will play an increasingly large role in maintaining international security in the future, both independently and in combination with other forces. To reap the benefits of large-scale production, notes A. E. M. Duynstee, Europe must integrate its resources in the fields of aircraft construction, space, computers, and advanced electronics. Some of this cooperation is currently urged and planned by the British Government in the aerospace industry, according to W. T. Gill. John Taylor reviews European fighter aircraft briefly by country and discusses both tactical and strategic bombers. Sir Richard Smeeton declares that the need for fixed-wing carrier aviation still exists and that the decision to turn over the fixed-wing responsibilities of the Navy to land-based aircraft operated by the Royal Air Force will prove a mistake. Grover Heiman comments on AIRSOUTH, the Allied Air Forces in Southern Europe. The Italian-American arrangement for production of the F-104S is explained by Barney Oldfield. Finally John Marriott sketches the main items the electronics industry supplies to manufacturers of aircraft and space vehicles.

122
Anderson, Roland B. NEW WEAPONS FOR THE ARMY. Ordnance, v. 51, Sept./Oct. 1966: 154-158.
UF1.O67, v. 51

Many new weapons are being developed, primarily for use in Southeast Asia. Two aircraft weapons systems are being introduced: a minigun/rocket-launcher combination, and a dual 20-mm. gun installation for the Huey helicopter. In addition three guns and a guided missile are being developed for use in airborne operations: the minigun, the 40-mm. grenade launcher, the 30-mm. gun, and the 30-mm. helicopter subsystem. Several grenade launchers are

under study for ground and vehicle applications, and a new lightweight weapon, the CAR-15 "Commando," may replace the pistol for officers. In the area of combat vehicles the stress is on improving mobility and firepower. Also in process is an air-defense gun system to combat the low-altitude threat in frontal zones, and a 107-mm. mortar with lighter weight and increased firepower. Finally a new lightweight howitzer is presently being introduced for employment by direct-support airborne and air-mobile artillery units.

123
ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE 1966. Navy, v. 9, Oct. 1966: 10-34. VA49.N28, v. 9

Partial contents. --Martell says some fail to see the urgency in ASW effort, by Charles B. Martell. --Navy stressing disciplined management for greater reliability of ASW weapons and equipment, by C. A. Karaberis. --A Soviet view of antisubmarine warfare, by V. Demyanov. --Undersea warfare research team at Penn State aids U.S. Navy, by Helen M. Kovar. --Superb new ASW training devices provide peak of realism at fleet school, San Diego. --The busy "TACCO"--key man on seaplane ASW air patrols.

As the first part of a series on "Naval Power in Action" surveys antisubmarine warfare. Such warfare is described as a "fundamental aspect of control of the seas" on which depends the oceanic leadership of the United States.

124
[THE ARMED CHINOOK] Bewaffneter Chinook, von ct. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Oct. 10, 1966: 556-558. U3.W38, v. 10

For escort and support missions in connection with airborne operations Boeing Vertol has developed an armed version of the proven CH-47A Chinook transport helicopter. Three models of this version, which was first demonstrated in the USA in November 1965, are undergoing extensive operational testing in Vietnam. The armed Chinook is equipped with a wide range of weapons and has a horizontal firing range of 360 degrees. It carries some 2000 lb of armour to protect the crew and vital equipment. (Abstract supplied)

125
ARMY AVIATION. Data, v. 11, Aug. 1966: 9-58. P&GP RR

Presents texts of interviews with Army personnel who are directly involved in developing Army aviation. A Data staff analysis predicts a bright future for Army aviation, and recent and pending developments in Vietnam and elsewhere are explored. A brief pictorial section illustrates experimental aircraft and modified existing craft.

126
[THE BELL AH-1G HUEY COBRA ASSAULT HELICOPTER] Kampfhubschrauber Bell AH-1G. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Aug./Sept. 1966: 496-499. U3.W38, v. 10

A thorough and lengthy evaluation will certainly be needed before the experience gained in the Vietnam fighting can produce valid fingerposts for the development of future weapons. New tactics and operational methods will doubtless emerge. When the Bell AH-1G Huey Cobra assault helicopter goes into service, it will not only mean a direct reinforcement of American fighting strength, but may also point the way to future developments in the concept of modern airborne operations and supply valuable experience on which to base later helicopter weapons systems. (Abstract supplied)

127
Ching, Yi-hung. MAO'S NUCLEAR BASE AND PROSPECTS. Free China, review, v. 16, July 1966: 34-38. DS701.F74, v. 16

Lanchow, located in the heartland of China and at the center of a rail and highway network linking Sinkiang with southeastern China, has attracted world attention as a result of China's recent atomic tests. Since 1957 a number of nuclear research institutes have been established in Lanchow with the primary aim of applying nuclear techniques, not pursuing theoretical research. Many of China's top scientists are assigned there. In addition, many important ores and some uranium are being mined in the Lanchow region. In the early 1960's the Chinese constructed a gaseous diffusion plant at Lanchow that now produces nuclear fuel for military use. Considering both this concentration of nuclear research activities and other factors, Lanchow must be the base for China's military nucleonics. The Chinese Communist accomplishments in nuclear science are limited; their nuclear potential is considerable, but not nearly as tremendous as imagined in the West. They lack money, advanced industrial potential, and high-grade uranium. At most Peking may be able to make three atomic bombs a year.

128
Cockcroft, Sir John D. THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER. [St. Lucia] University of Queensland Press [1965] 15 p. (The John Murtagh Macrossan lectures, 1964) TK9155.C6

Predicts future developments in the field of nuclear-power generation. Sir John believes that the demand for power by the end of the century can only be met by using "a fundamentally different kind of reactor as a source of heat--the fast fission reactor." Fusion reactors are another possible source of power for the future.

129
Conway, H. G. [COOPERATION IN EUROPEAN AERONAUTICS] Die Zusammenarbeit in der europäischen Luftfahrt. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Aug./Sept. 1966: 467-469. U3.W38, v. 10

International cooperation between the European aircraft industries is today an economic necessity, since despite substantial past contributions to aviation development no European country is now capable of supporting the burden alone. Yet Europe cannot hope to maintain--let alone improve--her standard of living unless she plays her full part in advanced new technologies. Here defence expenditure is vital, and it would not seem sensible to buy weapons exclusively from the USA when the home industry has to be diverted to other work in order to earn the dollars to pay for them. However, effective cooperation is possible only between equals--equals in industrial potential, technical status, education. Then there are problems of communication, of understanding not only the other man's language but also his mental outlook and reactions; also technical problems arising, for example, from differences in systems of measurements. All these can be overcome in time. Perhaps the most difficult questions, however, are: firstly, should cooperation be planned and controlled in detail by governments, or left to the initiative of individual companies? The former practice may lead to fatal administrative delays in the case of civil projects

which must compete with the products of America's private industry. Secondly, how is work on a joint project to be shared, and who is to play the role of leader? The article concludes with a list of suitable projects for future international cooperation in Europe. (Abstract supplied)

130
[DEFENSE INDUSTRIES OF THE NEUTRAL STATES OF EUROPE] Die Rüstungsindustrien der neutralen Staaten Europas. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, no. 2, Mar./Apr., 1966: 117-119; no. 3, May/June: 202-209. illus.
P&GP RR

Outlines those production plans of Swiss and Swedish defense industries that--in the opinion of the editors--lend themselves to greater cooperation among the neutral states of Europe. The article describes in considerable detail the various types of weapons the plants manufacture and occasionally gives the volume of their production. Among the Swiss weapons discussed are the 20 and 30 mm machine cannons HS 804, HS 820, and HS 831, as well as the artillery and aircraft missiles developed and produced by Hispano Suiza S.A., a Swiss-based company, which in addition to its three plants in Geneva has similar installations in the Netherlands and Great Britain, plus "a considerable share" in the defense industry of other countries. The second part of the article deals with the Swedish company SAAB Aktienbolag and the air defense weapons systems it develops or produces; e.g. the SAAB 105 aircraft with its SAAB 305-A air-to-surface guided missiles and the STOL multi-purpose fighter. Also discussed at length are Sweden's "strategy of neutrality" and its 7 year plan for the development of air defenses.

131
Englebardt, Stanley L. STRATEGIC DEFENSES. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell [1966] 168 p.
UGb33. E55

Contents.--Introduction to the system.--The threat.--The concept.--Concurrency.--Atlas and Titan.--Minuteman.--The hard sites.--Polaris.--The FBM submarine.--BMEWS.--Rearward communications.--NORAD.--SAC.--Positive control.--The never-ending game.

Surveys and describes briefly the basic components of the U.S. "strategic defense system."

132
[THE FIGHTER FOR CONVENTIONAL SORTIES, LING-TEMCO-VOUGHT A-7A CORSAIR II] Kampfflugzeug für den konventionellen Einsatz, Ling-Temco-Vought A-7A Corsair II. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Aug./Sept. 1966: 493-496.
U3. W38, v. 10

The Americans, who for years past have insisted on highly sophisticated tactical strike aircraft designed primarily for nuclear operations, found themselves forced into the recognition in Vietnam that their air forces possess no light attack aircraft suitable for conventional warfare. Just how much of a handicap the lack of such an aircraft has been in Vietnam is shown by the recent development of the Ling-Temco-Vought A-7A Corsair II. The accompanying article presents a detailed account of the origin, development, design features, operational spectrum, maintenance and production progress of the Corsair II. The final paragraph headed "A Word about German Requirements . . ." suggests why it might be desirable for the Bundeswehr to take an interest in a modern tactical aircraft. The conclusion reached is that in the present political and strategic situation it is far more important to select a successor for the G. 91 than for the Starfighter. The G. 91, though procured by the German Air Force for purely conventional tactical missions, must be described as inadequate for this task in view of its very limited range and small military load capacity; it certainly is not capable of meeting the Army's requirements for effective air support. (Abstract supplied)

133
Freeman, Christopher. [SCIENCE POLICY IN GREAT BRITAIN] Wissenschaftspolitik in Grossbritannien. Atomzeitalter: Information und Meinung, no. 8, Aug. 1966: 233-242. tables.
P&GP RR

Appraises recent changes in Great Britain's science policy, especially the reorganization of the nation's research efforts. The author expounds on the Labour government's reorientation of a considerable part of those efforts from the military to nonmilitary fields of interest.

134
Gabrielli, Giuseppe. WHAT EUROPEAN INDUSTRY SHOULD DO FOR ITSELF TO COMPETE IN THE COMMON DEFENSE MARKET. Armed Forces management, v. 12, June 1966: 74, 79-80. illus.
UB153. A65, v. 12

Presents the prospects for Europe's aerospace industry and in this context emphasizes the importance of greater cooperation between Europe and the United States and among Europeans themselves. Gabrielli asserts that close industrial and political cooperation is essential for achieving technical-industrial progress in the military area. Also "it is mandatory that the closest relationship between European nations be established, both in the military and civil aircraft production activities" as the only alternative to complete reliance on foreign suppliers. Political dissension within NATO prevents European countries from organizing themselves "in order to assume their part of world's responsibility, according to their resources," and thereby from giving mankind the benefit of Europe's experience in world affairs.

135
Getler, Michael. AMOS MAY FEED NEW ABM DESIGNS. Technology week, v. 18, June 13, 1966: 20.
UG630. M54, v. 18

A new observatory is being developed for the Advanced Research Products Agency [ARPA], which will provide detailed optical measurements on U.S. ICBM's during the mid-course phase of their flight from Vandenburg AFB, Calif., to impact areas in the Far Pacific. To be known as the ARPA Mid-course Optical Observatory Station [AMOS], the observatory is to be located on the edge of a crater atop Mt. Haleakala on Maui, Hawaii. Speculation cannot be ruled out that AMOS could be utilized in measurements of Soviet ICBM flights in the Pacific area; hence AMOS might play a role in ABM development programs. According to ARPA officials, "hopefully optics, perhaps in combination with radar, may aid in the separation of re-entry vehicles from decoys during the mid-course phase where radar alone cannot. Very-long-range intercepts may then be feasible."

136
Getler, Michael. SOVIETS TRYING TO CLOSE STRATEGIC GAP. Technology week, v. 18, June 27, 1966: 14-15. UG630. M54, v. 18

The Soviet Union's rate of ICBM deployment and its deliverable megatonnage reflect much less of a disparity with the United States than was estimated earlier. The Soviets are not trying to match the United States in sheer numbers, but are adding several hundred missiles with large warheads to their inventory and deploying an antiballistic missile [ABM] system. The most likely reason for the increase is that Moscow's foreign policy initiatives have suffered since the early 1960's when U-2 overflights and the Cuban crisis exposed the Soviets' strategic inferiority. U.S. debate over the Nike-X is also a key factor prompting the Soviets to build more missiles. They are increasingly uneasy because the "so-called light attack version of Nike-X" under consideration to counter the Chinese threat could be augmented to disrupt if not totally negate an attack by the present Soviet ICBM force. While the vehicle the Soviets are using to expand their force is not known, they doubtless have the capability to produce large numbers of ICBM's. They may either expand the production base for the existing second-generation ICBM or add one of the three new vehicles which they have displayed in the past year. Their ability to lift very heavy warheads and the effects of exploding these even at high altitudes has renewed U.S. interest in missile defense, midcourse interception, and improved radar and optic techniques. The United States has also speeded the pace of its offensive preparations in response to the likelihood of a Soviet ABM deployment and to offset the forthcoming strategic missile buildup.

137
Getler, Michael. U.S. OPTING FOR NEW, LOW-COST ABM. Technology week, v. 18, June 20, 1966: 14-16. UG630.M54, v. 18

The United States appears to be moving toward deployment of a thin area-defense antiballistic missile [ABM] system, a decision based in large part on intelligence estimates of Chinese programs and capabilities. The "light" system could later be augmented with Sprint missiles for terminal defense of selected targets and with additional radars and data processing equipment for either a more sophisticated Chinese strike or limited protection against a Soviet strike. Major improvements in the new version of the Nike-Zeus also bear heavily on the decision: the new missile has greater range, a larger warhead, and higher maneuverability. A Chinese missile penetration would involve fewer vehicles than a Soviet barrage, as well as relatively few decoys. Thus the thin defense would not totally obscure radar visibility with ABM warhead explosions as a large-scale defense might. Although many within the top levels of the Defense Department hold that defending against a Soviet first strike is futile, feeling exists that a thin-area antiballistic missile system could be successfully augmented to counter a Soviet second strike directed at targets other than U.S. strategic retaliatory forces. The Soviet penchant for very large warheads that would cause unacceptable damage even if exploded at an altitude beyond the current range of the Sprint missile also increases the interest in thin-area defense. Finally, military spokesmen agree, with some uneasiness, that testing in violation of the nuclear test ban treaty is not necessary for deployment of the thin defense but is essential for a system to meet more sophisticated threats.

138
Giese, Fritz E. [ARMAMENTS OF MEDIUM AND SMALL NAVAL FORCES] Rüstungen mittlerer und kleiner Seestreitkräfte. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, July 10, 1966: 428-431. U3.W38, v. 10

Contends that medium and small naval forces have generally gained in importance in recent years, both militarily and politically. The author outlines the most important changes in the naval power status of the world's leading nations from the time of World War I. He gives data on, and appraises, the present strength of medium and small naval forces operating on the Norwegian, Baltic, North, and Mediterranean seas, and in East and Southeast Asia.

139
Giese, Fritz E. [NEW SHIPS--NEW ARMS] Andere Schiffe--andere Waffen. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Oct. 10, 1966: 574-575. U3.W38, v. 10

Reports on new trends in weapons systems in the U.S., British, French, Italian, Danish, Norwegian, Portuguese, Swedish, and Japanese navies. Giese also discusses new antisubmarine defense systems, introduced recently by the British the French and the U.S. navies.

140
Gürth, Walter. [WILL ROCKET WEAPONS SUPPLANT THE ARTILLERY'S BARREL WEAPONS?] Werden die Raketenwaffen die Rohrwaffen der Artillerie verdrängen? Truppenpraxis, no. 7, July 1966: 505-509. illus. U3.T7, 1966

Asserts that medium-range (5 to 30 km) artillery "barrel-weapons" are very unlikely to be wholly replaced by nonnuclear rockets of the same range. Currently the barrel weapons in question comprise 105 to 203 mm cannons. Gürth outlines the present effectiveness of both kinds of weapons and speculates on major performance improvements in each for the next 10 to 20 years. He considers the actual and potential advantages of rockets over barrel weapons (in targeting, for instance) greatly outweighed by economic factors, mostly the costs and the logistic problems. At present rockets require three times greater propellant than do the cannons (for the same task), and the rocket propellant is by far more expensive than that used in cannon. Gürth suggests that in each period of development a new balance be established between both weapon systems according to the variants that determine their relative value.

141
Haavind, Robert. ELECTRONICS NEEDED FOR GUERRILLA WARFARE. Electronic design, v. 14, Aug. 2, 1966: 36-47. TK7800.E437, v. 14

Interviews with a number of electronic specialists at the Special Forces training camp in North Carolina to determine what developments and improvements in equipment they would like to see. Among those suggested were homing devices to assist in finding air-dropped supply bundles, metal detectors for ambushes and perimeter defense, and blasting caps for mines actuated by radio signals. Improvements were urged in the design of equipment, such as better cooling devices, greater design simplicity, and protection of delicate equipment from power surges. The specialists suggested that engineers get first-hand knowledge of battlefield conditions, so they can understand the designs needed to fill combat requirements.

142
Hahn, K. Robert. NATIONAL DEFENSE AND ITS INFLUENCE ON AN AUTOMATION POLICY. Automation, v. 13, July 1966: 102-111. illus. TJ212.A8, v. 13

The development of automation equipment and techniques has been both aided and required by American defense requirements. "Without automation there would be no national security for us today, and it would be questionable if we would be able to continue to exist as a world power at all." Since World War II, when the Army and Air Force first sponsored research programs in computer potential, computer use has influenced almost every aspect of the Federal Government's operations. Defense Department [DOD] expenditures remained constant between 1962-1965, yet there was a significant increase in the Department's investment in computers. The Government, particularly DOD, has taken the lead in the development of standardized programming relating to business and research applications of computers. In defense-related research programs, the computer made it possible for the United States to develop sophisticated missile and radar systems and to speed up major weapon research programs. The fallout from these defense-related activities has worked its way into civilian applications of computers. The state of computer art in the Soviet Union has probably reached a high level of proficiency, for its large weapon-system advances and space ventures also must require computers. Although the Soviets may still lag in civilian computer applications, the value of these machines was recognized by delegates to the 20th and 21st Party Congresses, who believed that computers will help the Soviet Union achieve mastery over the capitalist world. Each nation has shown a reluctance to allow "the art of automation to take its rightful place in the affairs of the country." By acknowledging the interrelationship between continued technological advancement and computers America will be able to master an increasingly complex and dangerous world.

143
HOW SCAMP KEEPS ARMY'S SERGEANT UP-TO-DATE, OPERATIONALLY READY. Armed Forces management, v. 12, June 1966: 121, 123-124.
UB153.A65, v. 12

One of the toughest problems with any piece of equipment in the hands of troops is insuring that it is kept up-to-date. Although modifications can be sent through channels, there is no assurance that they will be applied, or that, if they are, they will be applied correctly. With the complexity of missile systems, it becomes extremely important not only to have the modifications effected but also to minimize the number of differing systems in the field. To lick this problem, the Army Missile Command's Sergeant project has evolved a contractor "mod team" concept which has been extremely successful. Pershing also has such a team concept, differing primarily in numbers of people, permanency, and geographical dispersal of the teams. Hawk is just picking up the concept and Nike-Hercules has examined its applicability to that system. Its sponsors feel that this modification concept should be applied not only to missiles but to all major pieces of Army equipment. (Abstract supplied, modified)

144
Leary, Frank. THE ANTI-SUB SUBMARINE. Space/aeronautics, v. 46, July 1966: 52-66.
TL501.A786, v. 46

Discusses the many technological problems which must be solved if the United States is to meet the threat from the massive submarine buildup by the Soviet Union: more effective communications with submerged, surface, and airborne elements; more discriminating sensors; simpler, more practical fire-control systems; more precise and reliable navigation; improved weapons; improved hull design, especially of control surfaces; and better overall system design and reliability.

145
McElheny, Victor K. EAST-WEST EXCHANGES OF TECHNOLOGY INCREASE RAPIDLY. Science, v. 153, July 8, 1966: 156-158. Q1.S35, v. 153

The rapidly expanding trade between Communist and non-Communist countries, most of it the transfer of technology from West to East, is having unexpected effects. Such exchanges indicate a considerable deficiency in applied technology in the Soviet Union, which in turn spurs East European countries toward independent economic activity. Western industrialists now have wider opportunities to benefit from their research and development. Many Westerners fear that the expanding technological trade will compromise advanced techniques of both strategic and economic importance, but others argue that this underestimates the vast superiority of a private competitive economy over a totalitarian one. Studies of the chemical industry in particular show that Soviet engineers are backward in applying modern technology gained through exchanges and lack originality in applying it toward new discoveries. The little-known Coordinating Committee [COCOM] in Paris, representing 14 Western nations, reviews East-West trade in the light of its significance to Western defense. One of COCOM's important decisions last fall permits the sale of power reactors to Communist countries for peaceful uses. COCOM is now considering the exportation of computers. Technological trade can have economic, as well as strategic ramifications, which was demonstrated by the entry of the Soviet Union into the world oil market. Perhaps eventually trade will be less one sided, and the West will buy more from the Eastern nations. Prospects for expanded trade brightened in 1965 when the Soviet Union adhered to the world agreement internationally recognizing patent rights of inventors. Where Western industrialists formerly feared a patented process would be copied in the Soviet Union without remuneration to them, this barrier to international trade is now lowered.

146
McElheny, Victor K. FRANCO-RUSSIAN COLLABORATION IN SCIENCE: DE GAULLE'S VISIT. Science, v. 153, July 1, 1966: 43-45.
Q1.S35, v. 153

Charles de Gaulle is showing the world how cooperation in science and technology can be used as a tool of diplomacy. De Gaulle and the Soviet leaders did not talk conclusively about broad political questions last spring in Moscow, but strong political motives lurked behind the purportedly trivial agreements on technology and space. Pressures other than a desire to "score points off the United States" account for the Soviet Union's motivation for increased trade with the West. Western observers note that highly placed Soviet scholars and officials are worried about their country's continued economic inefficiency and political and military isolation. Franco-Russian moves toward scientific and technological collaboration have steadily taken place over the last 3 years. As early as January 1964, for example, Konstantin N. Rudnev, chairman of the Soviet State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research Work, visited France. In the

first part of 1966 French space scientists visited the Soviet Union to explore the possibility of French experiments or complete satellites being launched by Soviet rockets. The two nations have already taken a significant step in the field of high-energy physics with the French construction of an extremely large hydrogen-bubble chamber to be installed at Serpukhov, south of Moscow, by about 1969. According to the agreement French physicists will have access to this and similar joint projects in other areas. France thus may reap very large dividends from its rather idealistic and generous policy in some fields of scientific cooperation.

147
McGeoch, I. L. M. SUBMARINE DEVELOPMENTS. In Royal United Service Institution, London, Journal, v. 111, Aug. 1966: 199-207.
U1.R8, v. 111

"A lecture given at the R. U. S. I. by Rear Admiral I. L. M. McGeoch . . . on 16th February 1966." Discussion is given p. 204-207.

Comments on post-World War II developments in the design and military capabilities of submarines. Stress is placed on American innovations, British adaptations, and Soviet responses. Wider use of these warships in the future, especially in combat situations that pit submarine against submarine, is predicted.

148
Martell, Charles B. DEFENDING THE SEA. Naval engineers journal, v. 78, Aug. 1966: 617-620.
VM1.A5, v. 78

Reprinted from Industrial Research, Mar. 1966.

The use of the sea is absolutely essential to the United States and its Western allies. More than 99 percent of the goods transported within the alliance moves by maritime traffic. The Soviet Union currently has over 400 submarines, which is four times as many as the United States and the largest submersible fleet ever assembled by one nation. Therefore antisubmarine warfare [ASW] contributes most vitally to the U.S. Navy's overall mission of controlling the seas. Two basic areas are of interest in this field: detection, tracking, and identification; and destruction of hostile craft. Although it still has many shortcomings, sonar's detection and range have improved greatly since World War II. General advances have been made in use of acoustics, signal processing, and understanding of the various refracting surfaces and media of the oceans. Advances in weapon range and speed of delivery have matched the gains in submarine detection. Four important new weapons systems include ASROC, a surface launched antisubmarine rocket; SUBROC, a submarine launched antisubmarine rocket; DASH, a remote-controlled drone antisubmarine helicopter; and new rocket-propelled homing torpedoes. These weapons generally meet the challenge of the newer submarines, even the high speed nuclear ones. The Soviets also have a sizable antisubmarine warfare problem, and their capabilities are estimated as somewhat inferior to those of the United States. ASW forces in England are a good deal smaller, but their basic capabilities are excellent. Other nations of the Western alliance also have capable forces within the limits of their size. Since the submarine has become much more deadly with its ability to lauch ballistic and cruise missiles, the quest for rapidly reacting detect and destroy systems has gained primary significance.

149
Molter, Günther. [FRANCE'S AVIATION INDUSTRY: SUD-AVIATION'S HELICOPTER] Frankreich's Luftfahrtindustrie: Sud-Aviation: Hubschrauber. Flug-Revue, no. 10, Oct. 1966: 30-32. illus.
TL503.C524, 1966

During the past, France has successfully established her own helicopter industry which is dominant in Europe and occupies the second place in the western world in production capacity and programme variety. This special branch is served by Sud Aviation's main manufacturing plant at Marseille-Marignane and, for sales handling, at La Courneuve. Both facilities employ a total of 5000 men, 700 of whom are busy in research and development. Since the installation of these facilities, Sud Aviation has produced no less than 2000 helicopters which have been sold to 49 countries. The present programme comprises four basic types: Alouette II with both Artouste and Astazou turbines, the 'light' helicopter, the more capacious Alouette III, SA 330, the new medium helicopter for assault purposes, and SA 321 Super Frelon, the heavy transport and multi purpose helicopter. These helicopters are well suited for military and civil application. To complement the programme, a new light helicopter of advanced design is under development at present: the SA 340. The author covers this programme in detail and gives in the conclusion a summary of the light plane programme of Sud which was established with the adoption of the Gardan Horizon, the MS Rallye Commodore and, if a decision for production will be made, the Moynet Jupiter 360. (Abstract supplied)

150
Müller, Konrad. [ATOM FUEL: GERMAN NUCLEAR RESEARCH HAS VIGOROUSLY CAUGHT UP] Brennstoff Atom. Die deutsche Kernforschung hat stark aufgeholt. Die Zeit, v. 21, Oct. 4, 1966: 14.
AP30.Z39, v. 21

Reports on the progress in nuclear research made by West Germany in recent years. In 1956, the author states, the German Federal Republic was lagging behind the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union; today it is their equal in many fields of nuclear research, due mostly to the development of fast-breeder reactors. These have proved to be great uranium savers and far more economical than reactors using isotope U-235. The fast-breeder reactors convert uranium 238 to plutonium more rapidly than plutonium is burned as fuel in the process of generating electric power. The surplus plutonium can be used for fuel in nuclear reactors. With the economies achieved this way "the uranium deposits in the world will be practically inexhaustible."

151
[THE NATIONAL COMPANY FOR PROMOTING ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY] Nationale Gesellschaft zur Förderung der industriellen Atomtechnik. Chemische Rundschau, v. 19, July 21, 1966: 483.
TP1.C3485, v. 19

Excerpts of the report delivered by the board of directors of the Swiss National Company for Promoting Atomic Industrial Technology on June 29, 1966, to its regular meeting of shareholders. According to the report the production of "fissionable-material elements" was initiated by the company in the early part of 1965 "with very satisfactory results." By the end of September a Committee representing the French Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique and Société Industrielle de Combustible Nucléaire Therm-Atom decided on final "purchase specifications" according to which "the series production of segments" was to be

made. "At year's end a great part of the uranium rods were molded and about one third of the segments produced were ready to be picked up." The Swiss company has also conducted talks with the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited on possible cooperation in the area of reactors and associated matters. With French nuclear industry there has been a regular exchange of information on nuclear plant equipment.

152
National Security Industrial Association. MOTIVATION AND SUPPORT OF R&D TO ACHIEVE NATIONAL GOALS: PROCEEDINGS OF R&D SYMPOSIUM. Washington, c1965. 208 p. illus.
Q180.U5N34

The symposium was held Nov. 3-4, 1965, in Washington.

Proceedings of the four sessions of the symposium: "Research and Development as a Vital Force in Modern Science," "New Programs Affecting R&D of the Future," "Free Enterprise R&D Meets the Challenge," and "Impact of Government-Industry R&D Relationships."

153
NAVAER WEAPONS & AVIONICS. Data, v. 11, Sept. 1966: 13-44. P&GP RR

Contains assessments of the Navy's need for improved air forces, particularly in connection with its roles in undersea warfare and the Vietnam War. A guest editorial by Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air), and interviews with the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Air), the Director of Avionics for the Naval Air Systems Command, the ASW program manager's Assistant for Air, the Director of the Photographic Management Office, and the chief of its research and development branch, as well as a Data staff analysis of Defense Department support for new research programs all reflect the Navy's preoccupation with filling antisubmarine and reconnaissance roles.

154
NUCLEX 66: INTERNATIONAL FAIR AND TECHNICAL MEETINGS FOR NUCLEAR INDUSTRIES, BASEL/SWITZERLAND, 8 TO 14 SEPTEMBER 1966. Neue Technik. Nouvelles techniques. New techniques, v. 8, Aug. 1966: 211-260. illus.
TJ212.N4, v. 8

English, French, or German.

Information on the lines of specialization in the nuclear industry (or auxiliary fields) of each firm represented at the Nuclex 66 fair. The article lists and describes the full spectrum of products (from nuclear reactors to precision instruments of various types) used by the industry and exhibited at the fair by hundreds of leading companies from several countries.

155
O'Ballance, Edgar. NUCLEAR LAND MINES. Ordnance, v. 51, Sept./Oct. 1966: 165-166.
UF1.O67, v. 51

Nuclear land mines are part of America's tactical nuclear armament. Russia too has many of these weapons and is planning to use them for offensive and defensive purposes. Yet few facts concerning nuclear land mines have been made public. It is known that they can be controlled and detonated by electric locks, that each one of them may have explosive power approximating one kiloton, and that their effectiveness is greatly enhanced because they can be set off by remote control. Traditionally land mines are a "defensive" weapon; nuclear ones will be best used in a protective role, mainly to block military movements. From the strategic viewpoint, a number of mines carefully deployed could nullify the Soviet doctrine of large army "fronts," composed of all arms, that are completely mobile and thrust ahead at the rate of 60 miles a day. The disadvantages resulting from the use of nuclear land mines are significant, however. Since they have a ground burst they throw up much radioactive fallout unless they are buried deep to be used for demolition or earth-moving. Another drawback is that they can be detonated only once, and therefore their optimum use depends on human skill and judgment. On balance the West German arguments for a nuclear land-mine network along the Iron Curtain appear strong. But too much faith in such a defensive network could instill the type of attitude that proved fatal to France in 1940. An additional consideration is that the nuclear land mine, in signifying the use of atomic weapons at the very beginning of a conflict, would cause the fighting to escalate more quickly.

156
Pergent, J. [THE FRENCH ATOMIC TEST CENTER IN THE PACIFIC] Das französische Atomversuchszentrum im Pazifik. Wehrkunde, v. 15, Sept. 1966: 467-469. U3.W396, v. 15

Informs on and generally evaluates the French nuclear tests center in French Polynesia, which is supposedly used for nuclear arms tests of much greater magnitude than the two other French atomic test sites in the Sahara. Pergent indicates that France's first thermonuclear test will take place after 1967 at the earliest, due to its inadequate facilities for producing pure uranium 235.

157
Poschmann, Georg. [THE JOINT FRENCH-GERMAN PROJECT TRANSALL C-160] Das deutsch-französische Gemeinschaftsprojekt Transall C 160. Flugwelt, v. 18, Aug. 1966: 592-600.
TL503.F626, v. 18

Points out the advantages of international cooperation in developing and producing military aircraft as shown by the development of the tactical transport airplane Transall C-160 by a consortium of French and West German companies. The author describes various phases of the project, gives detailed technical data on the plane, and explains how work was divided among the participating firms and how the aircraft was adapted to the different logistic requirements of France and Germany. Regardless of the various producers within the syndicate, actual or potential, each component is fully exchangeable, and the aircraft itself can be easily adapted to civilian commercial use--a fact which has insured the product optimal marketing potential at low cost. Another important advantage of international projects of this kind is the combined production capacity of syndicated firms, allowing an instant production increase in case of emergency without too much stress on individual producers.

158
Pretsch, J. [EUROPEAN COOPERATION IN NUCLEAR RESEARCH] Europäische Zusammenarbeit in der Kernforschung. Atomwirtschaft--Atomtechnik, v. 11, Aug./Sept. 1966: 420-421.
TK9001.A97, v. 11

The Director of Department III, "Nuclear Research", in the German Federal Ministry for Scientific Research in a contribution to a symposium at the 1966 Hanover Fair expressed some thoughts on future research and development in Euratom after the fusion of the European Commissions. The main problem concerns the future of the joint Euratom Nuclear Research Centres which originally had the task of reducing the USA lead in this field. This task was not in fact accomplished in these Centres but rather in the National Centres of the member countries which were created as well. The nuclear research establishment, particularly the Centre at Ispra, should in the future be less dependent upon the Headquarters in Brussels. Some consideration should be given to the possible use of this Centre for coordinating other fields in the new technology than nuclear research. The collaboration through Euratom Association Contracts has proved a success but this form does not appear quite so suitable for the building of large prototype reactors. German industry at least would much prefer to collaborate in this area directly with the industries of the partner countries. The overall success which has been achieved in Germany in the atomic field with a small administrative section (in the Ministry) and a large advisory body (in the German Atomic Commission) makes it seem desirable also to advance international collaboration less through a supranational authority than through authoritive committees of government representatives and scientists. (Abstract supplied)

159
Rao, M. N., and others, MASS-YIELD DISTRIBUTION OF THE FISSION PRODUCTS IN FALLOUT FROM THE 14 MAY 1965 NUCLEAR EXPLOSION. Science, v. 153, Aug. 5, 1966: 633-635.
Q1.S35, v. 153

Twenty single particles separated from a 20-liter sample of rain collected in Osaka, Japan, shortly after the 14 May 1965 test explosion of the Chinese nuclear device, were analyzed radiochemically. The abundance pattern of the fission products in these particles resembled the shape of the mass-yield curve for the thermal neutron-induced fission of uranium-235, except for the facts that cesium-137 and strontium-90 were markedly depleted and the yields near the symmetric fission region appeared to be somewhat enhanced. (Abstract supplied)

160
Reinhardt, George C. THE DOCTRINAL GAP. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 92, Aug. 1966: 61-69.
V1.U6, v. 92

Discusses the role of nuclear weapons that were developed for tactical use in unified air-sea-ground campaigns and the controversy they have generated. The author fears that controversy over their use will retard technological advances and produce a serious handicap in weapon production. It is well known that some tactical nuclear weapons are available, and greatly improved versions are technically feasible. In 1950 President Harry Truman rejected a recommendation to abandon the thermonuclear-weapons program because he felt that he could not risk the Russians getting the weapon first. The author feels that in the case of tactical nuclear weapons Truman's example should be followed.

161
[RELATION OF MILITARY POWER BETWEEN EAST AND WEST] Das militärische Kräfteverhältnis zwischen Ost und West. Wehrkunde, v. 15, Oct. 1966: 547-548.
U3.W396, v. 15

Summarizes the recent annual report of the British Institute for Strategic Studies. The report deals with the strength and equipment of most of the important Armed Forces in the world, especially those of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Chinese People's Republic.

162
Richardson, Robert C. DEFENSE ON THE TECHNOLOGICAL FRONT: ANTICIPATE THE ATTACK. Air Force magazine, v. 49, June 1966: 98-102.
UG633.A65, v. 49

Department of Defense research and development activities have a dual responsibility: development and acquisition of new weapons in support of the operating forces, and development and maintenance of the scientific and technological base to meet future threats. The "technological war" differs from hot or cold war in that the opponent is not as obvious, and the threat is not as easily measured in terms of forces, weapons, or aggression. The objective is to maintain a worldwide technological superiority ensuring America's discovery of new breakthroughs before other nations, thereby enhancing the Nation's security and its international economic posture. The increased importance of innovation and the long lead times in the realization of advanced weapons systems have tended to decouple military research from operating requirements. The military must be free to undertake research based on considerations other than a visible military threat, and the Government must subsidize the scientific and technological base on which industry can produce future weapons systems. Maintenance of U.S. technological supremacy is wholly compatible with disarmament and arms control aspirations, because the independence of research and operating forces allows a "firebreak" between discoveries and translation into arms. At this point arms control and other policy considerations can and should be introduced. Arms control must come by decisions not to acquire weapons for inventory rather than by decisions not to invest in the necessary science and technology. In the less than all-out wars that prevail in this decade the broadest possible technological base is essential. The technological war must be won now to win the hot and cold wars of the 1970's.

163
Rothschild, J. H. CHEMICAL WARFARE. Ordnance, v. 51, Sept./Oct. 1966: 168-170.
UF1.O67, v. 51

Characteristics of various types of chemical weapons from mild incapacitants (tear gas) to potentially lethal types of nerve gas (anticholinesterase agents) described by the retired Chief of Research and Development of the Army Chemical Corps.

164
Sherwin, Chalmers W. HOW DO WEAPON SYSTEMS GET BORN?--PROJECT HINDSIGHT SEEKS ANSWER. Armed Forces management, v. 12, June 1966: 115-116, 118.
UB153.A65, v. 12

In the last 20 years the Defense Department has spent over $10 billion on research and technology. In 1964 "Project Hindsight," an assessment of the return on this large investment, was undertaken to see if there was "a favored way of managing it to produce high pay-off." The subsystems and components of the Bullpup air-to-ground tactical guided-missile were

analyzed as the Bullpup exemplifies efficient management. The question was asked: "What recent scientific knowledge of new technology is important to the increasing of the performance or reducing the cost?" Investigators learned that significant findings from other projects had been transferred to the Bullpup system. In general improvements that are the result of independent research can be added only if the management system permits it. There must be a "continual flow of innovating technology into a weapon system at all stages" for maximum upgrading of its performance and reduction of cost. It is the cumulative synergistic effect of various innovations that allows for radical improvement, and a decade or more is required for innovations to collect "to the point where one can show the feasibility of a radically improved design." Also a number of additional innovations--from 20 to 30 percent--are required to make the radically improved design practicable. Currently over 700 "research or exploratory development events" have been studied. Approximately 80 percent of these events were funded by Department of Defense dollars. Pure research accounts for 2 to 3 percent of these events while 20 to 30 percent occur after the contract is let. Need, it turned out, was the prime motivator of almost all events, and the flexibility of funding made it possible to overcome unforeseen problems in the early stages of development. Decentralized decisionmaking is essential investigators learned; as an example of this principle the new digital management information system for on going work in NASA and DOD allows for individual initiative and coordination of the national program.

165
[SOMEWHERE IN THE U.S.S.R.: GROUND-TO-AIR AND GROUND-TO-GROUND MISSILES] Quelque part en U.R.S.S.: des missiles sol-air et sol-sol. Air & Cosmos, v. 4, Oct. 22, 1966: 20-21.
P&GP RR

Publishes for the first time photographs of Soviet missiles taken "somewhere in the U.S.S.R." by a reporter who was present at the launching of one of them. The photos were released in Western Germany by the Soviet "Novosti" news agency and probably represent the TS5-C("Frog") missile, the famous Sam-2 missile, one intermediate-range ballistic missile in its silo, and one intercontinental ballistic missile.

166
Starbird, Alfred D. COMMUNICATIONS SURVIVABILITY A NATIONAL MUST. Signal, v. 21, Sept. 1966: 12-14.
UG1.M65, v. 21

Increased attention has been focused on the survivability of communications facilities in the face of a natural disaster or nuclear attack. Three steps are necessary. First, the operation of the circuitry sensing and conveying diplomatic matters must be protected. Second, such a system must be immune to overload. Third, a part of the system must withstand nuclear attack. Provisions for survivability "center on redundancy, operational direction and recognized priority for restoral." U.S. provisions have been made for interpolarity and priority of usage, and the Defense Communications Agency has established a "world-wide control complex to sense the condition of all circuitry and traffic loads and to direct restoration and reroute." Other agencies have agreed to this system of priorities. Flexible facilities are being developed that will be able to withstand nuclear attack and also function in overseas areas like Vietnam and in purely national contingencies. Capabilities that are almost invulnerable to nuclear attack are also under development.

167
TACTICAL AIR WARFARE. Space/aeronautics, v. 44, Nov. 1965: 59-95. TL501.A786, v. 44

This special report is concerned with a vital area of tactical warfare technology: systems for locating and hitting tactical targets from the air. It consists of four articles: 1. Air-to-Ground Missiles. Our progress in developing weapons that can be delivered on ground targets more accurately and from greater distances. 2. Air-to-Air Missiles. The problem of adding range and versatility to the weapons we need to insure air superiority. 3. Guiding Tactical Missiles. Building greater range, accuracy and autonomy into the guidance systems of airborne tactical missiles. 4. Targeting for Air Attack. The application of multiple sensors and automated interpretation to the tactical targeting problem. These articles . . . underline the vital role advanced technology can play in tactical air warfare. To develop this technology is surely one of the most important and most interesting technical challenges facing the aerospace industry today. (Editors' summary)

168
Thalau, K. [THE GERMAN AVIATION INDUSTRY] Die deutsche Luftfahrtindustrie. Flug-Revue, no. 10, Oct. 1966: 20-21. TL503.C524, 1966

Outlines the last 10 years and predicts for the next few years the development of the German Federal Republic's aerospace industry. The author, president of the Federal Association of the German Aerospace Industry (Bundesverband der Deutschen Luft- und Raumfahrtindustrie), sharply criticizes the Bonn government's policy of purchasing military aircraft in the United States as seriously inhibiting proper development of the West German aerospace industry.

169
U.S. Air Force. Strategic Air Command. THE PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND, 1946-1965. Offutt Air Force Base, Nebr. [1965?] 92 p. UG633.A47, 1965

A year to year report of the organizational, technical, and tactical advances of SAC forces since their inception in 1946, as well as of some of the outstanding feats performed by men of this command.

170
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DECISION TO REDUCE THE NUMBER AND TYPES OF MANNED BOMBERS IN THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND: HEARINGS, JANUARY 25, 26, 27, 28, FEBRUARY 1 and 2, 1966. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. p. 6077-6304. UG633.A412, 1966

Testimony by Air Force and Defense Department witnesses about America's manned strategic aircraft.

171
Wetmore, Warren C. BRITISH MISSILE INDUSTRY SHOWS STRENGTH. Aviation week & space technology, v. 85, Sept. 26, 1966: 135, 139, 141, 144-145.
TL501.A8, v. 85

The British missile industry appears vigorous despite the uncertainty hovering over the future of the aerospace industry. One of the newest weapons to be unveiled is the Short Brothers' Blowpipe, "a shoulder-launched, optically guided radio command missile." Another is the Anglo-French Martel, two versions of which are nearing completion. One, the AS.37, is designed to defeat tight radar discipline by holding its course even after the target radar is turned off. The other, the television-guided AJ.168, provides direct visual identification of the target without coming within visual or radar range. Still another missile on which new details are available is the Sea Dart, "an integral ramjet-powered weapon for use against aircraft and ships," slated to be one of the main armaments of the new Type 82 frigates ordered by the Royal Navy. Also scheduled for inclusion on the Type 82 frigates is the Ikara antisubmarine system. In flight the Ikara missile is radar-tracked and radio-controlled from the launching ship, with its arming point continuously updated and corrected by sonar inputs from the ship and from dunking sonar-equipped helicopters.

C. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES AND MILITARY STRATEGIES

172
Alt, Helmut. [PLANNING FOR AND TRAINING OF A NEW GENERATION OF PILOTS AT GERMANY'S LUFTHANSA] Planung und Ausbildung des Pilotennachwuchses bei der Deutschen Lufthansa. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Oct. 10, 1966: 551-553.
U3.W38, v. 10

Under its long-range plans up to 1975 Lufthansa will need 1000 to 1200 "new" pilots, that is, young pilots trained by the company itself. In addition, and not least because of its excellent reputation, the Lufthansa Flying Training School in Bremen under the management of Flight Captain Vermaaten has undertaken the training of Bundeswehr pilots, on Bundeswehr aircraft and in close cooperation with the Bundeswehr Staff, as well as of foreign students under the German aid programme for the developing countries. Although the training programme offered is today exemplary in both extent and quality, the number of trained pilots required each year can no longer be turned out without expansion. The programme for this expansion calls for a second training centre to be set up at Augsburg, which will be in addition to the Flensburg and Peine out-stations already in operation. Once Augsburg comes into operation the Lufthansa flying training school will be the biggest civilian pilot training establishment in the Western world. (Abstract supplied, modified)

173
[THE ARMY OF THE AIR--BUILDING UP A MODERN FRENCH AIR FORCE] L'Armée de l'Air--Aufbau einer modernen französischen Luftstreitkraft. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Aug./Sept. 1966: 478-481.
U3.W38, v. 10

The "French way of life," particularly in the political realm, is perhaps not to everybody's taste. The President of the Fifth Republic has created a style especially for his country, a style which appears to find expression in an unmistakable claim to national pre-eminence such as other nations have been reluctant to accept. However, a decade of courageous and obstinate French policy is now beginning to be reflected in practical shape. In the military field this is evident in the independent national atomic capability and in the reorganized French Air Force as the practical instrument of this capability. A military policy based on independent decisions also means independence in the economic and industrial field, hence an efficient, modern aircraft industry. In order to learn more about these developments, two members of our editorial staff recently paid personal visits to France, one to the French Air Force's military establishments, the other to the aircraft industry. The results of these visits are impressive. The Air Force was found to be passionately keen about the new concept of national defence, and its members are learning to handle and operate their flying equipment by entirely unorthodox--and very French--methods. The French aircraft industry, which supplies the Air Force with its weapons, has adopted modern technologies on a broad scale and in this respect need no comparison with the great pace-setters in the United States. The outstanding technical initiative of French engineers finds expression in a multitude of new aircraft designs and engines, some of which are to be produced in quantity in cooperation with other countries. At present no fewer than six major projects have been agreed upon with Britain, a sign that the aura of the French aircraft industry's technical and productive capacity is beginning to exert wide-spread influence on Britain's defence policies. (Abstract supplied)

174
Barnett, Frank R., William C. Mott, and John C. Neff, eds. PEACE AND WAR IN THE MODERN AGE: PREMISES, MYTHS AND REALITIES. Garden City, N.Y., Anchor Books, 1965. 421 p.
D843.B33

Partial contents.--Prologue: unilateral disarmament.--The historical setting.--The world in flux.--Communist ideology, strategy, and tactics.--Alternate strategies: the continuing debate.--The role of the military.--What forward strategy for America?

Reprints articles on contemporary world politics and national security policies that were written before Khrushchev's deposition and the change of power relations among the various Communist parties. The compendium has been assembled under the assumption that "the hierarchical chiefs of a Communist church militant, steeped in the same dogma for nearly fifty years, are not likely to entertain premises or develop outlooks that diverge in any pronounced degree from established Party tenets."

175
BASIC U.S. FOREIGN POLICY COMMITMENTS & THE QUESTION OF REDUCTION OF U.S. TROOPS IN EUROPE: PRO & CON. Congressional digest, v. 45, Oct. 1966: 225-256. JK1.C65, v. 45

Contents.--Evolution of basic policy objectives.--President outlines administration policy.--Major defense arrangements now in force.--Events leading to the creation of NATO.--The North Atlantic Treaty Organization.--Recent action in the 89th Congress.--Pro and con discussion: should the level of U.S. troops in Europe be substantially reduced now?

Contains, in addition to background information on U.S. foreign policy commitments, especially those made to Europe, arguments for and against the reduction of U.S. troop levels in Europe. Included are statements by Cabinet members and Senators.

176
Baumann, Gerhard. [THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AS A NATO PARTNER] Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland als NATO-Partner. Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, v. 16, Mar.-May, Aug. 1966: 121-141, 208-217, 266-277, 421-442.
U3.W485, v. 16
Bibliographical references included in footnotes.

A detailed analysis of the German Federal Republic's status, position, and requirements in NATO's overall defense system and strategy. The author compares the relative military strengths of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Soviet nuclear strategy in Europe is believed to be more realistic than the American, and the Soviet military threat to West Europe, particularly West Germany remains. Baumann attributes this threat particularly to the increase in recent years of Soviet potential in short-range and intermediate ballistic missiles, against which no adequate countermeasures have been provided by NATO.

177
Baumann, Gerhard. [MILITARY CAPACITY OF THE SOVIET OCCUPIED ZONE] Die militärische Kapazität der SBZ. Wehrkunde, v. 15, June 1966: 300-308.
U3.W396, v. 15

Appraises the strength, organizational structure, weaponry, and morale of the East German Armed Forces. The author also outlines the official rationale of their existence and possible future role.

178
Berk, L. J. M. van den. AFTER THE BIGGEST MANOEUVRES IN GERMAN HISTORY: MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND EAST GERMANY. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 11, June/July 1966: 102-104. UA646.F5, v. 11

Joint maneuvers involving 60,000 troops from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany in October 1965 convincingly demonstrated that the combined forces were an effective deterrent to conventional or nuclear aggression. The accent on offensive exercises reveals that "those members of the Soviet General Staff who advocated a defensive strategy in the discussions extending over several years past have now been worsted." Until 1956 the Soviet Union tightly controlled Polish Armed Forces. Assumption of power in Poland by Gomulka against the will of Khrushchev obliged the Soviet Union to relax this control. Polish Chief of Staff Spychalski made the Armed Forces "purely Polish" but at the same time actively promoted military cooperation with East Germany. Current Polish forces, estimated at 250,000 men and 1,100 planes, are equipped with the most up-to-date weapons. In Czechoslovakia less opposition to Soviet influence developed, partly because the Czech forces had not been infiltrated by Russian officers to such a large extent as in Poland, and partly because as early as 1951 the Soviet Union had outfitted them with modern weapons. Prague was encouraged to build up an armaments industry of its own and now is highly specialized in the production of "military aircraft equipment and shells." The 14 divisions of the Czech army are well equipped and are surpassed only by Poland and the Soviet Union as a fighting force in Eastern Europe. East German forces, while well equipped, are much weaker than those in the other two countries but are backed by strong Russian units permanently stationed there. The original scorn of East German soldiers for any military organization and their suspicion that they might be compelled to fight against the Federal Republic has gradually subsided in favor of pride in perfect mastery of the military craft. The extent to which East German troops are reliable is unknown even to their commanders, but in recent years it has no doubt increased rather than diminished.

179
Bonnefous, Edouard. [THE BOMB OR PEACE?] La bombe ou la paix? Revue politique et parlementaire, v. 68, July/Aug. 1966: 7-13.
H3.R4, v. 68

Between the foreign policy of France and her military doctrine lies a contradiction. In accordance with the principles of this doctrine France abandoned the Western mutual security system and adopted a policy of atomic nationalism. The Prime Minister of France recently explained in the National Assembly that the country's defense system was completely based on the strategic capacity of the "force de frappe." It is doubtful that the French force de frappe could dissuade foreign aggression. According to the Prime Minister's analysis of the results of this enormously expensive effort, the French nuclear potential in 1975 will not surpass one percent of the American or Russian potential. Furthermore French strategic bases are vulnerable, and France is not able to destroy the enemy's military targets or to bombard the population on such a scale as to provoke panic. France also suffers from a total absence of civilian defense. For many years to come French strategic power will not be able to exert any force of dissuasion, and in 1975 France will find herself surpassed and paralyzed by the development of American and Russian superarms. The force de frappe can be seen as a threat to France's foreign policy. The nuclear force of France is small and must be used without intermediate action after attack because France does not have tactical nuclear weapons. France's use of the bomb would force her allies to follow her immediately into a nuclear war. This actuality proves the inaccuracy of French strategic doctrine, which claims to be more defensive than offensive; in reality this strategic doctrine would lead the country into a preventive war and push her into a role similar to that of China--atomic blackmail. France is a prisoner of her force de frappe and military doctrine, which mars the image of France's traditionally humane and pacific character. This doctrine is foreign to the country and her citizens, who prefer collective security, international cooperation, disarmament, and peace.

180
Bousquet, Raymond. FRENCH STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POWER] La force nucléaire stratégique française. Revue de défense nationale, v. 22, May 1966: 793-811.
D410.R45, v. 22

Describes the concept of France's nuclear deterrence policy and the position France will occupy as a nuclear power, and reviews the reasons for France's decision to achieve nuclear status. Discussing the effects France's nuclear power will have on its scientific research and industry the author asserts that the policy will exercise a favorable influence on many aspects of the European political situation.

181
Braucher, E. P. THE ORIGINAL UNITED STATES CONCEPT OF NATO. Air University review, v. 17, Sept./Oct. 1966: 12-22.
TL501.A5574, v. 17

By the time of NATO's inception, unwanted involvement in two world wars had convinced Americans that they could not in isolation provide for their own security, and that a breach of the peace anywhere in the world, and especially in Europe, was a threat to U.S. security. A North Atlantic Treaty would thus enhance American national security. It would deter aggression in the North Atlantic area by establishing the principle that an armed attack against one member of the alliance was to be considered an attack against them all. NATO's contributions to international peace and security would strengthen the United Nations by fostering those conditions that are essential for effective U.N. functioning. By affording some measure of protection against internal and external aggression, it would promote European economic recovery and political stability and enable these problems to be tackled as a whole rather than as separate national problems. It would contribute to solution of the German problem by offering additional strength to the Western powers in their dealings with the Soviet Union and by partially solving the problem of France's very real fear of Germany. The proposed treaty would promote European integration by encouraging cooperation in matters of common concern and would reduce the long-term cost of European aid through greater coordination of efforts and an integrated pattern of defense. Although the world has changed since 1949, the Atlantic Alliance is as necessary today as ever. Americans contemplating the future of NATO should remember the original concepts upon which the alliance was founded.

182
Busch, Noel F. SHOULD WE BE TRADING WITH THE REDS? Reader's digest, v. 89, July 1966: 84-88.
AP2.R255, v. 89

Americans are beginning to question whether the export of nonstrategic goods to Communist countries is really in the national interest. In purely economic terms U.S. trade across the Iron Curtain has not amounted to much. Its major justification is as a force for peace. Some people say that raising the standards of living in the U.S.S.R. and the satellites will make them less belligerent. Also frequent contacts will give the opportunity to build bridges of understanding. Opponents of trade operate from different premises. In modern warfare, they affirm, anything that helps a nation in any way has strategic value. For example wheat shipments to the Soviet Union perpetuate a dictatorial regime by protecting it from the penalties of its own mistakes. Finally 16 years of trade contacts have done little to improve understanding with the Soviet Union and East Europe. Considering the arguments on both sides, the right course for the United States is to be sure it sends nothing to Communist countries which may be reshipped for use against America on the battlefield. The Nation should use trade to exact political concessions from the Communists, such as tearing down the Berlin Wall or moving toward genuine nuclear disarmament.

183
Cameron, Robert. COUNTERPOINT: THE CASE AGAINST GALLOIS'S "CASE." Diplomat, v. 17, July 1966: 10-11.
AP2.D575, v. 17

An objective reader of Pierre Gallois' "Case for France" [published in the April issue of Diplomat and abstracted as no. 1202 in vol. 2, no. 3 of this bibliography] would question the validity of the arguments he uses to justify the French decision to build the force de frappe, particularly the theme of the "infidelity of the U.S. in a crunch." The argument does not relate why De Gaulle chooses to disrupt the NATO alliance, which "is regarded--imperfections and all--as being one of the most inspired and successful in history." Small as the French atomic force may be, it must be recognized as a deterrent, and is thereby of value to the alliance. Unfortunately the United States has not accepted this fact, and has in general, by its criticism, made the French overly defensive about their deterrent. In contrast to Gallois' implication, an adequate conventional military force is necessary today, to control local and insurgent actions which do not justify the use of nuclear weapons. Alliances will continue to serve this useful purpose. Gallois should also remember that a second-strike capability and conventional forces are integral parts of an overall deterrent. His assertion that the United States might not come to the aid of an ally is cause for puzzlement. What should concern everyone is that the United States may use its nuclear weapons to defend an interest which is not vital, or where other means could have been used. That the strong should look after the weak has always been a fact of international life. Further, as far as the United States using the concept of "interdependence" as a cover for an attempt by American big business to "dominate the economy of Western Europe," this is not true. Every alliance member is fighting hard to gain a slice of the technological pie. As for the German desire to gain access to nuclear weaponry, it would be better for them to achieve this within the NATO control structure than to follow the French example and go it alone. France's efforts to acquire an independent deterrent cannot be condemned, although it need not be so secretive about its reasons for "rocking the boat." Gallois' desire to maintain strong political, economic, and cultural ties among the alliance nations is comforting. Even though members may strive to go their own way in some matters, their mutuality of interests will cause them to come together in the face of grave circumstances.

184
CANADIAN FORCES MOVE TOWARD TOTAL UNIFICATION. Armed Forces management, v. 12, June 1966: 93, 95-96, 99-100. illus.
UB153.A65, v. 12

Describes some of the sweeping changes involved in integrating the Canadian Armed Forces. Facets of the reorganization, including the difficulties thus far encountered, are mentioned, and various new command roles are identified. Unification is approximately two-thirds completed.

185
Cerny, Karl H., and Henry W. Briefs, eds. NATO IN QUEST OF COHESION: A CONFRONTATION OF VIEWPOINTS AT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY. New York, Published for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace by Praeger [1965] 476 p.
D845.C4

Contents.--Pt. 1. The issues.--The issues in perspective, by Karl H. Cerny and Henry W. Briefs.--

U.S. policy toward NATO, by George W. Ball. --Pt. 2. The dialogue. --The nuclear question. --Economic problems. --The political dimension. --Pt. 3. American and European Essays. --The crisis of the alliance, by Hans J. Morgenthau. --The crisis of political leadership, by Robert Strausz-Hupé. --Perspective on nuclear policy, by Klaus Knorr. --The military effectiveness of NATO, by James E. Moore. --Practical considerations about cooperation, by W. Randolph Burgess. --The need for a common nuclear strategy, by Friedrich Ruge. --Nuclear deterrence and world strategy, by André Beaufre. --The problem of the nuclear trigger, by Stefan T. Possony. --The case for a multinational nuclear strike force, by Sir John Slessor. --Requirements for a European deterrent in the 1970's, by Philip E. Mosely. --European integration and Atlantic partnership, by Kurt Birrenbach. --The advantages of diversity in NATO, by John W. Holmes. --Economic problems of the alliance, by Lawrence B. Krause. --The trend toward economic cooperation, by Stanislaw Wasowski. --An economic strategy for NATO, by Karl Brandt. --Economic dimensions of Atlantic partnership, by Pierre Uri. --Toward an integrated Atlantic community, by Maurice Allais. --Toward constructive world leadership, by Henrik Brugmans. --NATO and East-Central Europe, by Milorad Drachkovitch. --Background for Atlantic partnership, by Robert Kleiman. --Index.

Dialogue and essays from a conference held at Georgetown University in May 1964 to discuss the economic, political, and military problems facing NATO. No participant suggested that NATO had outlived its military usefulness. All agreed on the need for some modification of the U.S. nuclear monopoly, and for more meaningful consultation and coordination of nuclear strategic and tactical planning. Where the participants differed sharply was on the extent and means of modifying the U.S. monopoly, and particularly on the question of the multilateral force. While all supported shared military planning, discussions on economic policy reflected a lack of consensus even regarding a basic approach. Most participants felt that NATO should remain primarily a military alliance, and that various other international organizations should serve as vehicles for coordination of economic policies. The fundamental foreign policy issue was the degree of control and the corresponding degree of sovereignty to be shared among the NATO allies. Even more basic, participants questioned the desirability of an "alliance" policy.

186
Chable, Jacques H. [TRIANGULAR CONFRONTATION OF THE THREE "GREATS"] Confrontation triangulaire des trois "grands." Politique étrangère, v. 31, no. 3, 1966: 253-275 JX3.P6, v. 31

Summarizes the author's studies and synthetic works edited by him on the worldwide political and military situation. The strategic confrontations of the three great world powers are thoroughly discussed and exemplified, and the evolution of the world balance from bipolarity to a relatively stable multipolarity is traced.

187
CHINA'S THIRD NUCLEAR TEST. Survival, v. 8, July 1966: 229, 235. U162.S9, v. 8

The complete text of the communiqué released on May 9, 1966, by the New China News Agency to announce that Communist China "successfully conducted over its western areas a nuclear explosion which contained thermonuclear material." The bulletin states that Communist China has found it necessary to produce nuclear weapons "to oppose the nuclear blackmail and threats by US imperialism and its collaborators and to oppose the US-Soviet collusion for maintaining nuclear monopoly and sabotaging the revolutionary struggles of all oppressed peoples and nations." China's no-first-use of nuclear weapons pledge is repeated.

188
CHINESE ARMY PURGE. Survival, v. 8, Oct. 1966: 327-330. U162.S9, v. 8

Editorial for Army Day, Aug. 1, 1966, translated from Liberation Army Daily.

The "great leader, Chairman Mao Tse-tung" recently directed the People's Liberation Army to be a school for politics, military affairs, and culture; to engage in agricultural production, run factories, and manufacture products for its own needs or for exchange with the state. Army men are expected to do mass work, take part in the Socialist education movement, participate in the cultural revolution struggle, and criticize the bourgeoisie. "In this way," Chairman Mao said, "our Army of several million will be able to play a very great role indeed." This sums up the Army's experience in previous decades and represents a development of "army-building in the new historical conditions" diametrically opposed to the bourgeois military viewpoint of concentrating solely on military matters in complete disregard of politics. Three big struggles with representatives of the bourgeois military line took place after the founding of the Chinese People's Republic. The first, at the end of the Korean conflict, occurred when representatives of the bourgeois military line attempted to negate the Army's "historical experience and fine traditions" and tried to lead the Army on to the bourgeois armies' road. The second was in 1959 at the time of the Party's struggle against the "Right opportunist, anti-Party clique," when, taking advantage of its important posts in the Army, the clique tried to negate Chairman Mao's ideas on the People's Army and people's war by an effort to do away with the Party's absolute leadership over the Army, to eliminate political work and responsibilities for participating in Socialist construction and mass work, and to abolish the local armed forces and the militia. The third big struggle, not long ago, exposed the bourgeois representatives who "wormed their way" into important posts in the Army and were key members in the counterrevolutionary, anti-Party, anti-Socialist clique. They had opposed the Party's Central Committee and Mao Tse-tung's thought and deceived Lin Piao by covert opposition to Comrade Lin's resolute directives. The struggles between the two sets of ideas on army-building reflect the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between socialism and capitalism. "So long as classes and class struggle still exist, this struggle will never end."

189
Chou, William. MAAG--SAGA OF SERVICE. Free China review, v. 16, June 1966: 34-38. DS701.F74, v. 16

In the last 15 years the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group [MAAG] on Taiwan has transformed a Chinese Nationalist force totally lacking in modern

weaponry and organization into one of the largest and most combat-effective military establishments in the Far East. In addition to providing modern equipment and the training necessary to use it, MAAG has contributed to the establishment of a military school system to train the Chinese to replace MAAG technicians. MAAG support has also been extended to two brigades of Special Forces trained in irregular warfare. The working relationship between the Chinese and Americans is an excellent one. Although the United States has no direction or control responsibilities over Chinese forces, every MAAG adviser will be with his Chinese comrades in spirit when Free China forces defeat the Communists and liberate the mainland.

190
Church, Frank. EUROPE TODAY. REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S. SENATE, ON A STUDY MISSION TO BRUSSELS, PARIS, LONDON, BONN, BERLIN, AND THE EIGHTEEN NATION DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE AT GENEVA. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 9 p. D1065.U5C49

Conclusions and recommendations regarding problems faced by the United States in Europe. Nuclear sharing within NATO, the Senator recommends, should be handled by a consultative arrangement along the lines contemplated by the McNamara committee. He feels this approach might leave the way open to agreement with the Soviet Union on a nonproliferation treaty. On the question of a comprehensive test ban the Senator urges that attention be given to the "threshold" approach: limiting the ban on underground tests to explosions above the size that could be detected with the newer seismic devices without need for on-site inspections.

191
Cleveland, Harlan. [THE FUTURE OF NATO] L'avenir de l'O.T.A.N. Informations & documents, no. 229, July 1966: 4-9. P&GP RR

An interview on the future of NATO with the U.S. Ambassador to the Organization. Cleveland declared that in his opinion the imminent crisis has been averted and NATO is ready for a new departure with or without France. If France withdraws, an agreement must be drawn up with her on the cooperation of the French military forces in France and Germany. The Ambassador stressed that NATO can be used in the future as a political platform for negotiating the two fundamental problems, European security and reunification of Germany. Besides, the Atlantic alliance can substitute multilateral agreements for many of the existing bilateral ones, which often tend to appear as "satellization" because of the disproportion between the contracting parties. NATO can also promote cooperation among European nations and contribute to the organization of a supranational community, which is desired by all the small European nations.

192
Clubb, O. Edmund. SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. Diplomat, v. 17, Sept. 1966: 59-67. AP2.D575, v. 17

The trend toward a United States-China collision can be reversed today only by a major effort of thought and will. Relations were not always so hostile, although mutual understanding was lacking from even initial 19th century ties when the United States was as willing as the imperialist Britain and France to break down Chinese exclusionism to gain "open ports," rights of trade and evangelism, and extraterritoriality. With World War II the United States became an ally of a China led by the Nationalists in collaboration with the Communists against a common enemy. At the end of the war the United States continued to favor the Nationalists and encouraged them to seek a total victory over the Communists. U.S. aid to the Nationalists from V-J Day to March 1949 equalled over $2 billion. Nevertheless the Nationalists lost and most of their American equipment and materiel fell into Communist hands. Not unnaturally the Communists had long before developed an anti-American bias. The United States could have tried to rehabilitate its position in 1949 by extending recognition to the new Peking regime as did various other countries, but confronted with violently opposed views the Truman administration decided to "let the dust settle." Ignorance of Asia conspired with politics to keep Americans from realizing that the events of 1949 in China were not an isolated happening wrought with Russian assistance but an integral part of the vast social movement that had commenced a century before. Peking began its rule with some bias of its own together with accumulated bitterness reinforced by Marxism-Leninism. Anti-Americanism and disdain of American power became the core of Red China's foreign policy. During the Korean War the United States resumed largescale military and economic aid to the Nationalists on Formosa, and signed an alliance with the Nationalist regime on Formosa as "the Government of the Republic of China," crystallizing the hostility between China and the United States. In 1954 the United States proclaimed the "massive retaliation" doctrine and pressed for a network of alliances around China's periphery. By 1958 American policy firmly closed the door on China. American "anti-communism" was pitted against Chinese "anti-imperialism" in a war of contending faiths. China's grand strategy envisages the expulsion of American and other Occidental influence from the continent. A Formosa irredenta constitutes a formidable obstacle to any hopes of improved relations. Meanwhile a "Chineseness" composed of historic influences and past grievances has combined with Marxism-Leninism, modern aspirations, and national cares to reinforce certain highly personal policy decisions in China. Since world peace is in play, it is hopeful that the rest of the world sees China differently from the narrow and simplistic view of the United States and is unwilling to accept American solutions for the "China Problem."

193
Cohen, Bernard C. THE MILITARY POLICY PUBLIC. Public opinion quarterly, v. 30, summer 1966: 200-211. tables. HM261.A1P8, v. 30

In the 1960's many American foreign policy problems have taken on a distinctly military coloration. Still, public reaction to military policy remains a little-known area, since of the military issues only disarmament, an emotionally-laden topic, has been regularly explored by polling agencies. What, then, are the characteristics of the public that is attentive to military policy? Nineteen percent of a sample qualified as a military-policy public; this group is largely drawn from the segment informed about foreign policy matters, although the military group is much smaller and includes some individuals who are not attentive to foreign policy. The military policy group was slightly younger than the foreign policy group; it was comprised mostly of males. Both groups had rela-

tively high incomes and higher educational and vocational levels than the general sample. The military policy public evidenced a larger proportion of Democrats, although the combined military-foreign policy public tended to include more Republicans than did the whole sample.

194
Coward, H. Roberts. MILITARY TECHNOLOGY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. Cambridge, Mass., Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1964. tables.
UA15. C6

"Prepared under a contract with the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency."

First explains the bases for comparison of military forces, measurement of resources involved in military efforts, and problems in the diffusion of military technology. This is followed by the major portion of the study, a series of appendices containing statistical data on 84 "developing countries." Appendix I summarizes data for 1962-64 on the size of defense budget in U.S. dollars, munitions manufacturing capability, aid sources, nuclear potential, and major defense ties. Appendix II relates armed forces to population and defense expenditures to gross national product. Appendix III extrapolates probable manpower and defense budget expenditures for 1961-75 on the basis of projections of population and gross national product.

195
Craw, J. P. INDONESIAN MILITARY INCURSIONS INTO WEST MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE BETWEEN AUGUST 1964 AND 30TH SEPTEMBER 1965. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 111, Aug. 1966: 208-219. illus.
U1. R8, v. 111

Chronicles the Indonesian incursions into Malaysia. Lt.-Col. Craw briefly explains the historical background and then "gives details of how many landed and what happened to them," without attempting to analyze the political origin of the guerrilla skirmishes.

196
[THE CRISIS OF NATO: A DOSSIER OF OPINIONS HELD AND POSITIONS TAKEN] La crise de l'OTAN. Un dossier: opinions et prises de position. Informations & documents, no. 228, June 1, 1966: 4-9.
P&GP RR

Presents opinions expressed by members of the Atlantic alliance on the crisis provoked by French withdrawal from NATO. The opinions have been classified as to the different problems raised or concretized by the French decision. They embrace, in fact, the whole future of the Western community which emerged from the ruins of the Second World War, and they trace precisely the choices still open to the peoples of Western Europe. The texts of various notes, exchanged apropos of the crisis, were published in no. 227, May 1, 1966 of this periodical.

197
Däniker, G. [THE SMALL STATE'S DETERRENT] Kleinstaatliche Abschreckung. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, v. 132, Sept. 1966: 521-524.
U3. A43, v. 132

Contends that the increasingly close relationship and growing interdependence of states has greatly reduced the realm of traditional power politics--a fact which adds to the importance of the small country in any balance of power. Däniker argues that, even so, the small nation must not neglect its potential to deter all chance of military aggression. The deterrent does not need to be quantitatively comparable to the enemy's. It suffices when the threat of damage posed exceeds the possible strategic advantage the enemy can gain from aggression. Däniker doubts, however, the effectiveness of a conventional deterrent when nuclear arms are used in a war.

198
DANGEROUS PORTENTS FROM WEST GERMANY: THE MENACE OF THE BUNDESWEHR. Socialist Congressman, v. 6, Sept. 20, 1966: 9-10, 12.
JQ298. S6A35, 1966

For the ruling circles of the Federal Republic of Germany the Bundeswehr can serve as a mighty instrument for the realization of aggressive aims. Expenditure on arms has steadily increased and is expected to continue to rise in the future. At the beginning of 1966 West German Armed Forces totalled 450,000 men and DM 17,500 million was spent on arms, more than in any of the West European NATO countries. On July 1, 1966, with the assumption of the supreme command of NATO in Central Europe by a German general, an important NATO post passed into the hands of the West German militarists. In addition Germans have seized a number of leading positions in several other NATO organs. The Bonn government has developed an all-embracing war doctrine for the third attempt at a new order in Europe, after having deceived the West German population about its intentions. Over the past 3 years Bonn has worked out a whole system of aggressive measures ranging from border provocation to "sub-limited or under-cover war." West German ruling circles are making every arrangement to allow application of military means against democratic and oppositional elements. The permanent lie of the "danger threatening from the East" serves as justification for the aggressive armament policy, the intensified grasping for nuclear weapons and for a predominant position in NATO, and the intellectual preparation of the Army for an aggressive war. By glorification of the armed deeds of the Fascist "war machine," West Germany indirectly justifies Fascist aggression against the peoples of Europe.

199
Davidson, Bill. CAN NIKE X SAVE US? Saturday evening post, v. 239, Aug. 27, 1966: 19-21.
AP2. S2, v. 239

Nike X is a combination of the DM15X-2 and the Sprint missile plus a remarkable radar network. Though one of the most fantastic defensive weapons systems ever designed, it may never come into existence because its development and deployment would cost at least $30 billion and could protect, at best, only two-thirds of the population. The Nike X controversy has its "hawks" and "doves." The former would ignore the present détente with Russia and the nuclear test ban to initiate full-scale development and testing. The "doves" argue that after a nuclear holocaust the 140 million survivors "will envy the dead," and that the United States should either press for disarmament or maintain its 4-to-1 offensive superiority in ICBM's. The roots of the controversy can be traced back to

Nike Zeus, which was considered an infallible anti-missile weapon until its radar system proved unable to distinguish between warheads and decoys. New "phased-array radars" have remedied this, and the emergence of Communist China as a nuclear power may open the way for a compromise "thin" antimissile system to protect against Chinese missiles in the 1970's. But outside of that possibility Secretary McNamara, the most formidable "dove," can see little value in Nike X--"you just cannot win a strategic nuclear war today."

200
Dönhoff, Marion. IN THE SHADOW OF VIETNAM: THE GREAT POWERS MORE RIGID, ASIA MORE FLEXIBLE. International affairs (London) v. 42, Oct. 1966: 609-618. JX1.I53, v. 42

While the Vietnamese War has made the great powers' international policies more rigid in Europe and Asia, the small powers are developing initiatives and creating new groupings. Washington, Moscow, and Peking have no clear conception of the world situation. Each seems helpless, devoid of long-term policy planning, reacting ad hoc one to another among themselves. However, the world is not "condenmed to a state of immobilisme." Asia, in response to fear of China, is in flux. Asian illusions and idyllic dreams of a just postcolonial world have faded, and ideologies have been reduced to conflicts of interest. Asians hate Asians and white men are no longer their natural enemies. Two shocks shifted their attitudes: China's 1962 attack on India and American determination in the Vietnam intervention, which showed up the myth in China's appelation of America as a paper tiger and negated Peking's boast of ability to make war with impunity. The U.S. counterbalance against China's weight had a salutary effect. India is no longer pacifist. Indonesia unshackled itself from communism. Laos arrested communism's advance. Japan recognized reality and repealed its taboo on things military. Asian countries are "being aroused by their own initiatives." Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, South Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand founded the Asian and Pacific Cooperation Organization and set up an ambassadorial standing committee in Bangkok. In Vietnam both Washington and Hanoi have been mistaken. Hanoi refuses to accept the fact that the Americans cannot be defeated while the Americans persist in thinking that escalated bombing will force Hanoi to negotiate. Perhaps this shows that the concept of limited war may be unrealistic in presupposing "a great deal of intellectual theorizing on both sides, which in all probability, one simply cannot expect from North Vietnam." In the absence of a definite forecast on the future course of the Vietnam War the world situation looks like this: "Whilst the Great Powers have tied each other's hands . . . the Minor Powers in the West and the East make the most of the oppotunities" for changing the world scene.

201
Dommen, Arthur J. JAPAN, CHINA AND THE BOMB. War/peace report, v. 6, June/July 1966: 17-18. P&GP RR

The third Chinese nuclear test in May 1966 caused noticeably little reaction in Japan. It neither brought increased appeals for more rapid Japanese rearmament nor calls to decrease dependence on American nuclear guarantees through neutrality or a Japanese nuclear arsenal. The Japanese are aware they possess the technological and industrial base to produce nuclear weapons at short notice, but are content at the present to use this "potential" as a bargaining lever. Although eventually China's nuclear capability may erode Japanese confidence in American guarantees, for the foreseeable future these guarantees will remain credible. Much will depend on whether Japan can achieve the more influential role it desires in international affairs without acquiring the military strength associated with big power status. The Japanese are trying to make their influence felt in working for peace and are becoming increasingly concerned about the feasibility of curbing nuclear proliferation.

202
Eisenhower, Dwight D. THIS COUNTRY NEEDS MILITARY TRAINING. Reader's digest, v. 89, Sept. 1966: 49-55. AP2.R255, v. 89

The present military draft system exempts a great percentage of the nation's young men from serving in the Armed Forces. It excuses college students and those with mental, physical, educational, or moral deficiencies, leaving military service to physically fit high school graduates who have not gone on to college. Marriage, parenthood, and graduate work have afforded additional deferments for those who seek them. The result of these "loopholes" has been widespread feelings of unfairness in those who are called on to serve and a dilution of the sense of "duty, honor, country" that is "necessary to national survival." Many alternatives have been suggested in an attempt to devise a more efficient system of manpower procurement and training for military service; all have serious drawbacks. The present Selective Service system could be tightened up; a completely professional military establishment could be developed; or a lottery system of selection could be employed. Taking the best parts of many suggested plans for Universal Military Training [UMT], a possible solution would be a system that required every boy of age 18 or 19 (with the minimum possible exemptions) to spend 49 weeks in military training. These young men would be given the choice of enlisting in the regular Armed Forces immediately, with the concomitant benefits, or of remaining in the UMT program. UMT would develop a large reserve corps from which the country could draw in time of major war and benefit the community during emergencies and crises in which trained, disciplined men are needed. Arrangements would be made to insure the continuing recruitment of men for the regular forces, and the R.O.T.C. and National Guard programs could also be continued. Both political and organizational obstacles to a UMT program exist, and its costs would be very high; but the Nation would reap enormous benefits from the institution of one.

203
Elble, Rolf. [SOVEREIGNTY AND MILITARY ALLIANCE: REFLECTIONS ON A TOPICAL PROBLEM] Souveränität und Militärbündnis. Gedanken zu einem aktuellen Problem. Wehrkunde, v. 15, Sept. 1966: 455-462. U3.W396, v. 15

Analyzes the effects of the modern military alliance, such as NATO, on the sovereignty of the member states. Elble weighs the advantages and disadvantages of limitations on sovereignty, which of necessity are engendered by an alliance. He concludes that these should be accepted by the member nations, because certain aspects of sovereignty, being incompatible with

the modern military alliance, are unrealistic in the given international situation. The new situation is fraught, however, with the danger of subordinating political considerations to military ones in the decisionmaking process of member governments.

204
THE EXTERMINATORS [editorial] New republic, v. 155, Oct. 1, 1966: 7. AP2.N624, v. 155

In late September 22 American scientists (including 7 Nobel Prize winners) petitioned the White House to review U.S. policy regarding the use of chemical agents and biological weapons in Vietnam. The scientists had additional support in this plea from the Council of the Federation of American Scientists. The United States never ratified the 1925 Geneva protocol banning the wartime use of poisonous or other gases and bacteriological weapons. Although President Roosevelt gave a non-first use pledge in 1943, this promise appears to be in abeyance in Vietnam where field commanders have authority to use tear gas to drive civilian and insurgent inhabitants from protective bunkers, and then eliminate the latter with fragmentation bombs. This tactic works in conjunction with chemical agents used to destroy crops in areas governed by insurgent elements to starve them into submission. In short the United States is employing gas to kill while making statements deliberately designed to lull people into believing the opposite. Scientists are gravely concerned, particularly since the United States is presently spending hundreds of millions of dollars on research and manufacture of these lethal agents compared with $6.5 million 16 years ago. Scientists fear that once one side introduces these agents into warfare, reliance on them will grow with perhaps incalculable consequences. "Chemical and biological weapons could be far more dangerous as instruments of mass extermination than anything except nuclear weapons." If the enemy is to treat American prisoners of war humanely, in line with precepts of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention, the United States must adhere to the Geneva protocol ban on gas and stir itself to "ensure proper medical care for the Vietnamese children we napalm."

205
Fischbach-Wilke, U. [THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND ITS ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEM] Die Atlantische Allianz und ihre organisatorische Ordnung. Politische Studien, v. 17, Sept./Oct. 1966: 531-534. H35.P66, v. 17

Assesses the principles of NATO's organizational structure, its development, and present effectiveness after France's withdrawal from its high command. The author also evaluates NATO's "nonmilitary aspects." He feels that the alliance is in crisis and must be saved to secure peace in Europe.

206
Frank, Lewis A. A "SWORD AND SHIELD" STRATEGY FOR ASIA: THE NEED FOR AN AIRPOWER-BASED "NATO." Air Force and space digest, v. 49, Aug. 1966: 49-53. UG633.A65, v. 49

To meet the threat of Communist China's expansionism in Asia the United States requires a "sword and shield" strategy, in which airpower will play a central role. The United States and its Asian allies must reexamine their objectives for the region, paying special attention to the question of allied participation in nuclear strategy. How Japan, Australia, and India will finally assess the benefits and costs of relying on the U.S. nuclear deterrent is unknown. However, given the anticipated level of Chinese belligerence and weapons development, concern over the question of nuclear sharing will increase as more Asian air forces acquire systems capable of conversion to nuclear delivery. Airpower in the "deterrent defense force structure" of the region demands high-performance, flexible weapon systems that are usable in situations where ballistic missiles are unnecessary or ineffective. As an enemy thrust can come from any direction, reconnaissance aircraft must be available to detect clandestine or open movements. The United States and its Far Eastern allies must "draw the line" in Asia as decisively as was done in Europe, and they must agree on the appropriate types of response to specified provocations. For this the present treaty structures are insufficient. A Joint Defense Planning Board for Asia could serve a vital political and educational role as well as provide a forum for strategic planning. The Air Forces of the member states require centralized command and control through a Supreme Allied Commander-Asia. Each nation could contribute to its own defense in the widest measure possible while at the same time providing the basis for free-world unity in the region.

207
Freistetter, Franz. [COMMENTS ON SOKOLOVSKII'S "NEW PHASE OF STRATEGY"] Bemerkungen zu Sokolowskij "Neue Phase der Kriegskunst." Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, no. 1, Jan./Feb. 1966: 43-46. P&GP RR

Traces the postwar history of Soviet strategic thought from Stalin's concept of "the constantly effective factors" through the long-war theory (1954) to the present short-war doctrine that stresses the decisive importance of surprise. This doctrine includes inter alia a thesis on "revolutionary local wars."

208
[FRENCH DOSSIER, NATO, AND THE FOREIGN BASES. 4. AMERICAN BASES IN FRANCE AND FRANCO-AMERICAN AGREEMENTS] Le dossier de France, l'O.T.A.N. et les bases étrangères. IV. Les bases américaines en France et les accords franco-américains. Les documents politiques, diplomatiques et financiers, v. 47, Aug. 1966: 1-48. D1.D6, v. 47

Complete texts of the secret agreements on American military bases in France, published by "Documentation Française," the official organ of the French General Secretariat. The U.S. Government requested this revelation and the French Government approved it when the latter demanded the closing of the U.S. bases in France. After their withdrawal from NATO the French will consider the agreements inapplicable.

209
Gallais, Regis Y. THE FRENCH RESERVE. National guardsman, v. 20, July 1966: 10-14. UA42.N24, v. 20

Highlights some of the changes from the old to the new reserve system. The reduction in French mobilization requirements is discussed.

210
Gasteyger, Curt. [AN END OR A CHANGE OF ALLIANCES? REFLECTIONS ON THE CRISIS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE SYSTEM] Ende oder Wandlung der Allianzen? Gedanken zur Krise des atlantischen Bündnissystems. Europa-Archiv, v. 21, June 25, 1966: 427-432. D839.E86, v. 21

Contends that the value of an alliance should not be measured solely by its usefulness in confronting the opponent's system, but by the overall role the alliance can play in the stabilization of conditions necessary for general improvement of international relations. NATO's main objective was to check Communist expansion in Europe. With that task long fulfilled and the Cold War in Europe recessed, the Organization may still have an important role in preventing East-West tensions from developing into largescale conflicts as well as in refining the crisis management system both within the alliance and between the blocs--the latter to be done with the possible cooperation of another bloc. NATO's other tasks may well be the development of international cooperation in arms control and disarmament, especially to prevent nuclear arms proliferation.

211
Geisenheyner, Stefan. NATO'S TACTICAL AIR FORCES--THEIR MISSION AND STRENGTH. Air Force and space digest, v. 49, July 1966: 54-55, 57-58. UG633.A65, v. 49

An interview with Gen. Bruce K. Holloway, Commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe and of NATO's 4th Allied Tactical Air Force. General Holloway sees the reassignment of any of his troops as serious, but does not find the French withdrawal disabling. In spite of the significant strategic power available to the free world, he feels strong tactical forces are needed to deter to local aggression and to constitute a decisive force in general war. NATO's key defense against the missile threat is "mobility and dispersal." The General does not foresee any problems in communication and response in the event of surprise attack.

212
[GERMANY AND THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE] L'Allemagne et la défense de l'Europe. Oct. 8, 1966: 29. P&GP RR

The failure of Chancellor Erhard's visit to the United States disclosed the divergence between West German and American conceptions of European defense. The Government of West Germany does not accept the role assigned to its Air Force and doubts whether wartime conditions will permit large-scale air transport of U.S. troops to the defense of Germany, as is now planned. Although Von Hassel made an effort to obtain the support of NATO against McNamara and the atomic mission of the Luftwaffe has not yet changed, the acceptance of reinforcement of the conventional Air Force indicates that the American concept of flexible response is winning ground. The members of NATO have difficulty in accepting the new American conception of European defense, because this policy might lead to the destruction of Europe, leaving the two superpowers intact. Besides, Erhard is not willing to sacrifice West Germany's codecision in atomic matters.

213
Göbel, Dieter. [IS WEST GERMANY DEFENSIBLE?] Ist Westdeutschland zu verteidigen? Düsseldorf, Econ-Verlag [1966] 189 p. UA710.G6

Contents. --From the Rhine to the front line. --Armies at the Iron Curtain. --The last shot decides. --How iron is the Curtain?--Who defends this produces nothing. --Tactical atomic weapons--a redeeming magic word?--Escalation or atomic spiral?--Death sentences from the computer. --Strawberries from gardens of mines.--MLF--military weapon or the drug of political illusion?--Atoms for Europe?--The dead are no victors. --What kind of war is the best?--Can we sleep peacefully?

Appraises West Germany's security and military policies in the context of the nation's geopolitical situation and NATO's military posture. Göbel considers massive Soviet aggression against West Germany unlikely provided the German Federal Republic, or West Europe for that matter, do not pose a threat to the Soviet bloc's integrity through their armaments policy. Göbel feels that any large-scale conventional war in Europe could easily escalate into a nuclear one that would leave the Central and the West European nations little chance for survival. The odds against the escalation of war conducted with tactical atomic weapons into a full-fledged one are as good as nil. In such a situation the German Federal Republic would do best to rely on the strength of its allies and on its own conventional forces. These forces cannot possibly be a decisive factor in war, but in peacetime their very presence fills the military vacuum in Europe and deters possible aggression from the East. The role of the West German Army is "not to win the war, but to prevent it."

214
[GREAT BRITAIN: DEFENSE PROBLEMS] Grande Bretagne: les problèmes de défense. Air & Cosmos, no. 163, Sept. 3, 1966: 43. P&GP RR

Since the end of the Second World War Great Britain has tried to maintain military forces in the whole world in defense of its national interests and to honor contractual obligations. In recent years the economic crisis that developed in the postwar period has forced Britain to revise this policy and take into consideration the fact that its Armed Forces are not strong enough to cover all the danger spots in its former colonies and in Europe. On the other hand the withdrawal of British forces might cause a breakdown of equilibrium in many parts of the world, and this equilibrium is vital, both for the development of these colonies and for the defense of Europe. If British forces leave Europe it will constitute a worse crisis than French withdrawal from NATO, because, in spite of the détente, Russia still maintains a superiority over NATO's European defense in all important aspects. Thus, although the British White Paper for 1966 assures the reader that Great Britain will fulfill all of its multilateral obligations and take part in the defense of the free world, the riddle of whether it can or how long it will be willing to do so remains unsolved.

215
Greene, Felix. CHINA AND VIETNAM. Diplomat, v. 17, Sept. 1966: 115-117. AP2.D575, v. 17

To the Chinese the war in Vietnam is "one of the great 'pivotal' wars of history." They see the future of underdeveloped countries as the stakes of the contest: if the United States wins it will endeavor to suppress any future revolutionary liberation struggle. The Vietnamese National Liberation Front and the Chinese Communists share the view that this struggle is for the sake of the poor and oppressed peoples of the world. Acting from this conviction, the Chinese will not be deterred even by nuclear threats. Their behavior regarding escalation of the conflict will nonetheless be characterized by prudence. In the Korean War China asserted it would intervene if Americans crossed the 38th parallel; this statement was disbelieved, and within a week after the crossing the Chinese entered the conflict. Repeatedly the Chinese have emphasized the seriousness of vows of loyalty to the Vietnamese, with the apparent aim of avoiding a second communications failure of the Korean magnitude. Still, when China knows that the United States holds the "trump card--the bomb," how can a mood of confidence prevail? For one reason the Chinese are aware that bombardment necessary to destroy China's capacity for resistance would also create sufficient fallout to ruin several adjacent nations. Secondly the Chinese are confident from their own recent history that they can survive without cities or railroads and with only rudimentary road communications. America has set in motion a process that may involve it in the very type of war its military leaders have warned against for years, a land war on the Asian mainland. With its own terrain fully protected by a huge civilian militia, China is free to send its regular army wherever it deems advantageous. If the United States attacks the mainland from the air, China has announced, it will retaliate on the ground. In Vietnam the Chinese see the phenomenon of "a very small and technically very backward Asian people--90 percent of whom are simple farmers"--resisting with success the military efforts of the world's richest nation. The Chinese believe the United States will expand the war to the point of attacking China before accepting defeat. And they are sure "this will only serve to hasten the end of U.S. world power."

216
Griffith, William E. WHY RUSSIA IS OUR BIGGEST DANGER. Reader's digest, v. 89, Aug. 1966: 119-123.
AP2.R255, v. 89

Interview with "a distinguished authority on communism" who warns that the growing concern with China should not blind the United States to the fact that the Soviet Union still poses the greatest threat to the West. To meet this Soviet threat the United States must clearly demonstrate that, while not intending to bomb Hanoi or invade North Vietnam, it will not permit the Soviet Union to continue operation of its missile sites there. Further, this Nation must not allow the introduction of Soviet arms and guerrillas into Latin America. The United States must contain the Soviet Union wherever it attempts to support guerrilla warfare and world revolution.

217
Gutiérrez, Carlos M. HIDDEN TIGER. Atlas, v. 12, Oct. 1966: 10-15. AP1.A83, v. 12
Translated from Marcha (Montevideo).
AP63.M235

As expressed in an interview given by its Foreign Minister Chen Yi, mainland China believes that ideological deviationism and war--on an atomic scale and probably against a Western coalition including the Soviet Union--represent the two threats confronting it today. China is encircled and isolated, and Chinese anxiety to get to the root of deviation relates to the presence of the United States at the gates of China. Chen agrees with British Prime Minister Harold Wilson that China is the only country that constantly creates disturbances, but they are disturbances against capitalism, Chen adds, a policy that will not change even if "the earth should blow up." The Russians have fallen into capitalistic degeneration, Chen feels, because of their fear of the bomb and because of Stalin's stimulation of industry and technology (that is, urban work and the intellectuals) without resolving the agricultural problem. Stalin did not take steps to eliminate the evils of intellectuality, but China does. "To prepare the country and the people for the terrifying possibility of an atomic war, reorganize it consonant with the threat and, at the same time, face the enormous theoretical task of creating the ideological defenses against a revisionism which it considers lethal to the revolution--these," according to Chen, "are the goals which China has set for herself." Overall one receives the impression that to a large degree the best Chinese defenses are the size of the country, "the productivity of the people and the unified economic-administrative and cultural character" of the 88,000 communes. China can absorb blows, discard the damaged tissue, and reconstruct itself without ceasing to function normally. "A French diplomat I met in Peking told me: 'The nerve networks have multiplied until they have become connective tissue.'"

218
Halperin, Morton H., and John W. Wilson. NEW TENSIONS IN ARMY-PARTY RELATIONS IN CHINA (1965-1966). China quarterly, no. 26, Apr./June 1966: 58-65. DS701.C472, 1966

In 1958 the Chinese Communist leadership agreed on a new set of basic principles governing the relationship between the Party and the Army. China would continue to rely on a revolutionary strategy based on people's war despite the decision to devote substantial resources to nuclear weapons. The Party emphasized the need to put military units to work in the economy, turning the Army away from increased professionalism and technical training. By 1965 the increasing fear that the United States would extend the Vietnamese War to China brought the Army's role once again under review. Current disputes between the Party and Army center on what kind of war to prepare for and how to prepare. The Party proposes to rely on a strategy of people's war; the Army favors modernized military forces and a positional war. The Army wants to be freed from ideological indoctrination and training of the militia; the Party insists the Army place the emphasis of its preparations there. The Party rejects the proposition that a major conflict (including nuclear weapons) on the Chinese homeland would necessitate reliance on modern forces and the transfer of principal decision-making authority to the professional officer corps. The Army resents a strategy which forces it to concentrate on preparing the people for guerrilla war and readying the Army for retreat.

219
Harrigan, Anthony. FORCE AND POLICY. Ordnance, v. 51, July/Aug. 1966: 57-59.
UF1.O67, v. 51

The United States in theory renounces the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy and seeks the settlement of international conflicts by peaceful means. This theory is based on a strong conviction that war is immoral. In practice the United States recognizes and fights declared wars, and in an undeclared war is reluctant to do more than fend off the enemy's attack. Consequently America has gone through an era of well-intentioned submissiveness. In time of rampant aggression this philosophy and policy are badly out of key with reality. The United States has come to think of war as the clash of conventional armies. But the conflicts in which it is likely to be engaged in the years ahead are of a different type. Modern revolutionary wars involve whole populations, entire peoples at war with one another. The U.S. Government and public must realize that Communist China is relying, not on atomic weapons which she does not yet possess, but on the population bomb, a global human-wave strategy to overwhelm the countries associated with the United States and Europe. The United States and its allies must make a fundamental adjustment to conceive of warfare in these terms. Besides there is another great conflict, which is breaking out in this last third of the 20th century and which must be faced. This is the war between the advanced nations of the West and the backward nations of Asia and Africa. The West will not be ready to take all necessary survival measures until it appreciates the fact that the teeming hundreds of millions of Afro-Asians must be regarded as shock troops on a colossal scale. They constitute the human wave that will be used in the general assault on the advanced nations. In order to survive this assault the United States and its allies must see the naked reality of human conflict in the present historical epoch. Without betraying the finer elements of their civilization they must use force intelligently to avoid extinction.

220
Hassel, Kai-Uwe von. [THE SOVIET BLOC'S THREAT] Die Bedrohung durch den Sowjetblock. Wehrkunde, v. 15, Oct. 1966: 543-544.
U3.W396, v. 15

Excerpts from the September 9, 1966 address by the German Federal Republic's Minister of Defense to the 12th Annual Congress of the Atlantic Treaty Association.

Warns against mistaking the current absence of an acute Soviet-bloc threat for the absolute disappearance of or even for a decrease in that bloc's threat to the West, especially to Western Europe and the German Federal Republic. Von Hassel points to the constantly growing buildup and modernization of Warsaw Pact military forces.

221
Healey, Denis. "FAIR TREATMENT" IS ALL BRITISH ASK FROM U.S. DEALINGS SAYS HEALEY IN AFM INTERVIEW. Armed Forces management, v. 12, July 1966: 15-18. UB153.A65, v. 12

Replies by the British Defense Minister to questions on the defense budget, British alliance policy and overseas commitments, and the possibility of a two-way traffic in military hardware between the United States and Great Britain.

222
Heinl, Robert D. HONG KONG: COMMUNISM AND COLONIALISM IN COLLISION. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 92, July 1966: 72-81. V1.U8, v. 92

Discusses Hong Kong's importance today, as well as its military potential and political future. Hong Kong is a British colony leased from China for 99 years. The lease expires in 1997. The colony's principal problems are food and water, for which it depends on China. The author feels that with new technological progress the food problem can be solved. The Guantanamo Bay example might suggest remedial measures for the water problem, for there too water is as important as ammunition. Because of its advantageous position Hong Kong is a strategic advance base that while presently neutralized by larger political considerations is nevertheless of interest and potential importance to the United States in both the commercial and military senses. America's present and long-term interest in Hong Kong lies in its remaining a colony of Great Britain and in the hope that Chinese communism, like Russia's before, will mellow significantly by 1997.

223
Herre, Franz. [WORLD POLICY AND NATO] Die Weltpolitik und die NATO. Politische Studien, v. 17, Sept./Oct. 1966: 517-520.
H35.P66, v. 17

Examines the changes made in Western and Soviet bloc policies over recent years. Herre contends that both Washington and Moscow are now pursuing an "Asia first" policy and holding fast to the principle of bipolarism, which is threatened by France and Red China. He advocates coordination of European and U.S. policies and strengthening of NATO with both conventional and nuclear forces in order to meet the Soviet bloc's continued, if momentarily dormant, threat to West Europe.

224
Hirschfeld, Oswald. [AN AGREEMENT MUST BE REACHED WITH PARIS] Mit Paris muss man sich arrangieren. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, July 10, 1966: 402-403. U3.W38, v. 10

France's retreat from NATO, which at first was considered to be a provocation, forced reform of the European defense system. And now suddenly everybody feels that this reformation is a necessity. Even the USA--although indirectly--agrees with quite a number of De Gaulle's arguments and is considering realities which it has been avoiding for years. The politicians of the government in Bonn who expected hardships for the Paris government and strenghtening of the Bonn-Washington axis seem to feel disappointed, if not betrayed. President Johnson is quite prepared to come to an agreement with De Gaulle at any price, something which Bonn did not do in time. Federal Germany alone sees herself permanently threatened by the Soviet Union and sees no sign of relaxation of Communist imperialism. This is quite a contrast to the other NATO allies, who favor relaxation of tension, even at the price of reduction of military forces in Central Europe, and in particular nuclear neutralization of West Germany. We are beginning to weary our allies with talks on reunification, sole right of representation and the Oder-Neisse line, as justified as they may be. The humility of NATO's "model partner" is no longer appreciated by the United States. What then is left of all the principles to which Bonn's politicians clung so desperately for many years? Politics are established on might and profit; thanks are not asked, nor is awkwardly interpreted faithfulness. The pragmatic

De Gaulle certainly acts accordingly. In spite of it, or precisely because of it, the government in Bonn will have to come to an agreement with him. (Abstract supplied, modified)

225
Hirschfeld, Oswald. [130 BILLION--AND NATIONAL SECURITY?] 130 Milliarden--und die nationale Sicherheit? Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Oct. 10, 1966: 528-529. U3.W38, v. 10

There has not been any revolt among the Bundeswehr generals, and the supremacy of the political leadership has never for a moment been challenged. Following his naive remarks in Oslo, Chancellor Erhard, like von Hassel, has unequivocally contradicted this baseless supposition. Yet the feeling remains on all sides of a crisis of leadership. The Starfighter affair is merely a symptom pointing to the need for recasting the organization and structure of the entire defence machinery. At the same time a clear political interpretation of the German position and a precise definition of the Federal Republic's security needs are seen to be essential. These must of necessity lead to a better harmony in Bonn's relations with both West and East in Europe, without of course neglecting the USA as protecting power. These are the only conditions under which the Bundeswehr's mission can be so defined that both the tasks allocated to it by NATO and the defence of the homeland can be fully covered. However, nobody in this country believes that such a radical reform can be accomplished by the present Defence Minister, or even, for that matter, under Professor Erhard's government. The latter in fact appears to be no less in danger than von Hassel, who far from being an example will continue to be a national liability until he draws the long-overdue conclusions. (Abstract supplied)

226
Hirschfeld, Oswald. ["WE BRING A CORPSE INTO THE AREA . . . "] "Wir führen eine Leiche im Raum . . ." Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Aug./Sept. 1966: 456-457. U3.W38, v. 10

Bonn's fine-weather policies are at an end. However unsatisfactory this may have been both at home and abroad, the Federal Government paid for everything as long as the economy was flourishing, even for the others' mistakes. John Foster Dulles has long been gone, but his ghost still haunts the Bonn precincts. How comforting to know that the political guide lines are made to Washington's measure, what a pity that de Gaulle represented only French interests, not German, when he went to the Kremlin. Now we are between all the stools. The pact of friendship with France was deliberately torpedoed in the belief that this would please America, the explosion of NATO is simply ignored, the end of integration tears to shreds the whole fabric of German defence, American interest in the German "model student" is evaporating as the latest political New Look begins to assert itself at the Pentagon. All that remains at the present moment is the somewhat unsavoury haggling about support costs. Britain wants 1,000 million DM a year, the United States 3,000. Will Bonn pay? Can Bonn pay? If not, the British Army of the Rhine will shrink by 30,000, the U.S. 7th Army by 100,000 within a year. Who would have the unhappy courage to suspect de Gaulle of wanting to break up NATO? It couldn't even be paid for! (Abstract supplied)

227
Honey, P. J. NORTH VIETNAM AND THE WAR: STRATEGY AND THE DRV LEADERS. China news analysis, no. 628, Sept. 9, 1966: 1-7. DS777.55.C4469, 1966

Quotations and analyses of published articles and radio broadcasts in North Vietnam. The author states that Pham Van Dong recently implied to a Western visitor that North Vietnamese leaders had miscalculated U.S. willingness to commit troops to Vietnam. He notes that the leaders are defensive about the war and are making exaggerated predictions about its success. Failure of the press and radio to mention destruction of fuel stocks supports this interpretation. In a separate section the author discusses the difficulties of North Vietnam's position vis-à-vis China and the Soviet Union. Soviet leaders predict that although pro-China factions are currently strong, North Vietnam's need for sophisticated weapons that only the Soviets can supply will greatly enhance their position.

228
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL DEFENSE, no. 133/134, July/Aug. 1966: 1-14. UA926.I488, 1966

Partial Contents. --Operation techniques in case of nuclear explosion, by Gunnar Oehman. --When the sirens sound in a major city, by Peter C. McGillivray. --Position of civil defence in Belgium.

229
IS MOSCOW READY TO APPROVE MISSILES FOR NEUTRAL AUSTRIA? by W.O. Central Europe journal, v. 14, Nov. 1966: 361-362. DB200.7.S74, v. 14

Reports on Austrian-Soviet talks about possible revision of the Austrian State Treaty to allow that nation to acquire "special weapons" it is forbidden to possess under the Article 13 of the treaty. Among these weapons are guided missiles, which Austria contemplates buying from the Soviet Union. Moscow is reported to view the Austrian requests sympathetically in order "to keep Austria from establishing firm ties with the Western bloc, especially with the Federal Republic of Germany."

230
Ishibashi, Masashi. JSP'S COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY POLICY. Japan Socialist review, no. 109, May 1, 1966: 14-24. HX9.J3, 1966

An interview with Masashi Ishibashi, director of the defense and foreign affairs committee policy board of the Japanese Socialist Party, discussing the party's security policy. Among its stated objectives are a collective nonaggression treaty including Japan, China, the United States, and the Soviet Union; a reunified China, represented in the United Nations; a completely nuclear-free and neutralized belt across Asia; total prohibition of nuclear weapons; and total disarmament.

231
Kane, Francis X. TRENDS IN MILITARY THOUGHT. Air University review, v. 17, Sept./Oct. 1966: 2-11. TL501.A5574, v. 17

Uses the Battle of Waterloo as a basis for analysis, through fictitious dialogues, of trends in military theory. The author discusses the historical analyses

of the 1940's, the decisionmaking theorists of the 1950's, and the "defense intellectual" and "strategist" of the 1960's. A major deficiency in current thinking is the constant rehash of old themes and lack of new insight. The past must be used toward an understanding of human affairs and human motivation. If the United States is to prevail in the 1970's, strategists must be able to forecast which problems will provide the key to the future.

232
Kato, Fujio. JAPAN'S DEFENCE DILEMMA. Far Eastern economic review, v. 52, June 2, 1966: 442-443. HC411. F18, v. 52

Japanese politicians fear that the year 1970 will bring a recurrence--perhaps worse--of the security crisis of 1960 when rioters protested against the involvement of Japan in any kind of military confrontation in the Far East. In 1970 the 1960 security treaty with the United States is due for review. The ruling conservatives and the left-wing opposition groups find virtually no agreement on security matters. Because the Japanese are sensitive to the idea of nuclear weapons, the expected crisis "might speed up the emergence of a Socialist administration if Japan is compelled to arm herself with nuclear weapons for any reason by then." U.S. policies and attitudes toward Japan on political and trade matters will have much to do with the crisis; Japanese leftists are ready to take advantage of any kind or degree of strain in the Japan-U.S. relationship for their own ends.

233
Kaul, B. M. PLANNING. Seminar, no. 83, July 1966: 20-22. DS401. S365, 1966

Until 1962 India had practically no defense planning. Its leaders not only believed in "the invincible weapon of non-violence," but considered war unlikely in the foreseeable future. In 1962 India's "reverses at the hands of the Chinese" prompted a radical change in defense policy and the preparation of the long-range defense plan that now provides for an estimated total outlay of Rs 50 billion. But military spending alone will not improve the nation's defense capability without adequate coordination of all necessary defense investments and without coherent arrangement of priorities in meeting essential defense requirements. The plan's serious shortcomings are due largely to the incompetence and occasional authority abdication of the Government leaders who made it. The strangely unsystematic process of its preparation on various levels (including the professional military level) resulted in grave neglect of many important details affecting the nation's total military posture. The relative potentialities and limitations of conventional, specialized, and guerrilla warfare in the Indian strategic environment require careful assessment. While striving for self-sufficiency and, if possible, a nuclear capability of its own, India must cultivate friendly relations with other countries and seek, through its own diplomatic effort, whatever assistance it can get from abroad. India must never be surprised by any military situation. Pakistan will very likely embark on synchronized, conventional, and guerrilla warfare against India; guerrilla warfare training programs under expert Chinese advice are already underway in Pakistan. In addition China may enter Ladakh, which is too remote and too close to Kashmir to provoke U.S. or Soviet intervention. "The purpose of our foes may not be to win decisive victory but may be only to involve us in a war to wear out the spirit of resistance or to retard our internal progress and change our political and domestic structure." India should be prepared to deter its foes, to cope with all other emergencies, and to prevent Pakistan from ever seizing the initiative against it; India should "take the first step" if Pakistan again creates provoking circumstances.

234
Kissinger, Henry A. FOR A NEW ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: Reporter, v. 35, July 14, 1966: 18-27. D839. R385, v. 35

The article consists of the author's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 1966.

Asserts that the withdrawal of France from NATO has forced a reconsideration and reevaluation of the structure and purpose of the alliance which would have been inevitable even without the French action. "The harsh medicine of de Gaulle" is beneficial if it makes the United States recognize that the way to preserve the Atlantic alliance is to adapt it to the present rather than to insist that it maintain the structure of the past. A powerful and united Europe which is active in world affairs is definitely in the U.S. interest, even if its policies and internal structure do not follow the U.S.-preferred prescription. Kissinger concludes with specific policy recommendations for dealing with what he considers the two central problems in Europe today: the German question and the control of nuclear weapons.

235
Knorr, Klaus, and Oskar Morgenstern. SCIENCE AND DEFENSE: SOME CRITICAL THOUGHTS ON MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. [Princeton, N. J.] Princeton University, Center of International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 1965. 58 p. (Princeton University. Center of International Studies. Policy memorandum no. 32) U393. K6

Reviews the management of military research and development (R&D) and how it could be improved. Present R&D organization does not give optimum encouragement to new ideas, does not allow assets to grow, and does not sufficiently inspire the Nation's scientists and engineers. R&D should have a wider breadth of interests (it is now confined to military weapons) in order to promote more "invention and innovation in military doctrine and in associated political strategy." The authors conclude that research and development should not be confined to the military, but should be widened to include "political, sociological, and psychological elements." Because warfare is becoming a many-dimensioned undertaking, and because new international systems must be found for peace to prevail and for disaster to be averted, military force will have to be reorganized to fit into the scheme of things. "It would therefore be fitting for the Defense Department to raise its sights and, besides supporting research for weapons and their use, also support and encourage research on how war may be avoided. Science can and should become primarily a tool for peaceful progress."

236
Krippendorff, Ekkehart. [DISARMAMENT POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES] Die Abrüstungspolitik der

USA. Atomzeitalter; Information und Meinung, no. 7, July 1966: 190-196. P&GP RR

A slightly abbreviated version of the author's paper, delivered as part of a series of lectures on "Disarmament Difficulties in World Policy" at Philipps University, Marburg, Germany, summer 1966.

Should modern capitalism depend intrinsically upon armaments, any serious chance for disarmament by a modern capitalist nation would be ruled out as long as the present socioeconomic system prevails. In fact the dependence of capitalism upon armaments has been argued by Fritz Vilmar in his Rüstung und Abrüstung im Spätkapitalismus (Armament and Disarmament in Modern Capitalism, Frankfurt am Main, 1965). But Vilmar shuns the conclusion that the present system precludes disarmament. He recommends a gradual reorientation of the general investment structure to socially constructive ends as the alternative to the arms race. The last 20 years of American disarmament policy have been marked by frequent reversals of position and inconsistencies, with only a few "constants." The unquestionably honest desire of U.S. Presidents and their advisers to bring about genuine nuclear disarmament could not change the fact that U.S. freedom of action in that respect has remained quite narrow. This is so because of political power and the influence of other forces, including "the industrial-military complex" and traditional American "self-confidence." At the time of the American nuclear monopoly U.S. disarmament plans, if effected, would have prevented anyone from breaking that monopoly. Since the loss of the monopoly America has designed its disarmament plans to secure perpetual U.S. technical superiority. Beginning in about 1948 Washington's conviction of Soviet aggressive plans and perversity made pointless the pursuit of any disarmament. Later on the American Government found itself totally unprepared to seriously negotiate any disarmament settlement. Many fluctuations in United States disarmament policy can be explained by the personality of its leaders. The constants, few as they are, throw a significant light on the entire problem. Over the years American disarmament policy has aimed at: (1) preservation of United States military strength (the cessation of production of nuclear material would benefit the United States), (2) weakening of the Soviet power position in Europe (hence the demand for solution of political problems) and (3) information about the Soviet military potential (the demand for control and inspection), which, given the difference between the open society and "the slowly opening society," would chiefly benefit the United States.

237

Laegeler, Hellmuth. [ISN'T WEST EUROPE THREATENED BY THE EAST ANY LONGER?] Ist Westeuropa durch den Osten nicht mehr bedroht? Politische Studien, v. 17, Sept./Oct. 1966: 528-530.
H35. P66, v. 17

Argues that the Soviet bloc has improved its military striking power since the fall of Khrushchev. Laegeler considers the Soviet threat to West Europe to have grown and attributes this to a wider standardization of military power in the Warsaw Treaty Organization than in NATO.

238

Lambilliotte, Maurice. [HAS THE COUNTDOWN BEGUN?] Le compte à rebours a-t-il commencé? Synthèses, no. 242/243, July/Aug. 1966: 5-13.
AP22. S9, 1966

Did the countdown to nuclear war begin with China's possession of the atomic bomb? The bomb was tested and undoubtedly will improve, although the Chinese will not be able to use it for offensive purposes or as means of dissuasion in the near future. A distinct U.S. trend favors military means to delay China's development of the bomb. But the idea of preventive war is in itself somewhat odious. Also the Russians cannot accept it either because they would lose face, especially in the third world, and would jeopardize their role as equalizers of American power in Europe. If the present international tension persists China might try to break the peaceful coexistence of the United States and Russia, which she interprets as systematic collusion of socialism and capitalism directed against the countries under the Chinese type of Communist system. By provocation of a nuclear incident China might unleash a world war. The damage suffered in this war would destroy the Western tutelage of the world and open the door for Chinese domination, whereas a balance between Russia and America might stalemate China for a long time. Such balance can be easily attained if Europe becomes a tie between these two great powers, as well as their disinterested partner. As a privileged territory of coexistence and détente Europe could improve its relations with the East and its close ties with the United States and could give intelligently and imaginatively the maximum of aid to the underdeveloped countries. Then most of Europe's problems, especially the important German problem, could be solved more easily. A time might come when Europe could open a broad discussion with China and thus try to save the world from the danger of nuclear war. This seems to be the only reasonable way to oppose the Chinese menace and to interrupt the most tragic of countdowns.

239

Lansalot-Basou, M. L. [AIR TRAFFIC IN FRANCE] La circulation aérienne en France. Forces aériennes françaises, no. 227, July 1966: 19-24.
UG635. F8F66, 1966

Modern French military aviation requires the solution of an old problem: the efficient organization of air traffic. Up to now flight patterns have been channeled along traffic axes with the flights controlled from radioelectric reporting points to ensure their longitudinal separation. Military planes used the uncontrolled space between the axes. A study of the problem has revealed the necessity of a reorganization based on the unity of aerial space. Consequently a mixed military and civilian group visited the United States and Great Britain in 1963 to study their solutions to this problem. After the visit a group was assigned to work out a French solution that would take in account the special position of France in defense matters; the group later suggested an integrated civilian and military organization similar to that which preceded the creation of the U.S. Federal Aviation Agency. The French solution to the problem cannot ignore the essentially international character of commercial aviation. It must preserve all necessary flexibility to reconcile France's international obligations with the imperatives of French defense. No decisions have been finally made on this matter as far as France is concerned.

240

Lawrence, Robert M. SHOULD THE U.S. PULL OUT OF EUROPE? War/peace report, v. 6, June/July 1966: 22-23. P&GP RR

Weariness of the "ordeal of power" is causing some American political leaders to search for means to rid the Nation of some of its international responsibilities. One suggestion gathering noteworthy support is withdrawal of American military forces from Western Europe. Senator Stephen M. Young recently summarized the major arguments for U.S. departure: the manpower requirements of the war in Vietnam, the balance of payments deficit, the need to bolster the domestic economy, belief that the Soviet threat to Western Europe has receded, the economic ability of Europeans to contribute more to their own defense, and the increasing capability of the United States to airlift forces back to Europe in times of crisis. Although Senator Young's arguments are attractive politically, they neglect the important foreign policy goals of arms control and nonproliferation. Should the United States withdraw from Europe and urge nations such as West Germany to undertake more responsibility for their own defense, could the United States rationally expect these nations to refrain from "going nuclear?" Furthermore the American presence in the heart of Europe "exerts a benign influence," moderating the political climate, guarding against Soviet attack, and keeping a "lid upon additional German rearmament of a nuclear sort." On the other hand the debate on withdrawal has reminded the United States and Europe that American forces cannot remain forever. Both must give more serious thought to suggestions for mutual disengagement, nuclear-free zones, and conventional arms reductions. The United States can use the current problems and changes in Europe as a catalyst to develop a greater degree of harmony and stability.

241
Lider, Julian. WEST GERMANY IN NATO. Warszawa, Zachodnia Agencja Prasowa, 1965. 270 p.
UA646.5.G7L513

Contents.--pt. 1. The beginnings.--1950: Turning point or quickening of the peace?--Why was NATO concerned about West Germany?--What was West Germany's interest in NATO?--Political demands.--Military demands.--From the Pleven Plan to the Paris Treaties.--Well-satisfied.--pt. 2. Remilitarization becomes a fact.--West Germany's and NATO's cold war policies in the late 1950's.--West Germany's influence in the early stage.--Helping to bury "massive retaliation."--Turning-point.--1959-60: The Bundeswehr grows into the main European force of the "Shield."--Tactical nuclear weapons for the Bundeswehr.--pt. 3. On the way to domination.--New stage.--The "fourth nuclear power" struggle.--1961-65: The Bundeswehr on the way to domination in Europe?--Growing influence on doctrine and strategy.--1961-65: Increased West German influence on NATO policy.--The MLF struggle.--pt. 4. A few glimpses into the future, or new demands.--Inter-NATO demands.--Beyond NATO: the Bundeswehr is not enough.--How can it all be reconciled with integration?--Summing up, or take heed of experience.

Argues that West German remilitarization and the Bonn Government's successes influencing NATO's military policy have resulted in a situation not altogether favorable to the German Federal Republic. The author points to the growing awareness in Europe and in the United States Government of the irreconcilability of Bonn's "revisionist" (territorial) claims and militaristic aspirations (inter alia for nuclear power status) with European peace and security. Lider suggests West Germany's present stature within the Atlantic alliance is, among other things, a product of NATO's "having provided an illusory sense of security and an illusory safeguard against the emancipation of German militarism."

242
Light, K. E. BRITISH DEFENCE FORCES. Marine Corps gazette, v. 50, July 1966: 32-37.
VE7.M4, v. 50

The White Paper of March 1966 outlined Britain's reduced military role in world affairs. The overall plan was determined by three coordinates: "1. Britain's overseas commitments (Commonwealth and treaty obligations). 2. Britain's position in the world. 3. What can Britain afford?" The strategic military retraction of Britain is nearly over. The readjustment involves a shift to greater dependence on highly select naval and air bases and close cooperation with the United States, the Commonwealth, and NATO allies. This pruning, brought about by economic necessity and political reality, is guided by the following limitations: Britain will not undertake major military operations without allied support. Military assistance will be offered only if the recipient country is prepared to provide the necessary base facilities to make this aid effective. Finally, overseas facilities will be maintained only with consent of the host country. Adherence to the NATO alliance will continue together with strong support for development of an Atlantic nuclear force under NATO control. In this way the legitimate defense needs of all European members of the alliance will receive consideration. Provision for nonnuclear responses and sufficient NATO ground forces to meet limited incursions will prevent the immediate exchange of nuclear weapons. Britain's Mediterranean responsibilities will be drastically reduced, while a closer cooperation with Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Malaysia will help Britain retain influence "East of Suez." The closing of the Aden base in 1968 and Saudi Arabia's independence call for readjustments of British policy in this vital area of the world. The British strategic nuclear force will be continued, and the V-bomber force and nuclear-propelled missile-firing submarines will be assigned to the hoped-for Atlantic nuclear force. The death of the carrier and large surface ships relegates the Navy to transport of regular and strategic reserve forces to any trouble area. The strategic transport force will receive new aircraft, which will increase mobility to crisis areas. The outlook to some tacticians appears bleak. It need not, since, by virtue of modern weapons and highly trained military personnel, Britain will continue as a world power despite the programmed cutbacks.

243
Lipset, Seymour M. DOVES, HAWKS, AND POLLS. Encounter, v. 27, Oct. 1966: 38-45.
AP4.E44, v. 27

"Polls do not make policy so much as follow policy in most areas of international affairs." The opinion surveys on the Vietnam War indicate that President Johnson has almost a free hand to pursue any policy he thinks correct and get public support for it. The various surveys point up a mixed pattern of "hawk-dove" responses which show that most Americans strongly desire peace, but only if communism is contained in the process. If the President is to have public endorsement for waging the war, he must talk and offer peace in this context. His ability to determine public response is not absolute, as was indicated by

the sharp decline in support for his policy during the recent religious strife in Vietnam and the corresponding increase in support of escalation to end the war. But the public knows it must trust the President because there is no one else "with sufficient personal status and international experience to become a counter-centre of foreign-policy confidence." Lyndon Johnson is a political leader who makes opinion rather than follows it, and he can find in the polls justification and support for any policy he wishes to pursue. He can ignore most opposition because the surveys indicate that students, the main source of organized disagreement, are even more favorable to the war than the general public.

244
Lumsden, Malvern. PERCEPTION AND INFORMATION IN STRATEGIC THINKING. Journal of peace research, no. 3, 1966: 257-277. diagrs., tables.
AS9.J6, 1966

After a theoretical discussion of the relationship of information and perception to strategic thinking, an experiment is described where these factors are investigated in a series of simple strategic situations. While rarely conclusive, the results are suggestive on several points. The need to gain information about the other's choices seems to be a clear determinant of a subject's behaviour. Perceptions that the players have of themselves and of each other do relate to the behaviour of each, as measured by the relative proportions of one of two possible responses over the other. However, the context in which this behaviour takes place, even within the confines of the experimental design, seems to be an even greater influence on perceptions. This finding would not have come out if only one kind of game had been played. The method involved several ways of measuring the subjective elements in strategic thinking, which seem to be successful in themselves. While the results are rather 'open-ended', this was the intention of the experiment, leaving a number of more specific questions ready with a way both of asking and of attempting to answer them. (Author's summary)

245
Mead, Margaret. THE CASE FOR DRAFTING ALL BOYS--AND GIRLS. Redbook, v. 127, Sept. 1966: 40, 42, 44.
AP2.R28, v. 127

The focus of protest among young people today is the draft. The inequity of the system is not only the relatively small number who are called to military service--the others being deferred or rejected--but the concentration on young men exclusive of young women. The strongest protest against the draft arises from those whom it most favors. Students in the colleges and universities are loudly protesting the essential unfairness of making their less privileged contemporaries carry the heaviest burdens. Is it fair to ask only a portion of a generation to give involuntary service to their country? Would a universal national service be more equitable? Universal national service would not place every boy and girl in the same work, but would mobilize on a national scale a great variety of activities to meet the country's needs. All young people would benefit by the kind of experience in which obligation, privilege, and responsibility were combined, and in which they worked for the country wherein they expect to live as self-sustaining adults.

246
Melman, Seymour. OVERKILL: THE MILITARY TRANSFORMATION. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 11, June/July 1966: 40-43.
UA646.F5, v. 11

Both the United States and the Soviet Union now have the capacity to "destroy populations more than once." This "boundless accumulation of weapons . . . is militarily meaningless" and even blurs the distinctions among various forms of strategy. American strategic nuclear forces alone included in 1965 approximately 3,463 intercontinental delivery vehicles capable of carrying 19,584 megatons. Even if 90 percent of the aircraft and 75 percent of the missiles were destroyed in a first strike, 552 vehicles would remain to carry 2,246 megatons to 140 Soviet cities with populations over 100,000. Utilizing as killing power a "Hiroshima unit," theoretically only 500 units would be necessary to destroy these 140 cities, leaving 1000 times the firepower necessary to destroy Russian population-industrial centers. On the Soviet side after 50 percent first-strike attrition Moscow would still be able to destroy 132 American population centers 100 times over. Strategy has also been transformed by the transfer of the advantage from the defense to the offense. "During the Second World War, defensive interception of 10% of the attacking Luftwaffe over England gave a victory to the defense." In nuclear war, however, a penetration rate of only 10 percent insures a successful offensive. The 3,400 American strategic missiles are thus in actuality no more effective than the 510 of the Soviet arsenal. On balance only political understandings can truly deter nuclear war. Following the Cuban missile crisis the United States and the Soviet Union agreed "that neither would willfully make nuclear war" (according to a reliable source). Since that time neither has made nuclear threats toward the other. This political understanding now affords physical security to the United States and the Soviet Union. U.S. and Soviet security will probably diminish with the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction. Having failed to understand fully the military transformations wrought by possession of nuclear weapons the major powers have only weakly supported "workable international arrangements for the security of small states." So long as some states can engage in rocket-rattling other states will want to do so too. International disarmament is the only strategy that can guarantee security for all.

247
Mendershausen, Horst. FROM NATO TO INDEPENDENCE: REFLECTIONS ON DE GAULLE'S SECESSION. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp. [1966] 33 p. ([Rand Corporation. Paper] P-3334)
AS36.R28, no. 3334

Sees De Gaulle's decision to dissociate France from NATO as a catalyst that will prompt other powers to reexamine their relations with France and with each other in the light of their own interests. Although De Gaulle will most likely succeed in destroying the substance of NATO, Mendershausen predicts, he will probably fail to gain a strategic victory for France. By asserting France's independence from the United States, he is likely to open the way for Germany to be independent of France.

248
Merrill, B. S. SWORD WITHOUT SHIELD. Military engineer, v. 58, Sept./Oct. 1966: 354-355.
TA1.P85, v. 58

The "shields" of today are the fallout shelters that protect against the radiation from today's "swords"--nuclear weapons. But there is no effective program or plan to develop this nuclear shield in the United States. Evacuation, emergency shelters, and dispersal facilities are not adequate. Although the requirements for fallout shelters are simple, most military engineers prefer to ignore the problem. Millions of "free" shelter spaces have been found in existing buildings and "added millions could be provided at almost no cost if architects and engineers thought ahead about fallout." Dual-purpose fallout shelters, with a peacetime as well as an emergency function, cost little extra and assure a profitable use of space. A steady program to include such protection in new buildings will assure that "the sword will have its shield."

249
Messmer, Pierre. [MR. MESSMER DEFINES FRENCH CONCEPTIONS CONCERNING TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS] M. Messmer définit les conceptions françaises vis à vis des armements atomiques tactiques. Air & cosmos, v. 4, Oct. 29, 1966: 33.
P&GP RR

Interview with the French Minister of the Armed Forces that compares the American and French conceptions of the strategic role of tactical nuclear weapons. Americans consider these weapons as a sort of super artillery, which in a conflict will create a pause before escalation. They produce a great quantity of these weapons and maintain 6,000 to 7,000 in West Germany and Great Britain, enough to destroy the whole of central Europe. The French, by contrast, regard these weapons as deterrents and think that a much smaller number of them will produce the desired effect. France tested some tactical weapons in the Pacific area and the Sahara, and after 1972 plans to create a battery of 8 Pluton launchers in every Army division, each capable of launching several missiles if necessary. The Minister denied that he ever spoke about France's intention to build 200 tactical nuclear weapons.

250
Middleton, Drew. CRISIS IN THE WEST. London, Secker & Warburg [1965] 286 p.
D843.M44

A "pessimistic" view of European unity, the Western concept of collective security, and the Atlantic alliance. The author considers postwar European history, the various West European allies (particularly Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy), European communism, NATO's difficulties, and European unity and concludes that in order for Europe to be secure nationalism must be mitigated and NATO rejuvenated. American policies offered to Europe must be relevant to the second half of the 20th century.

251
Murphey, Rhoads. CHINA AND THE DOMINOES. Asian survey, v. 6, Sept. 1966: 510-515.
DS1.A492, v. 6

As one of the hypotheses that may figure importantly in future policy decisions the domino theory merits further consideration. As commonly asserted, for Southeast Asia the domino theory maintains that, unless the allegedly expansionist drive of Communist China is blocked by military means, Chinese or other Communist power will overwhelm Laos and South Vietnam and all the other adjacent countries, until the whole of Southeast Asia, and perhaps the Middle East and Africa are struck down through the impulse transmitted from the first fallen domino. The domino model for Southeast Asia may be seen to rest on two principal assumptions: first that the present Chinese state is insatiably expansionist; and second that each of the states of Southeast Asia lacks only the impulse provided by the fall of its neighbor to turn into a pawn of Communist China. But there is no sign that China has ever been involved in expansionism. In all cases of Chinese intervention a rational decision has prevailed, indicating that China is well aware of the limitations of her power beyond her borders. The best proof of this is the absence of Chinese troops in North Vietnam. Furthermore Chinese Defense Minister Lin Piao stated in Sept. 1965 that China will not attempt to export her revolution, because such an action would not agree with Communist doctrine. All that China requests is the establishment of nonhostile regimes in neighboring states. As far as the second assumption is concerned, neither external pressure nor the fall of a neighboring domino, but socioeconomic distress and political ineptitude and oppression are the prime causes of the spread of communism. Sometimes it is assumed that the Chinese state has motives of economic gain which impel her to expand. But analysis of South Asian economies shows that none of the products of the small states would make a critical contribution to Chinese needs. It is difficult to find any reliable reasons in past behavior, in the realities of the present, or in the predictable future for the application of the domino theory to the Chinese role in Southeast Asia. All in all this theory must be found a poor substitute for rational inquiry.

252
Needler, Martin C. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LATIN AMERICA. American political science review, v. 60, Sept. 1966: 616-626.
JA1.A6, v. 60

An examination of the period 1935 to 1964 shows that the Latin American coup d'état is likely to take place when economic conditions are deteriorating, tends increasingly to occur immediately prior to a presidential élection and the subsequent inauguration, and is apt to be conservative in policy orientation, directed against constitutional governments, and accompanied by violence. The coup usually is followed by conflict "between a more fundamentalist 'hard line,' and a 'soft line' that shows greater readiness to restore constitutional procedures and is normally represented by officers of higher rank, occupying positions of greater prestige in the provisional government." With respect to U.S. policy the conclusion that external opposition is ineffectual against military power seizures appears to be premature. On the other hand a military takeover, especially where the services are large and differentiated, depends for success in its later stages on the participation of officers least committed to its goals. Thus any deterrent, such as the suspension of military aid, may be sufficient to prevent the crucial "swing man" or group occupying that position from supporting a coup d'état. On balance the factors producing military dictatorships seem partly cyclical, with the cyclical pattern reproducing itself "around a clearly descending trend line, so that each successive peak in the number of dictatorships existing contemporaneously is lower than the last." In this respect, as well as in others, the abiding characteristics of Latin American politics are being progressively modified by evolutionary forces.

253
THE NEXT STAGE IN THE ARMS RACE: 1. OUR UNIQUELY TERRIFYING CENTURY, by David Carlton; 2. WHAT DOES LORD CHALFONT DO? by Peggy Crane. Socialist commentary, Oct. 1966: 21-24.
HX3.S74, 1966

Carlton: Considerable risk would attend an American decision to deploy an antiballistic missile [ABM] system against the Chinese threat. It could disturb the precarious equilibrium between the United States and the Soviet Union, inspiring each to race against the other to deploy nationwide ABM systems. The chance that one power might best the other in invulnerability could increase the chance of preventive war. Yet there is also a strong likelihood that the worst will not happen, and East-West stability will be restored, if not enhanced, by the early 1970's. If America decides in favor of inaction, the chance for stability decreases. As soon as China can threaten American cities with nuclear destruction, American guarantees to Asia will be much less credible. Either China, using nuclear blackmail, will sweep across Asia unchallenged, or more Asian countries, fearing this possibility, will decide to develop their own nuclear weapons. The risks of a Soviet-American ABM race pale in comparison to the certain chaos of a polycentric nuclear system. The Labour government must seek an essentially bipolar world where minor nuclear powers are kept under control by Washington and Moscow. The Labour government "should have the moral courage to advise the Americans as a lesser evil to launch the next stage in the arms race." Crane: Lord Chalfont, Britain's Minister for Disarmament, has been tireless in his efforts to promote an agreement on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and a ban on underground nuclear testing. Whereas an agreement on nonproliferation appears close at hand, there is growing concern that the great powers are no longer interested in a full test ban, largely because underground testing is needed for developing antiballistic missiles. It is impossible to guarantee that ABM's will be 100 percent effective against all-out nuclear attack, and their development cannot confer any more long-term stability on the great powers than does the present system of mutual deterrence. On the other hand China's caution is likely to increase as she moves to superpower status. If the world can get through the next 10 years without the Americans forcing a war with China, an era could emerge where major wars are no longer tenable because no one can win. If America and Russia start an ABM arms race these hopes of stability and lessening possibilities of war will be set back perhaps for a quarter of a century. The Labour government, in its advice to the U.S. President, should heed this warning.

254
1966 GREEN BOOK: A STATUS REPORT ON THE U.S. ARMY. Army, v. 16, Oct. 1966: 35-166. illus.
Ul.A893, v. 16

A graphic report on the current status and future plans of the United States Army. The role the Army is to play and its materiel requirements are presented in articles by men heading the various commands. The performance of the Army in Vietnam over the past year is assessed, including "an inexact gazeteer of bases and units" and a summary of General Westmoreland's command structure. The weaponry now available, or soon to become available, to battle units, is described and prime contractors are identified.

255
Niu, Sien-Chong. THE COMMUNIST CHINA MILITIA. Marine Corps gazette, v. 50, Oct. 1966: 37-42.
VE7.M4, v. 50

Mao Tse-tung utilized the Russian ideology and experience of a general arming of the people to create his theory of "people's war." Mao stressed "the militia is a military organization, a labor organization, an educational organization, and an athletic organization." While completely independent of the People's Liberation Army [PLA] the militia is subservient to the Party, providing manpower for production and exercising control over the civilian population. In 1958 the Chinese Communist regime attempted to organize all Chinese on a grand scale into one mighty instrument. The effort, for various reasons, failed to achieve any appreciable success until 1960. With the failure of the Great Leap commune program the military aspects of the militia were stressed while the economic aspects became less important. The militia is separated into two categories. The "ordinary militia" is essentially an enormous labor force strengthened by a plan designed to cement Party discipline. The "basic militia" force is made up of a select core of recruits, who are given fairly extensive military training and drilled every day after completion of their basic training course. It is the basic militia that will perform in conjunction with, and fill gaps in, the regular army. "At the highest levels, the control and command of the militia are assumed by the military districts and sub-districts of the PLA." Since 1962 careful emphasis has been given to quality rather than quantity. According to Western experts, the militia units are ill-trained and poorly armed and will be of little use in war. The Chinese, because of historical military experience and Mao's ideological precepts, adhere to a firm belief in the worth of these units. They believe that the armed Chinese masses will exterminate nuclear weapons rather than the other way around. This idea points up the Chinese threat to the whole world. The militia will constitute the vast second line of defense by providing the reserve for the regular army. While the militia system has economic, political, and military advantages, the plan, at least for the present, is still grander than the reality. Because of their own insecurity Chinese leaders use this sword of naked violence to stay in power. It could become a "spiritual atom bomb." The militia is recognized and feared by Party leaders. It could, at a future time, lead the revolt against communist oppression and lead the Chinese people's "fight for their own liberty."

256
Norden, Albert. WHITHER WEST GERMANY. New man, v. 18, Sept./Dec. 1966: 24-35.
P&GP RR

"Extracts from a speech by Professor Albert Norden, June 29, 1966."

German imperialism is making its third try this century to implement its policies: hegemony over Western Europe, the conquest of Eastern Europe, and neocolonialism. For this purpose the ruling circles of the Federal Republic are introducing an entire system of domestic measures to hold their own people down and are seeking to make Germany the NATO leader in Western Europe "in order to keep its rear free for further planned goals." Today West Germany possesses the mightiest military machine in Western Europe, an Army dominated by the traditions of the Fascist Wehrmacht and an Army that fosters anti-Communist hatred and a contempt for other countries.

A slowdown in the Federal Republic's rate of industrial growth and economic boom has accelerated Bonn's growing aggressiveness and its gigantic rearmament program. The special relations between Washington and Bonn, including the planned purchase of weapons and war material, foster the dangerous illusion that Germany has found in the United States the "right partner" for success in its attempt to establish a new order in Europe. The Federal Republic is the only country in the world that has not only two special revanchist ministries (the Federal Ministry for Expellees and the Federal Ministry for All-German Questions) but an official government organ for the sole purpose of subjugating, incorporating, and plundering the German Democratic Republic: the "Research Advisory Council for Questions of the Reunification of Germany." Far from planning peaceful rapprochement between the two German states, this ministry's warlike intentions are clearly recorded in the so-called "Grey Plan," a detailed instruction for the annexation of East Germany and the liquidation of all its people's achievements. If a third disaster this century is to be prevented, the two German states must renounce atomic armament, recognize the existing frontiers in Europe, establish diplomatic relations with all the states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and declare their readiness to negotiate on disarmament in Germany. The power of the people to achieve this is immeasurable if they are alerted to the danger and inspired to action.

257
Osgood, Charles E. PERSPECTIVE IN FOREIGN POLICY. [Urbana? Ill., 1965] 62 p.
E846.O8

Asserts that the basic problem facing policymakers in the nuclear age is to regain the initiative to operate on existing status quos without risking security or misusing power. As mutual nuclear deterrence is inherently unstable, "war as usual" obsolete, and abject surrender unpalatable, the alternatives remaining are graduated tension increase (escalation) and graduated tension decrease (de-escalation) or some combination of the two. Osgood concludes that escalation as a foreign policy fails on every count, and that only "graduated and reciprocated initiatives in tension-reduction" [GRIT] are acceptable. In the final chapters he shows how GRIT can improve U.S. policies in Vietnam and in China. "Operating within reasonable limits of national security, GRIT applies the 'stick' and the 'carrot' persistently and predictably as a means of creating gradually acceptance of a new set of rules for international behavior that are appropriate to a nuclear age." Although GRIT is not a glamorous policy, applied persistently it can keep potential crises under control and enable human institutions to catch up with weapons technology.

258
Pastusiak, L. DANGEROUS BONN-WASHINGTON DEAL. International affairs (Moscow) v. 12, July 1966: 45-48.
D839.I465, v. 12

The military-political compact between the ruling quarters of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany is one of the greatest dangers to peace in the present scene. To win world supremacy and carry out its anti-Soviet, anti-Socialist policy, the United States needed West Germany's manpower, economic potential, and territory; it laid foundations for the West German alliance as far back as the early postwar years behind the spurious slogan of "defending the free world from the Communist menace." The German bourgeoisie placed great hopes in the mounting East-West tension and the possibility of an armed clash between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union. The unity of interests between U.S. and West German ruling circles became the basis of close cooperation, strikingly expressed in the admission of the Bonn state to the Western military and political blocs. And now West German militarists are able to utilize NATO membership to achieve revanchist aims and provoke a global conflict. It is for this reason that the Socialist States devote so much attention to normalizing the situation in the heart of Europe where the two blocs confront each other; it is for this reason that proposals like the Rapacki Plan and the Gomulka Plan deal chiefly with Central Europe. We now see differences among the Western Powers regarding Germany. The striving of West German ruling circles to aquire nuclear weapons is causing growing anxiety in West European capitals, especially Paris. Although world attention is now focused on events in Southeast Asia, the problems awaiting settlement in Europe continue to be urgent. The Federal Republic is increasingly turning into an independent troublemaker in Europe and the principal partner of the United States against peace, socialism, and progress.

259
Perret, L. [COMMUNISM AND AEROSPACE STRATEGY IN THE U.S.S.R.] Communisme et stratégie aérospatiale en U.R.S.S. Forces aériennes françaises, v. 21, Oct. 1966: 305-322.
UG635.F8F66, v. 21

Describes the development of and interaction between policy and strategy in the U.S.S.R. under various Soviet leaders. The article is divided into the following four parts: "Stalin's Europeanism," "Malenkov's extremism," "Khrushchev's neo-Stalinism," and "Brezhnev's prudence."

260
Pfaff, William. DOES INTERVENTION WORK? Commonweal, v. 85, Oct. 14, 1966: 45-46.
AP2.C6897, v. 85

Argues that in the instance of Communist insurgency counterrevolutionary intervention by the United States is as likely to hurt as help and is even more likely to hurt in the kinds of situations faced today. A number of illustrative cases are cited.

261
Pierrené, Francis. [THE NEW SOVIET NAVAL STRATEGY] La nouvelle stratégie navale soviétique. Revue de défense nationale, v. 22, July 1966: 1233-1240.
D410.R45, v. 22

In recent years the world has witnessed spectacular development of the Soviet Navy. Russia now possesses nuclear-powered submarines and armaments and missiles launched from submarines, airplanes, surface structures, and coastal batteries. The role of the Soviet Navy in war is delineated in Military Strategy, a book prepared under the direction of Marshal Sokolovskii, and in his 1964 article in Red Star. Although the book apparently serves as a propaganda weapon, it does contain an outline of Soviet military doctrine. According to this doctrine the Navy will have three functions, two fundamental and one subsidiary: fighting the Western nuclear strike force, disruption of Western maritime transport and participation in strategic nuclear attacks. Up to now the Soviet Navy

has been assigned an essentially defensive role. Moreover the Navy's detection systems and its missile-launching submarines leave something to be desired. On the other hand the Soviet merchant marine will reach second place in the world by 1980. Russia's interests will demand protection of the merchant marine in war and peace. Consequently, Russia has good reason for developing its Navy and entering into competition with the West.

262
Powell, Ralph L. MILITARY AFFAIRS OF COMMUNIST CHINA. Current history, v. 51, Sept. 1966: 140-146, 178-179. D410.C82, v. 51

Analyzes in detail the recent developments in Chinese military affairs and concludes that, despite the great strengths of the Chinese armed forces, conditions at present "still limit Peking's ability to extend its military power far beyond its own frontiers and restrict its offensive capabilities to the countries on China's periphery."

263
REVOLUTION AND SECURITY IN THE THIRD WORLD. Social action, v. 33, Sept. 1966: 5-29. HN51.S45, v. 33

Contents.--Security problems of the Third World, by Chinmaya R. Gharekhan.--Moral dilemmas in revolutionary warfare, by Alan Geyer.--The United Nations and the security of the new nations, by Gerald N. T. Widdrington.

Focuses on some of the political and military aspects of the Third World's struggle for independence and development, "particularly in terms of the kinds of warfare prevalent or threatening in the Third World and the means of security available to it." Gharekhan finds that Third World security problems, such as unsettled boundaries and insurgency, are largely a legacy of colonial rule. He recommends general and complete disarmament, nuclear-free zones, and the United Nations as necessary means for tackling these problems. "The first moral and spiritual requirement which the Third World rightly exacts from American Christians," Geyer observes, "is to accept the reality and necessity of revolution itself . . . . It is more true than ever before that military power cannot simply be converted into political power--that indeed, by an ironic development which is dramatized most vividly in the Third World itself, the moralist's natural skepticism about military force has become at last the ally of political prudence." Widdrington concludes that a center of diplomacy that can "absorb and digest" the world's conflicting currents and "maintain its tradition of flexibility and retain confidence in its diplomatic skills to meet the recurrent crises still remains as the one hope for some form of order and a pooling of the peace-making skills of our modern world."

264
Rogers, B. A. WHITHER U.S. STRATEGY? Ordnance, v. 51, Sept./Oct. 1966: 163-164. UF1.O67, v. 51

Although U.S. military strength is vastly superior to that of the Soviet Union, the Nation's defenses against Communist subversion are wholly inadequate. This is partly because present American strategy was developed by "theoreticians in universities and research institutes, rather than by men with combat experience." Mutual deterrence, one current U.S. strategy, involves a balance of nuclear capabilities between two powers, making a pre-emptive strike by either unlikely. It is incorrect to assume that an equilibrium is desirable. The United States would not attack without provocation, no matter how strong its deterrent capability, and the Soviets are likely to do so at any time they think they may win. Communists also take advantage of the deterrent stalemate to initiate subversion and terrorism in many parts of the world. To this the United States has responded with the strategem known as graduated response. Hopefully the enemy, countered in several moves, will tire of the game and agree to negotiate. More likely, if his objective is important to him, he will intensify his efforts and escalate the conflict. U.S. military responses are hampered by civilians who insist upon the use of conventional equipment only, and a bare minimum of that. American theoreticians also believe nonproliferation is important and have pressured the Senate into approving the test ban treaty against the advice of the military. America is in its present dilemma because its strategy is planned by professors and others who do not understand the forces that dominate this century.

265
Roin, S. B. NUCLEAR POWER OF RED CHINA. Caravan, no. 344, Sept. 1, 1966: 20-22. AP8.C25, 1966

India can develop an atom bomb within 2 years. In the face of China's becoming the third important atomic power, India must make preparations to neutralize Chinese thrusts. Already the Americans are planning to meet the Chinese threat. India's most pressing problem is defense, and "we are open to every Tashkent rascal, Bokhara carpet thief, unclean Mongol cattle lifter and Persian double-crosser" who casts eyes upon the wealth of India. "If China feels it has a reasonable chance of winning, nothing will prevent it from attacking India." While America is discarding over-age sophisticated bombers, India is striving to develop an obsolete air force. India must at all cost attain nuclear parity with China. If not a weak India, dependent upon other friendly powers for its defense, will be open to Chinese aggression. A defense without nuclear-equipped missiles would encourage China to blackmail India. India should cultivate friends with at least three Asian countries which border China to neutralize its present strategic advantage. Further "India must enter into a mutual defence pact with the U.S.A. against China. America is the only world power which can prevent China from overrunning the small nations of South-east Asia." Most Indian leaders do not comprehend the purpose of the American presence in Asia. They should support, not criticize, American policy. Why should Indian leaders freely accept American foodgrains and not military supplies? If India is prepared to fight along with America against Communist China it can have as much American help as it wants. India will have to fight China one day. With India a firm American ally, American capital will flow in and help build India industry. Surely Russia would like to see a strong India help confine China within its present borders and hinder movement into Russia's Siberian provinces. Present Indian defense policy only encourages China to launch an atomic attack against India at China's convenience; this need not happen.

266
Rusk, Dean, Robert S. McNamara, and William S. Gaud. A REVIEW OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN AND

MILITARY POLICY. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 55, Sept. 19, 1966: 413-424. illus. JX232.A33, v. 55

"Transcript of a press conference held by Secretary Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, and Administrator of the Agency for International Development William S. Gaud at the conclusion of a Cabinet meeting" on Aug. 25, 1966.

A general summary of U.S. political and military activities throughout the world. At the conclusion of their statements the Secretaries of State and Defense and the head of the Agency for International Development answered questions from the press.

267
Rutherford, Malcolm. CUE FOR A NEW ARMS RACE. Spectator, no. 7215, Oct. 7, 1966: 442. AP4.S7, 1966

America's decision to discuss the antiballistic missile [ABM] in the councils of NATO strongly indicates that President Johnson is about to give his approval to the new defense system. Two possible reasons are China's nuclear development, and Russia's decision to proceed with its own ABM system. Although ABM's are most effective against a primitive nuclear attack such as China might launch, it is naive to assume that this is the only reason for preparations by the superpowers. Faced with a limited number of missiles to deploy, the United States can either cover some areas adequately, leaving the rest unprotected, or spread them so thin that they hardly afford any new protection at all. American ABM's would have ominous political repercussions in Europe, creating demands for similar protection of that area. The Russians would then react by spending more money on their own defensive system and on offensive weapons to probe the ABM defenses. The resulting new arms race would surpass all others to date.

268
Shastri, Shiv K. A POSSIBLE STRATEGY. Seminar, no. 83, July 1966: 31-34. DS401.S365, 1966

The world has moved from the "massive retaliation" strategy of the 1950's to the "counterforce" theories of the 1960's, but Indian policies have not kept pace. Under Nehru the fundamental aspect of India's foreign policy was noninvolvement in the power blocs. Nehru's basic fearlessness enabled him to project India as if its potential power were an actuality. His skillful exploitation of East-West differences neutralized the aggressive demands of each bloc. He fixed a pattern for other nations to follow. However, the success of the nonalinement policy was impermanent because it depended on a restraint shown by others that resulted mainly from the continued East-West deadlock and general revulsion at the destructiveness of the Second World War. Nonalinement's weakening is not the fault of the policy itself but of the subsidence of the factors that sustained it. To maintain its foreign policy today India must rely on the established institutions of power; namely an effective military establishment, a developed industrial base, an increased corps of scientists and engineers, efficient administration, and decreased dependence on foreign aid. The world is presently in a period of transition due to the realities of nuclear proliferation. Small nations must seek security in alliances; others, like India, which have the means to function as great powers, will have to make the sacrifices necessary "to measure up to their destiny." India cannot compete with the superpowers but can neutralize the blackmail aspects of China's nuclear capability by developing weapons of its own. India's defense strategy should include a small nuclear force to be used on the border and deployed only against invading combatants. Tactical nuclear weapons of this kind are clearly within the financial and technological means of India.

269
Simons, William E. THE LIBERAL CHALLENGE IN THE MILITARY PROFESSION. Air University review, v. 17, July/Aug. 1966: 33-37. TL501.A5574, v. 17

Considers whether the military profession can adapt to the liberal values of society and still retain its essential character. Within the ranks of the military a liberalist element has emerged that challenges established military maxims and seeks alternatives to the traditional approaches to defense issues. The young officers representing this trend are prepared to make fresh judgments, each one with awareness of the context, perspective, uniqueness, and suitability of different criteria for objective evaluation. While the judgment of military professionals must naturally be constrained by concern for national security and inevitably approach reality with a distinct set of attitudes, the professional today faces responsibilities that cannot be compared with any others in American history. These responsibilities demand a fresh and modern approach. Therefore the efforts of the military liberals should be encouraged and sustained.

270
[THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT] Le conflit sino-soviétique. Chronique de politique étrangère, v. 19, May 1966: 307-319. D839.C82, v. 19

The problems of China's nuclear defense and weapons production played a leading role in the origin and development of the Sino-Soviet conflict. The conflict has two aspects: the ideological divergencies within the international Communist movement, and the classic relations between two states bound together by alliances. On the ideological front the break between the two countries is complete in fact and only awaits legal sanction. The full break in Chinese-Soviet relations will come with the signing in Geneva of a nonproliferation treaty. China feels that this agreement will not be just a partial disarmament measure. She considers it Russia's complete and final abandonment of a bloc policy in which China still could take a part, and the start of an era of American-Soviet world domination. The last Soviet proposals at the Geneva Disarmament Conference indicate that the final break may not be far away. These proposals promise protection to all states that will renounce production of nuclear weapons or storage of nuclear weapons on their territory. As nobody, and certainly not the Soviet Union, can believe that China will renounce production of her own nuclear weapons, the Soviet proposals may be interpreted as Russia's readiness to revoke its protective guaranty of China, and to break the Sino-Soviet alliance.

271
SIXTEENTH ANNUAL AIR FORCE ALMANAC. Air Force and space digest, v. 49, Sept. 1966: 45-249. UG633.A65, v. 49

Examines the challenges facing the U.S. Air Force and the means with which it can meet them. These challenges include "deterring general nuclear aggression," participating in "a limited war with limited

objectives in Vietnam," serving as the technological initiator of the Nation's space and armaments programs, and promoting advancements in the "techniques of military management and development" that are applicable to the achievement of peace. In addition to reports from the Air Force commands, information on Air Force bases, weaponry, and space efforts are included.

272
Snyder, Glenn H. THE BALANCE OF POWER AND THE BALANCE OF TERROR. In Paul Seabury, ed. Balance of power. San Francisco, Chandler [1965] p. 184-201. JX1318.S4

In the "pure" nuclear balance of terror physical capabilities are significant only as a threatened sanction supporting political demand, not as the instrumentality for the direct physical achievement of political goals described in traditional balance of power theory. The balance of terror is more subjective than the old balance of power; whether the former is in a state of equilibrium depends at least as much on factors operating "within the minds" of opponents as on the latter's objective comparison of military capabilities. When nuclear deterrence is extended to include the protection of allies the subjective element, a mutual assessment of intentions, becomes more important than it is in simple bilateral deterrence and much more important than in traditional balance of power doctrine. The contemporary balancing process involves a mixture of nuclear and conventional forces. The entire system is in balance when each of its two subprocesses is out of balance--when one side preponderates in conventional power and the other in nuclear power--or when conventional and nuclear balances are separately in equilibrium. In traditional balance of power theories stability was viewed in terms of tendencies toward arms races, wars, and independence of the major actors. Today propensity toward war is regarded as the major dimension of stability, and the basic test of stability is the "distance" both sides are from possessing a full first-strike capability. A bipolar balance is usually said to be relatively stable, because only two power centers have the capacity to launch nuclear war and because they are likely to be cautious in conflict situations involving the danger of nuclear war. Contemporary arguments supporting this evaluation, like the interrelationships of international relations and military-strategic analysis, merit much more thought and consideration.

273
[THE SOVIET NAVY AND ITS SATELLITES. THE BALTIC SEA SITUATION UNDER THE SIGN OF THE RED NAVY] Die Sowjetflotte und ihre Satelliten. Ostseelage im Zeichen der roten Marine. Wehrkunde, v. 15, Sept. 1966: 479-482. U3.W396, v. 15

Data on the strength, equipment, and weapons systems of the Soviet bloc's naval forces in the Baltic.

274
SPACE ENVISAGED AS THE FUTURE MILITARY ENVIRONMENT. Data, v. 11, June 1966: 48-52. P&GP RR

A roundtable discussion by Maj. Gen. Jerry D. Page and Brig. Gen. Robert C. Richardson on the purposes, budgeting, military objectives, and prospects of the U.S. space program.

275
Spotswood, Sir Denis. ROYAL AIR FORCE GERMANY. Royal Air Forces quarterly, v. 6, autumn 1966: 173-181. UG635.G7A1252, v. 6

Great Britain developed the Royal Air Force Germany from the Tactical Air Force of 1943, which in turn became part of the Allied military occupation and then part of the NATO air command in Central Europe. Operational control of the national elements assigned to NATO in peacetime remains under national commanders with the provision that certain NATO criteria are met; this control transfers to SACEUR in times of emergency. Nuclear weapons have reduced the number of strike aircraft needed but reconnaissance operations still require a large force. Reconnaissance squadrons are essential to guard against conflicts of all sizes from frontier incident to full-scale nuclear attack and are held in a high state of readiness. RAF Germany's most important weapons are wielded by Canberra all-weather strike squadrons based near the Dutch border. Lightning squadrons (fighter aircraft) contribute to patrolling the border of the Soviet zone and to preserving the right of access to Berlin. RAF Germany is helping to secure the home base by contributing to deterrence and defense in NATO.

276
Stikker, Dirk U. FOURTEEN AGAINST FRANCE. Diplomat, v. 17, July 1966: 13-14, 58-59. AP2.D575, v. 17

French withdrawal from NATO has struck a blow at Western unity, but also promises certain advantages. For many years France stood as the principal obstacle to NATO's political and military progress, and a stumbling block in other ways. French withdrawal has at last brought into the open the conflict between nationalism and integration that has sapped NATO's performance in recent years. The remaining 14 nations must take advantage of this opportunity to improve the Organization and to define a new role for France. Although legally the original 15-member North Atlantic Treaty Organization ceased existence with the withdrawal of France, a simple resolution by the remaining 14 can reaffirm their attachment to the principles of interdependence on which the alliance was based. The new Organization formed by the 14 must remain open to French membership should France decide to return. Rather than question the legality of the French demand for withdrawal of allied defenses from its territory, NATO military and civil headquarters should leave France. To reorganize the existing civil machinery of NATO would only complicate the changeover, but the opportunity to improve the military command structure should be seized. For example unique opportunity exists to clarify present arrangements for the control of nuclear weapons. Assignment of these weapons to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe would give substance and reality to the U.S. commitment. While the French relapse into the "obsolete dogma of nationalism" is regrettable, there is no reason to feel pessimism in facing the temporary problems it creates. The ultimate results can be more unity in Europe and greater opportunity for Atlantic partnership.

277
Switzerland. Bundesrat. [REPORT OF JUNE 6, 1966, TO THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY, ON THE CONCEPT OF THE COUNTRY'S MILITARY DEFENSE] Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die

Konzeption der militärischen Landesverteidigung. Flugwehr und -Technik, v. 28, July-Aug. 1966: 167-172, 177, 193-194. TL503.F625, v. 28

The full text of the Swiss Government's report on the present and planned state of Switzerland's national defense, including its defense industry and the problem of acquisition of nuclear arms. Switzerland's current strategy starts with the deterrent value of selectively improving the strength of its conventional forces and provides, in case of foreign invasion, for holding at least a part of Swiss territory uninterruptedly throughout the war. Switzerland plans to do this by its own power for important political reasons. The Government assumes that the most likely instance of Switzerland's involvement would be a world war, and that the escalation of such a conventional war into a nuclear one cannot be ruled out as long as "the stockpiles of means of mass annihilation are still available to certain states." The report discusses also possible Swiss measures against nuclear blackmail and nuclear mass attack, weighs the advantages and disadvantages of the nation's present military posture, and describes at length the methods, the principles, and the problems (including financial) of Swiss short and long range defense planning. The Government underlines Switzerland's interest "in all efforts aimed at restricting use of nuclear arms." This notwithstanding, Switzerland has decided to examine carefully all the advantages and disadvantages of possible nuclear arms acquisition and not to give up its own freedom of choice in the matter regardless of the result of such a study.

278
Teller, Edward. PLANNING FOR PEACE. Orbis, v. 10, summer 1966: 341-359.
D839.O68, v. 10

Nuclear explosives and intercontinental missiles have negated the protection of U.S. ocean barriers; and the Nation's security has become as precarious as the European powers' has been for hundreds of years. Disarmament, attractive as it may be emotionally, will contribute to stability only if it applies to everyone and is controlled and enforced. At once questions arise concerning the paramountcy of national sovereignty and the right of self-defense. "No one has yet presented a complete and feasible plan for disarmament or arms limitation." Meanwhile, the danger of proliferation renders the international situation yearly more unstable. Recognition of the fact that modern mass-destruction weapons are within reach of numerous countries furnishes persuasive arguments if not for disarmament then at least for arms control. The majority of U.S. policymakers accept the idea that some form of a test ban is in the Nations's interest. On the other hand, U.S. adherence to a limited test ban may have given the Soviet Union an advantage in missile defense that may be permanent if a comprehensive ban is accepted. To set up arms control rules without providing for enforcement would be futile. Increased security is a function of adequate retaliatory forces. The United States has already taken the first step by acquiring overwhelming second-strike capability. Civil defense measures can give the United States a good chance to survive a nuclear war. Delayed response may emerge as "the safest, most practical, morally justifiable alternative open if we are ever forced to respond in a nuclear exchange." Proliferation of nuclear weapons will not seriously alter American deterrence. A bigger, stronger, and more assured retaliatory force along with passive and active defense measures, all kept up to date, will ensure survival. Increased U.S. strength will also strengthen NATO. Providing the European allies with a missile defense with ample safeguards against misuse could be the wisest move the Nation can make to strengthen the Organization. "The best guarantee of peace is appropriate force in the hands of those who want peace."

279
Thompson, W. F. K. DEFENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN-SOUTH-EAST ASIA AREA. In Royal Central Asian Society, London. Journal, v. 53, Oct. 1966: 255-265. DS1.R6, v. 53
"Address given to the Royal Central Asian Society on May 17, 1966."

Since Great Britain has reassessed its defense policy it must now do the same for its interests East of Suez. Does the nation oppose communism as an ideology, or because of its effects on the balance of power? Is India less important strategically now that it is no longer a British colony? What does British prosperity depend on? The nation's Middle East commitments are involved with oil, and the British presence is an important element of power in the Persian Gulf. This presence will remain. CENTO and SEATO are nebulous treaties, but the lines they have drawn are valuable. Southeast Asia contains intricate conflicts of long standing, but "of the only two really big question-marks in this area . . . one is provided by China and the other by Japan." The latter could be very strong militarily but currently prefers not to live up to this potential. Everyone is now asking, "What is China going to do?" Physically China probably will not break out of its boundaries; yet Peking would like to hold the other Southeast Asian Governments in sway. Although Vietnam could have been neutralized 4 years ago, the Soviet Union's failure to apply pressure and America's staking its own prestige on the outcome of the conflict have enormously complicated the situation. What kind of war should Great Britain be prepared for in Southeast Asia? Probably large-scale conventional wars will be deterred in much the same way as nuclear wars, but no real peace will come about as guerrilla warfare will undoubtedly continue. Sea communications in the Indian Ocean area may need to be protected, and jungle training must continue. Both the United States and Australia would like Britain to remain in Asia, and it will probably do so, but in the long run only Australia will be permanently available as a British base. In sum Great Britain will play a role junior to that of the United States in Asia, but in the Indian Ocean the British position is important and unique.

280
Topp, Erich. [TASKS AND STRUCTURE OF THE FEDERAL NAVY] Aufgaben und Aufbau der Bundesmarine. Wehrkunde, v. 15, Aug. 1966: 407-411.
U3.W396, v. 15

Information on the tasks of the West German Navy within the framework of general NATO strategy. The author evaluates the Navy's organizational structure, strength, and development plan.

281
Towler, Juby E. CIVIL DEFENSE DICTIONARY: WORDS, PHRASES, LETTERS. Danville, Va., Office of Civil Defense, 1966. 124 p.
UA926.T6

A dictionary of terminology generated by the American civil defense program. Slightly longer explanations

are given for technical terms. The volume is intended to be "particularly useful to the news media, Civil Defense personnel, and the volunteer workers."

282
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. IMPORTANCE OF NONMILITARY JUDGMENTS IN THE DIRECTION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 5 p.
UA12.U5, 1966

Indicates a number of the key issues involved in allocating military aid and argues that giving the Pentagon more authority over such aid is definitely not the way to prevent the waste or misdirection which may have occurred in the past.

283
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. BACKGROUND INFORMATION RELATING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA AND VIETNAM. 2d rev. ed. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 297 p.
DS550.U5114, 1966

Compilation of materials limited to "statements by officials of the executive branch and pertinent official documents, with the exception of the material on the programs of South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the National Liberation Front." Also included are a brief chronology of events in Southeast Asia, 1954-66; a table on U.S. foreign assistance to Vietnam, 1953-65; and a table on the number of casualties incurred by U.S. forces in Vietnam through Feb. 14, 1966.

284
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on International Organization Affairs. ATLANTIC UNION RESOLUTIONS. Hearings, 89th Cong., 2d sess., March 23 and 24, 1966. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 210 p.
JX1393.A8U525

Hearings on resolutions to establish an Atlantic union delegation, and to establish a commission for a stronger Atlantic union. Among the witnesses were Theodore Achilles, Atlantic Council for the United States; Richard J. Barnet, codirector, Institute for Policy Studies; John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; Robert Strausz-Hupé, director, Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania.

285
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations. THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. Hearings, 89th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966.
UA646.3.U443

Testimony by Dean Acheson, Christian A. Herter, and General Lauris Norstad. The subcommittee is chaired by Senator Henry M. Jackson.

286
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations. THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: ALLIED COMMENT. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 82 p. UA646.3.U43

Contents.--Old nations, new Europe, by Raymond Aron.--The Atlantic Community--unity and reality, by John W. Holmes.--Joint declaration, by Action Committee for the United States of Europe.--The changed setting of the Atlantic debate, by Alastair Buchan.--Press conferences excerpts, by Charles de Gaulle.--Address to the 11th NATO parliamentarians' conference, by Manlio Brosio.--Politics and economics, by Walter Hallstein.--The government statement to the fifth German Bundestag, by Ludwig Erhard.--Weakest link in NATO, by Dirk Stikker.

A collection of materials from allied sources representing a variety of viewpoints on the Atlantic alliance and European organization.

287
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations. THE WARSAW PACT: A STUDY. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 49 p.
JX1393.W2U5

Contents.--History of the organization.--The Warsaw Pact today and its value to the U.S.S.R.--Benefits derived by Eastern Europe from the pact.--Problems within the pact.--Charts.--Appendices.

Concludes that trends are at work within the Pact toward greater assertion of national interests and a new balance of decisionmaking power among the members. Politically the Warsaw Pact is one of the few remaining devices available to Moscow for holding the Soviet bloc together, and Eastern European armed forces are a useful adjunct to Soviet military power. Included in the appendices are the text of the Warsaw Pact Agreement and a comparison of the Warsaw Pact Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty.

288
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Armed Services. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee. U.S. ARMY COMBAT READINESS. Hearings, 89th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966.
UA23.3.A38, 1966

Presents assessments by Gen. Paul L. Freeman, Commanding General, Continental Army Command, and Gen. Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, of the Army's combat readiness and the "personnel and training problems confronting the Army today." Particular attention was given to the U.S. "ability to support Vietnam and maintain an adequate strategic reserve at the same time."

289
Warsaw Pact. Political Consultative Committee. Conference, Bucharest, 1966. [PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE] Paix et sécurité en Europe. Études soviétiques, no. 220/221, 1966: supplement, 3-32.
DK266.A2E78, 1966

Documents from the Conference of the Political Committee of the Warsaw Pact, held in Bucharest July 4-6, 1966. Included are full texts of the declarations on U.S. aggression in Vietnam and the strengthening of European peace and security.

290
WASHINGTON AND EUROPE. New times, no. 34, August 24, 1966: 1-2. D839.N483, 1966

Contradictions between Washington's European policy and West European interests were freshly evidenced recently by America's intensified propaganda

against normalization of East-West relations. On July 28 the Associated Press [AP] claimed that "Moscow is hardening to the West" which "tends to reduce Western urgency for initiative." On August 8 AP warned against being lured by the prospect of peace and urged Western politicians to cling to cold war positions, although AP's special correspondent William L. Ryan had to admit that, unlike Bonn's Foreign Minister Schröder, who cannot conceive of a Europe freed of American tutelage and interference, "many a European now seems to regard the U.S. military presence in Europe as anachronistic." Nevertheless, despite expiration of the NATO treaty in 1969 West European parliaments are being pressed to accept an arms program that will run at least to 1971. What Europe needs is not more of the crises "of other days which . . . tended to push the allies together," but a solution of its fundamental security problems without McNamara's trotting out, as at the July NATO Defense Ministers meeting, "the old story about the 'Eastern menace'" and insisting "on a 5-year arms drive programme." The Warsaw Treaty powers' Bucharest Declaration on Strengthening European Peace and Security gave impetus to the healthier trends gaining stride in Europe. The more frequent and fruitful "contacts between the capitalist and socialist parts of the continent have demonstrated anew the viability and efficacy of peaceful co-existence" and "some leading NATO countries are seeking broader political, economic and cultural ties with Eastern Europe," as may be seen in the recent visits of French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, Italian Foreign Minister Amitore Fanfani, and Denmark's Foreign Minister Per Haekkerup. Were Washington's European policy based on realism it would have changed, but so far there is no new approach. "America's foreign policy has never been distinguished for flexibility" but "the widening gap between the new trends in Western Europe and Washington's ossified European policy could well mean more serious complications for the United States."

291
West, Richard. THE PRESS AND VIETNAM. New statesman, v. 72, Sept. 23, 1966: 425.
AP4.N64, v. 72

Reveals that the lavish hospitality and attention extended to foreign correspondents by the U.S. propaganda machine in Vietnam combine with American correspondents' natural reluctance to criticize "the soldiers who actually run the risk" to distort the true image of the Vietnam War. The author suggests why "some of the best accounts of South Vietnam have come from foreign journalists."

292
WHY CHINA BUILDS BOMBS AT THE EXPENSE OF BREAD. I. F. Stone's weekly, v. 14, Nov. 7, 1966: 1, 4.
E740.I2, v. 14

China's giant strides to nuclear power represent the most important political and military development of this decade, but both Washington and Moscow pretend that nothing has happened. The Chinese ability to build an operational intermediate ballistic missile, miniaturize a nuclear warhead for it, and perfect the safety factor to the point where they can detonate it over their own territory ranks them as the number three nuclear power, ahead of both England and France. Even so, the United States continues to underrate Chinese nuclear strength and their ability to deter a U.S. atomic attack. The United States should read more carefully the pronouncements they now dismiss as "propaganda." The Chinese are sincere when they say their weapons "are entirely for defense." China's limited nuclear capability can force the United States into a conventional war, in which China's huge population provides a considerable advantage. That a nation as poor as China can develop a nuclear missile so quickly is proof that nonproliferation is a political, not technological, problem. To stop the further spread of nuclear weapons requires guarantees to non-nuclear powers that nuclear weapons will not be used against them.

293
Williams, Benjamin H. AMERICAN SECURITY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE. Social science, v. 41, June 1966: 147-152.
H1.S55, v. 41

Expresses concern over America's recent tendency to "send its military forces forth to intervene in the disputes of foreigners." Williams feels that the security of the United States and, indeed, of the world has been reduced by the advent of nuclear weapons, but that catastrophic nuclear war may be averted through "abandonment of unilateral military interventions and greater dedication to the principle of cooperative action."

294
Wilson, Dick. BRITAIN'S BARGAIN BASES. Far Eastern economic review, v. 53, July 28, 1966: 151-153. illus.
HC411.F18, v. 53

Britain intends to construct a new air-defense system based on small islands in the Indian Ocean to replace the naval presence that must soon be given up as too expensive. This tentative plan is full of military, political, and economic hazards. The heart of the planned system is a brand-new colony, the British Indian Ocean Territory. The colony comprises Chagos archipelago in the middle of the Indian Ocean and the three islands of Aldabra, Farquhar, and Desroches north of Madagascar on the African side of the Ocean. The two existing air bases at Gan and Cocos complete the picture. These "bargain bases" could provide Britain or her assigns (the United Nations or a united Europe) with an air umbrella extending from East Africa to Borneo. Joint surveys have been made of the islands by Anglo-American teams. The Americans want to close the 6,000 mile communications gap between their bases in Ethiopia and the Philippines and are prepared to pay the cost for installations. But the remaining costs to the British taxpayer could still prove excessive. That plus the political opposition to be encountered from the indigenous populations of the islands as well as from India (which has already protested), China, Russia, the United Nations, and Indonesia could prove formidable. "The search for a system of bargain bases for the Anglo-American transition from imperialism to U. N. peacekeeping in Africa and Asia will not be an easy one."

295
Wilson, Dick. POLICEMAN GO HOME? Far Eastern economic review, v. 53, July 14, 1966: 65-67.
HC411.F18, v. 53

Points out that the British Government has modified its original plan to withdraw the British military presence "East of Suez." But after painful reappraisal the ultimate aim is the same: to pass the peacekeeping burden to other hands. In important respects Britain differs from its American ally on

East Asian policy, notably on the questions of recognizing Peking, containing China, and "responding to the Vietminh challenge." But the rub is that Prime Minister Wilson has only £2,000 million a year to spend on military affairs, while President Johnson has just obtained the equivalent of £20,930 million from Congress for his defense spending this year.

296
Witzleben, Job von. [THE ESSENCE AND EVOLUTION OF THE PRESENT WEST GERMAN IMAGE OF WAR WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE WAR DOCTRINE] Evolution und Wesen des heutigen westdeutschen Kriegsbildes im Rahmen der Kriegsdoktrin. Zeitschrift für Militärgeschichte, v. 5, no. 5, 1966: 569-583. P&GP RR
Bibliographical footnotes.

Inquires into the German Federal Republic's strategic policy, its function in and influence on NATO strategy, and its actual and potential bearing on East-West relations in Europe and the world. Witzleben appraises that policy from the viewpoint of its all-important determining factor, the image of war, which in this case--as he seeks to explain--is not only imperialistic but based on an absolute belief in the inevitability of war. This concept makes "the war doctrine" the most essential element of state policy. He defines war doctrine (a term, he admits, used neither by NATO nor any NATO member) as comprising military policy, military theory, and military praxis and presenting the total model of how to prepare and conduct war. The author points out that his analysis relies primarily on "public pronouncements by members of West German and NATO military-political and military leadership" and not on "statements of more official character." Reviewed at length are the development of NATO strategy from 1962 to the present and the concomitant discussion among West German strategists of the German Federal Republic's comprehensive war doctrine. The essence of that doctrine, which has finally taken shape, rests on a theoretical classification of wars, which provides for a gradual escalation both of tensions leading to war and of war itself (from sub-limited to total war, from the local to the global). The West German war doctrine, although largely an adaptation of United States and NATO strategy to a local situation, influences the latter in no small measure by projecting unceasing conflict in Europe and promoting West German aggressive and imperialist ends. In its aggravation of tensions it poses a real threat to peace in Europe and the world.

297
Wu, Yuan-li. THE THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLAN: AN ECONOMIC DILEMMA. Current history, v. 51, Sept. 1966: 159-164. D410.C82, v. 51

Surveys the factors at work on mainland China's economy and points out that "noneconomic factors may well determine the economic choice." Together "they point to a higher rate of capital investment, a gradual shift in favor of industry, lesser reliance on material incentive, greater party control over economic and scientific policy, and . . . an independent and viable nuclear capability"--with or without a third 5-year plan. Wu discusses resource allocation, recent industrial development, present obstacles, economic growth and military capability, and tentatively concludes: "Unless the economy undergoes a sharp recession as it did in the beginning of the 1960's, Communist China's military capability will continue to pose a threat to peace--probably an increasing one--in the next few years even if the prospects of her internal economic growth are not necessarily promising."

298
Young, Stephen M. THE GREAT NATO BOONDOGGLE. War/peace report, v. 6, May 1966: 3-4. P&GP RR

De Gaulle's "go it alone" position vis-à-vis NATO is more a blessing than a disaster, leading to a long-overdue reappraisal of the 17-year alliance with the aim of persuading NATO's European members to assume greater responsibility. Hopefully this will unburden U.S. commitments in Europe, counter the U.S. gold outflow, and help meet increasing U.S. requirements in Southeast Asia. While the U.S. budget allots 63 percent to defense--much of it related to Europe--its allies there spend only fractions of that percentage. This imbalance of contributions leads directly to the imbalance of payments that weakens the U.S. economic position and threatens the dollar. Also while Americans are asked to forgo their vacations abroad to help stem the outflow of gold, 340,000 men plus some 300,000 dependents and other civilians stationed in a peaceful Europe pay out billions of dollars in a gigantic boondoggle. If the Soviet threat really exists the Nation should seek to establish a mobile, lean, fighting force of one-half or less the present one with tours of duty limited to 13 months sans dependents. In this connection U.S. officials should accelerate their efforts to secure an international nonproliferation agreement, otherwise West Germans will proceed without delay to become a major nuclear power. Having commenced two world wars, who knows on whose side the Germans would fight should there be another world conflagration. "One of the wise statements of Barry Goldwater in his 1964 campaign was a prediction . . . that if . . . there should be war between Communist China and the United States, the Soviet Union would fight alongside us as our strongest ally."

299
Zoppo, Ciro E. NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, MULTIPOLARITY, AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY. World politics, v. 18, July 1966: 579-606. D839.W57, v. 18

Unlike the traditional theories of international politics which emphasized a multipolar balance of power, arms control theory contends that a bipolar nuclear deterrence is more stable than several nuclear powers engaged in independent or alliance relationships. The primary cause of this apparent contradiction arises from the effects of military technology and its influence on the foreign policy goals of nations. One result of the greatly increased destructive capability of nuclear war has been to hobble the use of military means by the major powers to attain foreign policy goals. Even in an era of ideological strife the avoidance of all-out nuclear war seems to have become an established rule of the international system. Yet maintenance of deterrence requires that in each conflict political resolve must be demonstrated by a willingness to run the risk of general war. If general war is to be avoided by the superpowers, various tactical forms of conflict acquire more importance. The problem in such conflict, in insurgency for example, is to determine the limits of action that will avoid precipitating nuclear war. Nuclear technology directly affects the chances of maintaining international stability and is central to the process of deterrence. Mutual deterrence requires a minimum diversified

strategic force capable of inflicting certain and devastating retaliation. Symmetry of retaliatory capabilities is mandatory for stability, but is constantly threatened by obsolescence of weapons through technological breakthroughs. In addition to nuclear military technology, what distinguishes the present international system are the signals of communication exchanged between the superpowers acting in the context of the arms race. Communication is particularly crucial to indicate national intentions during crises and limited conflicts. During an escalating conflict in which nuclear weapons are used bargaining is indispensable for controlling events. The difficulties are multiplied by an increase in independent nuclear decision centers. Survival does not depend solely upon technological development but upon decisions of leaders. The skill of these leaders in adapting to change will determine the nature of the transition to the next international system.

D. CONSEQUENCES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES AND WAR

1. Biological

300
Bizzozero, O. Joseph, and others. RADIATION-RELATED LEUKEMIA IN HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI, 1946-1964: I. DISTRIBUTION, INCIDENCE AND APPEARANCE TIME. New England journal of medicine, v. 274, May 19, 1966: 1095-1101.
R11. B7, v. 274

The observations of the occurrence of leukemia in Hiroshima and Nagasaki for the period 1946-1964 are presented. During this period leukemia developed excessively in persons exposed within 1500 meters from the hypocenter. A decreased appearance time, defined as the interval between exposure to radiation and the clinical or symptomatic onset of leukemia, was noted in patients exposed within 1500 meters. Attention is invited to the role of age as a covariable to distance in the appearance time of acute leukemia developing in such persons. In this group chronic granulocytic leukemia developed in persons up to twenty-nine years of age at the time of the bombings in the period 1946-1955 at a disproportionate rate as compared to the distally exposed and the pattern of spontaneous leukemia for this age group. (Authors' summary)

301
Conard, R. A., J. E. Rall, and W. W. Sutow. THYROID NODULES AS A LATE SEQUELA OF RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT IN A MARSHALL ISLAND POPULATION EXPOSED IN 1954. New England journal of medicine, v. 274, June 23, 1966: 1391-1399.
R11. B7, v. 274

A medical study of the Rongelap Islanders accidentally exposed to radioactive fallout in 1954. Pathological thyroid changes were found and clearly linked to radiation. The authors conclude, on the basis of their findings, that "the seriousness of the internal hazard associated with fallout, particularly from radioiodine, must be revised upward."

302
IN BEAGLE COLONY: RADIATION REDUCES LIFE-SPAN. In American Medical Association. Journal, v. 197, July 25, 1966: 30-32.
R15. A48, v. 197

Some of the interim results of an experiment to ascertain the long-term effects of external and internal irradiation. Irradiated dogs seem to die of the same disorders as the control animals, but sooner and in greater numbers.

303
Kato, Hiroo, William J. Schull, and James V. Neel. A COHORT-TYPE STUDY OF SURVIVAL IN THE CHILDREN OF PARENTS EXPOSED TO ATOMIC BOMBINGS. American journal of human genetics, v. 18, July 1966: 339-373. QH431. A1A5, v. 18
Bibliography: p. 371-373.

A cohort-type study of children born subsequent to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and divisible into three groups on the basis of parental exposure (a heavily exposed group, a lightly exposed one, and a nonexposed set) has failed to disclose significant variation in mortality ascribable to differences in radiation. The average number of years at risk is nine but varies from three to 15 years. Though the comparison groups differ significantly with respect to certain extraneous sources of variation in mortality, notably, parental ages and birth rank, the failure to observe significant mortality differences among the exposure groups is not attributable to the existence of this concomitant variation. In view of the number of years of death at risk on the average and the knowledge that the bulk of mortality prior to the twenty-first birthday is, in fact, prior to the tenth, it seems improbable that mortality prior to maturity can be shown to be a function of parental exposure in either Hiroshima or Nagasaki. Our failure to demonstrate significant differences among the exposure groups does not necessarily imply that there are no differences. It merely means that within these years and numbers of observations no effect is to be seen. These data, considered in conjunction with the other data from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, may be utilized to approximate the minimal doubling dose for man, i.e., the amount of radiation necessary to produce the same number of mutations as occur spontaneously each generation. It is suggested that the present findings render it unlikely that the figure is less than 50 r for radiation of the type emitted by an atomic bomb and for mutations of the type resulting in early death in the first post-bomb generation. It is further suggested that under the more usual conditions of human exposure to radiation, the doubling dose for mutations of this type is of the order of 100 r. (Authors' summary)

304
Mitschrich, H. [RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT. II. THE MILITARY-MEDICAL OPINION ON SKIN BURNING CAUSED BY β-RADIATION] Der radioaktive Niederschlag (II). Die β-Strahlenverbrennung der Haut in wehrmedizinischer Sicht. Wehrmedizinische Monatsschrift, v. 10, July 1966: 209-212. illus.
P&GP RR

In addition to γ-radiation, nuclide mixtures cause invariably also a β-radiation in the field of radioactive (r.a.) fall-out. The radiant energy of this corpuscular radiation is already completely absorbed by clothes, or if the dust is located directly on the skin, by the dermal organ. This may, corresponding to the total dose, cause burns in the skin. Lesions caused by a dose exceeding approximately 3,000 rad. cannot be completely repaired. It is investigated in which way troops can be endangered by β-radiation in nuclear warfare. Furthermore, criteria is presented which provides for the determination of the maximum permissible β-dose of the skin, which is just barely permissible in the field, from the γ-value. The ratio of

the γ-dose to the β-dose is assumed to be 1:30, if the source of radiation is located approximately 1 m. from the detector. (Abstract supplied)

305
Sagan, Leonard A. HUMAN EFFECTS OF CHRONIC, LOW DOSE RADIATION. Archives of environmental health, v. 13, Sept. 1966: 345-350.
RC963. H22, v. 13

Explains the "late effects" of chronic low-dose radiation exposure. The author asserts that although knowledge concerning such injuries is "incomplete" it is nevertheless better understood than many other environmental hazards.

306
Schull, William J., James V. Neel, and A. Hashizume. SOME FURTHER OBSERVATIONS ON THE SEX RATIO AMONG INFANTS BORN TO SURVIVORS OF THE ATOMIC BOMBINGS OF HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI. American journal of human genetics, v. 18, July 1966: 328-338. QH431. A1A5, v. 18
Bibliography: p. 338

Data are presented on the sex ratio of 47,624 children born in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the years 1956 through 1962. The total number of births in these two cities for which information is available is now 140,542, and of this number in 73,994 instances one or both parents were exposed to the atomic bombings. The suggestion of an effect of exposure on sex ratio in the earlier data is not borne out by the present findings. One can argue either that a small early effect has disappeared or that the original observation had no biological significance. (Authors' summary)

2. Economic

307
Barney, Walter. INSTRUMENT OUTLOOK: GROWTH AND DIVERSIFICATION. Electronics, v. 39, Aug. 8, 1966: 110-114. TK7800. E4384, v. 39

Companies manufacturing instruments in the Western United States see an ever-expanding market for their products. Much of this growth is a direct result of the solid research and development budgets of the industry, which have created a steady stream of new products. Although Government spending still accounts for a large percentage of instrument sales, diversification, for example into medical devices, has lessened the significance of military spending. Many manufacturers feel the Vietnamese War has created more problems than profit, by tightening the materials, labor, and money market; they look forward to more commercially oriented, socially useful production.

308
Bartenev, S. ECONOMIC FOUNDATION OF MILITARY MIGHT. Soviet military review, Sept. 1966: 3-6.
P&GP RR

"To fight a war there must be money, money and more money." This aphorism from the days of mercenaries and smooth-bore muskets is even more striking today when huge resources are needed to support armed forces. New types of weapons and equipment usually are much more expensive than the old designs. A modern submarine costs as much to build as a combat ship of ten times the displacement. Britain's White Book of 1965 states that the cost of equipping an armored regiment is to be increased two-fold and of an infantry battalion six times. "The latest British Lightning-3 aircraft costs nearly five times that of the last Hunter model." Every new stage in the system of armament usually requires further improvement in logistics. According to U.S. figures, into the manufacture of each fighter aircraft go about 8 tons of aluminum, 1.7 tons of chromium, approximately a ton each of copper and nickel, and several tons of special steel, titanium, magnesium, tungsten, cobalt, and plastics. One can picture the huge economic effort involved to fit out and support an army of many millions with weapons, ammunition, and the most diverse material and technical means. With every new generation the cost of weapons, to take American figures, increases by at least 100 per cent. The rapid scientific and technological progress and the consonant changes in armaments make it imperative to revise many notions of economic factors such as: the importance of advance stockpiling, military buildup, and capacity for loss replacement; continual modernization and re-equipment; and the extent to which a national economy is no longer a base for logistical supply but a major military objective in itself. "In preparing a country for war the cardinal task today is to ensure the vitality of the economy, maintain a high level of morale and political consciousness among the population and reduce probable losses to a minimum."

309
Clayton, James L. AN UNHALLOWED GATHERING: THE IMPACT OF DEFENSE SPENDING ON UTAH'S POPULATION GROWTH, 1940-1964. Utah historical quarterly, v. 34, summer 1966: 227-242.
F821. U92, v. 34

Between 1940 and 1964 Utah's population grew 65 per cent, a rate more than double the percentage increase of the previous 23 years. Although it is widely assumed defense spending is responsible for this growth, no one has empirically tested this belief. First one must measure the magnitude of defense spending by determining the number of jobs directly related to defense employment. Since there is no defense sector in the standard industrial classification, this the student himself must determine. In March 1964 some estimates placed defense employment at 34,500, or 11.9 percent of the non-agricultural work force. Next one must determine Utah's rate of population growth, separating the birth rate from migration into the state. Demographic methods have many weaknesses in this area. Results of the various methods do substantiate the common knowledge that during the late 1950's and early 1960's Utah probably experienced a net in-migration of from 5,000 to 15,000. Utah's birth rate is clearly the primary reason for its growth, not defense spending. However, defense spending is clearly responsible for the increased number of new jobs created in Utah since 1940. Since most migration took place in the five counties most associated with defense spending, and since most of the salaried positions in the defense industries went to persons from outside the state, the relationship between defense spending and migration becomes strikingly evident. It seems probable therefore that unless defense spending is increased, Utah's population boom is now over and the pattern of out-migration will commence once again.

310
"CLOSING OUT": 1 BILLION DOLLARS' WORTH OF MISSILES. U.S. news & world report, v. 61, Aug. 22, 1966: 40-42. illus. JK1. U65, v. 61

Missile sites from New York to California are being disposed of by the U.S. Air Force in a move that will

save America some $117 million per year. Rendered obsolete by the newer, less-vulnerable Titan II and Minuteman, these Atlas and Titan I missiles did provide a crucial deterrent during the early 1960's. Through careful salvage of equipment and real estate, the Air Force has already recovered close to 70 percent of its original investment. The missiles themselves will not be destroyed; the nuclear warhead material has been returned to the Atomic Energy Commission, and the missiles will be used in developing antimissile and space programs. The silos, after they are stripped of all usable equipment, are to be turned over to the General Services Administration for disposal. Various civilian organizations, including oil companies, farm groups, and banks, have expressed interest in acquiring the silos for storage. Some will be used for Government records, others for university research, and one as the foundation for a school gymnasium. A large portion of the stripped-away equipment was turned over to Government departments for re-use; this departure from the practice of selling such equipment as surplus has saved American taxpayers almost $1 billion. "By previous U.S. standards of surplus disposal, authorities agree, the handling of the obsolete missile bases has set a new high for efficiency."

311
Donne, Michael. HOW UNITED KINGDOM IS RE-SHAPING ITS FORCES AND INDUSTRY FOR NEEDS OF 1970s. Armed Forces management, v. 12, June 1966: 67-70. UB153.A65, v. 12

Never has Britain's defense policy been so severely questioned and revised as in the past 2 years. While the process continues, the 1966 White Paper reveals what has been decided to date. Of prime importance is the decision to relieve the strain of defense costs on the British economy. Troop levels have been set that are consonant with Britain's nuclear capability and obligations, and changes in the organization of military units and research and development channels are being streamlined for greater economy and efficiency. Greater stress on international collaborative efforts reflects Britain's interest in the establishment of a "Defense Common Market." U.S. military hardware will quite often be modified by a substitution of British-made components. The affiliation with NATO has not proved fruitful as an avenue for identification of common defense needs, exchange of information, and multilateral development. British industry wants to see greater U.S. purchase of British military hardware, and the Government is taking steps to improve its entire overseas sales organization for military equipment by establishing an "Office of Defence Sales." The overhaul of procurement machinery will ensure domestic equipment requirements are fulfilled, as well as seeing to it that British contractors will benefit from the improved links with the Government.

312
Faulkner, Rafford L. THE COMING URANIUM MARKET. Nuclear energy, July/Aug. 1966: 195-196. TK9001.N73, 1966

Predicts that in the next few years commercial uranium requirements will increase sufficiently to replace Government purchases under current contracts scheduled to end in 1971. The uranium industry must explore, develop, and construct mining and milling facilities to meet the forecast market requirements for nuclear fuel.

313
Fox, Willard M. HOW TO FINANCE A WAR. Freeman, v. 16, July 1966: 12-17. AP2.F9155, v. 16

No matter how politically successful a war may be, nor how quick the victory, war is a wasteful activity from an economic point of view. It is a deplorable waste both of human and material resources. To think we can shift the tax burden of present wars to 1996 is foolish. No amount of fiscal hocus pocus can change the fact that war must be paid for by capital goods and materials now in being. The cost of waging war is borne by those deprived of things that would otherwise be produced and consumed in peacetime. The major source of war financing used to date in the United States is "a thinly disguised printing of money." The legacy of this mode of financing is the current dollar, worth 43 1/4 cents. War prosperity is politically popular but definitely illusory. The fairest way to finance a war is to tax the incremental earnings of the civilian population as these earnings accrue. If as much money is taxed out of the economy as the Defense Department pays for goods consumed in the war, there need be no inflationary rise in prices. Also there need be no danger of the usual postwar situation of newly created money chasing after a reduced stock of goods.

314
Greenberg, Edward. SOME ASPECTS OF THE STATE DISTRIBUTION OF MILITARY PRIME CONTRACT AWARDS. Review of economics and statistics, v. 48, May 1966: 205-210. HA1.R35, v. 48

Considers the state-by-state distribution of prime military contracts for research in relation to similar distributions of total prime military contracts. Research contracts have been said to lead to procurement contracts that are important for a state's economic growth. Examination of these distributions shows that research contracts do tend to bring procurement awards, but not until 2 to 5 years later.

315
Hounau, Général. [STRATEGY AND ECONOMY IN THE NUCLEAR ERA] Stratégie et économie à l'ère nucléaire. Revue de défense nationale, v. 22, Aug./Sept. 1966: 1379-1394. D410.R45, v. 22

In the U.S.-Soviet confrontation the exercise of Secretary McNamara's long-range strategy proved beneficial to the United States. As it uses dissuasion and persuasion rather than weapons, this strategy, without being deadly, is able to exercise considerable influence, not only in the military, but also in the economic and political spheres. With it a strong state is able to force the smaller ones to comply without striking a blow. As far as economic power is concerned, it has increased in importance with the development of nuclear weapons until today it is essential in any war. In limited conflicts that are waged on a low military level and protracted in time, as is the Vietnamese War, economic power cannot be underestimated. If, for instance, an important conventional war were to develop in a zone sufficiently distant from the vital interests of the two great atomic powers, say in Asia or Africa, industrial mobilization would become just as important as it was in the two world conflicts. In a great nuclear exchange, should it happen in the future, the economically most powerful party will have the last word, even if it suffers enormous and perhaps irreparable losses. Undeniably strategic power and economic potential have become indivisible in the nuclear era.

316
Molter, Günther, and Gert W. Heumann. [AERONAUTICAL DISPLAY IN FARNBOROUGH] Luftfahrtschau in Farnborough. Flug-Revue, no. 10, Oct. 1966: 22-29. illus. TL503.C524, 1966

Reports on the readjustment of the British aircraft industry to new market requirements since the British Government cut down its domestic orders for certain types of military aircraft. The authors point out that the industry has "displayed in a remarkable way its ability to survive" and that "small, light aircraft created by the smallest companies are on their way to gaining substantial orders to go along with the orders of the big companies that produce military equipment for the Middle East." A description is made of the various types of aircraft exhibited in the 1966 aeronautical show in Farnborough.

317
Sobin, B. SOME INTEREST RATE ASPECTS OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS INVESTMENT POLICY. Arlington, Va. Weapons Systems Evaluation Division, Institute for Defense Analyses, 1965. 70 p. tables, charts. (Institute for Defense Analyses. Research paper P-171) HD9743.U656, 1965

Revision of an earlier paper prepared in 1961 for the weapons systems evaluation division. "Analyses that may assist the Department of Defense in arriving at sound policy with respect to interest rates for weapons systems evaluations."

318
U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Federal Procurement and Regulation. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF FEDERAL PROCUREMENT. Hearings, 89th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 422 p. JK1673.A517, 1966

Includes testimony from Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense; Paul R. Ignatius, Assistant Secretary of Defense; Vice Admiral Joseph M. Lyle, Director, Defense Supply Agency; Lawson B. Knott, Administrator, General Services Administration; Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the United States; and Philip S. Hughes, Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget. The hearings were conducted to (1) establish guidelines as to the proper role of Government compared to the private sector and (2) list, analyze, and "consolidate common-type activities into streamlined operations." The Committee felt that "the national economy is best served by placing civilian-type activities in civilian agencies." Pages 3 through 4 list the hearings and reports already issued by the subcommittee.

319
Wallace, William. HOW THE WEST WAS WON. Electronics, v. 39, Aug. 8, 1966: 102-105. TK7800.E4384, v. 39

Business in the West Coast aerospace industry is running far ahead of the most optimistic predictions. The electronics industry expects over $5 billion worth of business in 1966 and at least 20,000 new jobs. Much of this gain is due to increased activity in aerospace. The Vietnam War, a rush of non-Vietnam contracts, a generally booming economy, and the industry's share of contracts in space and communications satellite fields are major factors. The aerospace electronics boom has some dark sides, however. Some projects not directly necessary for the Vietnamese War are being stretched out. Another problem is the slowing rate of profit, due in part to the fierce competition for contracts. Also manpower and material shortages have struck the industry. "To make sure the current boom does not become a bust," aerospace companies are trying to diversify and to increase funds spent in research and development.

3. Ethical and Social

320
Bennett, John C. NEW LOOK AT AN OLD SUBJECT: PACIFISM. Presbyterian survey, v. 56, Oct. 1966: 10-13. BV2570.A1P64, v. 56

In most Christian traditions the use of military force in certain instances has been accepted as morally right. However, a strong pacifist tradition has coexisted with this altitude. Within the American Protestant community absolute pacifists do not agree about where they should draw the line against the use of coercion. Guy Hershberger, a leading Mennonite theologian, states that "most American Mennonites have taken their stand somewhere between spanking and the police force. Many Quakers have taken theirs at a point between the police and the military." Particularly in the Anglo-Saxon countries, a somewhat amorphous pacifist tendency based on the character of modern war has developed. Warfare against Hitler set back this more pragmatic type of pacifism, but the development of nuclear weapons has revived it. Certainly the case for nuclear deterrence as a way of preventing war becomes weaker with burgeoning nuclear proliferation, the increasing danger of escalation, and the abatement of ideological conflict between Communist and non-Communist nations. Yet unilateral nuclear disarmament probably would not prevent war, and it might create so much international instability that the occasions for war would become more numerous. Current developments in the Roman Catholic Church are among the most significant in the history of pacifism. The Second Vatican Council moved close enough to nuclear pacifism to encourage this position, and it asked states to make legal provision for conscientious objection "provided they accept some other form of service to the human community." Without question some new ways must be found to protect those who feel that the killing in Vietnam violates their deepest convictions and to prevent the Government and the people from incarcerating many morally sensitive younger citizens. Pacifism cannot be a self-sufficient position for a nation and its statesmen, especially when pacifism is not a force in Communist lands. Yet pacifists must be thanked for criticizing assumptions that are unpopular to question.

321
Draper, G. I. THE PLACE OF THE LAWS OF WAR IN MILITARY INSTRUCTION. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 111, Aug. 1966: 189-198. Ul.R8, v. 111

"A lecture given at the R.U.S.I. on 9th February 1966 by Colonel G.I.A.D. Draper." Discussion is given p. 195-198.

Evaluates the significance of the 1949 multilateral lawmaking conventions that established codes of behavior for the treatment of combatants and noncombatants in time of war. These four codes of humanitarian conduct are reviewed, and the procedures for dealing with violations are explained. The author strongly advocates courses of instruction geared to

explain the laws of war to all levels of the military and asserts that all U.N. forces involved in peacekeeping operations should be thoroughly familiarized with the Geneva code. He concludes that awareness of this code will lead to higher standards of individual military conduct and thereby mitigate unreasonable military orders.

322
Gallagher, Joseph. THE AMERICAN BISHOPS ON MODERN WAR. America, v. 115, Nov. 5, 1966: 548-549. BX801.A5, v. 115

Few American bishops have spoken out concerning the bearing of Vatican Council II and Pope Paul's pleas on the Vietnam crisis. No post-Vatican II American bishop should be expected to do more than affirm (if such is the case) his personal conviction that the U.S. role in this crisis is "not clearly immoral." On the other hand recent, prenuclear history demonstrates compellingly that high churchmen ought not to give public support to government policy in a war that evidences dishonesty and miscalculation on both sides. Guenther Lewy's book The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany documents how the German Catholic bishops gave Hitler a degree of assistance that seems unbelievable in retrospect. The German bishops were not stupid or evil men, for as Vatican II points out: "Modern warfare, through a certain inexorable chain of events, can urge men on to the most atrocious decisions." From the Hitler era arises the terrible lesson of the persistent need "for the official spokesmen of God's word to stand in detached, supranational judgment over the morality of modern warfare." Especially in the nuclear age this need demands that no shepherd of the Roman Catholic Church ever again approve any war.

323
Leo, John. WAR-MONGERING IN AMERICAN CATHOLICISM. Peace, no. 5, spring 1966: 3-8. P&GP RR

The vulnerability of Catholics to warmongering has many roots. One such is Catholic separatism. In any modern society war benefits the outsider in society, because it mobilizes all sectors of the nation into a united effort. Another root is the uncritical love of legitimate authority in the Catholic Church. Many Catholics refuse to consider an issue further once a bishop has spoken. A third cause is a post-Council of Trent phenomenon, the great attention to personal sins in the Church and concomitant reluctance to come to grips with social sins. German bishops sought every possible means to find loopholes for Hitler and persuade dissident German Catholics to support him. "As a result thousands of German soldiers marched off to slaughter Slavs with one worry on their mind: that they would be able to preserve their chastity at the front." A fourth trap for Catholics is a "double standard": once one makes the assumption that national honor is correct, one is set for a moral crusade where facts do not intrude. Another problem, not exclusively Catholic, stems from the way that democracies conduct warfare. To gain support for a war the democratic state propagandizes itself into wide consensus; when the war is over, public opinion lags behind events and continues in favor of war. As a result, nations support such policies as unconditional surrender, which creates more slaughter than is necessary to accomplish desired ends. Catholics seem to be more vulnerable to sloganizing and a crusade mentality. The Catholic position on "just war" has also undergone change. Tradition since Augustine has required that the state prove the necessity of war. Today, "the presumption of right in favor of the political regime, any regime, whether democratic or totalitarian, has been one of the strongest undergirdings for Catholic warmongering."

4. Other

324
F.A.S. NEWSLETTER, v. 19, Feb. 1966: 1-4. Q11.F422, v. 19

Gives the statement endorsed by the Federation of American Scientists [FAS] condemning the use of chemical agents for the destruction of crops in Vietnam. Such tactics are indiscriminate, harming combatants and noncombatants alike, and can set a precedent for use of similar but more dangerous agents against human beings. The newsletter also includes a statement by Gabriel Kolko, associate professor of history at the University of Pennsylvania, criticizing the secrecy surrounding the chemical and biological research projects of the University's Institute for Cooperative Research. Kolko also questions the legality of chemical warfare. Finally the newsletter gives the FAS resolution on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons with an explanatory statement.

325
Garber, Alex. A CALL TO END THE DRAFT. Dissent, v. 13, Sept./Oct. 1966: 540-543. HX1.D58, v. 13

Compulsory military service, no matter how universal, constitutes "a severe deprivation of civil liberties . . . inimical to both democratic and Socialist values." Military organizations obviously reject the ideals of freedom and equality valued in civilian life. Furthermore it is generally agreed that a large standing army induces militarism and threatens democratic government. This is reflected in the American Constitution which thoroughly subordinates the military to civilian authority. The course of action open to those who disapprove of the present system of conscription is organization of an antimilitarist movement expressing popular opposition to compulsory military service except in dire emergency. The movement will also advocate publication by all nations of the size of their armed forces and military expenditures and urge reduction of all standing armies.

326
Schneider, P.E. "WHAT WE CAN'T COVER WITH PLANTS--WE'LL PAINT." New York times magazine, Aug. 14, 1966: 18-19, 26, 28. AP2.N6575, 1966

The French Army has chosen Albion, a plateau in the heart of upper Provence, as the place in which to install the second generation of its force de frappe: 25 nuclear missiles. Authorities were unprepared for the vehemence of the residents' protest against this deployment and are now attempting to reassure them. Besides the material rewards of additional jobs and local expenditures, the Army will bring new intellectual activity such as lectures and films. Authorities seek to allay fears that the missiles will be an enemy target and argue that tourists will go out of their way to visit the silos. While the roads leading to the silos will be visible, the silos themselves will not be, for the steel and concrete will be covered with a thin layer of earth and indigenous plants. However the residents

of the plateau remain overwhelmingly opposed to the installation, not because of the dangers of atomic warfare, but largely because of the inconvenience. Expropriation of private property and curtailment of hunting are especially sore points. What the people resent most is the arbitrariness of the intrusion. The prevailing mood is one of resignation. "'Maybe they will find something worse than atomic missiles and put it elsewhere,' sighs a retired farmer at Rustrel."

327
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. BASE CLOSURES AND REDUCTIONS. Report by Subcommittee No. 4, 89th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 5711-5729 p.
UA23.3.A64, 1966

"No. 53."

According to section 611 of Public Law 89-188 (the 1966 military construction authorization bill) the Secretary of Defense must present formal justification to Congress of his recommendations for base closures or reductions anywhere in the United States or Puerto Rico if military and civilian base personnel exceed 250. Congress requires this in conjunction with its responsibility for establishing bases either by authorization or by appropriation. The December 8, 1965 announcement to close 149 military installations required such formal justification for 16 of these bases. Reports and testimony were presented by the Secretary of Defense and other interested officials and representatives of the States involved. Subcommittee No. 4 questioned the wisdom of closing military installations at a time when there is increasing demand on U.S. Armed Forces, particularly in Southeast Asia. The subcommittee cautioned that it might be more prudent "to opt on the side of a possible surplus than to dispose of hundreds of millions of dollars in facilities for projected savings which may never materialize." The subcommittee recommended not closing facilities in the San Juan area of the Caribbean.

328
Wingell, Bill. PROTESTS MOUNT ON U. OF P. WARFARE RESEARCH. National guardian, v. 19, Nov. 12, 1966: 3. AP2.N244, v. 19

Reports on the controversy, demonstrations, and rallies generated by chemical and biological warfare research at the University of Pennsylvania's Institute for Cooperative Research.

III. INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

A. INTERNATIONAL LAW

329
Bosc, Robert. [A COLLOQUY ON INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION] Un colloque sur l'intervention internationale. Projet, no. 7, July/Aug. 1966: 839-842. HN37.C3.A46, 1966

A colloquy on the legal and political aspects of intervention and nonintervention, held recently at the Research Center of Social Action (Action Populaire), arrived at three conclusions regarding the legal aspect of intervention. First the procedure created by the United Nations to prevent intervention is inadequate; it does not cover intervention in the service of peace or other interests considered superior by the majority of states. Second the colloquium agreed that no jurist is ready to reduce the strictness of nonintervention regulations, because up to now there is no better means of protecting weak states, and, under the modern name of "peaceful coexistence," nonintervention is the only rule of international law recognized by all states, no matter what their ideology. Third the jurists rejected the principle of intervention by an international community in the affairs of a state whose government is incapable of insuring the minimal conditions for economic development; this type of intervention is odious, being an action of the strong against the weak. Politicians understand more clearly than jurists the necessity for the control of international change. They condemn instances of intervention, but recognize them as faits accompli, and they would prefer to regulate them in order to prevent the escalation of armed conflicts that might bring about world catastrophe. Politicians want freedom of movement, if the movement conforms to the objective values supposed to inspire human activity, and if it discerns correctly the cases for which the intervention is required, either by the principles of universal justice, or protection of respect for freedom and liberty. Finally, the colloquy recommended the substitution of the modern, less negative expression "peaceful coexistence," for the obsolete and inadequate expression "nonintervention," and the expression "protection of the rights to development" for "intervention."

330
Brown, Thomas D. WORLD WAR PRIZE LAW APPLIED IN A LIMITED WAR SITUATION: EGYPTIAN RESTRICTIONS ON NEUTRAL SHIPPING WITH ISRAEL. Minnesota law review, v. 50, Apr. 1966: 849-873. LL

Examines the ramifications of an economic or military blockade and the problem of deciding what cargo should be denied the enemy. In both World Wars the Allies expanded the degree of belligerent rights over neutral rights by using 19th century limited war doctrines in formulating a globally-oriented international prize law. After a short history of the prize law's development and a discussion of its applicability to the modern limited-war situation in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict the author concludes: "Despite the renewed importance of the prize doctrine of contraband seizure in a limited war context, it appears there has been little in the way of development of a separate standard in that law for limited war belligerents . . . . Assuming contraband law will continue to be of central importance in future limited wars, the responsibility lies with the prize courts to reexamine World War contraband doctrine. Such a judicial reconsideration, however, must await the diligent assertion of a more expanded version of neutral rights by the neutrals themselves."

331
Columbia law review. ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, FROM THE COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW. New York, 1965. 435 p. JX3091.C6, 1965
Bibliographical footnotes.

Partial contents. --pt. 1. Nature and scope of international law. --The sources of international law, by Frederick Pollock. --The legal nature of international law, by James B. Scott. --The changing dimensions of international law, by Wolfgang Friedmann. --pt. 2. Sources and development of international law. --Efforts to codify or restate the law of treaties, by Oliver J. Lissitzyn. --The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, by Philip C. Jessup. --pt. 3. State sovereignty and international law. --Recognition of governments, by H. Lauterpacht. --The problem of sovereignty reconsidered, by Hans J. Morgenthau. --pt. 4. Aspects of international organization. --The organization of the Permanent Court of International Justice, by John Bassett Moore. --Membership in the United Nations, by Hans Kelsen. --The relation of the European Coal and Steel Community law to the law of the member states: a peculiar legal symbiosis, by Gerhard Bebr.

Reviews basic aspects of international law. Pollock outlines the historical sources of international law, and Scott reviews different schools of thought with regard to the principle of sanction. Friedmann defines "basic challenges to the present structure and teaching of international law." Lissitzyn appraises the International Law Commission's draft on the law of treaties. Jessup discusses the separate laws of territorial seas and the contiguous zone of the continental shelf, general regime of the high seas, and fisheries. Lauterpacht considers the tests, principles, and legal effects involved in recognizing a government. Morgenthau presents legal-political analysis of the acquisition, the loss, and the limitations of sovereignty in contemporary times.

332
Goldberg, Arthur J. LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS. American Bar Association journal, v. 52, Sept. 1966: 813-816. LL

Three widespread misconceptions exist concerning the significance of law in the work of the United

Nations. The first is that law and politics are separable. Yet if members of the United Nations decided that the Charter and rules of procedure under which the organization operates were irrelevant to political matters, this decision would gravely imperil the future of the organization. Law has great importance in shaping the determinations of the United Nations, even on controversial political questions. The second misconception is the belief that today's great ideological cleavages destroy the universal character of international law. This view ignores the many areas of consensus that do exist in the world community. Even in the nuclear age the relations of adversary powers are governed by certain ground rules and mutual restraints. A final misconception is that Charter provisions can be mechanically applied without regard to political, economic, or technological circumstances. For example, effective Charter restraints on the use of force must be complied with by all nations or backed up by effective United Nations sanctions. Forbidding the use of force to the United States and its allies regardless of the behavior of Communist countries will not promote the goals of the United Nations. Those who work at the United Nations are aware that international law is imperfect and that it is not yet fully effective in all areas of international relations. However all members must work to build a world legal order if mankind is to find a rational alternative to violence as a means of settling its differences and ordering its affairs.

333
Gormley, W. Paul. THE UNILATERAL EXTENSION OF TERRITORIAL WATERS: THE FAILURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO PROTECT FREEDOM OF THE SEAS. University of Detroit law journal, v. 43, June 1966: 695-730. LL

Three major international conferences have failed to resolve the uncertainty and confusion of international law on the question of the breadth of territorial waters. The first attempt was made at the Hague Codification Conference, called by the League of Nations in 1930. Although a majority of states had repudiated the traditional 3-mile limit, the Conference failed to reach a consensus on a precise distance. The major maritime powers who desired to maintain the limit, led by the United States and Britain, clashed head-on with the smaller powers who wanted maximum control over their coastal areas. The conflict represented more than theoretic argument. The vital issues of freedom of navigation, customs control, exploitation of fisheries and fixed natural resources, and defense matters were closely involved. During two postwar Geneva Conferences in 1958 and 1960 the importance of fishing interests prevented the delegates from securing enough votes to adopt either a 3-or 6-mile limit. Meanwhile, after the failure of the 1930 Hague Conference, nations unilaterally extended exclusive sovereignty over increasingly large areas of ocean surface. The varying limits, enforced by sea- and airpower where not universally recognized, have resulted in a number of serious incidents. The United States, requiring maximum freedom of movement for its warships and merchant vessels, claims that until another rule is adopted internationally the traditional 3-mile limit prevails. Realistically, however, most nations have apparently repudiated the older limit. The rise of nationalism will further increase the breadth of territorial seas and continguous zones. The answer to the problem may be to preserve the 3-mile zone for the benefit of free navigation, while resolving the problems of the coastal states "on other grounds" and on an individual basis. Bilateral treaties will be easier to achieve on these issues than a single major multilateral United Nations convention.

334
Larson, Arthur. POWER AND LAW IN WORLD AFFAIRS. Progressive, v. 30, Nov. 1966: 12-15.
AP2. P8655, v. 30

First of two parts.

Recently the State Department's legal adviser, addressing the Foreign Law Association, strongly criticized international lawyers who have serious reservations about the legality of unilateral and protracted armed intervention by a great power in the internal affairs of smaller ones without either invitation or prior authorization by an international organization. This "interment of law and this apotheosis of power" represent a profound change from the period when many foreign-policy leaders recognized the necessity of replacing the rule of force in international affairs with the rule of law. The results of this policy of physical force, as seen in the Bay of Pigs or Dominican intervention, have generally been the exact opposite of those intended and have seriously damaged U. S. interests. On the other hand, policies that have resorted to law, particularly adherence to the United Nations Charter, have achieved the intended results of peace, security, and protection of the interests of the United States. Some argue that things would have been even worse in the Dominican Republic if the United States had not intervened because the Communists would have taken over. However, closer examination of Communist activities in the newly developing countries show this to be untrue. Nothing is more unrealistic than the picture of a little group of Communists with no army and a modest amount of aid and encouragement from Red China or the Soviet Union taking over an entire country from the ruling groups that control the military and the police. The Vietnam situation is not a typical revolution, as those familiar with its history know. True, the Communists can create a great deal of disorder, but to seize military control is something else. In Vietnam the United States should have demonstrated that it still believed in dealing collectively with threats to peace by attempting to obtain some kind of United Nations aegis for the Vietnam operation. There as in Latin America the U. S. unilateral action has markedly increased anti-Americanism in almost every country of the world and severly weakened its position of world leadership. The current world picture of the United States is of "a confused and unpredictable giant with immense power but no sense of restraint or direction."

335
Molodtzov, Stepan. A RIGHT? NO, A CRIME! Soviet military review, no. 8, Aug. 1966: 46-49.
P&GP RR

The victors over the World War II aggressors proclaimed in the U. N. Charter their resolve to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." Yet over the past 20 years mankind has been living in constant anxiety for the future. Korea, Egypt, Algeria, the Congo, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and other countries and peoples have been victims of imperialist aggression as were the freedomloving people of Vietnam for two decades. "Right is might" and "law of the jungle" became principles of international law when imperialism swayed the world. War was considered a normal means of settling international disputes and "uncivilized" countries could be possessed at will. But

those times are gone. Soviet Russia struck the first blow at imperialism and the colonial system in 1917 when it condemned war as a brutal means of resolving problems. The U.N. Charter stipulates: "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." To justify armed aggression today imperialist and colonialist politicians, lawyers, historians, philosophers, and sociologists brush over such acts with the whitewash of "self-defence" against the "menace of Communism," despite the fact that modern international law regards social and political events and revolutionary movements in any country as the domestic affair of that country and its people and categorically forbids foreign interference. An equally hypocritical doctrine, a hangover of the colonial epoch and juridically untenable today, is a nation's "right" to defend "the life and property of their citizens" on foreign territory by force of arms. This was applied without qualms by the United States in Lebanon in 1958 and, with the Belgians, in the Congo in 1964, although it violates Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Now U.S. leaders are making every effort to find "legal" arguments to justify the war against the Vietnamese people. "These arguments are as far from being legal justification as a lie is from the truth." The U.S.-Saigon "agreements" are fraudulent since they were not signed by "legitimate representatives of sovereign states." The Saigon regime neither does nor can "represent any people or state" and exists only with the backing of U.S. bayonets. "Even in the United States many experts on international law . . . do not accept all of their Government's arguments in defence of the . . . undeclared war. . . . Mankind cannot remain indifferent to such an unprecedented encroachment of international law [and] must press for [its] strick observance."

B. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

336
Hanrieder, Wolfram F. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 10, Sept. 1966: 297-313.
JX1901.J6, v. 10

Examines three functions of international organizations--"collective security, peaceful change, and pacific settlements"--in relation to the "permissive conditions and patterns of relationships that should prevail in the international system if an international organization is to perform successfully in these three task areas."

337
Keohane, Robert O. POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY [New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace] 1966. 64 p. (International conciliation, no. 557)
JX1907.A8, 1966

Describes the interaction between international politics and parliamentary politics that is basic to an understanding of the workings of the General Assembly. The author defines political influence as "the ability of a state or group of states to achieve its ends by altering the behavior of other states without the exertion of physical force." He divides the discussion into four sections: the framework of influence--patterns of cooperation and alinement in the Assembly; the exercise of influence--pressures and maneuvers states use to achieve their ends; sources of influence --those traits which increase the impact a state has; and a case study of a specific crisis--the attempts to apply Article 19 of the United Nations Charter to the Soviet Union and other states behind on payment of assessments.

338
Mahnke, Hans H. [THE PROBLEM OF THE UNITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMUNITY AND THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY] Das Problem der Einheit der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft und die Organisation der internationalen Sicherheit. Berlin, Duncker & Humblot [1965] 250 p. (Schriften zum öffentlichen Recht, Bd. 26)
JX1952.M22
Bibliography: p. 239-250.

Contents. --The problem of the unity of the international law community. --The cardinal point of the presently valid security system: prohibition of an aggressive war. --The United Nations--a universal system of world security. --North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Organization of American States, and the Warsaw Pact--partial-security organizations. --The United Nations and partial-security systems. --A universal security system or a system of a dualistic balance of power?

Examines symptoms of disintegration in the contemporary law of nations and defines its limitations as a framework for a universal system of security. The author discusses the United Nations role as well as that of "partial-security systems" (viz NATO, OAS, and the Warsaw Pact) in maintaining world peace, and analyzes in terms of the U.N. Charter the division of competencies between the United Nations and the partial-security organizations. Since the difficulties of establishing a truly universal system of world security seem to be insurmountable for the foreseeable future, the author suggests the institutionalization of the bipolar balance of power under international law. This would require, among other things, replacing the principle of the egalitarian relationship between states with the "qualifying principle of equality." A trend to draw legal conclusions from actual differences between states has already begun and must have its bearing on the legal foundations of the world security system.

339
Patrick, Hunter. COMPLETE DEBATER'S BRIEF ON THE PROPOSITION, RESOLVED: THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD BE CONTROLLED BY AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. Laramie, Wyo., Rocky Mountain Forensics Researchers, 1964. 62 p.
JX1974.7.P28

Excerpts from a wide variety of sources for both an affirmative and a negative debater's brief. Also included is a brief description of the authorities and periodicals cited.

340
Sauer, Ernst F. [A WORLD STATE?] Weltstaat? In his Staatsphilosophie. [Köln] C. Heymann, 1965. p. 313-335.
JC11.S38
Bibliographical references.

Contrary to some opinions (e.g., Ernst Jünger's) the realization of a universal state is hardly possible today or in the foreseeable future. None of the existing

superpowers has really subscribed to the idea, and the realities of the present world confirm with equal strength both the principle of national sovereignty and the process of "internationalization." The idea of a universal state--expounded upon by Confucius, Dante, St. Augustine, Francisco de Vitoria, Immanuel Kant, and many other great philosophers--in recent centuries has increasingly given way to the idea of a loose form of world government. The latter, realistically conceived, could contribute a great deal to the preservation of peace in the world. Hence pressure exists to reform the United Nations, especially to invest the organization with international jurisdiction plus sanctions. Although this is badly needed, it should not obscure the truth that the basis for world peace is an understanding between "the great coexterminators" and the governments of nonnuclear states that existence is to be preferred to death. Coming to grips with such reality is difficult but still much better than entertaining illusions.

341
World Association of World Federalists. THE UNITED NATIONS: THE NEXT 20 YEARS; [report of the 12th Congress, World Association of World Federalists, San Francisco, June 20-27, 1965. The Hague, 1965?] 1 v. (various pagings) JX1977.W58

Contains the reports of the Congress and its committees, as well as the resolutions adopted by the World Federalists. The Congress focused on the future work of the United Nations in three great problem areas: "Freedom from War," "Freedom from Want," and "Freedom for Diversity." Disarmament, international security and world peace, and peacekeeping operations received attention.

342
Zorgbibe, Charles. [THE INTERVENTION IN SANTO DOMINGO] De l'intervention à Saint-Domingue. Politique étrangère, v. 31, no. 3, 1966: 291-307. JX3.P6, v. 31

Although the Dominican affair bears many similarities to historical instances of intervention by the United States in the Caribbean, it cannot be regarded as a simple case of dollar diplomacy. Rather it must be seen as a typical crisis of the second half of the 20th century, a period in which relations between the United States and Latin America have undergone serious changes through the introduction of President Roosevelt's "good neighbor" policy and President Kennedy's "Alliance for Progress." Furthermore the Dominican intervention occurred within the framework of a new world strategy and, like the Soviet intervention in Hungary, manifested a nation's will to maintain the world status quo (based on nuclear balance). Although it was a kind of resurgence of the old American imperialism and a manifestation of the cold war, the intervention reflected in its contradictory development the confusion between interstate relations of the traditional type and the relations of institutionalized subordination which characterized it. The intervention was too illicit in the eyes of organized international society to be executed in the traditional form; this was why it required the guarantee of the Organization of American States, a regional organization of collective security. The OAS gave the intervention the appearance of a collective police action, that is to say an acceptable expression of organized international society. A unilateral intervention in a fairly organized society, and an action by collective police in a still anarchistic society, these were the two aspects of the Dominican affair. An analysis of these aspects demonstrates that a new doctrine of autonomous regional actions originated in the crisis, and this doctrine could easily lead to the restoration of the unconditional use of force in separate geographical zones. By this doctrine the system of universal collective security could be altered, and Art. 2, par. 4 of the United Nations Charter on the interdiction of the use of force, which seemed to lay foundations for a new international order, could be ruined. That was what the Secretary General had in mind, when he expressed his apprehension that the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic might set a precedent that many other regional organizations might be tempted to follow.

C. INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY FORCES

343
THE FUTURE OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING. War/peace report, v. 6, Aug./Sept. 1966: 3-11. P&GP RR

An edited transcript of a conference convened on United Nations peacekeeping operations by War/Peace Report on May 13, 1966. The participants were mostly writers with a common interest in the development of the world organization.

344
Gonionsky, S. WESTERN HEMISPHERE NATO? New times, no. 33, Aug. 17, 1966: 11-13. D839.N483, 1966

Washington's "hard time convening the third Foreign Ministers conference of the Organization of American States" reflects Latin American reluctance to buy Washington's plan for the inter-American armed force that the United States needs in order to carry out its own policies. Most of all, Latin Americans are concerned with economic development problems. The Rio de Janeiro Organization of American States [OAS] ministerial conference (Nov. 1965) was the scene of acrimonious debate, and Washington withdrew its Latin American force plan. At the subsequent conference in Panama, beginning February 25, 1966, Washington representatives spent 5 weeks searching for an acceptable formula to delete Articles 15 and 17 from the OAS Charter, which categorically forbid interference in the affairs of member states. The London Economist commented: "At Panama, the Latin governments found themselves on one side and the United States, alone, on the other." Washington hopes that the third ministerial conference will enable it to put its Latin American house in order, but there is a growing desire throughout the hemisphere to strengthen national independence and achieve economic independence. "The position in Central and South America is proof that Washington cannot endlessly . . . hold back the natural process of historical development."

345
Lang, Winfried. [POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCES. AN ATTEMPT AT POLITICAL ANALYSIS] Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer Friedensstreitmacht der Vereinten Nationen. Versuch einer politischen

Analyse. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, no. 4, July/Aug. 1966: 287-293.
P&GP RR

Bibliography: p. 293.

Appraises possible measures provided by the United Nations Charter for protection of world peace and security. The author compares the United Nations experience in this area with that of the League of Nations; discusses the financial and organizational problems of actual and potential U.N. peacekeeping operations, including the U.N. police force; and points out the special role of neutral, small states in assigning their troops to U.N. peacekeeping operations.

346
Nicholas, H. G. PROGRESS AT THE UNITED NATIONS. Listener, v. 76, Aug. 11, 1966: 195-197.
AP4.C4165, v. 76

The Suez crisis showed that the United Nations can pull back nations from the verge of uncontrollable conflict. To tired and frustrated General Assembly delegates the Canadian proposal for the U.N. Emergency Force [UNEF] must have seemed to promise an instrument for maintaining law and order in the Middle East. What UNEF actually did was provide a buffer that, without disarming the combatants, kept them from each other's throats. It froze a status quo and acted against any change save one acceptable to both sides. In working toward these goals UNEF was successful because all U.N. members were afraid of the consequences if it failed, because of the existence of a group of "middle powers" that could facilitate its operations, and because Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld was authorized to lay down the principles on which UNEF should function as well as to assemble it and direct its operations. While the philosophy of "leave it to Dag" had much to do with the accomplishments of UNEF, this philosophy contained perils as well: it encouraged the illusion that there is a self-motivating entity called the United Nations, and it encouraged states to get themselves into a scrape and then turn to the Secretary General to get them out of it. Moreover the operational responsibilities of the organization as a peacemaker--in Suez and subsequently in Lebanon and the Congo--were so great that they almost crushed Hammarskjöld. On balance no one interested in world peace will be content with a United Nations that relies on improvization, doles, and inadequately trained units of national military establishments. At the same time U.N. peace forces already have given tangible international expression to the will to contain violence.

347
Rikhye, Indar J. UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS. Australian Army journal, no. 200, Jan. 1966: 29-42. Ul.A92, 1966

For the past 20 years the United Nations has kept the peace and helped to prevent the cold war from escalating into a hot war. To this end, the Security Council was delegated "the primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security." A Military Staff Committee of five members was created to give the Council military expertise. The political-military chain can function only if there is no disagreement among the five permanent Security Council members. A veto on the political level could prevent or deadlock military operations. The real test of this machinery came with the Korean War. Under the circumstances, obviously, "control of such action could not be given to the Military Staff Committee. The method of entrusting a Member State--the United States--with the mandate was used as the only possible solution," although it was evident that an impartial chain of command would eventually be the only feasible peacekeeping machinery in confrontations between the two major cold war antagonists. In early experiences the Military Adviser was of great value, but the Congo operation, with its tangled web of political intrigue and controversy, made it necessary to create a Senior Political Officer present in the field. The Military Adviser normally has no executive functions whatsoever, only an advisory role. The single exception to this occurs prior to the actual establishment of a peacekeeping force, when there is no commander in the field and no force executive staff. During this delicate phase the Military Advisory Staff functions as the "Military Executive Staff for the Secretary-General," mounting and organizing the force in accordance with the mandate of the Security Council or the General Assembly. These forces have encountered a number of problems. The restraint of force, the national character of the contingents involved on the U.N. side, and the logistics and financing of operations must be dealt with if these forces are to be given the support they are entitled to. Standardization of weapons and better understanding of the U.N. role is a necessity. Canada, the Scandinavian countries, and some others have adopted procedures for contributing national forces to U.N. operations. Nations must bear in mind that the cost of preventing war is far less than engaging in one, and the U.N. is the most effective instrument for keeping world peace.

D. OTHER PROCESSES, PLANS, AND PROPOSALS

348
Bigelow, Albert, John A. Larson, and Theodore Olson. GRINDSTONE REVIEWED: 3 REJOINDERS. Fellowship, v. 32, July 1966: 23-25.
JX1901.F45, v. 32

Replies to comments in the May 1966 issue of Fellowship on an experiment in nonviolent resistance to aggression, the "Grindstone Experiment." Bigelow and Larson question the depth of the commitment to nonviolence of the participants in the experiment. Some of the basic principles and problems of the experiment are explained by Olson, who coauthored the report on it (Thirty-One Hours).

349
Crosby, Henry A. THE PEACE GROUPS: SINCERE, SOFT OR SUBVERSIVE? Washington report (American Security Council) Sept. 5, 1966: 1-4.
P&GP RR

After 15 months experience as executive director of the Council for a Liveable World it can be clearly seen that peace groups are not capable of finding pragmatic measures for reducing the risk of war. Some of them, in fact, are definitely harmful. While many members of peace groups are sincerely interested in peace, many also are "chronic malcontents," critical not only of U.S. foreign policy but of every facet of the society. Most of the groups share the following basic premises. The United States is invariably at fault in its international actions and policies. The Pentagon, State Department, and armaments industry are conspiring to perpetuate the cold war and prevent disarmament.

Trigger-happy generals in the Pentagon itch to use nuclear weapons against Moscow and Peking. The United States should accept at face value all Soviet peace proposals. Anyone who does not accept the above premises is a right-wing Birchite. A major deficiency of the peace groups, including their leadership, is lack of expertise and/or experience in foreign policy. Most are totally unaware of the day-to-day pressures exerted internationally on U.S. military and diplomatic policies. Although critical of almost all American foreign policy and defense measures, few, if any, have presented practical alternative courses of action. The majority neither care about nor understand U.S. security policy. Peace has become an end in itself. The end is not peace with freedom and justice, but peace at any price. For this reason, peace groups may be considered a danger to America.

350
[INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PEACE RESEARCH] Internationales Institut für Friedensforschung. Die Friedensrundschau, v. 20, no. 7, 1966: 8-9.
JX1903.F74, v. 20

Examines the recent report by a Swedish governmental committee that in 1964 was requested to estimate the need for and the possibilities of creating an international institute for research into the problems of peace and conflict. In its report the committee proposes the establishment of such an institute in Stockholm, and suggests general guide lines for its organization, activities, and financing. The report envisages the development of the institute in stages "so at the end of the first five-year period it would have a research staff composed of 15 to 25 persons."

351
Keyes, Charlotte E. "SUPPOSE THEY GAVE A WAR AND NO ONE CAME." McCall's, v. 44, October 1966: 26, 187-191. TT500.M2, v. 44

An article written by the mother of a draft-card burner who has been imprisoned four times for actions resulting from his pacifist views. Mrs. Keyes discusses her son's childhood and his decision to leave Harvard during his freshman year to join Polaris Action, "a radical peace organization." With other members of the group he was jailed for attempting to swim to the polaris submarine Ethan Allen. Convinced of the inevitability of world destruction unless desperate action is taken, he associated himself with experienced and strident pacifists willing to make active protests. On Christmas Eve in front of his local draft board office he burned his draft card "as a prayer for peace on earth."

352
Küpper, Christel. [PEACE AS A TASK OF RESEARCH] Der Friede als Aufgabe der Forschung. Vorgänge, no. 4, Apr. 1966: 184-185.
P&GP RR

Reports on the organizations, mostly American, that are engaged in peace research. The author covers, among others, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Institute for Policy Planning, the Institute for International Order, the Center for World Peace Through World Law, the American Faculty Council for the Gradualist Way to Peace, and the Canadian Peace Research Institute, as well as institutes and research centers attached to various American universities.

353
Langer, Elinor. PEACE QUESTIONNAIRE: SOVIETS SEEK VIEWS OF U.S. SCIENTISTS. Science, v. 153, July 15, 1966: 276-277. Q1.S35, v. 153

A questionnaire eliciting opinions on nuclear war and proliferation of nuclear weapons is being circulated among American scientists by an organization known as the Scientific Commission of the Soviet Peace Committee. The questionnaire accompanies an appeal that scientists use their influence and prestige in society to contribute to preserving peace. The circulation seems random, including both the East and West Coasts, many disciplines, and both Government and private scientists. The mailing does not concentrate on Americans particularly noted for their disarmament activities. The State Department regards the Soviet Peace Committee as a "propaganda front" and the questionnaire as a means to discredit American policy. The Department also believes the poll provides a means of identifying Americans who may be vulnerable to further Soviet contacts. It is not considered a serious effort to expand scientific or disarmament contacts. However the State Department is cautious about issuing restrictions or orders to an already sensitive scientific community. Its message to American scientists is gentle but clear: "Your failure to respond will be appreciated."

354
Liu, Ning-I. WE ABSOLUTELY CANNOT ACCEPT TAKING "UNITED ACTION" WITH THE SOVIET REVISIONIST LEADING CLIQUE. Peking review, v. 9, Aug. 19, 1966: 22-24.
DS701.P42, v. 9

A speech at a Peking rally honoring a group of delegates from many nations to the 12th World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Tokyo, August 1966). These representatives were compelled to withdraw from the meetings because of their protests against the Chinese delegation's exclusion by the Japanese Government. In the speech Liu downgrades U.S. disarmament proposals and appeals to the Japanese people not to let U.S. imperialists and Japanese reactionaries stand in the way of Sino-Japanese friendship.

355
Monnet, Jean. [EQUAL PARTNERS: FROM COEXISTENCE TO LASTING PEACE] Gleiche Partner. Von der Koexistenz zum dauerhaften Frieden. Dokumente, v. 22, June 1966: 179-186.
H5.D65, v. 22

Essential for peace is a transformation of the present coexistence between the Soviet Union and the West into an "entente" between both blocs. The Soviet Union and the United States alone are unable to create a viable entente of that kind because some of the most important international problems requiring peaceful solution (e.g., German reunification) are in Europe. With West European nations acting independently the temptation for Moscow to play European discord against the United States would be too great. West Europe's alliance with the United States is thus prerequisite to any effective East-West entente, and consequently to world peace. The alliance must offer equal partnership to both sides. Only consolidated (politically, economically, and militarily) would West Europe be able to act as the United States genuine partner and effectively counterbalance the Soviet Union's

overpowering position in Europe. Such a union should also include Great Britain. The lack of union, of common political institutions speaking for all West Europe, has not only hampered the realization of East-West entente but made increasingly difficult the tightening of friendship between the United States and West Europe. Contrary to some opinions the United States has sincerely sought West Europe's genuine and equal partnership in the Atlantic alliance. Without common international institutions there can be no vision of West Europe, European partnership in the Atlantic alliance, East-West entente, and a basis for a permanent world peace. Built on an East-West entente and accompanied by gradual disarmament of both blocs, such a peace would encourage other parts of the world, and by that time probably also China, to follow suit.

356
Parry, Albert. RUSSIA'S OTHER PEACE MOVEMENT. Nation, v. 203, Aug. 22, 1966: 142-145.
AP2.N2, v. 203

Many Russians, particularly the young, do not want to talk about war. Not only are they cynically wary of the call for volunteers to aid Hanoi, but even the heroic deeds of their fathers in World War II are practically a taboo subject. The new generation wants to avoid, if at all possible, a world war with the United States. Pacifist beliefs are harbored by some of the nonconformists in the Soviet Union. Such pacifism is distinct from the official version (the insistence by the Soviet Government that all of its policies are truly peaceful) which, ironically, some of the genuine pacifists use to justify their own antimilitary agitation or action. The Government does not, of course, appreciate such literal application of its slogans. Naturally no organized pacifist committees or clubs protest government policy as they do in the West. Peace groups are formed by the Communist Party and the Government to denounce Western warmongers and to laud the peaceful policies of the regime. Conscientious objection to military duty is not recognized. The Party and the military component are most suspicious of pacifism among writers and filmmakers, whom they alternately exhort and denounce. Nonetheless many Soviet writers continue to scarcely conceal their pacifism, or at best have maintained indifference toward the military.

357
Ramsey, Paul. NUCLEAR WAR AND VATICAN COUNCIL II. Theology today, v. 23, July 1966: 244-263.
BR1.T62, v. 23

The chief virtue of the statement on the question of war adopted by Vatican Council II is its effort to speak not only to the entire church, but to men of good will everywhere, and to them in the name of the entire church. The Council did not succumb to its own conjectures about specific policies. The statement contains three crucial utterances around which the whole of the text is organized. The first condemns direct attacks on noncombattants, such as the destruction of entire cities, as a crime against God and man. The use of scientific weapons may be censured where it violates this principle. The second utterance involves the fact and morality of deterrence. Although cautioning against the arms race as a treacherous trap for humanity and describing deterrence as only "a peace of sorts," the Council says nothing to indicate "that responsible decision and action in regard to deterrence falls below the floor of the morally permissible." In its third major utterance the Council urges that nations find means of resolving their disputes and work for the time when all war can be completely outlawed by international consent. A single world political authority is seen as necessary if peace is to become genuine. The Council recognizes not only that the structural defects in the world political system must be corrected but that the causes of war and dissension among men must be uprooted. Without justice there can be no pacem in terris.

358
Schwarzschild, Steven S. THE RELIGIOUS DEMAND FOR PEACE. Judaism, v. 15, fall 1966: 412-418.
BM1.J8, v. 15

Religion should not try to be acceptable to society but rather to pull it in the right direction. Unfortunately the demand for theological realism has led many religions to total irrelevance and many "respectable religious leaders" to talk about peace only when it fits into governmental plans and is socially safe. Although it recognizes moral and social values other than and even superior to peace itself, religion should propose and enact a peace program far ahead of the pragmatic peace programs of governments, social scientists, and independent social movements if it is to overcome its image as a moralistic straggler falling behind the real world. Hard-headed, literate thinking must be stimulated in the religious press. Instead of religionists making ineffectual criticisms of the overall plans of political scientists, let them see to it that politicians tackle the problems of the world in terms of a basic theology of ethics and society. The religious press can fill a conspicuous gap left in the general press by publishing government working papers concerning war. This too would "serve the ideals of peace, democracy, freedom of the press, and the preservation of mankind."

IV. GENERAL ANALYSES AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES

A. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

359
Blake, Robert, ed. SEARCHING FOR PEACE, 1914-1918. Listener, v. 75, June 9-30, 1966: 823-825, 843, 868-871, 903-906, 937-940; v. 76, July 7-14, 1966: 11-13, 51-53. AP4. L4165, v. 75-76

Six talks presented by the British Broadcasting Corporation's Third Programme "on various efforts to secure peace short of total victory during the first world war." In the first talk David Woodward discusses Turkish neutrality in relation to the anticipated disposition of Constantinople at the end of hostilities. The second lecture, by Arthur S. Link, covers Woodrow Wilson's peace moves before and after U.S. belligerency. This is followed by James Joll's recounting of the failure of efforts to settle the war by the traditional means of dynastic diplomacy. Harold Kurtz then analyzes the formulation and fate of the letter (published in the Daily Telegraph on Nov. 27, 1917) by which the retired statesman Lord Lansdowne endeavored to catalyze British war aims. The fifth talk offers Hugh Seton-Watson's assessment of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, a treaty which, together with the peace of Bucharest, "gives us a pretty good idea of German war aims, of the sort of treatment which the rest of Europe could have expected if the Germans had won in the west." The editor of the series concludes it by evaluating generally the problems of, and the efforts that attempted, a compromise peace settlement.

360
Ekirch, Arthur A. IDEAS, IDEALS, AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY: A HISTORY OF THEIR GROWTH AND INTERACTION. New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts [1966] 205 p. E183.7.E38

Contents.--The isolationist tradition.--The idea of mission.--Manifest destiny.--A stronger national union.--Expansion abroad.--For peace and democracy.--The renunciation of war.--World leadership under arms.--Containment and the cold war.--Index.

Summarizes the basic ideological themes that have shaped American foreign policy at various points in history.

361
FitzGerald, C. P. THE ORIGIN OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION. Current history, v. 51, Sept. 1966: 129-133, 178. D410.C82, v. 51

Traces China's recent history and notes that today "China is strong, and feared, and modernized to the point where it counts in the military calculations of outside powers; these are the achievements of the Communist government, and they win it the widest support." An irony of China's history is that the Communist movement, which opposed and defeated the "detested" Nationalist regime, is itself strongly nationalist in inspiration, and owes much of its strength to aroused nationalist feeling. Although collectivization, socialization, expropriation, and regimentation may chafe and antagonize the former wealthy, propertied, commercial, and intellectual segments of the population, the great mass of the people are satisfied; what freedoms are lost they themselves either did not possess or were not equipped to use. The Chinese people see that the Communists after 16 years have achieved their great goals of reform and revolution despite some harsh practices; they have restored power to China and, by means of modern development and industrialization, are also giving it wealth. In time the Chinese may decide that the price in ideological conformity to rigid Marxism-Leninism is too high. The aging leadership clearly fears the development of such beliefs in the modern generation. But, as long as the Communist regime can convincingly claim that it alone has restored the strength of the nation and can defend it from further attack or encroachment, the regime will retain the support of the people.

362
Fleming, D. F. THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE COLD WAR. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. American civilization: its influence on foreign policy. Special editor: James C. Charlesworth. Philadelphia, 1966. (Its Annals, v. 366) p. 127-138. H1.A4, v. 366

After World War II, the consequences of the Soviet Union's victory over the Nazis were rejected, and a global containment of communism was elevated into a doctrine by President Truman. By the Cold War, we spurred the Soviet Union from exhaustion to great-power status, the atomic bomb, and space achievement. Our policies against communism in China had much the same effect there. The Cold War has also frozen the world into its immediate postwar postures and prevented peace settlements in East and West. Since 1945 the United States has spent enough resources on the Cold War to make many ailing societies healthy, resulting in a dangerous weakening of our economy. We ourselves have submitted to the militarism we fought in two world wars and have gone far to create a United States dominated by the military. We have depleted our resources for peacetime living, while our competitors have forged ahead with such technologies. We have sadly neglected the nation's poor, and the President's Great Society legislation, aimed at helping them, is suffering because of the expense of the war in Vietnam. By making anticommunism our life motive, we have fostered rightist fanaticism. We have forgotten the inexorable law of life that every social system is in constant evolution, and, now that the Cold War with the Soviet Union has eased, we are preparing to wage one against Communist China. Is it too late for us to welcome China to the community of nations, avoid the final world war, and try to organize the unity of man? (Editor's abstract)

363
Gotlieb, Allan. DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF LAW IN THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS. Toronto, Canadian Institute of International Affairs [1965] 232 p. (Contemporary affairs, no. 34) JX1974.G53
Bibliographical references included in "Notes" (p. 203-227).

Partial contents. --The work of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee. --Legal principles and legal techniques: ban the bomb or the means of waging war? --Lawyers at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee. --Disarmament dialectics: the concept of sovereignty. --Disarmament proposals and their consistency with the United Nations Charter. --Treaty negotiation (a) reducing the areas of disagreement (b) drafting articles. --The choice of agenda topics: peacekeeping negotiations now or later? --The Geneva negotiations and the work of the United Nations. --Other procedural matters: the permanent co-chairmen. --Some specific problems: peacekeeping. --Justice in a disarmed world: the concept of "peaceful change." --Verification and the International Disarmament Organization: finding facts and interpreting them. --Responding to disarmament violations: what happens if there is a violation of the treaty? --The expanding nuclear club.

Studies legal problems of disarmament and arms control. Gotlieb outlines the history of negotiations at the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee and discusses the problems on its agenda as well as those that may evolve once a general disarmament treaty is concluded.

364
Gt. Brit. Central Office of Information. Reference Division. BERLIN AND THE PROBLEM OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION. Prepared for British Information Services. [New York, Reference Division, British Information Services, 1964] 66 p. maps.
DD881.G67, 1964
Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents. --The present division of Germany. --Four-Power co-operation and its failure, 1946-48. --Establishment of German Federal Republic. --The "German Democratic Republic." --Germany and Western defence, 1948-52. --Western efforts for German reunification, 1951-54. --The defence agreements of 1954. --The Geneva conferences of 1955. --Soviet policy on Germany, 1955-57. --Towards a summit meeting. --The status of Berlin. -- Developments in early 1959. --The 1959 foreign ministers' conference. --The 1960 summit conference and its breakdown. --The Berlin crisis of 1961 and its aftermath. --Outstanding Soviet-Western differences. --Chronology. --Appendices.

A history of Western efforts to bring about German reunification and "the development of the Soviet effort to supplement and reinforce the division of Germany." Included in the appendixes are full texts of: (1) the Western peace plan of May 14, 1959, (2) Western proposals for reunification of Berlin of May 26, 1959, (3) the memorandum on Germany given by Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy at their Vienna meeting in June 1961 (the Tass translation), and (4) the tripartite declaration on Germany and Berlin of June 26, 1964.

365
Hargreaves, Reginald. EXTREMES MEET. Quarterly review, no. 649, July 1966: 288-298.
AP4.Q2, 1966

Recounts many wartime incidents from Biblical times to the 19th century, that show humanity, civility, and honor in battle. Nowhere, the author notes, is there sharper contrast between barbarism and chivalry than in warfare. However mechanization and technology have dehumanized conflict and destroyed chivalry. To quote Sir Winston Churchill: "War, which used to be cruel and magnificent, has now become cruel and squalid. In fact, it has been completely spoilt. It is all the fault of democracy and science. From the moment either of these meddlers and muddlers was allowed to take part in actual fighting, the doom of war was sealed."

366
Herz, Martin F. BEGINNINGS OF THE COLD WAR. Bloomington, Indiana University Press [1966] 214 p.
D843.H47

Contents. --Introduction and perspective. --Stalin-Hopkins conversations. --Poland: roots of conflict. --Mostly Poland: Yalta and the aftermath. --Spheres of influence. --Gifts, loans, and disappointments. --Questions and answers. --Comments in retrospect. --Principal sources. --Index.

"An analytical compilation" whose purpose is "to summarize and highlight a few chapters of recent world history which encompass the major beginnings of the Cold War."

367
Lindberg, Folke. POWER POLITICS AND THE BALTIC. American-Scandinavian review, v. 54, June 1966: 158-168. AP2.A457, v. 54

During recent years the Soviet Union has manifested an increased interest in the Baltic. In 1950 Soviet views on the Baltic question were expressed in an academic thesis written by a student of international law, Molodzov by name, which was well received by Russian political scientists and the Soviet Government. Molodzov maintained that it was the exclusive right of the Baltic States to decide the legal position of the Baltic Sea and the Baltic Straits. In consequence he regarded as perfectly legal their decision that the Baltic and the connecting waterways to the North Sea should be open to merchant ships and warships belonging to the Baltic countries, but closed to the warships of non-Baltic powers. This thesis refuted the generally accepted interpretation given by Western experts, namely that the Baltic and the connecting waterways should be free for all ships. In 1957 Khrushchev declared in Helsinki that the Baltic should be neutralized and permanently pacified. In 1959 he stressed in Warsaw the transformation of the Baltic into a zone of peaceful collaboration, and Mikoian in West Germany welcomed the East German effort to establish contact with other powers in order to secure the pacification of the Baltic and prevent an extension of the aggressive, military preparations of the NATO countries into this sea. Mikoian's declaration showed that the main reason for the revival of the Soviet interest in Baltic affairs was the proposal to create a German-Danish naval unit under the command of NATO. Denmark occupies a strategic position in the Baltic, and the plan of NATO (described in 1957 by

Vice Admiral A. R. Pedder, Commander of the NATO naval forces in northern Europe) was to provide an effective blockade of the Baltic Straits in order to be able to prevent Soviet submarines from penetrating into the North Sea and the oceans during wartime. From the history of the Baltic we learn that the area has never been an open sea, and that Russia for centuries has made efforts to dominate it. The tremendous increase in power that Russia gained through the war, however, opened up prospects of finally attaining this objective.

368
Merchant, Livingston T. LIMITED OBJECTIVES, LIMITED SUCCESS. Foreign service journal, v. 43, Aug. 1966: 16-21. JX1.A53, v. 43

At the Geneva Summit Conference of 1955 four issues were to be discussed: the reunification of Germany, general European security, disarmament, and the need for increased contacts between East and West. The limited purposes were identifying the issues, designating forums to negotiate them, and endowing the negotiations with a new spirit or impetus. The main purpose was to abolish the danger of Soviet action based on miscalculation of U.S. intentions. This was to be accomplished by removing from the minds of the Soviet leaders the fear that the United States would attack the U.S.S.R. The Conference was made possible by the change in the Russian attitude toward the Austrian Peace Treaty and other evidences that Soviet diplomacy was entering a new, more flexible phase. After the general debate it became evident that the German reunification question would be the most likely cause of a deadlock. This question seemed very important to the U.S. delegation because it felt that without a unified Germany European security was illusory. The Russians were as adamant as ever on this question, and fear arose that the French and British, being very eager to reach an agreement, might accept language which would dismay the Germans and irreparably damage the position of Adenauer's government. As expected the meeting on the German reunification question ended in deadlock. The following session on disarmament was carefully prepared by the U.S. delegation, but when President Eisenhower proffered the "open skies" proposal the Russians condemned it as an intelligence scheme. After this the situation seemed difficult, but the U.S. delegation felt that the U.S.S.R. needed far more than America an amicable ending to the summit meeting, and that the moderation of the West, its willingness to consider legitimate Russian security concerns, and the sincerity of President Eisenhower's personality would move the Soviets to compromise on the language of the final joint communique. These expectations proved right. In the last meeting, after countless rewordings and rejections of the drafts, a French proposal, making the West's main points, was accepted by the Russians with a few harmless amendments. Thus the limited objectives of the Conference were achieved, the issues defined, and the work assigned to pertinent forums. The ensuing detente is still manifest in 1966.

369
Millis, Walter, ed. AMERICAN MILITARY THOUGHT. Bobbs-Merrill, New York [1966] 554 p. UA23.M565

Anthologizes "the most important documents for American military history up to 1945," with the purpose of collecting "original materials that demonstrate how Americans 'have tended to think about war, military policy, and the military factor in their free society.'" Some material is also included on "the military revolution since 1948."

370
Shulimson, Jack. MARINES IN LEBANON, 1958. Washington, Historical Branch, G-3 Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps [1966] 50 p. illus. maps. (Marine Corps historical reference pamphlet) DS86.S55

"A history of the Marine Corps participation in the Lebanon crisis from July-October 1958 . . . published to show the role of the U.S. Marine Corps in carrying out American foreign policy and the pacification of a country through a successful show of force." Records from the other services and the State Dept. were used. Pertinent published accounts and interviews are mentioned. Several citations refer to still-classified documents. A chart shows the command structure of American forces in Lebanon as of July 1958.

371
Thomas, Brian. THE COLD WAR AND HENRY WALLACE. Listener, v. 76, Sept. 15, 1966: 377-378. AP4.L4165, v. 76

Brief analysis of various interpretations of the origins of the cold war. The analysis centers on Henry Wallace's contention "first, that the cold war was not so much the result of Russian bad behaviour as the cause of it; and, second, that the Monroe Doctrine and the Truman Doctrine were irreconcilable."

372
Trefousse, Hans L., ed. THE COLD WAR: A BOOK OF DOCUMENTS. New York, Putnam [1965] 296 p. D839.3.T67
Bibliography: p. 293-296.

Contents: Origins: efforts at cooperation. --Origins: failure of cooperation. --The cold war in Europe, 1945-1950. --Cold and hot war in Asia, 1945-1953. --The cold war and the Eisenhower administration. --The cold war and Latin America. --The new frontier and the cold war.

Documents to facilitate "the study of the diplomatic history of the Cold War and to answer some of the questions raised by it." Annotations to many of the documents place them in historical perspective, and footnotes give the sources as well as their significance.

B. GENERAL ANALYSES

373
Bull, Hedley. THE CONTROL OF THE ARMS RACE: DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL IN THE MISSILE AGE, by Hedley Bull, with the cooperation of a study group at the Institute. 2d ed. New York, Praeger [1965] 235 p. (Studies in international security, 2) JX1974.B73, 1965

Contents. --The objectives and conditions of arms control. --Arms control through disarmament. --Arms control without disarmament. --The problem of continuous innovation. --Appendix: the problem of sanctions.

Analyzes, in an introduction to the second edition (the first, published in 1961, is reprinted without alterations), the changes that have taken place in the international environment over the past few years. As a whole the book defines the nature, desirability, and feasibility of disarmament and arms control. Its recommendations are concerned with methods and logic and not with specific measures. A chapter on sanctions and enforcement is included in the second edition. The striking difference Bull sees between 1961 and 1965 is that the problem of arms control is no longer a bipolar one. "In a word, if the events of the last few years have registered some progress in the implementation of the bilateral conception of arms control, they also raise the question whether a conception of this sort is any longer adequate; whether, if arms control is to remain relevant in the less polarized, more multilaterally ordered world into which we now appear to be moving, some fundamental rethinking of the subject must not take place."

374
Chalfont, Arthur Gwynne Jones, baron. THE POLITICS OF DISARMAMENT. Encounter, v. 27, Oct. 1966: 17-24. AP4. E44, v. 27

The realities of power politics cannot be ignored in the search for peace even though the political philosophy within which nations operate is obsolete, combative, inequitable, and often immoral. Within the next 10-15 years probably none of the great powers will attempt a substantial reduction of its military forces. The greatest dangers to the present precarious peace are the growth of Communist China, nuclear proliferation, and a major breakthrough in weapons technology. China's emergence as a nuclear power destroyed the last illusions of strategic balance and nuclear stalemate. Obviously China must be brought into international negotiaions. If one more country decides to become a nuclear power an inevitable "chain reaction" will follow, accompanied by a geometrical increase in the danger of nuclear war. The nuclear powers must show signs of flexibility and good intent if they hope to persuade other nations to practice nuclear self-denial. The present, extremely dangerous trend toward antiballistic missile defense shows no sign of abatement. The key to the tragic disarmament deadlock is held by the United States and the Soviet Union. Future confrontations will not be between capitalism and communism but between the haves and the have-nots or, worse, between the colored peoples and the whites. The Eastern and Western alliances "must free themselves from their cold war prisons and find some common ground for dealing with these problems." In the long run only the exchange of the obsolete nation-state for a new political philosophy that is based on world government and realized by an international system of education can provide any permanent solution.

375
Clark, Joseph S. EIGHTEEN NATION DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE: REPORT, OF JOSEPH S. CLARK ON A VISIT TO GENEVA, MAY 3-5, 1966, TO THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 9 p. JX1974.C484
At head of title: 89th Congress, 2d session. Committee print.

Senator Clark's first-hand observations of two plenary sessions of the Conference at which speeches were made by the delegates from Bulgaria, Canada, India, Italy, Nigeria, and the United Kingdom. "Discussion was largely confined to the problems incident to obtaining agreement on a treaty preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, a comprehensive test ban treaty and general and complete disarmament." On the basis of his trip Senator Clark makes a number of recommendations concerning such matters as NATO nuclear sharing, development of verification techniques, administration support of a nonproliferation treaty, and clarification of the U.S. draft treaty on general and complete disarmament.

376
Clemens, Walter C., ed. TOWARD A STRATEGY OF PEACE. [Chicago] Rand McNally [1965] 264 p. (Rand McNally political science series)
D843.C5758

Partial contents. --Toward a strategy of peace, by John F. Kennedy. --From containment to cease-fire and peaceful change, by Adlai E. Stevenson. --International conflict in the absence of war, by Walter Millis. --Political prerequisites to détente, by Fred W. Neal. --The fantasy of a warless world, from Jen-min jihpao and Hung-ch'i. --Advancing the American national interest without war, by Arthur I. Waskow. --Questions of war, peace, and revolution, by Mikhail Suslov. --Peking, Moscow and the West in a warless world, by Walter C. Clemens, Jr. --The needs of American and Soviet science, by Anatol Rapoport. --Arms control and world government, by Lincoln P. Bloomfield. --A Soviet view of a disarmed world, by N. Pitersky. --Implications for United States policy, by Walter C. Clemens, Jr. --First documents of a warless world. --Learning for peace instead of survival, by Samuel Gould. --A world without want, by Paul Hoffman. --Converting America's economy to a warless world, by Seymour Melman. --Pacem in terris, by Pope John XXIII.

Selections organized around the major themes of President Kennedy's American University address in June of 1963. The articles are grouped into sections covering the possibilities of peace, the common interests of the United States and Soviet Union, the pursuit of peace, and the relation between peace and human rights. About half of the material included has appeared elsewhere between 1962 and 1965.

377
Deutsch, Karl W. [NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL BALANCE OF POWER] Kernwaffen und internationales Machtgleichgewicht. Atomzeitalter; Information und Meinung, no. 6, June 1966: 158-163. diagrs., tables.
P&GP RR

Qualitative arms races--rivalry between powers in developing new weapons--constitute a facet of the general process of technological innovation. They are subject to limitations typical of the growth process of any radically new invention or technique. Once an innovation is made a multitude of factors, among them the imperfections of a new device and the shortage of specially trained personnel, interfere for quite some time with its utilization in quantity. This phase of the growth can be graphically presented as a concave curve. However with the gradual elimination of obstacles the initial concave curve adopts an exponential shape. In the next phase, after the growth ceiling is reached, the curve flattens. It then becomes a logistic

curve. This growth pattern (symbolized by the three curves) applies not only to technological innovation but to a great variety of other phenomena as well (for example, reactions in physics and the spread of epidemics). Unclassified data on American and Soviet nuclear capabilities, scarce and incomplete as they are, seem to support the hypothesis that the nuclear growth pattern in each of these countries has followed such a course. If so, the few years of American nuclear monopoly were hardly enough to give the United States a decisive strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. Eight American atomic bombs in 1948 or even thirty-two in 1951 (presumably the U.S. nuclear arsenal in those years) could not have inflicted on the Soviet Union greater strategic destruction than did the Nazi occupation of a large part of Soviet territory during World War II. Later on, when the United States achieved the nuclear capability to launch comparable destructive power against it, the Soviet Union had obtained its own minimum nuclear deterrent with which it could cause considerable damage to West Europe and, after a few more years, to the United States. Once a nuclear power achieves the saturation point in nuclear arms growth its interest in reducing the rate is obvious. Although independent technological breakthroughs by any nation that enters the nuclear arms race do not promise an immediate advantage in destructive capability, the relatively short time span between joining the nuclear race and achieving the level of minimum nuclear deterrence invites proliferation. This is a political problem that must be solved by political means.

378
Djerdja, Josip. DISARMAMENT--TODAY'S KEY PROBLEM. Review of international affairs, v. 17, July 5/20, 1966: 10-12. D839.R4, v. 17

Events at the latest session of the U.N. Disarmament Commission testify to the unwillingness of the nuclear powers to compromise their positions in order to achieve the banning of all nuclear tests and prevention of nuclear proliferation. There is no evidence that the United States and other economically secure nations intend to work toward an end to the armaments race. The capitalist nations seem determined to preserve their position of dominance even if the world must be brought to the brink of nuclear disaster. Recent efforts to effect a pan-Islamic union on a religious basis and to form a coalition of Asian countries against possible Chinese expansion bear witness to a continuation of those reactionary policies that have thwarted disarmament efforts in the past. "Further armament, in brief, is increasingly being confirmed as an element of the global strategy of the main NATO powers, and as an essential integral part of the general policy which relies on force and superiority." Against this background the Geneva talks can hardly make progress toward improving the international atmosphere for the World Disarmament Conference to be held in 1967. The nonalined nations must immediately form a preparatory committee to complete the preliminary work of the Conference; at the same time efforts must be redoubled to encourage the participation of Communist China in the Conference. "If for any reason at all the nonaligned and progressive countries should miss the opportunity which they themselves have prepared during several years of hard work with a view to organizing the World Disarmament Conference, it will greatly facilitate the schemes of those who through armament race and armament in general, direct today their main action against the new countries in the shape of neo-colonialism and against other countries in insisting on methods of force and pressure in settling differences and regulating relations."

379
Flechtheim, Ossip K. [STANDS AGAINST DISARMAMENT] Widerstände gegen Abrüstung. Frankfurter Hefte, v. 21, July 1966: 455-464.
AP30.F555, v. 21
Bibliographical footnotes.

Analyzes the diverse motivations of various political, economic, military, and bureaucratic establishments and groups--both in the West and the East--that oppose disarmament. Flechtheim discusses in particular groups in the United States, Germany (both West and East), and the Soviet Union.

380
Gotlieb, Allan. "COLLATERAL" MEASURES: ARMS CONTROL OR GENERAL DISARMAMENT. GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT: A NEW WORLD ORDER OR SOMETHING ELSE? THE EVOLUTION OF A NEW WORLD ORDER: ARE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST INSURMOUNTABLE? In his Disarmament and international law: a study of the role of law in the disarmament process. Toronto, Canadian Institute of International Affairs [1965] (Contemporary affairs, no. 34) p. 68-97.
JX1974.G53
Bibliographical references included in "Notes" (p. 203-227).

In the opinion of most of the powers concerned--Eastern, Western, and nonalined--accomplishment of a treaty on general and complete disarmament will require acceptance of preliminary "collateral measures." Proposals of this character refer either to partial disarmament or to certain kinds of behavior by states--behavior that in some cases will be independent of any formal obligation. Proposed collateral measures not dealing directly with disarmament include, for instance, the resolution against placing nuclear weapons in space, nondissemination of nuclear weapons, denuclearized zones, and discontinuation of production of fissionable material. Their intrinsic value notwithstanding, such measures are unlikely to induce adequate disarmament covering weapons of mass destruction. This would require, above all, establishment of a new international legal order capable of settling disputes and maintaining peace in a partially or totally disarmed world. The West's belief in an intimate connection between world order and disarmament underlies its disarmament proposals. In contrast the Soviet Union's revised draft treaty on disarmament completely ignores the issue. The question of a new legal system's ability to secure viable disarmament may be considered too academic, since there is no chance at present for a complete reconciliation of Eastern and Western positions on the subject. The problem is, however, too fundamental to be entirely dismissed. The growing acceptance by the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries of some traditional Western concepts--the principle that general international law is valid for all countries regardless of their social and political systems, to name one--may finally have its impact on the Soviet Union's currently expedient attitudes and eventually bring about a basic change in the Soviet estimates of the importance of the world legal order in securing disarmament.

381
Halperin, Morton H. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL: AN INTRODUCTION. China quarterly, no. 26, Apr./June 1966: 118-122.
DS701.C472, 1966

In the polemics of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Chinese have complained about a number of aspects of Soviet disarmament policy. They accuse the U.S.S.R. of seeking a nonproliferation agreement to prevent the further development of China's nuclear forces and to allow the two superpowers to dominate the world. They denounce the Soviet position on general and complete disarmament, charging that this can come about only after the overthrow of Western imperialism and cannot be negotiated with the Western powers. Furthermore they accuse the U.S.S.R. of subordinating support for wars of national liberation in order to achieve disarmament agreements with the West. The Russians, on the other hand, charge that Peking subordinates efforts to negotiate disarmament to its own desire to develop nuclear weapons. They further charge that the Chinese do not understand the dangers of nuclear war. Debates on disarmament in the Sino-Soviet dispute are a vehicle for discussing general issues of major importance. At the core of much of the disagreement is the question of how to treat the United States. Also both countries use arms control issues to expose undesirable policies of the other and compete for support in the third world and Communist bloc. Finally the discussions reflect very real differences about the appropriate policy toward arms control measures.

382
Hutchinson, Dorothy. RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN A WARLESS WORLD. IS THIS A PROBLEM WHICH IS PREVENTING DISARMAMENT? In International Institute for Peace, Vienna. Active co-existence, no. 2, Dec. 1964: 15-22.
P&GP RR

The official U.S. view holds that a strong U.N. armed force is the sine qua non of disarmament; yet the Nation "makes only vague eventual provision for the compulsory peaceful settlement of international political disputes." The Soviet position is that "a disarmament agreement, and little else, is needed to insure world peace." Proponents of world government, on the other hand, believe that there is no satisfactory substitute for a world order based on law and, consequently, for a complete revision of the U.N. Charter. Those of the "disarmed disorder" school characterize disarmament as immediately necessary and possible, provided that it is accompanied by a relatively noncoercive, vetoless U.N. peace force with strictly defined and limited powers. But "world disarmament will not proceed beyond a token stage until nations accept their need for some binding rules beyond disarmament." In a word, states will not disarm "until they can agree on some reliable means of assuring an approximation of justice for themselves in a disarmed world." Therefore inquiry must be made immediately into the minimal rules for international conduct and the minimal world machinery for dealing with disputes, both of which should be agreed to either before or at the time of general and complete disarmament. These rules and this machinery might concentrate, for example, on cases of incursion and the shipment of arms across national borders, inflammatory propaganda directed across state lines, and expropriation of property owned by nationals of other countries. Men might also establish rules governing impartial review and control over economic boycotts, peaceful change in the status quo, peaceful self-determination of peoples, and graduated measures for vesting a world authority with power to halt violence. Finally the world must consider how to prevent secession from the disarmament agreement itself.

383
INTERNATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. In Canada. Dept. of External Affairs. External Affairs, v. 18, Aug. 1966: 325-330.
JX351.A3, v. 18

Reports a privately sponsored conference held in Scarborough, Ont., during the summer of 1966. Supported by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in conjunction with the American Assembly of Columbia University, Britain's Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, the Conference presented "nearly all hues of the international political spectrum," with a strong emphasis on defense, nuclear technology, and arms control. Nuclear proliferation and a nonproliferation treaty were important among the topics discussed.

384
JSP OPPOSES CHINA'S NUCLEAR TEST. Japan Socialist review, no. 110, May 15, 1966: 1-2.
HX9.J3, 1966

The text of the statement made on the occasion of China's third nuclear test by the director of the Japanese Socialist Party's international bureau. The statement was issued May 10, 1966. While recognizing China's need for nuclear weapons at a time when the United States is also developing them, the director nonetheless finds that China's nuclear test promotes proliferation and nuclear competition and will further bring Japan under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Therefore all nations should strive for the complete abolition of nuclear weapons through a world conference of heads of state.

385
Johnson, Max S. U.S. ROLE IN A CHANGING WORLD. U.S. news & world report, v. 61, July 18, 1966: 45.
JK1.U65, v. 61

Out of two major American seminars on strategy has come an analysis of the contemporary world that indicates, among other things, the current unlikelihood of thermonuclear war. A European war is improbable; but if such should occur it would be largely conventional. Communist ideology is disintegrating, and consequently the Warsaw Pact is loosening along nationalist lines, as is NATO. In Europe Western and Communist nations come increasingly closer to détente. China, having alienated both the United States and the Soviet Union, is following an unsuccessful foreign policy, but will nevertheless continue to develop its influence in Asia and its nuclear capability. Militarily Moscow and Washington have reached a nuclear stalemate. Nuclear weapons will proliferate, bringing both greater danger and greater understanding of the threat posed by nuclear war. Both East and West will of necessity study in depth the waging and ending of "central" and tactical nuclear wars, and all parties in Europe will probably end by rejecting both as possible strategies. NATO will attempt to carry on but will function poorly without France. In Asia the Vietnam conflict will be slightly stepped up and may drag on for some time. In time

the war will probably spread to Thailand, but America will eventually find some basis for compromise with the Communists. Japan is shaping up as the major Asian power. Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America were all seen as potential trouble areas. Seminar participants agreed that the United States is in serious need of both an accepted national strategy and an agreed set of goals for the future.

386
Kraminov, D. DISARMAMENT: A FUNDAMENTAL POLICY. Soviet union, no. 199, 1966: 1-2.
DK266.A2S574, 1966

A recent Washington Post cartoon shows three skinclad men amidst massive ruins. One holds a scrap of paper and speaks: "As far as I can make out, this says: 'We agree, in principle, to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, but --.'" This brings home what artificial barriers to mankind's future lie behind the diplomats' perilous "but," which gets into every disarmament document framed by the Western states. In contrast the Soviet Union's efforts for disarmament are not a tactical move but a fundamental policy pursued from its birth and recognized today as being even more important in the light of the burdensome cost and destructive power of modern weaponry. World opinion forced the United States and other Western countries to set up an 18-Nation Committee to discuss disarmament but on July 17 the New York Times admitted: "the United States produced its own proposal, never really thinking that it would be seriously considered, much less adopted." Despite the Soviet Union's efforts to ban all nuclear tests the United States insisted on leaving a loophole for underground tests, which it has pursued feverishly in the 3 years since the partial test ban treaty was signed, averaging about one test every 10 days. America also has done nothing to stop the dangerous proliferation of nuclear weapons. Washington and London agree only "in principle" with the Soviet proposal, supported by nearly two-thirds of the Committee members, that "no country possessing nuclear weapons should . . . turn them over to any other country." This is because they want to share their nuclear arms with all NATO countries and first of all Germany, which is "frantically impatient to get its finger on the trigger," and which "Washington is trying to pull . . . into the nuclear club through the back door . . . ." Facts show who is sabotaging disarmament and Washington's smokescreen will not hide from anyone that "the masters of the 'military-industrial complex,' as ex-President Eisenhower called it, will go on resisting real disarmament and do their best to keep this urgent problem in the cul-de-sac into which they steered it." A way must be found out of the blind alley. "That is what the people demand."

387
McNamara, Robert S. SECRETARY MCNAMARA DISCUSSES ASIAN AFFAIRS AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL IN INTERVIEW FOR JAPANESE MAGAZINE. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 55, Aug. 29, 1966: 303-311.
JX232.A33, v. 55

"Transcript of an interview with Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara by Kei Wakaizumi on July 15 [1966], which was published in Japanese in the August 9 issue of the Japanese monthly magazine Chuo Koron."

The U.S. view of military preparedness, arms control, and Asian affairs, as seen by the Secretary of Defense.

388
Sonnenfeldt, Helmut. THE CHINESE FACTOR IN SOVIET DISARMAMENT POLICY. China quarterly, no. 26, Apr./June 1966: 123-135.
DS701.C472, 1966

China's influence visibly affects Soviet disarmament policy in at least four aspects: tactics of the U.S.S.R. at formal disarmament conferences, its formal proposals, the general thrust of its propaganda, and decisions by the U.S.S.R. to negotiate seriously for the purpose of actually achieving an agreement. Examination of the conferences held since 1957 indicates that the U.S.S.R. prefers to hold disarmament talks in periods of Sino-Soviet tension, although other factors may affect its decision. Conversely the U.S.S.R. is less likely to come to the conference table when trying to placate the Chinese. Although the timing and content of Soviet disarmament proposals depends on many extraneous factors, the U.S.S.R.'s general and complete disarmament, test ban, and nonproliferation proposals came at major turning points in Sino-Soviet relations. In brief, disarmament policy has played a role in the Soviet dispute with the Chinese, "sometimes as a stick, sometimes as a carrot." The Chinese influence is most apparent in Soviet propaganda, because here Moscow confronts Peking directly. In defending its proposals against Chinese attack Moscow stresses the danger of modern war, to which the Chinese are allegedly indifferent. This should not, however, make the West overly sanguine about the prospects of reaching disarmament agreements with the U.S.S.R., as post test ban negotiations have shown. The most one can say is that in several instances the Russians have been prepared to conclude an agreement which they believed to be in their national interest, in spite of Chinese objection and attack. On the other hand, none of the agreements which the U.S.S.R. has concluded so far are directly injurious to Chinese interests.

389
SOVIET PRESS MATERIALS ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, no. 5, Washington, Joint Publications Research Service, 1966. 136 p. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 37,391)
P&GP RR

"CSO: R-7000-D."

Translation of 61 press and radio commentaries with attributions to authors and news services on the following subjects: European Security, Geneva Negotiations (ENDC), NATO, Peace Campaign (World Peace Council), United Nations (a) General and (b) Outer Space Treaty, and "Miscellaneous."

390
SOVIET PRESS MATERIALS ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, no. 6, Washington, Joint Publications Research Service, 1966. 66 p. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 37,905)
P&GP RR

"CSO: R-7000-D."

Translation of 27 press and radio commentaries with attributions to authors and news services on the following subjects: European Security, Geneva Negotiations (ENDC), International Conferences, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, United Nations, and "Miscellaneous."

391
Willot, Albert. [GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT: AN APPROACH] Le désarmement général et complet; une approche. Bruxelles, Éditions de l'Institut de Sociologie, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1965. 137 p. (Études de science politique)
JX1947.W578

Bibliography: p. 130.

The differing viewpoints revealed during recent disarmament negotiations involved the following primordial issues: (1) Maintenance of a balance of military forces during the disarmament process. The possibility of aggression during the disarmament process and the fear and distrust among the great powers effectively hinder achievement of this task. (2) Verification of the execution of disarmament treaty stipulations. The Russians reject the "intermediary negative" verification proposed by the West, because they do not want their military secrets to be disclosed and refuse to admit Western controllers to Russia. (3) Chinese hostility to any agreement. This feeling is so fundamental that it eliminates a priori all reasonable hope of change of attitude in the near future. (4) Assurance of nations' deference to international legality after disarmament. The Western powers insist on the idealistic principles contained in the proposed preamble to the disarmament treaty. But according to Soviet doctrine international agreements are based on common interests and valid only as long as the common interests exist. Since in their view international legality changes with the development of the historical process, they refuse to sign any agreement of undetermined duration. Analysis of the primordial problems reveals that they should be freshly approached by creation of an international authority, one that would be totally different from the United Nations or any other institution applying international law. Nations must entrust this authority with the enforcement of eventual disarmament and allow it to act as the guardian--powerful and intransigent--of nonviolence. If observed from the realistic viewpoint "general and complete disarmament" does not mean an impossible total and universal disappearance of armed forces, but the greatest possible reduction of the armed potential of the greatest possible number of states and a reorganization of this world armed potential into an instrument of world peace and security. The general definition of a proposed international disarmament authority and the draft scheme of a treaty of general and complete disarmament offered in this volume have been prepared entirely on the basis of this realistic perspective.

C. GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

A. NEGOTIATION

392
Cousins, Norman. REPORT FROM GENEVA. Saturday review, v. 49, Sept. 3, 1966: 14-16.
Z1219.S25, v. 49

The expected agreements on nonproliferation and a comprehensive test ban have not materialized at Geneva, for the two nations that stand to gain the most from such arrangements have been unable to develop a consensus on these issues. The United States does not want to exclude nuclear weapons from the arsenals of its military allies, which the Soviet Union sees as a ploy for a loophole through which West Germany can gain access to nuclear weapons. Secretary McNamara's proposal for NATO consultation on the use of nuclear weapons raised hopes among the Geneva negotiators, but the Soviets feel that the United States attaches more importance to its ties with Bonn than to checking nuclear proliferation. As a consequence most of the delegates judge that a great opportunity to snuff out the arms race has been missed. On the other hand they recall that the talks leading to the partial test ban at times appeared more futile and frustrating than have the more recent efforts of the Geneva Conference. These delegates also tend to think that future negotiations may benefit from the U.S. offer of a plant-by-plant shutdown of nuclear manufacturing installations, and its description of a new system to monitor a cutoff in fissionable materials production, both presented at the close of the last round of talks. But the one fact emerging most clearly from the latest efforts of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament is that no one thing concerning peace can be kept separate from anything else which concerns peace. Another disarmament conference would only meander from the great issues to the small ones and then back again. Therefore the first essential step is for the American President and the Soviet Premier to enter into direct communication on the nonproliferation issue. The second is for the United States to seek high-level agreement on a comprehensive test ban. Lastly and most importantly a new context for a workable peace must be created--by bringing the United Nations up to full strength in procedures, powers, and membership.

393
Randolph, Lillian. A SUGGESTED MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 10, Sept. 1966: 344-353.
JX1901.J6, v. 10

Offers a bargaining model that takes into account "the relationships among elements in the phases of bargaining which are conducive to reaching an enforceable agreement" and "the elements in bargaining which are helpful in enforcing the agreement." The author concludes that "international negotiation is essentially a conservative process, involving constituency participation or support and modest changes in the status quo, at least in the short term."

B. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

1. Escalation

394
Clapp, Archie J. ESCALATE. Marine Corps gazette, v. 50, Sept. 1966: 20-23.
VE7.M4, v. 50

The term "escalation" denotes a sharp rise in the intensity of some international activity, usually one that involves military action. The term is usually used in a precautionary sense, as something to be prevented at all costs. Although the United States cannot shove its opponents into a corner hoping they will do nothing but sit there and cower, the Nation has considerably more maneuvering room short of war than it has chosen to use many times in the past. "Keeping a situation on the lowest possible burner" is not always the best thing to do; at times to deliberately escalate a situation best serves the national interest. Being moralistic and fundamentally peaceloving, the United States will never be an aggressor. However the country should regain a measure of initiative by tailoring its responses to fit its military capabilities rather than adjust itself to the mode of combat begun by its opponents. The Communists have purposely adopted a mode of battle at the lowest end of the intensity scale, the war of national liberation, to avoid giving the United States adequate provocation to react in strength. History shows that an effective guerrilla force, while never gaining military victory, can cost those who oppose it very dearly in both blood and capital. Therefore why should the United States condescend to fight at the intensity level of the enemy instead of escalating the situation to a degree the enemy cannot feasibly counter. No insurgency can get very far without some outside support and sponsor. What the United States must do is identify the sponsor and draw up a target list directed against him, followed by an ultimatum for withdrawal of his sponsorship. The targets will be destroyed in ascending order of importance until the sponsor agrees to terminate his support of the insurgents. America must stop thinking of escalation as an unfortunate turn of events, and adopt controlled escalation as a well-advertised national strategy.

395
GET-IT-OVER MOOD SPURS NEW, FATEFUL ESCALATION OF WAR. Weekly people, v. 76, Oct. 15, 1966: 1, 6.
HX1.W38, v. 76

Probably many people agree with General Eisenhower that "any action," including the use of nuclear weapons, should be undertaken to end the Vietnam War quickly--"to win," as the former President put it. As Arthur Schlesinger has stated, however, if this is the American idea of "protecting" a country against wars of national liberation, what other people will wish to stand behind a U.S. shield? Gen. Maxwell Taylor has observed that the objective of the American bombing campaigns in Vietnam is to change the will of

enemy leadership. But Secretary McNamara disputes this by saying "we never believed that bombing would destroy North Vietnam's will." Thus is demonstrated the bankruptcy of U.S. capitalism; Washington has the power to exterminate whole populations yet cannot cope with guerrilla warfare or with the popular support it implies. No wonder then that Peking opposes negotiations and urges the Vietnamese to increase their resistance. Although, as U.S. News and World Report observed in August, the American military know that bombing will not win in Vietnam, they want more of the same. "And don't they look forward longingly to the ultimate escalation--nuclear bombing?" Another U.S. "peace offensive" is under way, to be sure; so are major increments in U.S. defense expenditures, B-52 raids, and a meeting among the United States and its Asian and Pacific allies that has all the earmarks of a war council. In brief America's peace moves are impugned by its formidable display of intentions to escalate the war once again. Despite "the egregious failure of past escalations of the war, more are on the way." A supreme crisis in world history looms, and "the forces of Socialist enlightenment must intensify their activities if they are to influence the outcome."

396
Starner, Frances L. THE ROAD TO HANOI? Far Eastern economic review, v. 53, Aug. 25, 1966: 355, 357, 359-361. HC411.F18, v. 53

Describes the debate in the United States and presents the argument that contradictions inherent in the Administration's policy have ended national consensus and placed the President willy-nilly in the hands of the military establishment on an escalatory road that might lead to Hanoi itself.

2. Conventional arms transfers

397
Alexandros, L. [MIG AFFAIRS] Mig-Affären. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Oct. 10, 1966: 560-561. U3.W38, v. 10

The Soviet Union has stepped up its military aid to the uncommitted states of the Middle East in recent weeks and months. For example, many countries in this permanent area of tension have received one of the newest Soviet combat aircraft, the MiG-21. Already French-built Israeli Mirage 3 C interceptors have several times been involved in air battles with Syrian Air Force MiG-21s, in each case showing themselves to be superior to the Russian-built machine. In August the West received a free gift of an undamaged MiG-21, an aircraft which it had long been trying to get its hands on by a variety of means. A captain in the Iraqi Air Force, which is equipped with a number of these tactical fighters, made use of a training flight in order to defect to Israel. In his situation report this month, our Middle East correspondent describes the duels which have already taken place between Israeli Mirages and Syrian MiGs and reveals something of the background to the daring flight of the MiG-21 from Iraq to Israel. (Abstract supplied)

398
Cooley, John K. FROM MAU MAU TO MISSILES. African forum, v. 2, summer 1966: 42-56. DT1.A225, v. 2

Communist military aid to the independent African nations is no more than one-tenth that of the Western nations. As for the latter, although about 10 percent of U.S. foreign economic aid goes to Africa, in 1963 only 2 percent of American military assistance did. The amount of Communist aid is very small. The West thus cries out against Communist military aid not because of its size, but for fear that Communist ideology can be imparted along with skill in using the weapons. The soldier may be taught at whom to shoot as well as how to use the gun. In deference to political realities many African states prefer to diversify the sources of their military aid as much as possible. Sometimes they do this to preserve their nonalinement; sometimes to play one state against another. Despite Communist aid to "anticolonial liberation movements" and Western encouragement of counterinsurgents, the East and West do not clearly confront one another in Africa as in Asia. As far as possible the Africans hope to avoid that. The Western nations have concentrated their training efforts on small but efficient African forces for maintaining stability. They should continue these efforts and should avoid the fear that refusing to give equipment will result in its supply, with political advantage, by the other side. Military men on both sides should avoid the temptation to outbid one another in the sophistication of the equipment or training offered. This type of thinking not only encourages the arms race, but can harm Africa.

399
Kurz, H. R. [THE TRANSIT OF WAR MATERIEL THROUGH SWITZERLAND AND ITS EXPORT] Die Durch- und Ausfuhr von Kriegsmaterial aus der Schweiz. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, no. 2, Mar./Apr. 1966: 109-116. P&GP RR

Switzerland exemplifies a fundamental question regarding neutrality: To what extent can, and must, a neutral nation be prohibited from exporting war materiel and allowing it transit through its territory? The answer depends basically on the generally accepted concept of neutrality, a concept which has undergone substantial change over the past few centuries. In 1907 the Hague Agreements prohibited a neutral country from exporting (or allowing transit of) war materiel destined for nations at war, but did not institute an absolute prohibition. A neutral state is not obliged to restrict or control private export and transit of war materiel. However, once a neutral state introduces any kind of restriction with regard to private trade or traffic of this kind, it must see to it that this does not contravene the principle of parity treatment (viz equal treatment of combatants). Since maintenance of absolute parity treatment by a neutral nation is virtually impossible, a formal observance of the principle should suffice. Switzerland's self-imposed restrictions, dictated by its own standard of neutrality, have always exceeded those provided by international law. Consequently Swiss exports of war materiel over a period of years have been negligible. Should Swiss national interests, including the nation's neutrality, require reversal of the policy, it would be perfectly within the limits of the existing international law of neutrality.

400
Morris, Joe A. PANDORA'S AMMUNITION BOX. Nation, v. 203, Aug. 8, 1966: 109-112. AP2.N2, v. 203

Rather than jettison the Arab States as a lost cause the State Department has adopted a policy of allowing selective arms sales to them "based on careful case-by-case examinations and a determination that such a

sale would not be a de-stabilizing factor." This means, for example, that Washington will provide Jordan with arms if doing so helps to keep Moscow out of the Arabian munitions market. It also means that U.S. weapons will be sold to states that have accepted Sovietization of their military equipment if a chance exists that Communist domination of a particular market can be broken. In practice U.S. arms sales in the Middle East often appear to do more harm than good. The Arab-Israeli confrontation in particular makes American arms policies look like the outpourings of a demented computer. These policies are not altogether destabilizing, in that the Israeli military capability is developed and then employed to deter Arab terrorism. Nor is Washington disturbed by those Arab States that demand help in building a military potential impressive enough to "discourage the aspirations of their revolutionary brethren." That which facilitates or helps precipitate a major Arab-Israeli showdown is another matter, however. Unfortunately an upheaval in this region comes closer to breaking out with every step taken toward military preparedness by the Arab States. Although criticism of U.S. arms policy in the Middle East comes easily, the alternatives for which Washington can opt remain far from clear. The United States probably will proceed with the sale of tanks and airplanes to both Arab and Jew. At the same time it will continue hoping that the tanks and airplanes "will be used for bluffs that never quite come to blows."

401
Watt, D. C. BRITAIN STIRS IT UP. Spectator, no. 7212, Sept. 16, 1966: 339-340.
AP4. S7, 1966

Recent British arms sales to the states around the Persian Gulf are extraordinary even by the "rather peculiar" ethics of international arms trade. The sales, prompted by British withdrawal from Aden, represent willful abandonment by Britain and the United States of any attempt to control the level of armaments in the Middle East. Until recently the West tried to maintain a balance between the Soviet-equipped U.A.R. and the states around it through guarantees and supplies. Although the system had many weaknesses, it did work well considering it was an externally imposed means of arms control. The breakdown began with the revolution and civil war in Yemen and Saudi-Egyptian intervention and rivalry. "Someone in London" saw this rivalry as an opportunity for Britain to beat a hasty retreat from the Middle East, leaving Saudi Arabia to maintain the peace with arms purchased from Britain. Britain hoped to earn rather than spend foreign exchange and still protect her interests as before. The scheme has not only contributed to instability in the Middle East, but has intensified the already existing arms race. The unfortunate Saudis are expected to balance Nasser in the Red Sea and also deal with Iran's claims in the Persian Gulf. Iran meanwhile is buying British arms for cash only in order to be unrestricted in their use. "To the welcome clink of convertible currency" Britain is incurring emnity from all sides. Any hope of great power agreement on arms limitation in the Middle East has been completely destroyed.

3. Nuclear proliferation

402
Brownlie, Ian. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: SOME PROBLEMS OF CONTROL. International affairs, (London) v. 42, Oct. 1966: 600-608.
JX1. I53, v. 42

Analyzes recent proposals considered in international forums and advances five conditions that must be fulfilled if nonproliferation measures are to become practicable: stricter control over peaceful-uses technology than that provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency; cessation of discriminatory attitudes concerning the security of nuclear and nonnuclear states--the nuclear powers should allow other states to create nuclear-free zones in their own regions; adoption of genuine disarmament measures by nuclear powers as a standard for others; consideration of military alliances as means and not ends in themselves; and true observance of existing international standards governing intervention, threat of force, and international security by the larger states.

403
Brunner, Dominique. [THE CHINESE BOMB AND THE NONNUCLEAR COUNTRIES] La bombe chinoise et les pays non-nucléaires. Revue militaire suisse, v. 111, Sept. 1966: 450-455. U2. R5, v. 111

The third explosion of a nuclear device in China proved anew China's constant and unexpectedly fast growth into a formidable nuclear power. The explosion also demonstrated the urgent need for energetic measures to check the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Except for the Moscow Treaty of 1963, the superpowers have made almost no attempt to meet the demands of the nonnuclear countries in promoting disarmament. The repercussions of the explosion were therefore tremendous throughout Asia, and especially in India. The Indian leaders immediately demanded accelerated development of India's own nuclear power. The situation was aggravated by the disclosure that China had again used, as in the previous tests, enriched uranium instead of switching to the less expensive plutonium. Presumably, China uses U-235 because it yields more explosive force and is indispensable as detonator of thermonuclear bombs; by using it China hopes to match the nuclear status of the United States and Soviet Union. The implied growing danger underscores the importance of India's nuclear industry. Experts like Leonard Beaton assert that the Indian atomic potential is comparable to the Chinese in more than one aspect. If it is true that China, like Sweden and Israel, began to store plutonium some years ago, the exploitation of India's potential might seem urgent under the new circumstances. Although Indian atomic armament could reestablish equilibrium in Asia (at least in the field of dissuasion) the risk implied in this kind of regional arms race between inimical, underdeveloped, and overpopulated states cannot be underestimated. In inadvertently using nuclear weapons to forestall a supposedly imminent attack, these countries could unleash a world war.

404
Chou, En-lai. PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI GREETS THE 12TH WORLD CONFERENCE AGAINST ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN BOMBS. Peking review, v. 9, Aug. 5, 1966: 15-16. DS701. P42, v. 9

Asserts that "U.S. imperialists collude with the Russian revisionists in plotting a so-called treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in an attempt to deprive the peace-loving countries of the right to defend themselves against nuclear threat by developing their own nuclear weapons." Chou insists that the people of the whole world must expose and smash this criminal plot. China, he says, has always advocated complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Since it failed in its effort, it was

forced to build up its own nuclear power in order to break the nuclear monopoly of the United States and Russia. Chou En-lai assured the conference that under no circumstances will China ever be first to use nuclear weapons.

405
THE CLOCK TICKS ON. Economist, v. 220, Aug. 6, 1966: 521-522. HG11. E2, v. 220

Two parallel movements have developed in the world since the signing of the 1963 partial test ban treaty: to extend the treaty to all testing, and to conclude an agreement that would halt the spread of nuclear weapons. At the sessions of the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva a strong time element has pressed the delegates. On the one hand many of them fear that if they have no progress to show the U.N. General Assembly there may never be another ENDC session; on the other, "advocates of less haste and more phlegm" warn against concocting hollow and possibly disastrous deals simply to impress the Assembly. No agreement whatsoever on a comprehensive test ban seems imminent. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have been conducting underground tests, and the Americans strongly disapprove of the secretive nature of the Russian test series. A treaty without adequate verification procedures therefore seems unworkable. A Swedish proposal for "verification by challenge" has been argued against by Washington on the grounds that a number of challenges each year over "dubious underground 'events'" would exacerbate rather than moderate East-West tensions; the Russians have totally ignored the proposal. Nor does a nonproliferation treaty seem likely soon, since the Soviet delegate has stated that the American draft treaty provides for proliferation, and only the Soviet draft effectively bars it. The West has seemingly withdrawn its proposals for any NATO nuclear force, turning instead to consultative arrangements among the Atlantic allies; but now Moscow rejects even these agreements as representing proliferation. Russia may yet modify this hard line. Meanwhile the acquisition of nuclear weapons by nations all over the world looms as an ever-increasing menace.

406
Cole, Sterling. NEEDED: A REBIRTH OF THE IAEA. Nuclear news, v. 9, Sept. 1966: 19-20. QC770. N75, v. 9

When the 10th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency meets in Vienna this September, the participating governments should take a close look at the course charted for the Agency, for it is being avoided or circumvented. IAEA is unique among international organizations in its potential for control over nuclear-weapon materials. Its "full and immediate exploitation" could offer what is currently the brightest opportunity for nuclear control and disarmament. During the years of IAEA's existence it has worked out and set up elaborate procedures to "safeguard nuclear materials under its control against diversion from peaceful uses." But, since there appears to be no grist for the Agency's mill, and since the international climate seems favorable for moves toward converting weapons into plowshares, the Agency Statute could profitably be revised to better utilize its potential. The IAEA General Conference could set up a special conference to be convened next year. At that time, a revised Statute should be drafted. Each Agency member would renounce the use of nuclear weapons "except in retaliation for a nuclear attack made upon it or upon another member." Members would consent to refrain from constructing or reactivating nuclear-weapon production facilities. They would agree not to transfer or share nuclear weapons, materials, or facilities, although the latter two categories could be transferred under the Agency's auspices. All existing and future nuclear reactors would be placed under IAEA control, and all tests or explosions would be approved and supervised by it. Member nations would transfer materials and equipment to the Agency, and these would be sold to other members in order to defray costs. Violators of Agency obligations would be denied its benefits, and be subject to "concerted action by the Agency independently or in concert with the United Nations." The Board of Governors, whose authority would be restricted to policy matters, would be selected on a "realistic basis." The authority of the Director General would be expanded to a point where he would be, "without question, the executive force in formulating and executing the Agency's activities." The revised Statute would go into effect as soon as it had been ratified by a majority of IAEA members including the United States and the Soviet Union.

407
Cygielman, Victor. [WILL THEY RENOUNCE THE BOMB?] Renonceront-ils à la bombe? Nouvel observateur, no. 88, July 20/26, 1966: 11. AP20. O2, 1966

Prime Minister Eshkol disclosed in the Israeli Parliament that American scholars were allowed to visit the nuclear plant in Negev. The Prime Minister stressed that no inspection was involved. In spite of this assurance the permission may be seen as a concession to Washington's pressure, which has been applied since the conclusion of a Russian-American agreement to cooperate in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Opposition to the pressure precipitated the downfall of Ben Gurion's government in 1962. At the time Israel already possessed a nuclear reactor built with the help of France. Does the permission for inspection mean renunciation of nuclear weapons? The opinion of the people of Israel on this matter is divided. Some would prefer a denuclearization of the area. Others feel that they need the weapons to face the Arab danger. The Government avoids any decision in order to maintain good relations with both the United States and Russia. But the time will come soon when a clear decision will be inevitable.

408
Fisher, Adrian S. U.S. URGES EXPANDED SAFEGUARDS OVER PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITY. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 55, Aug. 22, 1966: 281-283. JX232. A33, v. 55

Statement "made before the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva on July 28," 1966.

Recommends, as one aspect of the nonproliferation question, that International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards or their equivalent be applied to all peaceful nuclear programs of nations that do not possess nuclear weapons and that no state transfer nuclear materials for peaceful uses without submitting them to IAEA safeguards. Fisher, Deputy Director of the U.S. Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency, considers this system of safeguards "not only effective but workable" and asserts that "in the transfer of these [nuclear] materials and equipment between states for peaceful purposes, all states would be treated alike."

409
Gupta, Sisir. [INDIA FACES THE NUCLEAR ARMS QUESTION: THE DEBATE ON THE APPROPRIATENESS OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENT] Indien vor der Kernwaffenfrage. Die Debatte über die Zweckmässigkeit nuklearer Rüstung. Europa-Archiv, v. 21, Sept. 10, 1966: 617-624.
D839.E86, v. 21

Outlines the arguments for and against India's embarking on its own nuclear arms production--the same arguments that have been used in the long-lived public debate on the subject. Gupta thinks it certain that Indian political leadership will finally reject any such plan. He himself is not absolutely positive that such a decision would be right.

410
NUCLEAR NON-TREATY? Economist, v. 221, Oct. 1, 1966: 18-19. HG11.E2, v. 221

Since 1960 U.N. General Assembly sessions have concluded with an urgent plea from the nations that a nonproliferation treaty be concluded. There is no reason to think that this year will be any different, except that it may be the last. A reasonable chance remains that such a treaty can be concluded before the next Assembly; if this is not done, the possibility of halting nuclear spread may vanish. NATO nuclear sharing (which the Russians feel would put nuclear weapons into German hands) continues a stumbling-block. For the West's part, "hardware solutions" to the nuclear-sharing issue have apparently been abandoned in favor of consultative arrangements. Unfortunately the Soviets have seen this development neither as an accomplished fact nor even as a satisfactory answer to their concern over West Germany. Moreover the Bonn government does not recognize consultative arrangements as guaranteeing their security within the alliance. President Johnson has chosen not to press Chancellor Erhard on this issue; in view of the fact that the Russians seem unready to compromise on anything this was probably the wisest choice. It may well be that the sharing issue is merely a Soviet red herring, and that Moscow's troubles within the Communist world, and particularly with Red China, have paralyzed the Russian hand.

411
THE NUCLEAR SPREAD: TESTS, TRIALS, AND TRIBULATIONS. Economist, v. 220, Aug. 13, 1966: 633-634. HG11.E2, v. 220

A number of actors on the international scene have expressed hope about slowing the arms race. Some of these expressions, such as those of Mr. Kosygin, have been rather unlikely, since his country's delegate to the Geneva talks has been silent at best and often negative at worst. Sweden's delegate, Mrs. Alva Myrdal, is dubious about a nonproliferation treaty, but she has stated that a comprehensive test ban and a cutoff on fissile-material production would stall nuclear-arms development. Recent trends in detection, she feels, make a complete test ban feasible. Her suggested "verification by challenge or invitation" has met with only tentative response from the United States and a stony silence on the part of the Soviets. Indeed the Russian answer to her suggestion may well have been the unannounced Soviet blast recorded on August 5. Washington is probably awaiting the results of a November shot that is designed to test detection procedures before it takes a position on a comprehensive test ban. Each country stands to lose by an extended ban. New ballistic missile systems--both offensive and defensive--are being worked on and tests are required. Yet both nations fear this "vertical proliferation" of ever more sophisticated and lethal weapons. Both nations would also like to turn nuclear power to peaceful uses such as the Plowshare excavation project. Unfortunately it is now apparent that the technology involved in nuclear excavations is quite advanced and would further the spread of nuclear weapons if placed in the hands of aspiring nuclear powers. Thus tight international safeguards on all nuclear activity and material in the hands of the non-nuclear states is the keystone for an effective non-proliferation treaty.

412
Patel, H. M. DETERRENCE. Seminar, no. 83, July 1966: 27-30. DS401.S365, 1966

China's invasion of Tibet and construction of a road in the Aksai-chin area should have awakened India to the realities of the international situation, but unfortunately it took the 1962 "debacle" in the Northeastern Frontier to rouse Delhi even partially. Likewise Pakistan's intransigence in Kutch and Kashmir in 1965 at last opened Indian eyes to the continuous Pakistani needling and insidious encroachments. India must assess realistically the strengths of its two potential enemies, China and Pakistan, and the attitudes of the other nations toward India's relations with these two countries. Delhi's "permanent interests lie in the intact preservation of our territories, and they include Kashmir." Pakistan has been able to gain a measure of tacit support from the United States and the United Kingdom over the Kashmir issue and active support, in the way of arms, equipment, and assistance, from Red China and, to a lesser degree, from the Arab world. The Soviet Union finds it expedient to remain neutral in the Indo-Pakistan conflict. Although at the time of Indian independence only Pakistan seemed likely to become hostile, other nations, including Pakistan's ally China, now seem ranged against India. Since China and Pakistan threaten India's borders with their potentially mighty military machine, and since none of India's friends rushed to its side in the recent conflict, it is evident that India must develop a self-sufficient deterrent. China is bent upon gaining a nuclear capability. Until now Delhi has marked time in responding to this threat, due partly to its reluctance to reverse earlier stands in favor of nuclear disarmament and against the spread of nuclear weapons. Yet the only real risk of nuclear irresponsibility is in allowing China to practice nuclear blackmail of India undeterred. If India develops atomic arms, Pakistan may feel forced to acquire them too, even though a Pakistani bomb is only a threat if India does not possess one. In lieu of acquiring its own nuclear weapons India could seek absolute assurances from the nuclear powers that they would retaliate immediately against an attack on India, but the odds against such an assurance are great. India already comfortably spends a great deal of money on merely conventional defense, and a nuclear program might well have beneficial effects on the economy. Conventional arms must be built up no matter what the decision in regard to

nuclear weapons. "India must necessarily possess an army of a size which would enable it to take on single-handed either China or Pakistan, or both for a period of time." Such wars must be more clearly envisioned to determine what equipment and training are needed by Indian troops. Conventional buildup involves a very costly military machine, and, since assistance from other nations will be required, Indian foreign policy will have to be adjusted "suitably, quietly and unobtrusively."

413
Pergent, Jacques. [PROLIFERATION OF ATOMIC INDUSTRIES] La prolifération des industries atomiques. Forces aériennes françaises, no. 227, July 1966: 25-41. UG635.F8F66, 1966

The words "proliferation" or "dissemination" have a special meaning in atomic terminology; they are negatively conceived and connote only the nonproliferation of everything connected with atomic weapons. This represents the will of the superpowers, who do not want to share responsibility for the use of atomic weapons with other countries, be they medium-sized or small. On the other hand throughout the world many countries want to develop atomic industry for peaceful use. As it is no longer impossible for them to develop atomic weapons, it seems necessary to evaluate how long this would take. A survey of the situation in the atomic industries of two important powers (Germany and Japan), some countries with small potential, and some small countries with high potential showed that the countries can be classified in four categories of potential: (a) 4 atomic powers which possess atomic industries and have produced atomic weapons; (b) 12 atomic countries possessing atomic industries but not ready to produce atomic weapons; (c) 7 countries which do not yet have a reactor in operation but have announced projects to be executed before 1970 and have bought one or more reactors; and (d) 7 countries with some potential, not precisely known. From this evaluation it can be generalized that a country possessing atomic industry could manufacture some A bombs 5 years after it had established its first nuclear power plant. From the included table it becomes evident that this dissemination is not yet absolutely imminent.

414
Plimsoll, Sir James. NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. In Australia. Dept. of External Affairs. Current notes on international affairs, v. 36, Oct. 1965: 634-638.
JX1162.A33, v. 36

"Statement by the Leader of the Australian Delegation . . . in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on 25th October, 1965."

Presents the Australian view of the proposal to conclude a nonproliferation treaty and of the general field of disarmament. According to Plimsoll the Australian Government strongly favors any efforts designed to halt nuclear proliferation. But Australians are "very conscious of the fact that these things are only elements in the wider problem; that until agreement is reached on a wider range of disarmament matters, any agreements we reach in the nuclear field are essentially unstable; and that if greater progress is not made in other fields, and if important countries stay out of agreements on test bans and the dissemination of nuclear weapons, then pressures will mount on some of the non-nuclear countries with capacity to make nuclear weapons, and we may find that, irrespective of escape clauses or otherwise in treaties, some of these countries will be pushed by their own public opinion, or the realities of the situation, into getting into the nuclear field themselves."

415
Purdom, Tom. THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Kiwanis, v. 51, Oct. 1966: 22-24, 48, 50.
HF5001.K43, v. 51

Scans many of the problems and factors that comprise the nuclear proliferation issue: national policies, negotiations, proposed measures to curb and control nuclear spread, related measures such as bomber bonfires and nuclear guarantees, and the advantages and disadvantages of a nonproliferation treaty.

416
Robison, David A. LEARNING TO LIVE WITH NUCLEAR SPREAD. Air Force and space digest, v. 49, Aug. 1966: 56, 57, 63-65.
UG633.A65, v. 49

Attainment of a nonproliferation treaty is perhaps less important than learning "to live in a multipolar, multinuclear world in a manner that avoids general war." It is argued that some proliferation is inevitable and U.S. efforts to prevent it would be costly and ineffective. Yet the official consensus is geared toward halting further proliferation. The present anti-proliferation treaty "is an essentially gimmicky, public-relations solution to an unsolvable problem, and its eventual demise will bring us no closer to learning to live in a multinuclear world." It is essentially a pledge, which may exert some influence on potential nuclear nations but will not bind these nations when adherence to the treaty is not in their national interest. The big nuclear powers lack commitment to disarmament or at least to some reduction in existing stockpiles and a halt in nuclear weapons production. Countries such as India, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic are reluctant to commit themselves to second-rate nonnuclear status while the current nuclear club remains a thriving operation. Many of the politically feasible controls that might halt or contain proliferation depend on the good faith of the nonnuclear countries. Stringent international inspection of reactors, a complete test ban, and sanctions--either economic or military--imposed by the powerful nuclear countries will be unacceptable to the nonnuclear countries. The proposed nonproliferation treaty will probably fail because "for at least a few of the more important nonnuclear countries in the next ten years, the motivations for building these weapons are not going to be eliminated, reduced, sublimated, bought off, altered by ingenious argument, or provided for by other means." Nuclear weapons bring prestige, political influence, the ability to deter attack by an opponent, and the opportunity to be left alone. The United States might incur both a loss of prestige and less friendly relations with allies such as Japan or Germany from too ardent a campaign for nonproliferation. The "greatest cost" would be incurred if it attempted "to substitute American security guarantees around the world in place of national nuclear forces." Situations would arise when it would not be in the U.S. national interest to guarantee assistance to a recipient country or when it would be embarrassing to choose one side in a conflict between two American-guaranteed countries. Guarantees would place an inordinate amount of responsibility on the great nuclear powers to defend the smaller countries. Such commitments could lead to widespread nuclear confrontation between the nuclear powers as they tried to fulfill their roles. The United States can

contribute more, perhaps, to adjusting to the rise in the number of nuclear powers than in trying to halt nuclear spread. Along with more nuclear countries will come increasing multipolarity in the world, a situation which will be influenced greatly by the interactions of the great powers. If conflicts that might in involve the great powers are kept at a minimum--possible with Soviet-U.S. cooperation--a working "Concert of Powers" may be achieved.

417
Robison, David A. SOFTENING THE IMPACT OF NUCLEAR SPREAD. Air Force and space digest, v. 49, Oct. 1966: 82-84, 87, 90, 93-94, 97.
UG633.A65, v. 49

To approach the occurrence of proliferation as a disastrous event to be reckoned with by insistence on pushing through an agreement to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons probably will not alleviate the dangers that might follow in the wake of continued expansion of the nuclear club. A better course of action is to consider how the impact of proliferation may be softened. Briefly, the incidence of nuclear war will not increase geometrically with an increase in nuclear nations; presently nuclearized nations are not going to be "catalyzed" into all-out war. States will continue to back away from the use of nuclear weapons in limited or local conflicts. A small country would not benefit by attempting to fix the blame for using nuclear weapons on another--even if such could be accomplished. Widespread nuclear proliferation will not reduce U.S. power in relation to the rest of the world. In adjusting to nuclear multipolarity the United States will continue to exercise its own judgment about intervening in local conflicts in which it has an interest, given the presence of nuclear weapons or not. Lastly, it has been projected that a dangerous situation will follow directly upon West German nuclear weapons acquisition. However, it would be more catastrophic to force an anti-proliferation treaty on West Germany. In assessing the relative probabilities of nuclear proliferation the first lesson to be kept in mind "is that the development and deployment of nuclear weapons systems has been a product, and not a producer, of tension." What alternatives are open to concerned countries such as the United States? Proposed sharing arrangements, which include equal veto power for member nations, do not satisfy a nation's need for an independent nuclear capability to be used or not at will. "If possession of nuclear weapons is looked upon as a symptom of the need for security, then a policy that aims to improve the conditions of security in key areas of the world may be far more productive than one which aims only to stop the building of the weapons." A volatile situation would ensue from the combination of nuclear weapons, intense hostility, and a clash of vital national interests. It behooves the United States to do as much as it can in maintaining good relations with its allies (West Germany, Japan, France, Great Britain, and India). Recognizing that it is important to contribute to--but not dominate--its allies' conditions of security the United States can use the deployment of its tactical nuclear weapons abroad for this purpose. These weapons "can play a vital role in deterring territorial aggression." Equally important to the nuclear contributions to security are political commitments--to make alliances convincing and to guarantee existing borders.

418
Sarabhai, Vikram A. INDIA AND THE BOMB. Gandhi marg 39, v. 10, July 1966: 241-245.
DS481.G3G22, v. 10

Press conference remarks on India's nuclear capabilities and intentions by Vikram Sarabhai, Indian nuclear physicist, Pugwash member, and chairman of the Indian Committee for Space Research. Sarabhai feels the question is to find the proper balance in allocation of resources. Military preparedness against external aggression can be undermined by internal weakness through lack of social reform and economic development. "One atomic bomb explosion does not constitute increased security. If you want security on the basis of what the Americans and Russians have, then the meaning of this is quite different and the cost of this is known to you."

419
Schlesinger, James R. THE STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. Reporter, v. 35, Oct. 20, 1966: 36-38.
D839.R385, v. 35

Proliferation of nuclear weapons has taken on the character of a dire threat to international security, yet the real disadvantages are political. Further spread of nuclear weapons will not alter the military power balance at all. In fact demonstrating the unalterability of the power balance "provides in the long run the best hope of controlling proliferation and its consequences." Exaggeration, in contrast, leads to the notion that nuclear weapons are "the great equalizer" in international conflict and heightens the desire to acquire them. The "degree to which a nuclear force is strategically useful and credible is determined by its size and sophistication and by the vulnerability of the society it is designed to protect." Since low-yield warheads require sophisticated, accurate delivery systems, and since inaccurate delivery can be effective only with massive warheads, "no nation is going to be in a position to develop a strategic capability that is both sophisticated and cheap." Regional power balances may be disturbed seriously by proliferation, but the United States and Soviet Union, if they are willing to pay the costs involved, will remain able to deter any third power. That the real risks of proliferation accrue to the underdeveloped world is obvious. Yet some third powers have been led by public discussion of the subject to believe that the superpowers stand to gain the most by the curtailment of nuclear-weapons spread. The problems involved in minimizing the risks of nuclear spread become that much harder--in fact the opportunities for "second-stage" control over proliferation will be lost--if failure is automatically assumed with any increase in the membership of the nuclear club. Minimizing the risks of proliferation involves limiting weapons programs and reducing the possibilities that the weapons will actually be employed. The next step is deployment of systems that can reduce the threat to major powers from smaller nuclear nations, e.g., the antiballistic missile system. Methods of identifying the debris from nuclear detonations and ascribing responsibility should be evolved. All of these measures involve a somewhat unappealing concept, that of superpower domination of world affairs. Yet the existing and ever-increasing strategic gap between the superpowers and the rest of the world is a potentially stabilizing factor and as such must not be ignored. If America is expected to defend its nonnuclear allies, then "it does not seem unreasonable for the United States to possess protective measures of a type not universally available in order to hold the potential losses to a minimum." In sum, proliferation will not be able to upset the central balance, and even disturbances of regional balances can be contained by effectively exploiting the stability of the central balance of power.

420
Schulz, Joachim. NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. German foreign policy, v. 5, no. 3, 1966: 187-197.
P&GP RR

Humanity stands at the crossroads between "lasting peaceful coexistence" and "thermonuclear hell." Only general and complete disarmament and its collateral measures can safeguard peace; there is no other way. The ever-growing number of potential nuclear powers not only increases the danger of war but also complicates the realization of general and complete disarmament. States such as West Germany will never voluntarily renounce nuclear weapons once they have acquired them. The West German government is doing all it can to get nuclear weapons for its avowed purpose of conquering the German Democratic Republic and territories belonging to Poland, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia. Under current international conditions Bonn considers the proposed NATO multilateral nuclear force [MLF] the best way to obtain these weapons. Thus MLF would be "an instrument for the proliferation of nuclear weapons." Signing a nonproliferation treaty is futile if states can acquire possession or control of nuclear weapons through military alliances or other international organizations. The nuclear test ban acts as a partial restriction on proliferation that must be followed by a more comprehensive nonproliferation agreement. Legal justification for such a treaty already exists in the special international obligations imposed on East and West Germany by the Potsdam Agreement, which prevents any kind of German remilitarization. "Consequently, West Germany striving for nuclear weapons is a priori not entitled to own or control them." A treaty on nonproliferation must be treated as a limited measure to safeguard security and not as a final solution to all international problems. Therefore the treaty must deal with the proliferation problem only and must not insist on compliance with other provisions, no matter how important politically. The treaty must apply not only to individual states but also to groups of states. The essential difference between the Soviet and U.S. draft treaties lies on this point.

421
Schumann, Kurt. [BONN'S ATOMIC COOPERATION WITH TEL AVIV, PRETORIA, AND MADRID] Atomare Zusammenarbeit Bonns mit Tel Aviv, Pretoria und Madrid. Einheit, v. 21, July 1966: 926-932.
HX6.E4, v. 21

Contends that the German Federal Republic has expanded its nuclear research activities to Israel, South Africa, and Spain, not only to support the nuclear aspirations of those countries, but also to promote its own chances of producing nuclear arms. Within the Western European Union no effective control system exists that would prevent Bonn from using its nuclear industry "for nonpeaceful purposes." The present annual volume of plutonium produced in the German Federal Republic would suffice for making 70 atomic bombs. By its nuclear cooperation with other countries Bonn hopes to exert pressure on the United States to agree more fully to West German demands for sharing in NATO nuclear arms and nuclear decisionmaking. The United States seems to be quite ready "to smooth the West German imperialists' road to nuclear armaments."

422
THREE YEARS AFTER TEST BAN--NUCLEAR RACE SPEEDS UP. U.S. news & world report, v. 61, July 18, 1966: 50-52. JK1.U65, v. 61

Despite the 1963 partial nuclear test ban treaty the atomic arms race has never been more intense than it is today. Two new members have been admitted to the nuclear club, and the original members--the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain--are steadily adding to their arsenals. France, which refused to sign the test ban treaty, has planned a series of atmospheric explosions that should culminate in full tests of thermonuclear weapons. Communist China, likewise a nonsignatory, may be within a year of a full-fledged hydrogen bomb. The British arsenal is being upgraded, with particular attention to Polaris submarines. Moscow's program includes warheads of up to 100 megatons. Although the Soviets have conducted fewer underground tests than the United States, they garnered enough information from their massive atmospheric test series between 1961 and 1963 to permit tremendous advances. The United States, on the other hand, has made extensive use of underground testing and "has improved its nuclear position substantially beyond what was conceivable three years ago." This progress--leading to versatile bombs and missiles, lighter, more efficient warheads, and even the so-called "neutron" bomb--shows no sign of slackening. Despite the fact that antimissile systems and blast effects on missile-launching bases and communications centers cannot be readily tested underground, new underground test techniques can simulate altitudes of up to 500,000 feet. At least 10 nations could go nuclear at this point. India appears to be the best bet for the next entry to the nuclear club, particularly as the Chinese Communist threat becomes increasingly real. Japan, also under Red China's guns, "could embark on a testing program within 12 months." Canada and Germany could easily develop nuclear weapons were it not for political restraints. Obviously it will take far more than a nonproliferation treaty to slow the arms race.

423
Ungerer, Werner. [THE NUCLEAR DILEMMA AND THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC] Das nukleare Dilemma und die Bundesrepublik. Aussenpolitik, v. 17, Oct. 1966: 599-606. D839.A885, v. 17

"Can the German Federal Republic produce atomic bombs?" is a question often asked in Germany and abroad. The slogan "a German finger on the nuclear trigger" is becoming a solid component of the propaganda vocabulary of certain states. Dr. Werner Ungerer inquires into the question, to what extent has the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes attenuated the danger of producing nuclear weapons, and what has been done to insure that nuclear material in the German Federal Republic not be used for production of nuclear weapons? (Translation of supplied abstract)

424
Willrich, Mason. THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONTAINMENT. Virginia quarterly, v. 42, autumn 1966: 497-511. AP2.V76, v. 42

Since the achievement of the nuclear test ban treaty in 1963 the United States has given top priority to efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. A nonproliferation agreement essentially consists of two prohibitions, one against transfer of nuclear weapons to states not already possessing them and the other against manufacture or acquisition of such weapons by nonnuclear states. The nuclear powers already are against transfer, with the major exception of nuclear-sharing in NATO, and the present

loosening of the NATO alliance may give the United States the opportunity it needs to shift away from this problem toward a nonproliferation agreement. As general sentiment in Europe favors liquidation of the cold war, and as such a détente is essential to settlement of the German problem, most nations in Europe are likely to favor this policy. On the issue of weapons acquisition by nonnuclear states, however, many nations have mixed feelings. Although they recognize that a lessening of East-West tensions is definitely in their interest, they feel that permanently inferior status and military insecurity are somehow connected with lack of nuclear weapons. Civil nuclear power industries in many nonnuclear countries are creating problems of regulation and control that also affect the feasibility of a nonproliferation policy. Unless a system of accountability for nuclear materials is devised in the near future, other efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons will become meaningless. The most promising means of establishing safeguards is through the International Atomic Energy Agency. The technological forces at work give mankind perhaps a year or two, but not decades, to solve the problem of proliferation. The United States must act now.

425
Young, Oran R. CHINESE VIEWS ON THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. China quarterly, no. 26, Apr./June 1966: 136-170.
DS701.C472, 1966

The Chinese said very little about proliferation before the beginning of the sixties. When they did announce a position, however, it was a strongly stated and doctrinally buttressed stand, definitely in favor of the spread of nuclear capabilities to other Communist states and possibly to non-Communist states as well. The Chinese maintained this position until their 1964 nuclear detonation. Communist countries, they declared, need nuclear weapons to strengthen the overall Socialist deterrent, both by increasing in the eyes of the United States the probability of retaliation to aggression and by "reducing the opportunities for peripheral initiatives which could be kept below the level required to catalyse direct Soviet retaliation." Possession of even a small nuclear capability would be a good counter to "imperialist blackmail." The Chinese have also argued that, regardless of the recipient involved, the spread of nuclear weapons will definitely increase the prospects for the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons on a worldwide basis. Chinese support of proliferation was possibly a sincere view of the most desirable policy alternative; or more likely it served to justify their nuclear program. In any event, between the first Chinese detonation in October 1964 and the second in May 1965, the Chinese pronouncedly de-emphasized the whole question of proliferation. At the same time they stepped up their campaign for the complete prohibition and destruction of all nuclear weapons and repeatedly emphasized the defensive purpose of their weapons. Since the middle of 1965 the Chinese have shown signs of resuming their support for proliferation, possibly to woo certain states into their political orbit, to stir up nationalism, or to trade nuclear assistance for worthwhile technological data and resources. A major disadvantage of the Chinese rationale is that it increases the danger of American attack on the mainland in general or at least on the nuclear installations. While the Chinese are somewhat ambivalent at present on their old policy that proliferation basically is a good thing, they seem willing to use the issue for political gains without fear of losing control of it.

4. Other (accidental war, command and control of weapons, etc.)

426
COMMAND CONTROL: A NEW GENERATION OF SYSTEMS. Armed Forces management, v. 12, July 1966: 43-160.
UB153.A65, v. 12

Contents. --Effectiveness, responsiveness of national command system vital to U.S. security. --DCA's Starbird: command systems meeting "survivable, uninterruptable" goals, by Alfred D. Starbird. --Joint command & control requirements group insures world-wide C&C. --For the Seventh Army, TOS is up: Army field units will be automated. --For the sea-going services, the naval and marine tactical data systems are "the best since radar." --Across the spectrum, Air Force carries the weight in command & control. --ESD's O'Neill: airborne platforms herald new flexibility in military information systems, by John W. O'Neill. --How not to build C&C systems is still an unanswered question in defense. --Fourth annual military electronic systems catalog, compiled by Joe H. Wagner. --Military commanders must learn that C&C systems can aid art of command, by Robert P. Hagen. --Europe's NADGE: "how we'll do it" is as interesting as "what will be done."

A composite review of developments in electronics which bear on military communications. Improvements in Air Force, Army, and Navy command facilities are mentioned. The annual survey catalog gives a complete listing of military electronic hardware. Interviews with Lt. Gen. Alfred D. Starbird, Chief of the Defense Communications Agency, and Maj. Gen. John W. O'Neill, Commander of the Air Force System Command's Electronic Systems Division, reveal recent progress in the design and implementation of the new systems. Some of the formidable obstacles involved in applying new technology to practical situations are demonstrated in the articles on (1) NATO's difficulties in deciding on the new NATO Air Defense Ground Environment system, and (2) the questions that remain unanswered in building a command and control system.

427
EXPOSING NEW U.S. FRAUD OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS, by Observer. Peking review, v. 9, June 24, 1966: 27-28.
DS701.P42, v. 9

China has repeatedly proposed an agreement with the United States on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons, but the United States has continually refused or attempted to link acceptance of the Chinese proposal to the "tripartite" nuclear test ban treaty. This treaty, a "criminal concoction by the two nuclear overlords--the United States and the Soviet Union--to consolidate their nuclear monopoly," restricts China's development of nuclear weapons. China has long seen through what the United States means by disarmament--general arms expansion and war preparations. How can one sit at a conference table and discuss disarmament while the United States is stepping up its aggression against Vietnam and threatening to spread the war to the whole of Indo-China and China? Chinese representatives definitely will not attend any world disarmament conference within or outside the United Nations. Besides signing the treacherous tripartite treaty the Soviet Union has intensified its collusion with the United States on the question of nuclear proliferation. The tripartite treaty, the proposed

world disarmament conference, the prevention of nuclear proliferation, and the linking of China's no-first-use proposal to the tripartite treaty are all aimed at restricting and depriving China and all other peace-loving nations of their legitimate right to develop armed forces for self-defense. The Chinese Government will advocate the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons when the U.S. nuclear threat is countered.

428
Grankin, V. [PROTECTION OF COMMUNICATIONS FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS] Zashchita sviazi ot iadernogo oruzhiia. Voennyi vestnik, v. 46, Aug. 1966: 106-108. U4.V87, v. 46

Points out the measures to be taken by operational personnel in order to protect communications facilities from various aspects of nuclear explosions: shock waves, radioactive irradiation and contamination, electromagnetic irradiation, and heightened ionization.

429
Holsti, K. J. RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS: A TAXONOMY OF BEHAVIOR AND SOME FIGURES ON PROCEDURES. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 10, Sept. 1966: 272-296, tables. JX1901.J6, v. 10

Classifies types of behavior that lead to the resolution of international conflicts. Available modes of action include avoidance, violent conquest, forced submission, compromise, award, and "passive settlement." Holsti presents tables and figures "based on an analysis of most of the international conflicts which have occurred and ended since 1919 and which involved the threat or use of force." He concludes that since 1945 "pacific nonsettlement" has been on the increase, and he recommends that international organizations can play a useful role in settling conflicts in quarrels "less awesome" than those involving the great powers.

430
Hubbell, John G. THE CASE OF THE MISSING H-BOMB. Reader's digest, v. 89, Sept. 1966: 239-276. AP2.R255, v. 89

Unwinds the mystery of the American hydrogen bomb that was lost in the crash of a SAC bomber over Palomares, Spain. In his account of the almost 3-month search that followed the accident, the author describes the nature of the arming, fusing, and firing procedures of such bombs, emphasizing that there was never any danger of a nuclear explosion taking place. Although radiation contamination of the residents and land of Palomares was negligible extreme caution was taken in decontaminating the area.

431
Johnson, Lyndon B., Pres. U.S. THE SEARCH FOR AGREEMENTS IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 55, Sept. 19, 1966: 410-413. JX232.A33, v. 55
Speech delivered at "the National Reactor Testing Center for the Atomic Energy Commission at Arco, Idaho, on Aug. 26," 1966.

Discusses official and unofficial agreements involving the United States and the Soviet Union and serving the cause of peace. The limited test ban treaty, the Antarctic Treaty, the U.N. resolution prohibiting orbital weapons, and the Soviet-American cutback in fissile material production are mentioned. In addition, President Johnson touches upon possible future agreements, including a formal international treaty limiting space to peaceful uses and a nonproliferation treaty.

432
Vlay, George J. COMMUNICATION SATELLITE SYSTEMS: SECOND GENERATION COMING UP. Signal, v. 21, Sept. 1966: 8-10. UG1.M65, v. 21

Communication has always been a problem in any war; however within the next decade, the new satellite communications facilities will put an end to the hiatus. One soldier carrying a portable radio will be able to communicate with superiors anywhere in the world. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration developed the Syncom II and III synchronous satellite communication systems for research and testing. These satellites were transferred to the Defense Communications Agency which uses them to provide service over the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Satellite technology is opening new frontiers, with increased channel capacity, increased transmitter output, high antenna gain, and noise reduction leading the way. Technological advances are but minor examples of American activity in the field. The proceedings of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Communications Satellite Systems Conference held in May 1966 should be used to compile the political, technical, socioeconomic, and legal aspects of communications satellites and their operating systems. The major problem faced by the military in this area will be effective use of "transportable and mobile terminals with synchronous and near-synchronous satellites." Communications will be the key to present and future concepts of command and control, by giving a commander instantaneous direction over an operation. The threshhold has been reached, although "the operational doctrine associated with this type of communication system will require the integration of planned procedures with advanced system concepts." Configurations for 1968-70 have been developed, and research is underway for future requirements. System managers must consider satellite communication as integral to operational concepts. Close involvement between the user and designer-engineer will lead toward the development of a "sophisticated communication system in support of the United States Armed Forces and the defense of this nation."

C. REGIONAL

1. Tension areas

433
Alexandros, L. [INDO-EGYPTIAN COOPERATION] Indisch-ägyptische Zusammenarbeit. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Aug./Sept. 1966: 484-485. U3.W38, v. 10

In this periodical series our regular correspondent contributes up-to-date information from the permanently troubled Middle East. In the present article L. Alexandros offers an insight into India's arms policies, with special reference to the Mogul tank and to Indo-Egyptian cooperative aircraft manufacture. The tactical and political arguments, mingled with the author's perspicacity, should produce an exceptionally good picture of the situation in the Middle East and Southern Asia. (Abstract supplied)

434
Alexandros, L. [SITUATION REPORT FROM THE TENSION AREA OF THE NEAR EAST: TOYING WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS] Situationsbericht aus dem Spannungsfeld "Nahost;" Liebäugeln mit atomaren Waffen. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, July 10, 1966: 414-416. U3.W38, v. 10

Reports on the Arab-Israeli arms race, arms suppliers and arms supplied to both sides, and possible changes in the Israeli strategic situation depending on the outcome of the war in Yemen and on Egypt's strategic planning. The author considers a serious conflagration along Israeli-Arab borders to be almost a certainty within the next 3 years and contends that any possible decision by Israel to acquire nuclear weapons would, on the whole, jeopardize the nation's security. "According to experts the United States would long ago have intervened by economic pressure together with security guarantees were it not for its preoccupation with the Vietnamese War." A discontinuation by Great Britain in 1968 of its commitments to defend the Aden protectorate and other Crown colonies (after these territories are ceded to the "South Arabian Federation") would strongly enhance the United Arab Republic's strategic position and impair Israel's.

435
[THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT] Le conflit israélo-arabe. Revue française de science politique, v. 16, Aug. 1966: 753-798. JAll.R6, v. 16

Contents: Preliminary remarks.--Position of an Israeli, by André-Chouraqui.--Position of an Arab, by Ali El Samman.--The Arab-Israel conflict as seen from the Maghreb, by Mohammed Bahri.--The Arabs and Israel, by Maxime Rodinson.

Asserts that the principal problems of the Israeli-Arab conflict are three, which can be identified as follows: the Arab refugees in the camps of Gaza and Jordan; the status of the Arab minority in Israel; and the use of the waters of Jordan. All three problems are technical and soluble, but many historical, political, ideological, and psychological differences make their resolution problematic. After analyzing the situation in all its aspects, the authors concluded that Israel is ready to accept peace if it is based on the legality and independence of Israel and the Arab States as sovereign nations and if they are internationally guaranteed against any outside aggression. If the Arabs would overcome their feeling of humiliation and recognize the Israeli state, a solution similar to that applied in Ireland might restore the close cooperation between Jews and Arabs that existed in the Arab countries for centuries.

436
Armbrüster, Alex. [CREDIT FOR THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC?] Kredite für die DDR? Neue Politik, v. 11, Aug. 27, 1966: 5-6. H5.N377, v. 11

Suggests that a more liberal West German credit policy with regard to East Germany would contribute to the "undoctrinization" of the German question; it thus would represent a step toward German reunification.

437
Barzel, Rainer. THE GERMAN QUESTION REMAINS PARAMOUNT. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 4, fall 1966: 366-376. D839.A85, v. 4

The dynamics of a divided Germany and a divided Europe is no foundation on which a durable peace can be built, says the majority leader in the German Bundestag. "This situation is too inhuman, too explosive, too expensive and too unreasonable. This situation must change." He urges the United States, France, Great Britain and the Federal Republic to form a working group to develop common principles for dealing with the situation and has some specific suggestions. (Abstract supplied)

438
Burns, James M., and Anthony Eden. TOWARD PEACE IN ASIA. A WAY OUT IN VIETNAM, by James MacGregor Burns; TOWARD PEACE IN INDOCHINA: TWELVE STEPS TO A LONG-RANGE SETTLEMENT, by Anthony Eden. Harper's magazine, v. 233, Aug. 1966: 34-43. AP2.H3, v. 233

Burns: A "core theory" is proposed for bringing peace to Vietnam. Allied forces would continue operations until they had secured enough ground to establish a potentially viable national entity. Once this "core" were established bombing of North Vietnam and ground operations in the South, other than those necessary to maintain the area, could stop. The Vietcong could cease actual combat without negotiations, treaties, or loss of face. The United States would step up aid to the South Vietnam core, but maintain its armed forces in the area in case de-escalation failed. International guarantees similar to those the United States gives to Korea and Germany would maintain the new nation. Eden: Twelve points could lead toward peace in Indochina. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 should serve as a framework for the new settlement, and the cochairmen and membership of the Geneva Conference and the Supervisory Commission should remain the same. The agreement should contain guarantees, endorsed by all the powers represented at the Geneva Conference, of the territories and neutrality of Laos and Cambodia, and should offer the same opportunity to North and South Vietnam. The guarantees offered to Indochina should be on the "Locarno model," giving the guarantors the right to act without waiting for unanimity should the terms of the agreement be violated. The guaranteed nations should be prohibited from purchasing arms from any guarantor power. A sufficient period of time, 10 to 15 years, should elapse after the ceasefire before North and South Vietnam are called upon to decide their mutual relationship. All nations should support the scheme for the use of the waters of the Mekong River that the United Nations is now preparing. The Geneva Prisoners of War Convention should be strictly enforced. Finally, "military plans and movements should be dovetailed into the political program laid down by the Conference, whose first duty should be to give instructions for determining a cease-fire."

439
Chalfont, Arthur Gwynne Jones, baron. VALUE OF OBSERVATION POSTS IN NATO AND WARSAW PACT AREAS. European review, v. 16, autumn 1966: 31-33. AP4.E78, v. 16

It cannot be said that progress toward arms control and disarmament measures requires in every instance the solution of political difficulties. But so far as Europe is concerned--and the European case may be unique--such measures are likely to be achieved only with the amelioration of political problems. Nonetheless some limited agreements could prove useful even under present circumstances. Cases in point are

observation posts in the NATO and Warsaw Pact areas and a freeze on numbers of missiles and bombers. Moves along these lines would build confidence between East and West and also further the reduction of tension in Europe. Other measures for which the Geneva Disarmament Conference is working would have a similar impact. A treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and an agreement to ban underground nuclear tests could not fail to engender the growth of common interest and trust that are essential to wider-reaching steps. Sooner or later Germany must be reunified. In the process of European reconciliation arms control measures might play an important part in lowering the political and military barriers now dividing the Continent.

440
Eissner, Albin. [POLAND PUSHES FARTHER TO THE WEST] Polen drängt weiter nach Westen. Aussenpolitik, v. 17, July 1966: 438-444.
D839.A885, v. 17

Argues that Poland strives to expand its territory as far westward as possible beyond the Oder-Neisse Line and that at a future peace conference it may formally put forward its maximal territorial claims against Germany. These, the author explains, would by no means be identical to Poland's "so called historical claims."

441
Eppler, Erhard. [LIFE WITHOUT A FUTURE IS MISERABLE: PLAIDOYER FOR A GERMAN POLICY DEVOID OF GRUMBLING AND RESENTMENT] Ohne Zukunft lebt sich's schlecht. Plädoyer für eine Deutschlandpolitik ohne Nörgelei und Ressentiments. Die Zeit, v. 21, Oct. 25, 1966: 3.
AP30.Z39, v. 21

West Germany's foreign policy--like East Germany's--is still conditioned by a cold war situation that existed some 10 years ago. Since then most of the world has increasingly oriented itself toward a post-cold war era that includes Soviet-American cooperation. Bonn's policy of resentment and chronic preoccupation with "the conservation of the unconservable" amounts to a negation of the future of Germany's younger generation and helps to alienate the nation in a world where Wilhelm II and Hitler are not altogether forgotten. Any serious effort toward the reunification of Europe should not neglect bringing "back the extreme Left and reintegrating it with European nations and Europe itself." In the post-cold war era greater importance will accrue to nations than to ideologies. Because some of the German people live behind "the already rusting Iron Curtain," the Federal Republic of Germany should start building economic, cultural, and political bridges with East Europe in order to attract the latter to a "life in freedom." Germany should expect to play a lesser military role in 1970 or 1975 than it does today. For this reason it should unhesitatingly renounce any acquisition or sharing of nuclear weapons. Such weaponry would not only add nothing to the German Federal Republic's political power but also would undoubtedly hinder German reunification.

442
Erven, L. TURMOIL IN THE NEAR EAST. Review of international affairs, v. 17, Oct. 5, 1966: 8-10.
D839.R4, v. 17

The cancellation of the Arab Summit Conference in Algeria in September draws attention to the disagreements--especially between the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia--that interfere with inter-Arab relations and hinder the settling of political issues in the near East. Dramatic evidence of this can be seen in the continuing strife in Yemen and the activity of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia aimed at creating an Arab Muslim bloc in the face of the evolution of a new Arab nationalism that is founded on social reform and liberation from the medieval traditions of a dynastic, Muslim theocracy. Faisal's plan is an effort to realize a political grouping of Muslim states on the basis of religion much like the Muslim Alliance that came out of Pakistan two decades ago and that emphasized religion while playing down its obvious political motives. Within the framework of Arab problems this Islamic initiative reflects the fundamental contradiction hindering the development of political, economic, and social conditions in the Arab world. This ambivalence manifests itself in the clash between the backward semifeudal monarchies and traditional Mohammedanism on the one hand and the movement seeking political and social emancipation of Arab society based on contemporary concepts of political and social progress on the other. This deterioration in inter-Arab relations comes at a time when the Near East has again become a target of foreign colonialism. The major powers have attempted to hold back liberation movements in the backward areas on the east coast of the Arabian peninsula. By their armament policies they play off Israel against certain of the Arab states, thus exacerbating the tensions and lack of confidence in relations between the Arabs and Israelis and within and among the Arab states.

443
Florin, Peter. [EUROPEAN SECURITY PROBLEMS] Probleme der europäischen Sicherheit. Einheit, v. 21, July 1966: 940-948. HX6.E4, v. 21

Contends that the Bonn government's policy toward the German Democratic Republic and the Socialist bloc constitutes a serious threat to European and world peace. "Any war adventure" in Europe would, the author argues, certainly lead to world nuclear war. The German Federal Republic's military armaments, its nuclear aspirations, and its revanchist territorial claims give the lie to Bonn's recent propaganda effort in the world with regard to its peaceful policy. Florin states further that the German reunification problem is preeminently a German problem to be solved solely by Germans. "Big powers can neither bring about nor prevent the reunification of both German states. Sooner or later the reunification will come." This will be the result of a decision by the political forces of both German states--forces independent of the monopolistic capitalism that now rules West Germany.

444
Fokeev, G. V. [SOUTHWEST AFRICA IN POSTWAR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS] Iugozapadnaia afrika v poslevoennykh mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniiakh. Voprosy istorii, v. 41, July 1966: 59-71.
D1.V6, v. 41

The article examines the question of delivering Southwest Africa from the rule of the South African racialists, who have factually annexed it. The author graphically shows how in the course of the twenty postwar years this problem has been repeatedly raised in

the United Nations without, however, finding its positive solution. This should be attributed in the main to the constant counteraction on the part of the leading imperialist powers, notably the United States and Britain, to the adoption of any effective sanctions against the racialists. Moreover, South Africa's apartheid policy was even supported and encouraged by the imperialists. A sharp struggle flared up in the U.N. between these imperialist powers and the socialist countries, as well as a number of newly-liberated states, who resolutely demanded the immediate expulsion of South African racialists from Southwest Africa and the inclusion of this territory in the U.N. trusteeship system representing, according to the U.N. Charter, the first step towards independence. Beginning with the early sixties, when a large group of newly-liberated African states appeared in the U.N., the alignment of forces in this international organization changed in favour of the anti-colonialist group of countries. In present-day conditions the imperialist states are compelled to camouflage their support of South African racialists. The liberation of Southwest Africa is an urgent problem whose solution depends on the Southwest African people's persevering effort to free themselves from the rule of South African racialists, on the firm determination of all freedom-loving nations to wipe out the remaining colonial regimes in Africa and every other part of the world. (Abstract supplied)

445
GERMANY: TODAY AND TOMORROW. Survey, no. 61, Oct. 1966: 4-195. DK1.S549, 1966

Partial contents. --The German scene, by Karl Robson. --German and European renunciation, by Pierre Hassner. --Bonn's Ostpolitik, by Ekkehart Krippendorf. --The foreign policy of the DDR, by Kurt Tudyka. --The Federal Republic and Eastern Europe, by Hansjakob Stehle. --In search of a new policy, by Peter Bender. --The Hallstein Doctrine, by Hans Speier. --The German problem and American policy, by William Griffith. --Soviet Union and DDR, by Ilse Spittmann.

Focuses on "the internal affairs and the foreign policies of the Bundesrepublik and the DDR, with the emphasis on the division of Germany and the political and social problems that have resulted from this division." The editors of Survey feel that the German problem is no closer to resolution than in 1962, although "the centre of world tension has moved elsewhere."

446
Heinze, Christian. [CYPRUS--A TASK FOR ATHENS AND ANKARA] Zypern--eine Aufgabe für Athen und Ankara. Aussenpolitik, v. 17, Oct. 1966: 624-635. D839.A885, v. 17

Contends that the best chances for finding a viable solution to the Cyprus conflict lie in a resumption of bilateral talks between Athens and Ankara. The negotiations should be based on the 1959 and 1960 agreements between Greece and Turkey that acknowledge the right to co-determination of the Greek majority and the Turkish minority in ruling the island. Heinze thinks that in order to consolidate rather than split the bi-ethnic nation this right should be expressed through public referendum. This would necessarily "prove the moral power of the wide masses of the Greek population" in checking "blood-thirsty" extremists and fanatics and would thus pave the way to peace. According to the author the prolonged United Nations operation in Cyprus has resulted in complete deadlock.

447
Hinckel, Erika. [THE TWO GERMAN STATES AND THE PERSPECTIVE OF GERMANY'S NATIONAL LITERATURE] Zwei deutsche Staaten und die Perspektive der deutschen Nationalliteratur. Einheit, v. 21, July 1966: 915-925. HX6.E4, v. 21

Two mutually opposed German cultures, the working class and the bourgeois, will continue to exist until all Germany becomes a Socialist nation. Significant for the present German condition is the unprecedented fact that the bearers of those two cultures each rule their own separate German state. This is so even though German working class culture has spread beyond the German Democratic Republic to the progressive segments of the bourgeois West German state. In fact no contemporary German culture prevails today outside that of the bourgeoisie and the working class, despite claims that a third group representing a culture of "all-German humanism" will serve as a link between East and West. This claim totally ignores the reality of the existence of two German states. The true national responsibility of progressive writers in both these states is to fight West German imperialism according to their different environmental conditions. Such a fight, for peace, democracy, and humanism, constitutes an important contribution to development of the German national, and at the same time truly humanist, culture.

448
Hoppe, Günther, and Vitali Stoljarow. [WHY "EITHER--OR"?] Warum "Entweder--oder"? Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, v. 14, no. 9, 1966: 1113-1128. B3.D4, v. 14

A Marxist philosophical analysis of the social-political system in West Germany and a doctrinal explanation of "the broadly based, anti-imperialist and democratic unity front" that should be established in the German Federal Republic to overthrow monopolistic capitalism there. The authors insist that the latter cannot be immediately replaced by socialism, because the only immediate alternative to monopoly capitalism is "an anti-imperialist democratic economic system." This type of system as "a necessary stage in the struggle for a transition from capitalism to socialism" will by no means be an antithesis to socialism, but a "creative application of Marxism-Leninism to the complicated conditions in West Germany." The Socialist Unity Party's program with regard to the social system in West Germany is based on exactly such concepts.

449
INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN. International studies, v. 8, July/Oct. 1966: 1-212. JX18.I55, v. 8

Contents. --The Tashkent Declaration: retrospect and prospect, by M. S. Rajan. --India's policy towards Pakistan, by Sisir Gupta. --India and Pakistan as factors in each other's foreign policies, by Jayanta Kumar Ray. --Foreign military aid and the defence strength and policies of India and Pakistan: a comparative study, by D. Som Dutt. --America's military alliance with Pakistan: the evolution and course of an uneasy partnership, by M. S. Venkataramani and

Harish Chandra Arya. --China and Indo-Pakistani relations, by Vidya Prakash Dutt. --The Commonwealth and Indo-Pakistani relations, by S. C. Gangal. --The Soviet Union and Indo-Pakistani relations, by Harish Kapur. --India, Pakistan, and West Asia, by M. S. Agwani. --India, Pakistan, and South-East Asia, by Vishal Singh. --Bibliography: Indo-Pakistani relations, 1947-1965, by R. K. Barman, J. C. Tandon, and Dalip Singh.

A special double issue on many aspects of relations between India and Pakistan, published by the quarterly journal of the Indian School of International Studies in New Delhi.

450
Ischreyt, Heinz. [GERMANY IN THE SOVIET WRITINGS OF 1965 AND 1966--LETTERS AND HUMANITIES] Deutschland in Sowjetschriften der Jahre 1965 und 1966--Literatur und Literaturwissenschaft. Deutsche Studien, v. 4, Sept. 1966: 372-381.
P&GP RR

Bibliographical footnotes.

Tells of the current Soviet assessment of trends and schools in German letters and philosophy, both past and present. Ischreyt discusses recent Soviet criticism of the German ideal of national unity, as presented in the German classics and by some contemporary West German writers. He quotes a Soviet historian of philosophy as saying that the neo-Hegelian concept of a nation as a community surmounting classes expresses itself in the West German propaganda for the liquidation and the annexation of the German Democratic Republic. Ischreyt points out further that current Soviet literature also condemns neo-Kantianism as a bourgeois element within social democracy.

451
Kapil, Ravi L. ON THE CONFLICT POTENTIAL OF INHERITED BOUNDARIES OF AFRICA. World politics, v. 18, July 1966: 656-673.
D839.W57, v. 18

Because their present locations do not represent the territorial culmination of locally generated political processes, substantial conflict would seem to inhere in the boundaries of African states. These boundaries antedate the establishment of colonial administration; thus problems of superimposition and disruption do not exist with respect to the modern or nontraditional aspects of environment. If boundaries do create tensions in the postindependence period, strife is most likely to be "generated by demands originating in the traditional sectors of African societies to the extent that such traditional interests find an outlet in the politics of the new states." The fact of the matter is that postindependence disputes have occurred over only eight international boundaries. The eight disputes were precipitated by states in which political power is exercised by a leadership representing either an indigenous tradition that spans the colonial period or a culturally homogeneous political community. Each of these situations is atypical to Africa, where decision-making authority is usually exercised by nontraditional leadership over culturally plural political communities. Since a major problem confronting this leadership has been to create a territory-wide consensus, the existing territorial limits of authority have become essential reference points in defining a nontraditional concept of political legitimacy. Political modernization requires, therefore, affirmation of even those boundaries that have been superimposed on traditional systems of interaction. Indeed the evolving African position on boundaries may in time rest on a version of the doctrine of uti possidetis, used in Latin America to establish absolutely that boundaries must coincide with the frontiers of the Spanish colonial provinces to which states were successors. To date, certainly, the attempts of Morocco and Somalia to base territorial titles on precolonial history or ethnic self-determination have received no support from their continental neighbors.

452
Le Marec, P. [THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND REUNIFICATION] La République Démocratique Allemande et la réunification. Revue de défense nationale, v. 22, Oct. 1966: 1599-1611.
D410.R45, v. 22

A study of the historical, geographical, political, economic, and military aspects of the German reunification problem reveals two paradoxes: First, that the two German Governments, while officially ignoring and occasionally offending each other, nevertheless have established very important commercial and cultural relations; second, that while the two countries possess armies with completely different structures and ideologies, the East German is the one based on the Prussian concept. In politics, the East demands from the Bonn Government recognition as a sovereign state and the renunciation of nuclear weapons as a concession preliminary to unification. The West wants the expulsion of Ulbricht from political life. But, first of all the four great powers who won the war in 1945 must resolve their own problems concerning Berlin and European security. With Bonn not willing to make the preliminary concessions and Russia not wanting to lose a quarter of the productive capacity of her European satellites, no reunification of Germany can be expected in the present decade.

453
Mende, Erich. GERMAN REUNIFICATION AND EUROPEAN SECURITY. Central Europe journal, v. 14, Nov. 1966: 331-335. DB200.7.S74, v. 14

Dr. Erich Mende, Germany's vice-chancellor, and national chairman of the Free Democratic Party, has reviewed the political factors concerned with German reunification and Europe's security. He notes that although the victorious power acknowledged their responsibility for the restoration of German unity when they signed the Potsdam Agreement--which stipulated the temporary nature of Germany's division and Soviet Russia's administration of German territory, underscoring the oneness of Germany's legal entity--there has been no progress toward actual unity for Germany in the 21 years since the war's end. Germany is still divided and a wide segment of the German people is still being denied its basic rights and freedoms as well as self-determination. Not only, observes Dr. Mende, have the Soviets rebuffed overtures toward talking about the question of German unity but have permitted acts of deliberate chicanery such as helicopter flights in off-limits areas above Berlin, prevention of free movement in and out of that city and erection of barriers to travel through the Soviet Zone. Dr. Mende not only feels that hope is still warranted with respect to ultimate unification but proposes intensified internal German trade, promotion of factual information about the Soviet Zone

and the positive achievements of the Soviet Zone working population. He urges Germany to demand of its allies that they abide by their commitment to achieve reunification and that when it does draw near, that they take care to see it effected, not within a Bismarckian nationalist concept but along lines suited to present-day needs. (Abstract supplied)

454
Schack, Alard von. [GERMANY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA] Deutschland und die Tschechoslowakei. Aussenpolitik, v. 17, Oct. 1966: 607-613.
D639.A885, v. 17

Suggests revision of Bonn's policy towards Czechoslovakia, especially with regard to territorial and national-minority problems (Sudeten Germans). Schack thinks that even if Bonn considers the Munich agreement still valid and is supported in this opinion by many experts (e.g., in Great Britain), for overwhelming political reasons "it should not be afraid to renounce that agreement completely." The climate thus created would enhance the good relations between the German Federal Republic and Czechoslovakia and might well spell "the beginning of Europe's recoalescence."

455
Schröder, Gerhard. "REDUCE EUROPE'S POLITICAL TENSION ALONG WITH ITS ATOMIC ARMAMENT." Presse und Informationsamt Bulletin, v. 14, Oct. 11, 1966: 3-4. P&GP RR

An interview with Foreign Minister Schröder, who discusses the reasons for West Germany's recent proposal that the nuclear powers agree not to pass nuclear weapons into the national control of other countries. West Germany's attitude toward the Fanfani plan, which calls for the nonnuclear states to forgo acquiring nuclear weapons and toward the moratorium clause included in the plan are also discussed by the Foreign Minister. He feels that President Johnson's and Premier Kosygin's proposed guarantees to the countries that would adopt nonnuclear status appear not to add any special protection for West Germany. In addition Herr Schröder interprets West Germany's policy toward a step-by-step reduction of atomic weapons in Europe, and the form in which West Germany will follow up its offer to the East European Governments to exchange formal declarations on the renunciation of force. The renunciation will be extended "to German policy on both sides," but will in no way "upgrade the Soviet Zone regime."

456
Ulbricht, Walter. [THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, EUROPEAN SECURITY, AND THE EASING OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GERMAN STATES] Die Deutsche Demokratische Republik, die europäische Sicherheit und die Entspannung der Beziehungen zwischen beiden deutschen Staaten. In Volksarmee. Dokumentation: Materialien der 13. Tagung des ZK der SED. Berlin, Sept. 1966. p. 25-32. U3.V7, 1966

A speech by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party, delivered Sept. 16, 1966, at the Committee's 13th session.

Stresses that the only way to solve the German problem is "the disarmament and neutrality of Germany," and the most reasonable approach to European peace and security is the one proposed to all European states by the Political Advisory Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization--"the strongest European group of states that ever existed" and therefore the one especially qualified to seek solutions to such problems. Ulbricht sees in West German militarism, revanchism, and armament, and in American support to German imperialism the main obstacles to the solution of the German and European problems. He appeals to West Germany to normalize its relations with East Germany, drop the Hallstein doctrine, cease arming, and renounce its territorial claims. "One has to reckon--concludes Ulbricht--with the side by side existence of the two German states for a longer period of time due to the kind of evolution the situation and the power relations in Europe have undergone since the time both states were established."

457
Wolfe, James H. TOWARD STABILITY IN MULTINATIONAL STATES. World affairs, v. 129, July/Aug./Sept. 1966: 94-100.
JX1901.W7, v. 129

The failure to find compromise solutions that would permit ethnic minorities to preserve and assert their identities has often resulted throughout history in the collapse of constitutional processes, terrorism, civil war, and even genocide. That the problem is no nearer solution today is obvious in such situations as those of the French in Quebec, the Flemings and Walloons in Belgium, and the French in the Swiss canton of Bern. The multilateral efforts of the League of Nations and the United Nations to preserve minority rights after major wars have been too often ignored by nations' concern with advancement of their own interest at the expense of human rights. The history of the Sudetan German question perfectly illustrates the problem and the chaotic conditions which can follow an unjustifiable violation of human rights. After the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Empire had led to the formation of the first Czechoslovak Republic the Sudetan Germans were promised semiautonomous status by Dr. Benes. But throughout the interwar period the national minorities, including Germans, Hungarians, and Poles, achieved little in the way of self-determination and were discriminated against in most fields. The inability of the League of Nations to improve Czech-German relations in Bohemia indirectly resulted in the cession of Sudetanland to Nazi Germany. After a Czech government was re-established in 1945 the German and Hungarian minorities were forcefully expelled amidst widespread atrocities. The government today "is vigorously pursuing a policy of assimilation aimed at the total disappearance" of those 200,000 Germans remaining in Czechoslovakia. The failure of the international community to cope with the bitter ethnic crises raging among the newly emerging states of Africa and Asia is almost identical to the failure of responsible governments to find a solution to the problem of German-Czech relations between the wars.

458
Ziegler, Walter, and Günter Sarge. [THE "UNDERCOVER WAR" OF WEST GERMAN IMPERIALISM AND SOME DUTIES OF COURTS IN DEFENDING THE PEACE AND THE SOCIALIST STATE] Der "verdeckte Krieg" des westdeutschen Imperialismus und einige Aufgaben der Gerichte zum Schutze des Friedens und des sozialistischen Staates. Neue Justiz, v. 20, no. 18, 1966: 545-548. LL

Anticipates imminent and large-scale West German subversive activities in the German Democratic Republic and an intensification of provocative border incidents, and instructs on measures available to the East German judiciary for most effectively dealing with such crimes. Ziegler (Vice-President of the GDR Supreme Court) and Sarge (Chairman of that court's Collegium for Military Criminal Cases) stress that such West German activities, including psychological warfare, aim at the escalation of "the crisis situation" in Europe and through it at conquest of the German Democratic Republic. By efficiently coping with those crimes the East German courts would help their state fulfill its "international duty" of fighting West German militarism and in serving the cause of peace in Europe.

2. Disengagement, neutralization, etc.

459
LATIN PROGRESS ON A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE. War/peace report, v. 6, June/July 1966: 21.
P&GP RR

Prospects look good for a nuclear-free zone in Latin America by next year, where countries are presently making special efforts to reach consensus on the draft treaty drawn up at the third session of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America held in Mexico City, April 19-May 4, 1966. Some nations, led by Brazil and Argentina, will not sign the treaty unless Cuba and the nuclear powers agree to respect its terms; others, led by Mexico, do not want the treaty to depend on Cuba's signature. The United States favors the denuclearization plan, but excepts Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands from coverage. However it is willing to include Guantanamo Naval Base if Cuba signs the treaty. The United States also reserves the right to transport nuclear weapons through the Panama Canal. The Soviet Union has indicated its endorsement in principle, but may not support the treaty formally unless Cuba agrees to sign. France is skeptical but sympathetic and excludes French territories in the area. Britain is favorably inclined although not committed, and Communist China's feelings are not yet known. Key questions yet to be resolved are whether the treaty can take effect without Cuba's signature, and whether all countries in the area or only a part are necessary to enact the agreement. If this effort is successful, it will mark the first time a populated area of the world has been denuclearized.

460
Sell, Manfred. [THE NEUTRAL ALPS] Die neutralen Alpen. Stuttgart, Seewald, 1965. 241 p. maps.
DQ70.S4
Bibliography: p. 223-230.

Contents. --Region and neutrality. --The history of Swiss confederate neutrality. --Neutral Switzerland today and tomorrow. --The history of Austrian neutrality. --Neutral Austria today and tomorrow. --Non-allied Yugoslavia. --Neutrality in our time.

Evaluates, using the examples of Switzerland and Austria, the actual and potential role of neutrality in European peace and security. Sell points out that the neutral region in the heart of Europe, stretching from Mont Blanc to the Danube, represents an important asset for the normalization of international relations in Europe that is much underestimated by the West. Strategically the neutrality of the Alps is beneficial for both the West and the East. Sell draws a line of distinction between neutrality and neutralization. The first represents a constitutional institution freely adopted by a nation, the second a condition imposed on it by outside coercion. Since the latter, in the opinion of the author, depends solely on external conditions, its durability is always questionable. Hence the Rapacki Plan and other similar plans for neutralized zones in Europe would base European security on shaky foundations.

D. OUTER SPACE

461
Bayer, Richard. [THE NEUTRALITY OF AIRSPACE IN LIGHT OF MODERN WEAPONS] Die Neutralität im Luftraum unter Berücksichtigung moderner Waffen. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, no. 5, Sept./Oct. 1966: 376-382.
P&GP RR
Bibliographical footnotes.

Traces changes in the concept of airspace neutrality from the time preceding World War II to date. The author discusses the difference between aircraft and space vehicles in international law and the importance of this difference for the development of the concept of airspace neutrality. He considers the range of anti-aircraft weapons--the "aerodynamic height limit"--to be irrelevant to the legal determination of the upper limit of airspace, and consequently to airspace neutrality.

462
Brooks, Eugene. NATIONAL CONTROL OF NATURAL PLANETARY BODIES: PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS. Journal of air law and commerce, v. 32, summer 1966: 315-328.
LL

Legal problems involving control of the moon and other planets will become crucial as the United States and the Soviet Union edge closer to the moon. Although any nation is unlikely to claim sovereignty over an entire celestial body, real controversy exists on the character and degree of control appropriate for specific areas. Those acts legally required for a claim to national sovereignty over planets are probably best defined in decisions regarding occupation of land masses far removed from civilization, such as Greenland. A nation must have carried out activity both physically and politically in the form of exploration, settlement, and legislation purporting to deal with the territory as a whole. If uninhabited, a large land mass that is a geographic unit or a naturally distinct region may be claimed in entirety. Even a small occupation force entitles a nation to claim a large amount of territory. The presence or absence of competing activities and claims will, of course, affect the claims of one nation as against those of others. Legal norms are somewhat less definite with respect to the ownership of resources in space than they are in regard to control of planetary surfaces. Objects found on celestial bodies or minerals extracted therefrom legally belong to the finder. Both the Soviet Union and the United States consider the military and physical control of space and the seizure of planetary terrain vital to their national interests. Each should balance these seeming advantages against the potential damage of unchecked nationalism and national rivalries. Ideally all title to celestial bodies and products

from them should be vested in the United Nations or some similar body. The world community would jointly finance and decide on disposition of any proceeds of exploration and use of terrain. The chief opposition to international control may come from the Soviet Union.

463
COMMITTEE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE. UN monthly chronicle, v. 3, Aug./Sept. 1966: 31-32. JX1977.A.U564, v. 3

Summarizes discussion on an international treaty governing the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, held in Geneva, July 12-Aug. 4, by the Legal Subcommittee of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

464
Cooper, John C. WHO WILL OWN THE MOON? Spaceflight, v. 8, July 1966: 230-234. TL787.B725, v. 8
Reprinted "from 'University,' a Princeton Quarterly, 1965, Princeton University."

Examines the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and various committees calling for clarification of the question of territorial rights on celestial bodies. Cooper concludes that until a comprehensive treaty on the exploration of the celestial bodies is signed, no one can state with certainty whether or not the victor in the race to the Moon may claim territorial sovereignty over occupied areas.

465
Davis, W. A. THE UNITED STATES IN AIR AND SPACE. Vital speeches of the day, v. 33, Nov. 1, 1966: 38-42. PN6121.V52, v. 33
"Delivered at the SAE National Aeronautic and Space Engineering and Manufacturing Meeting, Los Angeles, California, October 6, 1966."

Studies conducted by the U.S. Air Force identify at least four areas in which airflight will have major importance 10 to 20 years hence: global airlift, vertical takeoff and landing [VTOL], hypersonic flight in the outer fringes of the atmosphere, and "single-stage-to-orbit launch systems, 'aerospace planes,' or reusable boosters." The development of global airlift is important because existing and potential confrontations between the military forces of democracy and those of communism are generally not near the continental United States. With long-range, large-payload airlift it is conceivable that a credible deterrent to limited warfare could be fashioned in much the same way mixed forces of strategic aircraft and missiles serve to deter all-out nuclear war. In this connection the support VTOL can give to theater logistics transport will be considerable. Beyond military considerations, technological progress both in airlift and VTOL will confer numerous civilian benefits. Maximization of the full potentialities of hypersonic flight and "single-stage-to-orbit launch systems, 'aerospace planes,' or reusable boosters" will depend on whether the Nation continues to concentrate on space exploration or shifts its sights to space utilization. The Nation should do the latter, for existing forecasts of manned and unmanned space missions are likely to err on the conservative side. Moreover America must recognize that vast potentials for constructive applications in space are open to their adversaries as well as to themselves. The key factor for future progress in all areas of flight, just as in technology generally, is the human one. "So if we are going to move into the future ahead of the competition, we will obviously need a lot of people who think competitively. . . . On this basis we can have real progress in the years ahead."

466
Dembling, Paul G., and Daniel M. Arons. SPACE LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS: THE WORK OF THE LEGAL SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE. Journal of air law and commerce, v. 32, summer 1966: 329-386. LL

Discusses by session the work of the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space since its establishment in 1962. The authors give particular attention to the assistance and return of astronauts and space vehicles and liability for damage. Appendix II contains a comparative table of the U.S., Belgian, and Hungarian proposals on liability.

467
Doty, L. L. U.S., RUSSIA NEAR ACCORD ON SPACE PACT. Aviation week & space technology, v. 85, Aug. 1, 1966: 21-22. TL501.A8, v. 85

Prospects are bright for a full international agreement on space activities. Both U.S. and Soviet draft treaties are being discussed before the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The Soviet draft, broader in scope, includes such topics as registration of vehicles, liability for damage caused by space objects, assistance and return of astronauts, and space activities undertaken by international organizations or consortiums. The Soviet treaty covers the use of space and its exploration, and all of outer space, rather than just the moon and celestial bodies as does the U.S. treaty. The Committee has adopted the Soviet clause on liability along with several other articles. It has decided that outer space and celestial bodies shall not be subject to national claims of sovereignty, and that all activities in outer space are subject to international law. The Committee probably will adopt an article barring military activities in space. The Russians have agreed to "voluntary" sharing of information on space exploration, a provision they previously rejected. The United States has consented to add "all outer space" to the scope of the treaty. Both nations have agreed to prevent harmful contamination of celestial bodies and to assist the nationals of other nations engaged in space activities where circumstances require it. Although the meetings opened in discord, both the United States and the Soviet Union have shown increasing flexibility.

468
[EUROPEAN SPACE EXPLORATION AND SPACE INDUSTRY] Europäische Raumfahrt und Raumfahrtindustrie. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 10, Oct. 10, 1966: 538-545. U3.W38, v. 10

The recent meeting of the European aerospace Round Table in Munich discussed two major propositions: 1. In view of the critical situation of ELDO [space research project of 6 European nations, including Great Britain], it would appear to be necessary to arrive at a far-seeing definition of future European cooperative efforts in the space field; 2. A study should be made of whether the existing European organizations have been

altogether capable of fulfilling their tasks; if not, how should such necessary institutions be organized in order to perform pioneering European tasks. The first point that came to light in discussing joint efforts was the need to distinguish between national and international programmes, and their financial, scientific and technical requirements. What is needed is the greatest possible equalizing of the present very disparate technical and personnel resources of the different countries, and a sensible division of labour on the programmes selected. At present it is seen that those countries which sustain the major part of their space research and engineering via their defence budgets are in an overwhelmingly superior position in relation to those which do not engage in any military space or missile activities. Quite apart from this, however, there seems to be no doubt that government support for space research and the space industry is inadequate in all European countries and bears no reasonable relationship to overall national expenditure on industrial research. Secondly, there appears to be agreement in all European countries that there are too many supranational organizations, which tends rather to complicate than to facilitate efforts. Thus it is very difficult to harmonize programmes. An amalgamation of these organizations would enable European space efforts to be presented much more forcefully to the political bodies and governments of the participating countries. The creation of a central organization with full powers of decision, on the model of the United States' NASA, thus appears to be an urgent need. Such an organization would be in a position to guarantee the best possible use of available funds, to streamline and accelerate programmes and in particular to coordinate national and international efforts of a non-military nature. The central body should be matched by a government-recognized organization of the space industry capable of effective action, which would have to have much greater competencies than appears to be the case with Eurospace at the present time. The need to engage in far greater public relations efforts in this field could, unfortunately, merely be outlined during these talks. (Abstract supplied)

469
Fasan, Ernst. [SPACE LAW] Weltraumrecht. Mainz, Krausskopf-Flugwelt-Verlag [1965] 234 p. illus.
JX5810. F3

Bibliography: p. 211-212.

A considerable body of pioneering literature on space law existed before man reached space for the first time. Since then a multitude of problems have arisen that still must be solved or clarified. To these belong, for instance, the demarcation line between air-space and space (a problem involving national sovereinties), the legal nature of space, the question of war and neutrality in space, the legal nature of celestial bodies, the validity of private law in space, space communications, and relations between humans and other living creatures that may come from or live on other celestial bodies. Legal controversies surrounding these and other problems along with the current status of international law render more difficult the creation of a uniform international space law. Yet such a law is needed urgently. As space travel creates legal facts in space, they are covered either by existing legal norms (leges latae--for the most part norms that have already been applied to terrestrial facts of the same nature) or by new norms (leges ferendae, which must be introduced in order to cover new situations). The security of states depends in large measure on the legal nature of space. According to existing legal norms (de lege lata) space does not and cannot fall under the sovereign rule of any state. Consequently its legal nature should be determined by pertinent United Nations resolutions, which, while lacking the quality of positive law, may be considered general customary law in the making, due to the very fact that they were adopted unanimously and express therefore all mankind's attitude. The United Nations has defined space as belonging to all (res omnium communis) and has declared its use limited to peaceful purposes. Analysis of these principles leads to the following conclusions: (1) On the basis of existing legal norms space should not be used for aggressive purposes, should be out of limits for nuclear and other weapons of mass annihilation, and may be used by nations for purposes of self-defense. (2) From the standpoint of "de lege ferenda," any military measure in space that is not of a scientific nature should be prohibited; use of space by nations for self-defense should be ruled out as long as terrestrial measures suffice.

470
Johnson, Rodney W. PROBLEMS OF LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE. American Bar Association journal, v. 52, June 1966: 555-558.
LL

The maintenance of law and public order in space is a very real problem that should be understood prior to extensive involvement in space. Some jurists argue that enough knowledge exists to make legal decisions on a case-by-case basis, while others believe that the lack of a body of agreed rules and laws can lead to serious international misunderstanding and tension. Aware that the inevitable increase of space activity will pose many problems, legal experts have been studying existing legal processes and statutes for possible application to control of space. They have found, in comparing law of the high seas to space passage, that the boundaries of international waters are not clearly defined, and a sound basis for extrapolation to space does not exist. Andrew G. Haley, an expert on international and space law, studied the possible application of terrestrial law to outer space. After compiling 3,000 national statutes relating to air law, he concluded that beyond the ocean of air enveloping earth, approximately 50 miles high, there is no law. The Antarctic Treaty, suspending national territorial claims and leaving the continent open to exploration and scientific study, may be profitably studied for outer space application. Also desirable is a specific international agreement that space will not be militarized. The existence of a body of laws will not preclude conflicts in space; therefore a recognized regulatory and judicial body must be empowered to take over and dispose of these conflicts. The various programs proposed for international space cooperation will not only ease some of these conflicts, but will broadly reduce international competition and improve understanding. The problems of law and order in space do not differ significantly from those on Earth. Solution of these problems will enable achievements in space to be used for the welfare and benefit of man.

471
KEEPING LAW & ORDER IN SPACE. Time, v. 88, Sept. 30, 1966: 26-27. AP2. T37, v. 88

"In all his long upward odyssey, man has never been confronted with anything quite like it . . . an ocean without shore that bathes every nation"--space. So far nations' approach to space has been conducted in a

remarkably amicable fashion under a protective arch of forbearance. This has been facilitated by the efforts of a small group of lawyers and the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which hopes through treaty to bring law and order to this uncharted world. Some of the problems they face can be classified as follows: (1) The borders. Where does space begin? (2) Sovereignty. Who owns space? (3) The traffic problem. Some 1,111 man-made objects and fragments now circle the earth. (4) Talking satellites. The U.N. has shied away from the problem of how to handle these, but by 1969 the Communications Satellite Corp. will have five Early Birds in space which will enable any single TV broadcast to blanket the globe. (5) Spies in the sky. Since the U-2 flights over Russia were halted the United States has had to depend heavily on its Samos, Ferret, Midas, and Vela systems for vital intelligence. The Russians in turn have flown dozens of Cosmos satellites for aerial espionage. (6) Military potential. The advantages are not clearly apparent, although apprehension exists that one nation might make technological advances that would enable it to deny the use of space to others. Given these problems, and the fact that every nation will invariably act to protect or advance its own interest in space, many lawyers believe that the only effective way to control the exploration of space is to put it under some form of international control, as the high seas are now covered by maritime law.

472
Langer, Elinor. DISARMAMENT ON THE MOON: THE PROSPECTS LOOK GOOD. Science, v. 153, July 8, 1966: 153-154. Q1.S35, v. 153

Negotiations for an international treaty on peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies are proceeding so well that even the most "diligent pessimists" consider the chance for success good. The basic principle of the U.S. draft treaty is that the moon and other celestial bodies should be open to exploration by all nations and should not be subject to claims of national sovereignty. The draft stresses cooperation and sharing of scientific findings and freedom of scientific investigation. All military activities are prohibited, including stationing or testing weapons, and all installations are to be open to inspection by other states. The U.S.S.R. treaty proposal makes essentially the same points. The Soviets place less emphasis on exchange of scientific information and make no provision for open inspection of space facilities. They also show more concern with respect to national authority over space vehicles and on liability. These differences, however, are unlikely to raise any real difficulties in the negotiations. Basically the treaty will ratify an existing situation. The United States has already decided against orbiting weapons and establishing bases in space, and the new proposals will not interfere with already existing intelligence and reconnaissance activities. It is doubtful whether the treaty will contribute positively to U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space, because the Soviet space program has always been locked under tight secrecy. However agreement between the two countries may build a tradition of trust and experience that will lead to resolution of greater differences.

473
LESSONS FROM GEMINI--NEXT, THE MILITARY SPACEMAN. U.S. news & world report, v. 61, Sept. 26, 1966: 74-75. illus. JK1.U65, v. 61

America's Gemini and unmanned space programs have provided important lessons for national defense. Photos under study show "fine details of airfields, submarine pens, missile-launching pads--almost everything aboveground--particularly in Russia and China." The next phase of the space program, as far as the military is concerned, is the Manned Orbiting Laboratory under the direction of the Air Force. MOL will provide a more-or-less permanent space platform on which men may work as long as 30 days. Here the military role of American astronauts will be determined. Meanwhile Samos satellites continue to orbit, "taking thousands of highly detailed pictures of almost every corner of the globe." Other satellites use infrared sensors to detect hostile missiles, while still others provide relays in military communications networks.

474
Schalk, Heinrich. [SPACE TRAVEL TECHNOLOGY AND ITS MILITARY APPLICATION] Die Raumfahrttechnik und ihre militärische Anwendung. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, no. 3, May/June 1966: 223-229; no. 4, July/Aug.: 311-315; no. 5, Sept./Oct.: 399-406. P&GP RR

Assesses the U.S. and Soviet space programs, past, present and planned in terms of their military use. Schalk points out the military significance of the space projects that serve, for instance, communication, navigation, and surveying purposes. Among the American programs discussed are the Manned Orbital Space Station, Gemini, Apollo, Orbiter, Explorer, Telstar, Relay, Echo, Early Bird, Vela (satellites designed for surveillance of nuclear weapons tests), Prospector, Mariner, and Surveyor; among the Soviet systems: Sputnik, Vostok, Elektron, Poliot, Proton, Lunik, Voskhod. Schalk stresses that the ground support operations of the various space programs are of military significance even in cases where the programs themselves are not.

475
Seitz, Frederick. SCIENCE AND THE SPACE PROGRAM. Science, v. 152, June 24, 1966: 1719-1721. Q1.S35, v. 152

As the technical barriers to success in space exploration and research all but disappear, the United States should note the other factors involved in its national commitment to this important field. This Nation would undergo a severe psychological trauma if it did not realize its potentialities in a field in which the Soviet Union has evidently chosen to challenge it. In fact, overt competition between the two countries might better take the relatively benign form of a race in space, where the expenditure in life and material is inconsequential compared to the losses of war. The space program also contains the essence of a vast revolution in managerial relationships involving the governmental and private institutions of this country. Through it new levels of accomplishment and reliability are achieved that can have profound effect on everyday life. Militarily the implications of the technological innovations of space research will remain important until that far-off era of universal disarmament. While some developments of military importance are already clear, others of marginal interest may assume significance in the future. Finally the United States can make the space program additionally valuable by lending support to its "purely scientific" components. Although the space program exists for reasons which

may in themselves be peripheral to science, it nevertheless provides valuable scientific information obtainable in no other way.

476
U.S. Library of Congress. Legislative Reference Service. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ORGANIZATION FOR OUTER SPACE: STAFF REPORT. [Prepared by Mrs. Eilene Galloway] Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1965. 580 p. (89th Cong., 1st sess. Senate. Document no. 56)
TL788.5.U54

Looks at space technology--the "new focal point for international cooperation." This survey of organizations conducting space and space-related programs analyzes "the impact of the frontier of outer space upon U.S. foreign relations; bilateral and multilateral relations among nations; the relationship between outer space and arms control; international economic, technical, and scientific developments; and policies and programs pursued within the United Nations and its specialized agencies."

477
U.S.-U.S.S.R. ACCORD FORESEEN ON LANGUAGE OF SPACE TREATY. Technology week, v. 19, Aug. 29, 1966: 37-38. UG630.M54, v. 19

Outlines the nine articles that have been agreed upon by the 28 members of the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Drafting and acceptance of an outer space treaty await settlement of the remaining major areas of disagreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R. on reporting, access, military equipment, and signatories.

E. VIOLATION OF AGREEMENTS AND RESPONSES

1. Violation, inspection, verification

478
Bycroft, G. N. SURFACE DISPLACEMENTS DUE TO AN UNDERGROUND EXPLOSION. In Seismological Society of America, Baltimore. Bulletin, v. 56, Aug. 1966: 877-888. QE531.S3, v. 56

A simple solution to the problem of the surface displacements on an elastic halfspace caused by an underground explosion is presented. The analysis is based on deriving the transient case for a point source from the steady state point source and then proceeding to the case of a finite spherical cavity by means of a retarded potential. Theoretical values of maximum displacement compare favorably with measured values from the underground test shot Rainier, a nuclear explosion of Operation Plumbob. (Author's abstract)

479
Clauss, J. [AN ATTEMPT TO ESTIMATE THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC'S DEMAND FOR URANIUM IN THE NEXT DECADE] Ein Versuch zur Abschätzung des Uranbedarfs der Bundesrepublik in den nächsten Jahrzehnten. Atomkernergie, v. 11, July/Aug. 1966: 278-282. diagrs., tables.
QC770.A8, v. 11

A simple method, which was published by H. Hessel, is used to estimate demand for uranium in the Federal Republic. The simplicity of the computation may be justified because the parameters and boundary conditions of a future nuclear reactor development are very uncertain at present. The nuclear energy is introduced on the basis of economic need and we can also assume a randomly distributed set of various reactor types. (Abstract supplied, modified)

480
Ginsburg, Th. [THE INFLUENCE OF THE DEPTH OF DETONATION UPON THE EFFECT OF SUBTERRANEAN EXPLOSIONS IN ROCK] Der Einfluss der Detonationstiefe auf die Wirkung unterirdischer Explosionen im Fels. Explosivstoffe, v. 15, June-Aug. 1966: 126-132, 154-158, 169-174. diagrs., illus.
TP270.A1E84, v. 15

Bibliography: p. 132.
Reprinted from Technische Mitteilungen für Sappeure, Pontoniere und Mineure, Feb. 1965.
UG1.T4

Investigates methods of detecting subterranean nuclear explosions in rock formations. Ginsburg points out that the task of this study is to appraise the possible effects of underground nuclear explosions or surface bombing on Swiss fortifications and buildings constructed either underground or in rock. He compares the effects of nuclear and chemical underground explosions and discusses the problem of chemical simulation of nuclear explosion--an important consideration for a nation that wants to increase its knowledge of the effects of atomic explosions without itself violating the nuclear test ban treaty. He analyzes air shock waves (air-induced earth impulses), direct earth impulses, the ratio of detonation energy to the size of crater, radioactive fallout both local and global, "the effects of the depth of the explosion," and the formulas for earth impulses from surface explosions. Ginsburg points out that the theories and computation methods employed in his study "rest on greatly simplified suppositions"; therefore the results should be interpreted with all necessary precaution. He underlines, however, that "the results should give an expert concrete indications as to the order of magnitude of effects that must be expected from a subterranean nuclear explosion."

481
Hanna, Frank A. MEASURING THE ACTIVITY OF SMALL MANUFACTURERS. Applied statistics, v. 15, no. 1, 1966: 37-47. HA1.R813, v. 15

Considers "some of the problems of obtaining reliable industrial statistics in countries, here called small-plant economies, in which small units contribute importantly to the aggregates." Statistical methodology used to evaluate industrial activity in countries such as the United States may lead to misleading results if applied to small-plant economies.

482
Michigan. University. VELA Seismic Information Analysis Center. A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SEISMOLOGY FOR THE VELA UNIFORM PROGRAM: REPORT OF VESIAC, edited by VESIAC staff. 2d ed. Ann Arbor, Geophysics Laboratory, Institute of Science and Technology, University of Michigan, 1965. 848 p.
Z6033.E1M5, 1965

Presents abstracts of approximately 2,000 articles and reports on seismology and the detection of underground explosions. The material is arranged alphabetically by author within a subject outline.

483
[THE SALMON SEISMIC EXPERIMENT] Journal of geophysical research, v. 71, July 15, 1966: 3405-3521.
QC811.J6, v. 71

Contents. --The Salmon seismic experiment, by Glenn Werth and Philip Randolph. --Free-field motion near a nuclear explosion in salt: Project Salmon, by Leo A. Rogers. --Nuclear decoupling, full and partial, by Dan W. Patterson. --Crustal seismic measurements in Southern Mississippi, by David H. Warren, J. H. Healy, and Wayne H. Jackson. --Calculation of first-zone P wave amplitudes for Salmon event and for decoupled sources, by Donald L. Springer. --Travel times and amplitudes from the Salmon explosion, by James N. Jordan and others. --Detection, analysis, and interpretation of teleseismic signals, 1, Compressional phases from the Salmon event, by C. B. Archambeau, E. A. Flinn, and D. G. Lambert. --Epicenter determination for the Salmon event, by Eugene Herrin and James Taggart. --Post-explosion environment resulting from the Salmon event, by D. Rawson and others.

Reports an underground nuclear explosion staged to study "the generation and propagation of the seismic waves from an explosion in a salt dome in the southeastern United States." More generally, the Salmon event, a "tamped" explosion, was intended to determine various aspects of decoupling.

484
Seemann, Klaus. [THE NATO REFORM AND THE POSITION OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC IN THE ARMS CONTROL SYSTEM OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION] NATO-Reform und Stellung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Rüstungskontrollsystem der Westeuropäischen Union. Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, v. 16, Apr. 1966: 181-207.
U3.W485, v. 16
Bibliographical references included in footnotes.

Appraises in considerable detail the arms control system adopted by the Western European Union, especially measures designed to prevent the German Federal Republic from producing nuclear and toxic weapons. The author considers the system--particularly its elements pertaining to toxic weapons--impractical, both in terms of arms control and NATO's new organizational requirements. Owing to its serious shortcomings and lack of legal sanctions, the system should not serve as a model for arms control arrangements between East and West.

485
Simonitsch, Pierre. [WHEN WILL THE UNDERGROUND ATOMIC TESTS STOP?] Wann werden die unterirdischen Atomversuche eingestellt? Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte, v. 17, Aug. 1966: 479-482.
HD4809.G38, v. 17

Relates efforts, past and present, aimed at cessation and prohibition of underground nuclear tests. Simonitsch outlines the United States and Soviet positions on halting underground blasts, and reports on the Conference of Experts from Egypt, Australia, India, Japan, Canada, Poland, and Rumania that was held in May 1966 in Stockhom. Sponsored by the Swedish Government, the Conference discussed among other things the proposed "Detection Club" -- an international organization for seismological detection of subterranean atomic tests.

486
Springer, Donald L. P-WAVE COUPLING OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES. In Seismological Society of America, Baltimore. Bulletin, v. 56, Aug. 1966: 861-876. QE531.S3, v. 56

P-wave amplitude data for underground nuclear explosions are correlated with detonation energy. Amplitudes are reproducible to 25 per cent when source media and propagation path differences are minimized. These data verify theoretical scaling relationships and establish relative coupling for various shot media. An empirical correlation of these amplitude data with dry porosity of the detonation medium indicates that a medium with 60 per cent dry porosity may couple explosive energy one-fourth or one-fifth as efficiently as does alluvium. The relationship of teleseismic magnitude to explosive yield for various types of low coupling shows that dry porous media give a significant reduction of seismic signals generated by underground nuclear explosions. (Author's abstract)

487
Willis, Paul. NEW HOPE FOR AN UNDERGROUND TEST BAN. War/peace report, v. 6, June/July 1966: 20. P&GP RR

U.S. and Soviet representatives to the International Assembly on Nuclear Weapons (Toronto, June 23-26), acting in a private capacity, agreed on experimental suspension of underground tests with verification "by challenge and inspection." The State Department did not reject the proposal, but has been extremely cautious in its response. If America agrees it will do so mainly because advances in seismological detection techniques have reduced the need for on-site inspections. Under the system of "inspection by challenge or invitation" proposed by Mrs. Alva Myrdal (head, Swedish delegation to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament) a country that suspects another of underground tests would challenge the suspected party to prove its innocence. This could be done either through documentation of some sort or by an invitation for on-site inspection. If the challenge were not met, steps could be taken to abrogate the treaty. Conclusion of a comprehensive test ban agreement would contribute to nonproliferation in two ways: first by restricting new countries from developing nuclear weapons through prevention of testing, and second by meeting the demand of the nonnuclear nations that nuclear states agree to restrict their own arms race.

488
Zablocki, C. J. ELECTRICAL TRANSIENTS OBSERVED DURING UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. Journal of geophysical research, v. 71, July 15, 1966: 3523-3542. QC811.J6, v. 71

Electrical transients were recorded from eleven underground nuclear explosions at the Nevada Test Site and from one near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The electric field components are only a few microvolts per meter at distances less than 10 km from the shot point, and they generally decay approximately as the

inverse cube of distance. Magnitudes are proportional to about the 0.4 power of yield. Two source mechanisms are considered: the formation of an elementary magnetic dipole by the conductive plasma expanding in the earth's magnetic field and the formation of an elementary electric dipole by radial asymmetry in the generation and absorption of β rays. The data accordingly were interpreted in terms of equivalent buried dipole sources. (Abstract supplied)

2. Enforcement

F. CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES

489
Kokat, Robert G. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DISARMAMENT ON THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY. Kyklos, v. 19, no. 3, 1966: 481-502.
Hl. A15, v. 19

To investigate some of the major structural problems which might arise from disarmament, an input-output model was constructed specifying three full-employment patterns of end product deliveries which might reasonably be expected for the year 1970. The purpose of the model was to measure the impact of varying compositions of final demand accompanying a reduction in defense expenditures on the production capabilities of sixty-six processing sectors. Each disarmament pattern was stipulated with respect to a specific level and composition of defense expenditures in conjunction with a compensating policy offset. The relative impact on total industry requirements was discerned by comparing the derived output levels of each industry under the alternative policy formulations. An analysis of the computational results lead to the following five major conclusions: 1. A fifty per cent reduction in defense outlays, offset by compensating increase in expenditures within either the private or public sector, will affect the industries producing weapons substantially but will have little effect on supporting industries. 2. The magnitude of the shift in final demand postulated was not large enough to pose structural problems. 3. The derivation of the indirect requirements indicated that the processing sectors are quite consumer oriented. Indeed, this dependence was so strong that substantial shifts between other major categories of final demand were dampened considerably. 4. Industry sensitivity to variations in final demand patterns was diminished markedly by the pattern of accompanying intermediate demands. 5. The effect of public policy was not significant to the output levels of industries supporting the military oriented industries. (Summary supplied)

G. OTHER PROBLEMS AND MEASURES

490
Kuhn, Edward W., and Edward D. Re. MOBILIZATION FOR PEACE: THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION. American Bar Association journal, v. 52, June 1966: 529-532. LL

Reviews the accomplishments of the White House Conference on International Cooperation, held Nov. 28-Dec. 1, 1965, in connection with the United Nations International Co-operation Year. The authors give particular attention to the proposals of the Committees on Development of International Law, Human Rights, Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Space, and Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.

491
THE SOVIET PROPOSALS AT THE U.N. New times, no. 40, Oct. 6, 1966: 1-2. D839.N483, 1966

A major event when the U.N. Assembly meets is a speech by the Soviet delegate. At the 21st Assembly, after reviewing the international situation which the Vietnam war has worsened, Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko submitted three proposals whose adoption would mean significant progress toward a détente: (1) The Assembly should warn states which engage in armed intervention in other states' and peoples' internal affairs that they "assume responsibility before all peoples for all the possible consequences to these states themselves included." (2) All states having military bases in independent countries or dependent territories in Asia, Africa, or Latin America shall immediately dismantle these bases and establish none in the future. (3) The Assembly should call upon the states: (a) "To refrain, pending the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, from all actions which could impede agreement on nuclear non-proliferation"; and (b) "To take all necessary steps for the speedy conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons." The proposals made by the Soviet Union at the present Assembly stem from a desire to strengthen peace and international security and ease the tension in the world. "The resolution of the 23d Congress of the Soviet Communist Party says: 'The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is aimed at securing, in conjunction with other socialist countries, favourable international conditions for the building of socialism and communism; cementing the unity and cohesion, the friendship and fraternity of the socialist countries; supporting the national-liberation movements and maintaining all-round co-operation with the young developing countries; upholding consistently the principle of the peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems, repelling firmly the aggressive forces of imperialism, and delivering mankind from a new world war.' The Soviet proposals at the U.N. are evidence of the Soviet government's determination to move, step by step, towards the achievement of these aims."

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